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“Habent sua fata verba [words have their own fate], though some words have a fate more bizarre than others. The word ‘ideology’ sets, 
however, a record which is difficult to beat. Finding a common denominator 
to the sharply different historical uses of the term, or a transformative logic 
productive of its successive avatars, is a notoriously tall order,” wrote the 
philosopher Zygmunt Bauman in his recent book (1999, 109). Ever since the 
late eighteenth century, when Antoine Louis Claude Destutt first put forward 
the idea of ideology as the science concerning the formation of ideas and 
human knowledge, innumerable philosophers, thinkers, historians and 
politicians have proposed their own definitions of this category. In his 
classic Ideology and Utopia of 1929, Karl Mannheim complained that “we 
do not as yet possess an adequate historical treatment of the development of 
the concept of ideology, to say nothing of a sociological history of the many 
variations in its meanings” (Mannheim 1936, 53–54).
Since then circumstances have gone to the other extreme, and one is 
more likely to be troubled by the superabundance of works on the subject 
* First published in History and Theory 1 (40) (2001): 57-73.
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(cf. the works of Larraín 1979; Kendall 1981; Thompson 1984; Ricœur 1986; 
Eagleton 1994; etc.; for the latest works, see Bauman’s short essay “Ideology 
in the Postmodern World,” Bauman 1999, 109–130).
The author of one of the latest of these surveys, the English Marxist Terry 
Eagleton, begins his book with a list of sixteen definitions of ideology taken 
almost at random from studies of recent years:
(a)  the process of production of meanings, signs and values in social life;
(b)  a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group or class;
(c)  ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; 
(d)  false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power; 
(e)  systematically distorted communications; 
(f)  that which offers a position for a subject; 
(g)  forms of thought motivated by social interests; 
(h)  identity thinking; 
(i)  socially necessary illusion; 
(j)  the conjuncture of discourse and power; 
(k)  the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of the world; 
(l)  action-oriented sets of beliefs; 
(m)  the confusion of linguistic and phenomenal reality; 
(n)  semiotic closure; 
(o)  the indispensable medium in which individuals live out their rela-
tions to a social structure; 
(p)  the process whereby social life is converted to a natural reality. 
(Eagleton 1994, 1–2)
A significant majority of these formulations are directly or indirectly connected 
to Marx and Engels’s The German Ideology, with its notion of ideology as a camera 
obscura where “men and their circumstances appear upside-down,” and the 
“ruling ideas are nothing less than the ideal expression of the prevailing material 
relations … and thus an expression of those very relations which make that class 
the ruling one” (Marx and Engels III, 25, 45–46). This selection of definitions 
not only reflects Eagleton’s party affiliations, but also the actual state of scholar-
ship. The issue of ideology has been developed most actively either within a 
Marxist framework, or, in the extreme case, in an attempt to get beyond it.
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Interpreting ideology as a “camera obscura” left open the question of 
the theoretical status of Marxism itself. One possible solution was partly 
noted by Marxists of the start of the twentieth century, including Lenin; it 
was developed by Lukács in his book History and Class Consciousness 
(1922), and despite the harsh criticism of this work in the party press, was 
accepted by official Soviet philosophy. Reviving the Hegelian substratum 
of Marxism, Lukács saw in the history of class consciousness a kind of 
materialist analogue for the self-consciousness of the absolute spirit. 
Insofar as the proletariat’s class interests correspond to the logic of the 
historical process, the contradiction between science and ideology is 
removed and proletariat ideology coincides with objective truth (see 
Lukács 1971).
Another, opposite approach sees ideology as compromised, in Engels’s 
expression, as “false consciousness” (Marx and Engels XXXIX, 82; cf. Mannheim 
1994, 66–69), contrasting this to scientific Marxist sociology. Within the 
Marxist tradition the most radical adherent of this view was the French philos-
opher Louis Althusser, who saw ideology as a type of subjectivity that could be 
eliminated from thought only by means of objective scientific analysis 
(Althusser 1971; cf. Ricœur 1984, 120–132; Eagleton 1991, 137–154). On the 
other hand, K. Mannheim applied the critical method worked out by Marxism 
to his own gnoseological premises:
For the Marxist doctrine it is obvious that behind every theory stand aspects 
of vision that belong to a definite collective. This phenomenon—thought, 
conditioned by social and life interests—is what Marx called ideology.
Here, as often happens during the course of political struggle, a very 
important discovery was made, which … should be brought to its logical 
conclusion . … First of all, it is easy to be convinced that a thinker of the 
socialist-communist tendency will only see elements of ideology in his 
opponent’s thinking, while his own thinking appears to him to be free of 
any manifestations of ideology. From a sociological perspective there is no 
basis not to extend to Marxism its own discovery. (Mannheim 1994, 108)
Mannheim made a distinction between a “particular” ideology, defined as the 
actual “content” or programmatic component of the pronouncements made by 
one’s political opponent, and a “total” ideology embracing the worldview of 
that opponent, including his categorical apparatus. Accordingly, any reference 
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to the socially conditioned character of a “particular” ideology would more or 
less constitute a critical judgment, while similar reference to a “total ideology” 
would be considered standard scholarly practice: 
The notion of partial ideology follows from the fact that this or another 
interest serves to falsify and cover up the truth, [while] the notion of total 
ideology is based on the opinion that certain points of view, methods and 
aspects of observation correspond to certain social positions. Here too an 
analysis of interests is applied, not in order to reveal casual determinants but 
to characterize the structures of social being. (Ibid., 58)
It is precisely in terms of the latter that Mannheim worked out his concept of 
sociology of knowledge as a historical discipline that examines ideological prac-
tices in their social context without reference to contemporary political 
judgments. Yet no matter how rich and developed the procedure espoused by 
Mannheim for an “anti-ideological hygiene,” the intellectual procedure itself does 
not allow one to move beyond the fatal question of the sociologist’s own condi-
tionality and the conditionality of his analysis, a question Geertz called 
“Mannheim’s paradox.”
With the inevitable logic of a boomerang, the polemical device developed 
by post-Marxist sociology for the criticism of its teachers only undermines its 
own foundations. In postwar years the inescapable question “And who are you 
then?” more often sounded from their liberal-leaning opponents, from sociolo-
gists and political scientists who tended to associate the concept of ideology 
with communistic or fascist totalitarian doctrines while viewing their own 
propositions as de-ideologized and grounded either in universal values or in the 
propositions of a positive science.1
The American sociologist Geertz analyzed and rejected the entire 
complex of Marxist and post-Marxist approaches to sociology in his article 
“Ideology as a Cultural System,” which was included in his collection The 
Interpretation of Cultures (Geertz 1973, 193–233; Geertz 1998). Geertz 
1 Mannheim differentiated between ideology that legitimizes the existing social order on the 
basis of values transcendental to it and a utopia that would destroy this order through similar 
values while projecting a different social construction. Working from this distinction but 
from the perspective of a different philosophical tradition, Paul Ricœur suggested that it was 
precisely the conscious acceptance of utopia that reflectively creates a pure position for the 
critique of ideology (see Ricœur 1984, 172). We will consider “utopian” thinking as defined 
by Mannheim and Ricœur as one of many varieties of the ideological. 
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grouped all of these various wide-ranging approaches to the analysis of 
ideology under the category of “interest theory”: “The fundamentals of the 
interest theory are too well known to need review; developed to perfection of 
a sort by the Marxist tradition, they are now standard intellectual equipment 
of the man-in-the-street, who is only too aware that in political argumenta-
tion it all comes down to whose ox is gored” (Geertz 1998, 13). 
In the final analysis, it is this commonsensical, man-on-the-street aspect of 
interest theory that constitutes at once its strength and weakness. According to 
Geertz: 
The battlefield image of society as a clash of interests thinly disguised as a 
clash of principles turns attention away from the role that ideologies play in 
defining (or obscuring) social categories, stabilizing (or upsetting) social 
norms, strengthening (or weakening) social consensus, relieving (or exacer-
bating) social tensions . … The intensity of interest theory is … but the 
reward of its narrowness. (Ibid., 13–14) 
The emphasis within interest theory on “post-Marxist common sense” satis-
fies him as little as the post-Freudian cliché of “strain theory” (as Geertz calls 
the hypothesis according to which social conflicts within a destabilized 
society find their outlet in ideology).2 In his opinion, “both interest theory 
and strain theory go directly from source analysis to consequence analysis 
without ever seriously examining ideologies as systems of interacting 
symbols, as patterns of inter-working meanings” (ibid., 17). It is precisely this 
lacuna between source and consequence that is inaccessible to traditional 
theoretical models of ideology and which Geertz attempts to fill with what 
he calls “the semiotic approach to culture” (Geertz 1973, 5, 24–30). 
 2 
For the Russian reader this last phrase immediately conjures up very specific 
associations. Geertz’s most famous works were written in the very same years 
2 In the second half of the 1960s, Althusser attempted to introduce the theoretical elabora-
tions of Freud and Lacan into the Marxist approach to ideology. According to Althusser, 
in serving as the basic means for the reproduction of existing industrial relations, ideology 
is a transhistorical phenomenon that was also located in the sphere of the “social subcon-
scious” (see Althusser 1971). On the further development of this tradition, see Jameson 
1981; Žižek 1999). 
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that saw the formation in the USSR of the so-called Tartu-Moscow school, a 
period now canonized as the Golden Age of Russian scholarship in the 
humanities. By 1973, when Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures—a collec-
tion of essays which included in the form of an introductory chapter the first 
publication of “Thick Description: Towards an Interpretative Theory of 
Culture,” a general account of the theoretical bases of his anthropology—was 
published, six issues of the Tartu-Moscow School’s own Studies in Symbolic 
Systems [Trudy po znakovym sistemam] had already appeared. 
One cannot rule out the possibility of Geertz’s familiarity with the work 
of Lotman and his associates, translations of which had begun to appear in 
the West in the late 1960s; it is more likely, however, that the scholarship of 
the noted (although as yet not especially well-known) American anthropolo-
gist might have been in the field of vision of the Soviet semioticians. 
Nonetheless, there is little need to talk of any serious mutual influence. The 
“Geertzian” and “Lotmanesque” models of the semiotics of culture were 
created independently of each other and on the bases of different academic 
traditions—a fact that makes the points of convergence and divergence 
between them all the more interesting. 
The anti-structuralist orientation of The Interpretation of Cultures is not 
simply transparent but clearly stated. Geertz included in Interpretation his 
1967 review of Levi-Strauss’s most important works, an essay that is at once 
both deeply respectful yet sharply polemical. Geertz summarizes Levi-
Strauss’s methodology in the following manner: “Binary opposition—that 
dialectical chasm between plus and minus which computer technology has 
rendered the lingua franca of modem science—forms the basis of savage 
thought as it does of language. And indeed it is this that makes them essen-
tially variant forms of the same thing: communications systems” (ibid., 354). 
Steadfastly hostile to the panlinguistic quality of structural ethnography and 
its striving toward constants and deep structures, Geertz turns the French 
scholar’s own scientific arsenal against its author, seeing in Levi-Strauss’s 
anthropology a possible realization of a unitary deep structure, the “universal 
rationalism of the French Enlightenment.” 
“Like Rousseau, Levi-Strauss’s search is not after all for men, whom he 
doesn’t much care for, but for Man, with whom he is enthralled,” comments 
Geertz (ibid., 356). Geertz himself is categorically opposed to the search for 
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universality, instead replacing the revelation of deep structures with “thick 
description.” In his understanding of man as a “cultural artifact” (ibid., 51), 
Geertz on the whole avoids generalizing uses of the term “culture,” which he 
prefers to use in its plural form or to set it off with the article “a” or “the.” In this 
way each of the cultures he investigates will contain within it its own anthro-
pological dimension. 
The very possibility of the construction of a single theory of culture calls 
forth a certain distrust; according to Geertz, 
any theoretical sharpening of one’s scholarly instruments should serve for a 
more subtle and adequate interpretation of individual cases: coherence 
cannot be the major test of validity for a cultural description. Cultural 
systems must have a minimal degree of coherence, else we would not call 
them systems; and, by observation, they normally have a great deal more. 
But there is nothing so coherent as a paranoid’s delusion or a swindler’s 
story. The force of our interpretations cannot rest, as they are now so often 
made to do, on the tightness with which they hold together, or the assurance 
with which they are argued. (Ibid., 17–18)
It goes without saying just how distant this approach is from the scientifically 
minded optimism of the Tartu and Moscow semioticians, for whom Levi-
Strauss remained (at least, in terms of methodology) an unshakable authority, 
and for whom the impulse towards a total scientific synthesis was a symbol of 
faith of a kind. It should be mentioned that as a whole, the philosophical 
anthropology of the French Enlightenment and especially that of Rousseau 
was especially meaningful for Lotman, who spent a lifetime studying the 
legacy of that epoch. It was not coincidental that at the same time that Geertz 
was directing his own semiotics against structuralism, the research of the 
Tartu-Moscow school continued to be referred to as “structural-semiotic.”
However, one cannot juxtapose these two semiotic approaches without 
making certain important reservations. Above all, the intellectual continuum 
articulated in the conjunction “structural-semiotic” also contains within it, 
albeit somewhat indistinctly, two different methodological poles. One can 
(somewhat simplistically) view the evolution of Lotman himself from his 
Lectures in Structural Poetics to his study of the semiophere and his interest in 
the philosophical ideas of Ilya Prigogine in terms of his movement from one pole 
to another. Yet the immense ideological pressure to which the Tartu-Moscow 
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school was constantly subjected placed significant limits upon the possibility of 
an open polemic within the school itself, and in particular, of any explicit criti-
cism of its own views from an earlier period. 
It is easy to imagine the sort of ugly gloating that would have greeted any 
move by Lotman or any of his close confederates to distance themselves from 
any of the fundamental assumptions of structuralist doctrine. Understand-
ably, the prospect of ending up the author of the latest “monument to scientific 
error”3 would block not only the writing of self-polemicizing texts, but even, 
to some degree, the very impulse towards self-criticism. Yet for all that one 
still sees clear signs of a polemic in many of the positions of the later Lotman, 
including his insistence that complex sign systems were fundamentally irre-
ducible to attenuated configurations of lower-order systems. 
In his attempts to overcome structuralism, Geertz turned to the categor-
ical apparatus of hermeneutics—an approach to culture that he referred to by 
turns as “semiotic” or “interpretative.” “The whole point of a semiotic approach 
to culture is … to aid us in gaining access to the conceptual world in which our 
subjects live so that we can, in some extended sense of the term, converse with 
them” (ibid., 24). In his later book, Geertz also characterized the term “inter-
pretative” as a euphemism for the word “hermeneutical” (Geertz 1983, 21). It 
is no accident that Geertz’s works found such passionate support from one of 
the pillars of hermeneutics, Paul Ricœur, who saw in “Ideology as a Cultural 
System” the development of his own ideas, expressed even better than he 
himself had done (Ricœur 1984, 181). For Russian semioticians, Bakhtin’s 
theory of dialogue, following a similar philosophical course, played an analo-
gous role (see Ivanov1973; cf. Grzhibek 1995; Bethea 1996, etc.).
However, the radical nature of Geertz’s break with earlier scientific 
paradigms should not be exaggerated. His skepticism towards excessive 
generalizations and scientistic utopias did not lead him to deny the prin-
ciple of scientific investigation itself. He insists that the conceptual structure 
of cultural interpretation should underlie clearly formulated procedures of 
critical evaluation to the same degree that the parameters of biological 
observations or physical experiments do in the sciences. At the end of his 
3 “A Monument to Scientific Error” was the title of a 1929 article by the critic Victor 
Shklovskii in which he renounced the errors of his Formalist beliefs. His colleagues 
regarded the article as an act of treason and a capitulation to ideological pressures. 
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theoretical introduction to The Interpretation of Cultures Geertz writes: “I 
have never been impressed by the argument that, as complete objectivity is 
impossible in these matters (as, of course, it is), one might as well let one’s 
sentiments run loose. As Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying 
that as a perfectly aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well 
conduct surgery in a sewer” (Geertz 1973, 30). 
As a whole, the conception of culture proposed by Geertz is close to the 
formulations and definitions scattered in abundance over the pages of 
the collections of the Tartu-Moscow school. In his words, two of the central 
principles of interpretative theory are that, first: culture “is best seen not as 
complexes of concrete behavior patterns—customs, usages, traditions, habit 
clusters,… but as a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instruc-
tions (what computer engineers call “programs”)—for the governing of 
behavior. The second idea is that man is precisely the animal most desperately 
dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms, such 
as cultural programs, for ordering his behavior” (ibid., 44). Parallel statements 
from Lotman’s works are too many and too well-known to mention.
Many of the classic works by Lotman, Boris Uspenskii, and other 
scholars of the Tartu-Moscow school are closely concerned with the analysis 
of the semiotic mechanisms which organize various ideological systems and 
regulate the behavioral strategies of their bearers, be they the Decembrists, 
Peter the Great, or Radishchev. Sometimes such analysis is put forward as the 
explicit focus (see, e.g., Lotman and Uspenskii 1993), but is more often 
worked out in the course of circuitous argumentation. At the same time, the 
Tartu-Moscow school on the whole shied away from theoretical interpreta-
tions of ideology as a system of cultural norms and regulators, often replacing it 
with the close, albeit far from synonymous concept of “mythology.” Yet the 
problem here was not simply one of censorship or self-censorship. In the 
Soviet context, the very category of ideology irredeemably belonged to a 
completely different discourse, the language of party propaganda, so that 
even to approach its study “scientifically” was psychologically problematic. 
Hence for Western scholars to approach ideology from a theoretical 
perspective was easier in all respects. Yet even here the same inertia of philo-
sophical tradition was powerful. It is possible that Geertz only succeeded in 
exploding the tradition as a result of the utterly unique combination of his 
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personal research experience and the cultural-political reality which moved 
him to turn to this theme. 
 3 
“Ideology as a Cultural System” was included in the collection The Interpreta-
tion of Cultures, the 1973 publication which brought its author widespread 
fame. However, it had first appeared nine years earlier in 1964, when it became 
one of the most significant responses to the processes of decolonialization just 
being completed at that time in the formation of sixty-six new nation-states 
(the number is Geertz’s) which now found it necessary to build systems of 
nation-state self-identification almost completely from scratch. 
The wave of ideological creation that seized the third world almost 
surpassed that seen by Europe in analogous periods of its own history: specif-
ically, in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the First World War. 
Geertz, who had studied traditional cultures in such far-flung countries as 
Indonesia and Morocco, now found himself in a position to understand the 
logic of this ferment, to see in the tumultuous bloom of ideological thinking 
the specific processes integral to modernization: 
In polities firmly embedded in Edmund Burke’s golden assemblage of 
“ancient opinions and rules of life,” the role of ideology, in any explicit sense, 
is marginal. In such truly traditional political systems the participants act as 
(to use another Burkean phrase) men of untaught feelings; they are guided 
both emotionally and intellectually in their judgments and activities by 
unexamined prejudices, which do not leave them “hesitating in the moment 
of decision, skeptical, puzzled and unresolved.” But when, as in the revolu-
tionary France Burke was indicting and in fact in the shaken England from 
which, as perhaps his nation’s greatest ideologue, he was indicting it, those 
hallowed opinions and rules of life come into question, the search for 
systematic ideological formulations, either to reinforce them or to replace 
them, flourishes. The function of ideology is to make an autonomous politics 
possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful, the 
suasive images by means of which it can be sensibly grasped. It is, in fact, 
precisely at the point at which a political system begins to free itself from the 
immediate governance of received tradition, from the direct and detailed guid-
ance of religious or philosophical canons on the one hand and from the 
unreflective precepts of conventional moralism on the other, that formal 
ideologies tend first to emerge and take hold. (Geertz 1973, 218; Geertz 
1998, 24–25)
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In his position of the participant-observer present during the radical mutation 
of the object being studied and with the reflexive experience of a man of 
Western civilization, which had existed almost two hundred years in conditions 
of fierce competition among various ideological models, Geertz was not only 
able to understand the genesis of ideology, but also to propose an entirely new 
understanding of its nature. Given this situation, the approaches of the cultural 
historian and the ethnographer in the field essentially become identical, and 
ideology inscribes itself in a series of other fundamental mechanisms of 
sociocultural integration. Along with “Ideology as a Cultural System,” Geertz 
included in The Interpretation of Cultures his essay “Religion as a Cultural 
System”; the essays “Common Sense as a Cultural System,” and “Art as a 
Cultural System” would appear in his next collection, Local Knowledge (1983). 
At the basis of Marxist, neo-Marxist, post-Marxist, as well as anti-
Marxist understandings of ideology lies a more or less articulated opposition 
of and comparison between ideological and scientific thought. Science is 
assigned the function of substantiating (if only in official Soviet philosophy) 
or unmasking (in almost all other philosophies) ideology’s pretensions to the 
role of official interpreter of the past, present, and future, of verifying its 
premises and conclusions with its own data, as well as that of exposing the 
presence of ideology wherever it might hide, insofar as ideology has a habit of 
making itself out to be science, art, or common sense. Geertz clearly separates 
the two types of intellectual activity: “An ideologist is no more a poor social 
scientist than a social scientist is a poor ideologist. The two are—or at least 
they ought to be—in quite different lines of work, lines so different that little 
is gained and much obscured by measuring the activities of the one against 
the aims of the other” (Geertz 1973, 231; Geertz 1998, 33).
According to Geertz, the specificity of ideology as one of the matrices that 
programs behavioral strategies is the delineation of unfamiliar cultural space for 
human associations. The role of ideology grows sharply in conditions of insta-
bility, when more archaic orientational models reveal their full or partial 
unsuitability: “And it is, in turn, the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise 
incomprehensible social situations meaningfully, to so construe them as to 
make it possible to act purposefully within them, that accounts both for the 
ideologies’ highly figurative nature and for the intensity with which, once 
accepted, they are held” (Geertz 1973, 220; Geertz 1998, 25).
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The approach to the “figurative nature” of ideological thinking as 
proposed by Geertz is especially important. Of course, Geertz was not the 
first to address the oversaturation of ideological texts and slogans by various 
kinds of tropes. Generally speaking, it is impossible not to notice this fact. 
Even Marxism with its near-monopolization of discussion of the problems of 
ideology began with the metaphor of a wandering specter. Nonetheless, the 
figurative component of ideological concepts has been understood by 
scholars as a sort of rhetorical flourish, as a tool for propaganda, populariza-
tion, or deception, or as more or less effective doctrinal packaging. 
Geertz thoroughly reconsiders this traditional approach to ideology and 
rhetoric. For him, the trope—and in the first instance, of course, metaphor—
forms the very nucleus of ideological thinking, for it is precisely through the 
trope that ideology realizes the symbolic demarcation of social space that 
allows the collective and its members to make it “habitable,” to make it their 
own. Geertz supports these observations first with an analysis of the phrase 
“Slave Labor Law” (the slogan raised by union activists in their battle against 
the famous Taft-Hartley anti-strike law), before turning to an interpretation of 
the initial attempts to create a national ideology in post-colonial Indonesia. 
Although Geertz repeatedly cautions his reader that the interpretative 
approach to culture is diagnostic, but not prognostic in character, his own 
highly pessimistic prognosis for the development of events in Indonesia 
proved fairly accurate. It should be remembered that Geertz’s article was 
written before the unsuccessful communist coup in Indonesia and the ensuing 
butchery that took the lives of more than a half-million of the country’s 
inhabitants. 
Still, the value of Geertz’s analysis is not in its concrete political judg-
ments, but rather in its exposing of that role which “conceptual,” ideological 
factors play in the movement of the historical process. The quality of the 
symbolic map drawn by ideology is determined by the degree of success 
with which the individual is able to orient himself by that map within the 
“locale” it attempts to define. The developmental paths of the collective, be 
it a union movement or an entire country, depend to no little degree on what 
kind of maps it has at its disposal. The power of an ideological metaphor, its 
ability to capture reality and to produce new meanings, in a very real way 
influences the dynamic of historical events. 
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In the late 1980s and early 90s the processes that Geertz had occasion to 
observe in the Third World began on the territory of the USSR and continued 
in the countries that were formed after its disintegration. The analysis of 
changing ideological metaphors proposed in “Ideology as a Cultural System” 
can be very productive for understanding cultural collisions that have taken 
place before our eyes. We will limit ourselves here to preliminary observations 
regarding several events of the last decade of the twentieth century in Russia. 
The history of independent Russia begins with the defeat of the putsch 
of August 19–21, 1991. Many of the conditions of this historical drama were 
shaped by the logic of the country’s economic development, by the clash of 
social forces, by institutional crisis, backstage political intrigues, the person-
alities of its leading participants, and so on (not to mention the morphology 
of the revolutionary process as studied by de Toqueville; Toqueville 1986). 
Nonetheless, the cultural and symbolic dimension, the system of figurative 
changes and substitutions that was woven into the fabric of historical events, 
also played a significant role (see Freidin and Bonnel 1995). 
In August 1991 across several kilometers of central Moscow there was 
staged in accordance with the laws of high political carnival a duel of two 
systems, a duel repeatedly described to us in the past not only by Soviet 
propaganda, but by anti-Soviet propaganda as well. Throughout the entire 
postwar epoch, the Kremlin and the (American) White House, synecdo-
chally representing the two “superpowers,” had played the main protagonists 
in a skirmish destined to decide the historical fate of the entire world. Yet in a 
curious twist, during the events of 1991 it was the Russian White House on 
the Krasnopresnenskaia embankment that assumed the traditional role of its 
overseas older brother vis-à-vis the Kremlin. The resulting functional symbol-
isms proposed by each side of this drama are worth enumerating. 
On the Kremlin’s side were the very same attributes of power that it had 
demonstrated to the world throughout the Soviet period. In the first place 
were the tanks, useless for solving the problem that faced the putschists, but 
which for decades had successfully represented state power. In the second 
place was the use of canonized Russian music; apart from short informational 
reports and a pair of incomprehensible decrees, the GKChP (the so-called 
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State Emergency Committee formed during the coup) informed the country 
of its taking power by broadcasting “Swan Lake” on all TV channels.
The failure of the putsch became evident after its leaders’ press conference 
that with lightning speed turned the trembling hands of the Soviet Union’s vice 
president Yanaev into the symbol of the new power. The basis of this semiotic 
catastrophe was a profound communicative miscalculation. In notifying the 
country of the return to the old order, the members of the GKChP themselves 
used the information technologies of the glasnost’ era. In the Soviet era, the 
organs of collective leadership that exercised real authority always acted behind 
closed doors. As opposed to grandiose Party Congresses and sessions of the 
Supreme Soviet that were for show, reports about Central Committee plenums 
were only read out on TV, orally, without video images, and published in news-
papers without any accompanying photographs. As far as meetings of the 
Politburo, this kind of information had only begun to appear in 1983, after 
Andropov came to power. 
In contrast, the defenders of the White House possessed a popularly 
elected president and parliament, and they clearly interpreted their own civil 
disobedience to the GKChP’s illegal takeover by the as an act of political 
self-constitutionalization (“We, the people”). Minor details of the events, 
such as the rock concert and the distribution of free imported cigarettes only 
strengthened the idealized image of America as the highest embodiment of 
civilization, formulated in the Soviet period by the entire culture of anti- 
Communist protest. The three most oft-repeated sound bites of those days—
“Russia,” “Yeltsin,” and “freedom”—served as a prototype for the synthesis of 
non-imperial patriotism, legality, and individualism proposed as the ideology 
of the new Russian state. 
Two years later, from September 20 to October 4, 1993, political crisis 
once again spilled out into a confrontation between the same two architec-
tural complexes. However, this time it took place against a backdrop of 
radically regrouped symbols and in a significantly different ideologically 
marked space. To begin with, the nationalist-communists who now gathered 
around the White House were doomed to repeat the scenario played out 
by their despised opponents and—even worse—to repeat to a certain degree 
their symbolic gesticulations. The logic of the conflict forced them to declare 
themselves supporters of parliamentarism and constitutional order, an 
15Introduction
assertion which was catastrophically at odds with their raised red banners, 
their organization of armed units, and with the expectations of their own 
supporters. And while at the time of the coup it was announced by one 
communist paper that “the White House has finally become the House of the 
Soviets,” the rhetoric about the “defense of legal organs of power” contra-
dicted both the appearance and actions of the defenders, who were unable to 
work out a convincing system of ideological metaphors. 
At the same time, President Yeltsin, who had made the move into the 
Kremlin, appropriated Tchaikovsky from his predecessors and even, in part, 
their tanks, all the while preserving his earlier rhetoric of “entry into the civi-
lized world.” On September 26, the National Symphony Orchestra from 
Washington, D. C., under the direction of Rostropovich played the “1812 Over-
ture” on Red Square. The number of people gathered for this twenty-five-minute 
concert, not including the millions who watched on television, was more than 
had come together for all of the meetings and demonstrations organized by 
both sides of the conflict combined. On the most famous of Russian squares an 
American orchestra played Russian music under the baton of a world-famous 
musician who had once been exiled from Russia by the Soviet regime. Over the 
heads of the communist usurpers, the new authority had attempted to present 
itself as the true heir of the age-old traditions of the Russian state.
In the battle of metaphors the president’s side prevailed before October 5, 
when all of the saved-up symbolic capital was, with far-reaching political 
consequences, superseded by CNN’s TV cliché image of “firing on the White 
House.” Such images of civil war left an impression on Russians’ consciousness 
and created a need for an ideology of reconciliation to which Yeltsin quickly 
responded, proposing that the Duma’s communist majority sign an Agree-
ment on National Reconciliation and Harmony, that subsequently gave its 
name to the November 7 holiday. However, the metaphors of total reconcilia-
tion were only fully realized in the framework of quite a different ideological 
model whose most visible and obvious expression were the celebrations of 
September 5–7, 1997, on the occasion of Moscow’s 850-year jubilee. 
As Paul Ricœur has argued, as a rule, national holidays are based on the 
juxtaposition of one historical epoch to another. The celebrated event is likened 
to an act of creation that separates the cosmos from chaos (see Ricœur 1986, 
261–262). Thus, for example, the thousand-year anniversary of Russian 
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statehood, celebrated with great pomp in 1862, and the celebration of a 
thousand years of Christianity in Russia in 1988 both represented a negation of 
pre-Varangian and pagan Rus’. In the imperial period the main state holiday was 
the ascension day of the reigning monarch, and it was better not to mention 
predecessors, especially recent ones. Of course, November 7, 1917, was felt to 
be the start of a new era, as was also the case for the memorable days of demo-
cratic Russia, at least at first. Religious holidays are also structured like this: 
those who celebrate Christmas or Easter re-experience anew the symbolic 
ending of the pre-Christian era. The holiday divides time into two and rejects 
its first half. 
Choosing the date of the founding of a city as a holiday reduces this 
symbolic negation to a minimum. In trying de facto to turn the founding of 
the capital into the main national celebration, the organizers of the holiday 
did not reject any aspect of its heritage, permitting other cities and locales to 
exercise their own powers of myth-making. A wave of local jubilees immedi-
ately swept through Russia, especially in Petersburg which prepared an 
ostentatious fête on the occasion of its triennial jubilee.
In the scenario for Moscow’s anniversary Russia’s tragic history was 
unexpectedly interpreted as an endless and conflict-free succession of golden 
ages. Everything was wonderful under the grand princes and the tsars of 
Moscow who made short shrift of them, under the Petersburg emperors who 
rejected Muscovy, as well as under communists and under democrats. The 
mayor of Moscow appeared at the celebration in the costume of an ancient 
Russian prince. A portrait of good king Ivan the Terrible was projected on 
the wall of Moscow University as part of a laser show by the French composer 
Jean-Michel Jarre. It was as if the opening of Tseretelli’s monument to Peter 
I during the anniversary was meant to rescind the Petersburg period of 
Russian history, having returned the first Russian emperor and all of his 
heirs to the old capital that they had abandoned. 
Of course the narrative of history is thus completely washed away and 
history itself becomes a kind of decorative prop. Together with the newly 
reconstructed Cathedral of Christ the Savior, genuine historical monuments 
lose whatever authenticity they may have had. It turns out that it is virtually 
impossible to know if St. Basil’s or the Kremlin have really stood on Red Square 
for hundreds of years or if Moscow’s former mayor Luzhkov had them rebuilt 
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together with the Iverskii Gates and the Cathedral of the Kazan Holy Mother. 
Of Red Square’s entire ensemble it seems that for now only Lenin’s Mausoleum 
has not been disemboweled and does not provoke questions concerning its 
identity. All of the other buildings look like a magnificent decoration, a stylized 
background for a theatrical performance which they became during the anni-
versary celebration. 
Moscow’s two central squares—Red Square, which in Soviet times 
served as a place for parades and as symbol of imperial might, and Manezh 
Square, which during perestroika became the site of huge demonstrations 
and a kind of symbol of the country’s awakening political life—have both 
undergone curious functional metamorphoses. Having partitioned off Red 
Square with the newly-built Iverskii Gates, the city authorities blocked the 
way for tanks and turned it into the country’s leading place for outdoor 
concerts. And Manezh Square was adorned with a cupola above a magnifi-
cent shopping mall. Built in an historical style, the mall differs from its 
New York prototype in that it does not rise above the city but is hidden 
underground like the stations of the Moscow Metro which once proclaimed 
to the world that socialism in the USSR had been mostly achieved.
The new message that the Moscow celebration announced was that 
Russia had joined the society of consumers, and that this was a national, 
imperial, Orthodox society of consumers, sanctified by the country’s history 
and religion. Many observers during the celebrations, including the author 
of these lines, got the impression that the cherished idea destined to unite 
the nation had at last been found. Russia’s future, it seemed, was as a country 
of neo-feudal consumerism, ruled by an alliance of apanage princes headed 
by Moscow’s grand prince playing the role of first among equals. However, 
quite soon—in the fall of 1999—this ideological model and its creators 
suffered a crippling fall. The crisis of August 1998, the wars in the Balkans 
and in the Caucasus again required metaphors of a strong arm, territorial 
integrity, and the vertical of power. 
 5 
Of course, the concept of the metaphorical nature of ideology propounded 
by Geertz is part of the general reconsideration of Aristotelian ideas on the 
nature and purpose of metaphor begun in the 1920s by Ernst Cassirer’s The 
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Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, a discussion which has assumed a particular 
amplitude in the decades since “Ideology as a Cultural System” was first 
published. To oversimplify somewhat, this process essentially consists of 
overcoming the idea of the derivative nature of metaphorical as compared 
with literal meaning—an idea which confines the metaphorical use of 
language to the specific realms of linguistics, stylistics, and genre. As the 
influential British philosopher and linguist I. A. Richards remarked, 
“Throughout the history of rhetoric, metaphor has been treated as a sort of 
happy extra trick with words, an opportunity to exploit the accidents of their 
versatility, something in place occasionally but requiring unusual skill and 
caution. In brief, a grace or ornament or added power of language, not its 
constitutive form” (Richards 1990, 45). 
By contrast, new theorists discerned within metaphorical thought- 
formation the basis of the cognitive process as well as of a person’s practical 
activity. In his tellingly entitled work, The Rule of Metaphor, Paul Ricœur—a 
scholar who shares common ground with Geertz—also insisted upon the 
primacy of metaphor in language (Ricœur 1977; cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Lakoff and Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1990). Accordingly, metaphor 
gradually ceased to be the property mainly of poetic language, becoming an 
inseparable element not only of scientific and legal discourse, but also of 
everyday linguistic practice. Nonetheless, having lost its monopoly on the 
metaphor, imaginative literature acquired in return a sort of privileged scholarly 
status insofar as it is the realm of metaphor creation and accumulation par 
excellence and thus capable of serving as an ideal laboratory for investigating 
the mechanisms of the production of meanings. 
In his own article, Geertz merely notes the direction of possible research 
in the field of the study of ideologies in his reference to the work of the literary 
theorist Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Forms, then popular in the 
1960s. Yet the question of the applicability of poetics to the analysis of 
ideology is only one (and hardly the most interesting) of the many problems 
arising in this connection. At the very least, the application of Geertz’s ideas 
to the sacramental theme of the interrelations of ideology and literature offers 
no fewer prospects for investigation. 
Understandably, Marxist aesthetics and literary scholarship have tradi-
tionally given primary significance to these very interrelations. Although we 
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needn’t return to slogan-like communist formulations culled from “Party Organi-
zation and Party Literature,”4 it is worth recalling here William Mills Todd’s 
exceptionally precise exposition of two authoritative contemporary representa-
tives of this tradition in Western thought. In a work devoted to the connections 
between the Russian novel of the second quarter of the nineteenth century and 
the ideology and institutions of the aristocracy of the period, Todd writes: 
In these studies ideology appears not as a readily detachable filter between 
the individual and the “real” or between the text and the “real.” On the 
contrary, it is embedded in “experience,” in “common sense,” in taste, in 
discourse, in all acts of signification. Imaginative literature works upon the 
ideology that presents itself to the text in language and, according to 
[Pierre] Macherey, wrests ideology into a new, nonideological (yet 
non-“scientific” in the Marxist sense) form through techniques of isola-
tion, caricature, and figuration, thereby demystifying ideology and 
revealing its unacknowledged absences and contradictions. Eagleton chal-
lenges this apparent privileging of literary form, however, because it slights 
the persistent coherence of ideology and because, to Eagleton, ideology 
does not merely mystify or screen history. In his own formulation, literary 
form becomes not an escape from the “shame of the merely ideological,” 
but a production of the ideological to the second power; it does to ideology 
what ideology does to history, makes it seem “natural.” (Todd 1996, 20) 
It is easy to see that for all the distinction and intellectual acuity of the two 
concepts, both begin with the presence of ideology and then describe how 
imaginative literature is able to overcome, deform, and naturalize it, or—to use 
official Soviet terminology—to embody and popularize it. Doubtless such a 
relationship between ideology and art often does exist, yet if one understands 
Geertz’s conception of ideology as a system of metaphors, it is only one among 
many possible relationships. 
First of all, the obverse relation between the two is also widespread. Those 
who possess power—politicians; authors of programmatic texts and formulas; 
in general, all of those who make up (in Althusser’s expression) the “ideological 
apparatus” (Althusser 1971)—are themselves readers, or, to put it more 
4 This was the title of an article by Lenin in which he stated that, regardless of an author’s own 
intentions, any work of literature reflects the ideological assumptions of one or another 
party. Lenin’s article was a required and oft-memorized text in Soviet schools and 
universities. 
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broadly, consumers of texts likewise capable of becoming imbued with and 
directed by the narrative and tropic models of those texts. This latter theme in 
particular was thoroughly explored by Iuri Lotman and his fellow semioticians 
in their penetrating analysis of the poetics of “literary behavior.” The conversion 
of ideological constructions created by imaginative literature into strictly ideo-
logical rhetoric is at the very least no more difficult than the transformation of 
ideological clichés into poetic speech. 
In this way, ideology can first appear in poems and novels only then to 
find itself embodied in slogans or political programs. It must be said that as far 
as the doctrines of oppositional politics are concerned, such a thesis appears 
fairly trivial: formulations like “the ideas of the Decembrists were born under 
the influence of the freedom-loving works of Griboedov and Pushkin” are 
familiar to us Russians from our earliest school days. While perfectly justified 
in and of itself, an analogous formulation of the question in terms, say, of the 
various groups who in one or another form implement practical politics, will 
also encounter certain difficulties. Political action inevitably runs up against 
resistance from the context in which it takes place, deforming its original 
ideological aims, which are then themselves forced to undergo adaptation. 
Put somewhat simplistically, one can say that the more distant the association 
of ideology with actual authority, the more “literary” it becomes. Yet it is 
precisely this ratio that allows one to reveal various further dimensions of the 
possible interaction between literature and the ideological arsenal of govern-
ment authority. 
The fact of the matter is that in the analysis of such interactions, the noto-
rious problem of primacy and the direction of influence in general is not of 
paramount significance. Group and especially state ideology can exist as such 
as long as there is at least a minimum of consensus regarding its basic meta-
phors. (As we well know, with a developed apparatus of police and ideological 
violence an orchestrated appearance of consensus can successfully replace 
actual consensus, although for our present considerations this is unimportant.) 
The procedure for creating such a consensus requires a reasonable degree 
of translatability for the fundamental metaphorical constructions from the 
language of programmatic documents, decrees, and resolutions into the 
language of concrete political action, as well as the language of official rituals 
and mass holidays, the language of the organization of everyday life and the 
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spatial environment and the like. As with any other translation, this takes place 
not without the loss of certain shades of meaning, but the general accuracy of 
the translation is confirmed by both the intuitions of the members of the 
collective as well as by specially created institutions of ideological control. 
Of course, literature is just one of many possible spheres for the produc-
tion of ideological metaphors. Historically, this function has often been 
fulfilled by theater, architecture, the organization of court, state and religious 
rituals and celebrations, church homiletics and many other types of human 
activity. In the twentieth century movies, advertisements and various genres 
of mass media most often play this role. That being said, the axis of ideology 
and literature is of particular interest because both work through an identical 
medium: the written word. 
Poetic language is capable of constructing the necessary metaphors in 
their most pure form. It is for this very reason that art and especially litera-
ture acquire the potential to serve as a kind of universal depository of 
ideological concepts and as a measure of their practical realization. In a certain 
sense, ideology is capable of transforming itself into so many and such varied 
phenomena of social life because it possesses the “gold standard” preserved in 
poetic language. An old Russian saying has it that one cannot nourish a 
nightingale on fables alone. However, those very same nightingales use fables 
to nourish eagles (of both the one- and the two-headed sort!), lions, dragons, 
and other heraldic monstrosities, and with considerable success. 
Moreover, ideological creation is most definitely a collective, albeit (the 
persistence of Marxist clichés notwithstanding) a far from anonymous 
process.5 It doesn’t matter who exactly begins this process, be it a writer, 
philosopher, politician, journalist, historian, or even an architect or master of 
ceremonies. The distribution of roles may differ completely; what is essential 
here is that in the course of the formation of ideological constructions, the 
contributions of one actor impels, completes, interprets, and misrepresents 
those made by other actors. And if practical politics tests poetry’s practicability, 
then poetry returns the favor in terms of the capaciousness and expressiveness 
of the corresponding political metaphors.
5 Cf. Althusser’s formula: “Human societies secrete ideology as an element or atmosphere 
necessary for breathing and existence” (Althusser 1969, 232).
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The subject of this book is the history of Russian state ideology of the last third 
of the eighteenth through the first third of the nineteenth centuries, beginning 
with Catherine II’s “Greek Project” and continues down to S. S. Uvarov’s 
proposed doctrine of “Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationalism.” Somewhat of 
an exception is made for the ideology of the people’s body and popular war 
that was put forward by oppositionist literary men grouped around Admiral 
A. S. Shishkov that was officially adopted after he was appointed state secretary 
just before Napoleon’s invasion of 1812. 
The ten chapters offered here have been constructed in quite different 
ways. At the center of some are a particular work of poetry, such as an ode 
by V. P. Petrov or an epistle by V. A. Zhukovskii, or a group of such works, 
such as odes on Russian victories in the war with Turkey in 1768–1774, or 
the poems and tragedies written in the early nineteenth century on the 
theme of the Time of Troubles. Other chapters are dedicated to official 
and semi-official publicism—Shishkov’s manifestoes, sermons by Filaret 
(Drozdov), Uvarov’s memorandum. Two chapters concern state ceremo-
nies and rituals—Catherine II’s Crimean journey and the celebration that 
G. A. Potemkin staged in the Tauride Palace. Finally, two other chapters 
examine the cultural mechanisms of specific historical conflicts—Speranskii’s 
fall from power and the publication of the treaty creating the Holy Alliance. 
Of course, these are only the main issues that are investigated and within 
each chapter the subjects under analysis may be similarly diverse.
This heterogeneity stems mostly from the book’s basic conception. The 
author’s goal was not to describe the regular transmission of ideological ideas 
from one institution to another—indeed the very existence of such regularity 
seems highly doubtful—but to trace the historically concrete dynamics of the 
working out, crystallization, and change of basic ideologems. In such an 
approach the ideological sphere of culture functions as a kind of reservoir of 
metaphors which people of various professions and types of activity both 
draw from and replenish. 
In general, the center of our attention is on the ideological underpinnings 
of the Russian Empire’s foreign policy: its wars and preparations for them, 
treaties and military projects. The great Russian reformer M. M. Speranskii 
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once wrote that “there is not one state question … down to tariffs” that cannot 
be worked out “in the spirit of the Gospel” (Speranskii 1870b, 188–189). To 
paraphrase, we could say that there is no sphere of state activity that does not 
lend itself to ideological analysis. Together with this, the sphere of foreign rela-
tions that is so closely tied to the problem of national self-consciousness and 
to state mythology, is most amenable for identifying and analyzing ideolog-
ical symbols, whether in works of art or in practical political affairs.
Hence Catherine II’s and Alexander I’s active reform politics remain 
beyond the bounds of this study, as do Speranskii’s own projects for reform that 
serve only as subsidiary material that helps to clarify the ideological concep-
tions of his political opponents. As far as Uvarov’s triad is concerned, it was 
created after a period of war and upsets, with a view toward a long period of 
peaceful development for the empire, but its central goal was to define Russia’s 
position in regard to European civilization. Paul I’s short reign was left out for 
other reasons. This emperor, who was extremely prone to ideological creation, 
changed his orientation so swiftly that no productive dialogue between public 
opinion and artistic practice had time to develop. For this reason no consistent 
models significant for later periods appeared.
In the course of this work the author often confronted the following 
question: to what extent were the monarchs and ministers who populate 
these pages actually guided in their activities by ideological notions, or did 
these merely serve as a rhetorical cover for their true goals and interests? 
However, such an opposition seems artificial. Words really do have their fates 
and, once said, become an active factor in the historical process, whether or 
not the speaker was sincere. Even more important is the fact that the very 
posing of political goals is thoroughly ideologized, and ideas about what 
makes up state or national interests are subject to change and are to a great 
extent defined by symbolic reference points that allow people—to use Clifford 
Geertz’s already-cited formulation—“to render otherwise incomprehensible 
social situations meaningfully, to so construe them as to make it possible to act 
purposefully within them.” 
In 1813 Alexander I wrote to one of his closest associates that he 
dreamed of making “his motherland happy, but not in the vulgar sense” 
(Nikolai Mikhailovich II, 7). One might say that this book represents an 
historical study of the actual meaning of these intentions. 
 1 
Catherine II’s well-known “Greek Project” is undoubtedly one of the largest, most comprehensive and ambitious foreign policy ideas that 
Russia’s rulers have ever put forward. Like Catherine’s colleagues and oppo-
nents both in Russia and abroad, modern historians tend to see it as just another 
of Potemkin’s fantasies which the usually sober-minded empress allowed herself 
to be caught up in; as a manifestation of traditional imperial expansionism; as a 
smoke screen to hide less far-reaching but more practical intentions; or as 
a clear and well thought-out plan of action (see, for example, Markova 1959; 
Hösch 1964; Raeff 1972, Ragsdale 1988, Smilianskaia 1995, Leshchilovskaia 
1998, Vinogradov 2000, and others; for the most thorough survey to date and a 
survey of the sources, see Hösch 1964). Authors who write about this usually 
limit themselves to the sphere of diplomacy and court politics, and completely 
ignore the symbolic dimension of the project (see Hösch 1964, 201–202). Yet 
for an evaluation of the project’s sources as well as the historical significance of 
the empress’s plan, this dimension may turn out to be most crucial. 
Catherine laid out the “Greek Project” in comprehensive form in her 
letter to Emperor Joseph II of Sept. 10/21, 1782 (Arnet 1869, 143–147). 
Russians as Greeks: 
Catherine II’s “Greek Project” and the Russian Ode 
of the 1760s–70s
CHAPTER 1
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Somewhat earlier, approximately in 1780, it was noted in a memorandum 
by A. A. Bezborodko, possibly intended for a meeting of the two emperors in 
Mogilev (SbRIO XXVI, 384–385). At the same time it is obvious that by 
Grand Prince Konstantin Pavlovich’s birth in 1779 that a sufficiently 
well-developed outline already existed. The choice of name for the newborn 
and the memorial medal with classical figures and Church of St. Sophia that 
was minted to mark his birth testify to the empress’s intentions with regard to 
her grandson rather clearly. As English ambassador James Harris stated, 
“Prince Potemkin … is continually occupied with the idea of raising an 
Empire in the East; he has so far infected the empress with these sentiments, 
that she has been chimerical enough to christen the newborn Grand Duke, 
Constantine; to give him a Greek nurse, whose name was Helen; and to talk 
in her private society, of placing him on the throne of the Eastern Empire. In 
the meanwhile, she is building a town at Czarsco-Zelo, to be called Constant-
ingorod” (Harris I, 97–98). The numerous odes on the birth of the grand 
prince demonstrate that, despite the secrecy that surrounded the diplomatic 
correspondence, the Russian public was perfectly well informed of these 
intentions (Ragsdale 1988, 97–98). In particular, Petrov wrote:
… Мавксентий коим побежден,
Защитник веры, слава Россов,
Figure 1 Medal commemorating 
the birth of Grand Prince 
Konstantin Pavlovich (1779).
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Гроза и ужас чалмоносцев,
Великий Константин рожден …
… град, кой греками утрачен,
От гнусна плена свободить, - 
(Petrov I, 164).
(The one who conquered Maxentius, / Defender of the faith, the glory of 
Russians, / Threat and horror of the turban-wearers, / Great Constantine is 
born… / …To liberate the city from odious captivity / That was lost by the 
Greeks)
Apparently, the idea of the “Greek Project” originated in the mid-1770s when, 
after the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, G. A. Potemkin gave Catherine his plan 
of the “Eastern System” (on which see Samoilov 1867, 1011–1016),1 which 
was to replace N. I. Panin’s “Northern System” in Russia’s foreign policy (see 
Griffiths 1970). Potemkin’s swift rise to power, beginning in 1774, was not 
only due to personal reasons but also because the ideas he put forward were 
in line with Catherine’s strategic plans that had been worked out during the 
course of the Russian-Turkish War of 1768–1774. 
Both contemporaries and later commentators on the “Greek Project” 
paid special attention to its central element, which was also the most 
critical and difficult to achieve: the conquest of Constantinople. However, 
this very idea of Catherine’s and Potemkin’s was not in itself new. Plans for 
conquering the former capital of the Eastern Roman Empire had stirred 
Russian tsars as early as the seventeenth century (see Kapterev 1885; 
Zhigarev I-II, and others). They had circulated during Peter I’s Azov and 
Pruth campaigns and arose again under Anna Ioannovna during the Turkish 
campaign of 1736–1739 (see Kochubinskii 1899). In 1762 the hero of 
that campaign, B. K. Minikh, presented Catherine with a letter in which 
he called on her to fulfill Peter’s will and to take Constantinople (see 
Hösch 1964, 181). The theme of Constantinople reverberated in Russian 
1 Working on a biography of Potemkin in 1814, A. N. Samoilov still considered the realization 
of the “Greek Project” a question of the Russian monarchs’ will: “Death, having cut the life 
thread of this glorious man [Potemkin], put an end to (ostanovila sushestvovanie) the 
Ottoman Empire until the present events; but the basis of his great plan is solid even today, 
and Russia always has the means of implementing it” (Ibid, 1011). 
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journalism and social thought even later, right up to 1917, when the idea of 
placing a cross above St. Sophia and taking control of the straits outlived 
the Russian monarchy and became one of the reasons for the failure of the 
Provisional Government.
The special historical nature of Catherine’s “Greek Project,” at least if we 
judge by the letter to Joseph II and by public perception of the time, lies on a 
different plane. The empress did not at all plan to unite Constantinople with 
the Russian Empire, or to move its capital there.  According to her project, 
the Second Rome was to become the center of a new Greek empire whose 
throne would go to Constantine only under the strict condition that he 
himself and his heirs would forever and in all circumstances repudiate any 
pretensions to the Russian crown. In this way, two neighboring powers 
under the scepters of the “star of the North” and the “star of the East,” 
Alexander and Constantine, would be united (using deeply anachronistic 
but precisely accurate terminology) by the bonds of fraternal friendship, so 
to speak, while Russia would play the role (again resorting to anachronism) 
of elder brother.
However, more profound historical factors would have had to support 
the dynastic union guaranteeing this brotherhood, which in turn would have 
propelled a member of the Russian imperial family to the throne of the new 
Greek empire, thus raising the whole project above the level of just another 
opportunistic diplomatic game. Such a factor was the Russian Empire’s reli-
gious heritage in relation to that of Constantinople. Russia had received its 
faith from Greek hands as a result of the marriage between a Kievan prince 
and the Byzantine emperor’s daughter, and therefore could now act as the 
natural savior of the Greeks from the yoke of the infidels. This gave a new 
twist to the newly developing relations between Russians and Greeks, as 
Russia not only appeared as the savior of Greece but also as its heir, or—to 
continue the familial metaphor—as a daughter who was obliged to return a 
long-time debt to her elder and at the same time younger sibling. 
Here we approach what is arguably the core of this entire ideological 
construction. In the “Greek Project’s” system of coordinates, religious succes-
sion was equated with the cultural, as if by default. Hence Constantinople 
and Athens were marked as equivalent and by definition Russia’s role as the 
single heir to the Byzantine church also made her the only indisputably 
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legitimate heir to classical Greek culture.2 In all aspects of the project we 
consistently see the mixing of Byzantine and classical motifs, including in the 
aforementioned celebrations on the birth of Constantine and in the program 
for his education. 
This logical tour de force fundamentally changed the thinking about 
Russia’s historical role and destiny. If it had been traditionally thought that 
the torch of enlightenment had gone from Greece to Rome, then taken up by 
Western Europe, and from there passed on to Russia, now Russia was seen to 
have had a direct line to Greece and therefore, had no need for intermediaries.
“The present reigning idea (and it carries away all others) is the estab-
lishing of a new Empire in the East, at Athens or Constantinople. The empress 
discoursed a long while with me the other day on the ancient Greeks; of their 
alacrity and the superiority of their genius, and the same character being still 
extant in the modern ones; and of the possibility of their again becoming the 
first people, if properly assisted and seconded,” the English ambassador Harris 
wrote home soon after Constantine’s birth (Harris I, 204). Catherine’s speech 
reveals a highly characteristic mode of thinking. Russia was called to restore 
their true nature to the Greeks, to lead them back to their own origins. She may 
also be seen as obliged to do this, insofar as she was the legitimate heir to clas-
sical Greece by way of Byzantium, and in some sense its modern embodiment. 
At least in Harris’s perception, Athens and Constantinople enjoy equal rights 
to serve as the capital of the future empire. 
In an obvious way, this position led to the idea of Russia’s cultural potency 
in Europe and to a reconsideration of her political priorities. In the early 1780s, 
after Catherine’s meeting with Joseph II in Mogilev, negotiations began 
concerning an alliance between Russia and Austria. This alliance was very 
necessary for Catherine given her new political orientation, but at the decisive 
moment of signing the treaty it was almost rescinded because the Russian side 
raised the question of a so-called “alternative.”
According to the diplomatic etiquette of the time, it was standard prac-
tice that two copies of the treaty would be signed simultaneously, and then the 
two sides would swap places and sign again. However, this practice did not 
2 One may see the outline of this interpretation in Lomonosov’s “Foreword on the Use of 
Church Books,” written in the late 1750s, in which similar conclusions were drawn based on 
the linguistic succession from Greek to Russian (see Picchio 1992).
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apply to the Holy Roman Emperor, who claimed the immutable right to sign 
first. Given Russia’s new orientation, this did not suit Catherine in the least. As 
strongly as she was interested in an alliance with Austria, she could not accept 
its diplomatic primacy. Russia, as legitimate heir to the Eastern Roman 
Empire, demanded equality with the Western (see Madariaga 1959/1960).3 A 
compromise that was on the whole advantageous to Catherine was finally 
found, but the very emergence of this conflict eloquently testifies to the enor-
mous growth of Russian state consciousness that was unquestionably tied to 
the “Greek Project.” According to Joseph II, during the Mogilev meeting, 
every time that he began to speak of Greece and Constantinople, the empress 
made mention of Italy and Rome (Arned III, 250). Catherine’s idea was that 
Europe’s political leadership should consist of two empires: the Viennese, heir 
to Rome, and that of Petersburg, heir to Constantinople. 
Not even the most sophisticated imagination could fashion a figure more 
suited to conceive and carry out all of these hyperbolic plans than 
G. A. Potemkin. The English Ambassador Harris reported in his dispatches 
that Potemkin was little interested in Western politics but that he paid great 
attention to Eastern matters. Later, when the question of transferring rule of 
the island of Minorca in the Mediterranean to Britain was under discussion, 
Potemkin quickly expressed an intention to settle Greeks there (see Harris I, 
203, 316; cf. Samoilov 1867, 591–592, 1010–1014, 1203–1204; Brinker 1891, 
47, 59–67, et al.; on Potemkin’s relations with Greeks, see Batalden 1982, 
67–72; Ponomareva 1992, et al.). In an epistle to the Greek community of 
Enikal and Kerch, the Greek Archbishop Nikiforus called Potemkin “a true 
defender and patron of our people, for out of all tribes he loved Greeks most 
of all” (Batalden 1982, 69). 
A visionary and utopian with traits of administrative genius, Potemkin—
who combined in himself exalted piety, theological erudition (the schism 
between Eastern and Western churches was one of his favorite topics of 
conversation), a worshipful attitude toward classical antiquity and a passion 
3 Madariaga suggests that Catherine’s hard line on the question of the alternative was insti-
gated by N. I. Panin, who wanted the talks to fail. This is hardly a convincing explanation. By 
this time Panin’s influence had significantly weakened, and the empress, who knew his posi-
tion perfectly well, would hardly have let him endanger such a fundamental, strategic plan 
had she not considered the question under discussion to be very serious. 
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for Greece and the Greeks—was the very person who could be inspired by 
the idea of Russia’s gargantuan geopolitical turn toward the South. From the 
Baltic with its predominant orientation toward the German Protestant 
world, on which Peter I’s politics were focused, Russia was now to be redi-
rected toward the Black and Mediterranean Seas, to the northern Black Sea 
coast and the Balkans, settled with fellow Orthodox Greeks, southern Slavs, 
Moldavians and Wallachians—to territories that had once been united under 
the Byzantine scepter, and even earlier, by Alexander the Great. 
Potemkin’s personality very clearly dominated this entire scheme. It is 
all the more interesting that its basic conceptual links had been worked out 
during the previous five years, during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, 
even before the political ascent of “his most serene highness (serenissimus).” 
 2 
V. O. Kliuchevskii himself noted that Catherine’s “Greek Project” was to a 
great extent inspired by Voltaire’s letters (Kliuchevskii 1993, 509). However, 
this subject has never been investigated properly. As a matter of fact, in his 
letters to Catherine from the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, 
Voltaire constantly addressed the theme and unfailingly urged the empress to 
conquer Constantinople and to revive the Greek state and learning. So it is all 
the more important to try to distinguish which elements of the “Greek 
Project” indeed stemmed from this correspondence and which might have 
been suggested by other sources. 
On November 15, 1768, when news of the start of the war had still not 
reached Paris, Voltaire wrote to Catherine:
If they make war on you, Madam, what Peter the Great once had in mind 
may well befall them, namely that Constantinople will become the capital of 
the Russian Empire. These barbarians deserve to be punished by a heroine,  
for the lack of respect they have hitherto had for the ladies. Clearly, people who 
neglect all the fine arts and who lock up women, deserve to be exterminated. 
… I ask your Imperial Majesty’s permission to come and lay myself at your 
feet, and to spend a few days at your court, as soon as it is set up in Constanti-
nople; for I most earnestly believe that if ever the Turks are to be chased out of 
Europe, it will be by the Russians. (Catherine 1971, 20; Lentin 1974, 51–524)
4 References to Lentin indicate that the translation from the Catherine-Voltaire correspon-
dence has been taken from his edition.
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In her answering letter, the empress reported to her correspondent that 
before “his entry into Constantinople” she was sending him “a beautiful 
costume à la grecque, lined with the best furs from Siberia” (Catherine 1971, 
23). This Greek-style costume made of Siberian pelts is symbolic of the 
Greco-Russian synthesis which would subsequently be realized in the “Greek 
Project.” Somewhat later, informing Voltaire about the successes of A. G. 
Orlov’s first naval expedition, which will be discussed below, Catherine 
developed this theme: “It depends solely on the Greeks whether Greece will 
be revived. I have done everything possible to adorn geographical maps with 
a direct connection between Corinth and Moscow” (ibid., 62).
However, Catherine’s caution didn’t satisfy Voltaire. Throughout their 
whole correspondence he scattered compliments about Russian victories and 
urged his correspondent not to be satisfied with partial concessions but to 
prosecute the war until the complete destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 
which for him represented an unqualified embodiment of barbarism, igno-
rance, and spiritual abasement. “If you follow up your victories, I think you 
will spread them wherever you please; and if you want peace, you will dictate 
it. For my part, I still want your Majesty to go to Constantinople to be 
crowned,” Voltaire wrote to Catherine in a letter of August 28, 1770 (ibid., 
67). The recognized leader of European classicism, he saw driving the Turks 
out of Europe as the prerequisite for its cultural renaissance, and he believed 
that the “Northern Semiramis”—simultaneously his patron and pupil—had 
to become the instrument of Providence, spreading enlightenment with her 
soldiers’ bayonets:
Oh Minerva of the North, oh, you, sister of Apollo,
You will revenge Greece, driving out the unworthy,
The enemies of the arts, persecutors of women,
I will depart and will wait for you on the fields of  
   Marathon, - 
as he wrote in his “Stanzas to the Empress of Russia Catherine II on the Occa-
sion of the Taking of Khotin by the Russians in 1769” (Voltaire XIII, 316).
The Russo-Turkish War was thus equated to the Persian War with the 
Greeks, which Voltaire of course interpreted as a clash between culture and 
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barbarism. In September 1770, he set forth before Catherine an entire program 
for reviving classical culture in its historical cradle:
Those who wished setbacks upon your Majesty will be quite confounded; 
and why should people wish to see you disgraced when you are the avenger 
of Europe? I suppose these are the people who do not want Greek to be 
spoken; for if you were queen of Constantinople, your Majesty would very 
soon establish a fine Greek academy. A Catheriniad would be written in your 
honor. Many a Zeuxis and Phidias would cover the earth with statues of you; 
the fall of the Ottoman Empire would be celebrated in Greek; Athens would 
be one of your capitals; Greek would become the universal language; all the 
traders in the Aegean would ask your Majesty for Greek passports. … (Ibid., 
71; Lentin 1974, 86)
Two and a half years later, in February 1773, when it was already clear that the 
results of the war would be much more modest than both correspondents had 
counted on, Voltaire nevertheless returned to these ambitious plans. Not long 
before, Catherine had sent him translations of two of her comedies which she 
presented as works by an “anonymous author” (ibid., 171). Like Russian 
readers of Catherine’s comedies, Voltaire was by no means led astray by this 
ploy, which it seems never seriously aimed at hiding the name of the real author 
from anyone. However, it gave him the opportunity of again laying out his series 
of geo-political theses before the empress:
… a rare quality indeed is that of cultivating all the arts, as you did, at a time 
when the entire nation was engaged in the art of war. I see that the Russians 
are an intelligent, a highly intelligent people; your Imperial Majesty was not 
made to govern fools. It is this which has always convinced me that nature 
destined you to rule over Greece. I keep harping on my favorite topic; this 
will come to pass. In ten years’ time … the Turkish Empire will be parti-
tioned, and you will have Sophocles’ Oedipus performed at Athens. (Ibid., 
178; Lentin 1974, 148)
Voltaire’s hyperbolic praise gives a very clear notion of his political and cultural 
priorities. He is primarily if not exclusively interested in freeing Greece from 
Turkish domination and in restoring the great traditions of classical culture in 
their original home. Russia and even her monarch—on whom Voltaire, as 
always, lavished the most effusive compliments—played an instrumental polit-
ical role in his thinking. Envisioning Catherine as ruler of Greece, Voltaire 
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seemed to presume her metamorphosis (at least in a cultural regard) into a true 
Greek; Catherine’s transformation from a German princess into a Russian 
sovereign offered a familiar biographical precedent for such flights of fancy. “If 
your Majesty is going to establish your throne in Constantinople, as I hope, you 
will learn Greek very quickly,” he wrote at the very beginning of the war, 
“because it is absolutely necessary to chase the Turkish language out of Europe, 
as well as everyone who speaks it” (ibid., 27).
Catherine responded to these sentiments with characteristic caution. At 
first, in August 1769, she wrote that her plans for studying the Greek language 
were limited to the “Greek compliment” she planned to make to Voltaire, just 
as two years earlier she had “learned several Tatar and Arabic phrases in 
Kazan, which gave great pleasure to the inhabitants of that city” (ibid., 315). 
However, then she probably decided not to disenchant her correspondent 
too strongly, and this whole passage remained in the draft. Later the empress 
returned to this question again, expressing greater interest in her own clas-
sical education, but also not forgetting to delicately remind her correspondent 
which language had to be the main focus of her attention: “I basically agree 
with you, that soon will come the time that I will have to go to some univer-
sity to study Greek; meanwhile Homer is being translated into Russian; it’s 
always something to make a start” (ibid., 80; she was writing about P. E. 
Ekimov’s prose translation). Ultimately Voltaire had to agree, insofar as Cath-
erine’s position did not permit the continuation of the discussion, but his 
tone clearly expressed disappointment: “If the Greeks had been worthy of 
what you did for them, Greek would today be the universal language; but 
Russian could well take its place” (ibid., 169; Lentin 1974, 142).
In enticing the empress with the throne of Constantinople, giving prefer-
ence to it over Moscow and Petersburg (ibid., 162), and even recalling Peter 
I’s plans for the city (ibid., 191), Voltaire was thinking not so much about the 
Byzantine capital itself as much as about Athens, to which, as he wrote, he was 
“unalterably attached thanks to Sophocles, Euripides, [and] Menander” and to 
“old Anacreon, my colleague” (ibid., 139). He complained that “if you … never-
theless grant peace to Mustapha, what will my poor Greece become, what will 
come of that beautiful land of Demosthenes and Sophocles? I would abandon 
Jerusalem to the Moslems voluntarily; those barbarians were made for the land 
of Ezekiel, Elijah and Caiaphas. But I will always be bitterly grieved to see the 
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Athenian theater turned into a kitchen and the lyceum into a stable” (ibid., 
123). Once in the correspondence he makes a slip and calls Constantinople 
“the city of that nasty Constantine” (ibid., 76). Quite clearly he was not only 
ignorant of and indifferent to the religious motivation of the Russian mission 
in Constantinople, but also openly hostile to it. 
In his correspondence with the empress, the philosophe had to refrain 
from this kind of expression of hostility and to patiently listen to lectures on the 
truly Christian character of the Eastern Church and its inherent tolerance from 
his royal correspondent, who was not noted for her special piety. Here he could 
only permit himself light and respectful sarcasm: “As for me, I am faithful to the 
Greek church, the more so when your beautiful hands in some sense hold the 
censer and you may be seen as the patriarch of all the Russias” (ibid., 118). 
Catherine in fact more than once called herself “head of the Greek church” 
(ibid., 176, 193, etc.), to some extent taking up the ironic intonation of her 
interlocutor and to some extent just confirming the actual state of affairs. Later, 
responding to Catherine’s words about the fact that the Greeks had “degener-
ated” and “love stealing more than liberty” (ibid., 78), Voltaire wrote, “My 
other regret is that the Greeks should be unworthy of the liberty they would 
have recovered, had they had the courage to assist you. I have no further desire 
to read Sophocles, Homer or Demosthenes. I would hate the Greek faith, if 
your Imperial Majesty were not head of that church” (ibid., 155; Lentin 131). 
Nonetheless, in his “Ode on the Current War with Greece” Voltaire did 
not hide from readers that it was precisely the Greek Church that he consid-
ered most responsible for the decline of the ancient heroic spirit: 
There are no more Herculeses
Who would follow after Minerva and Mars,
The fearless conquerors of the Persians
And lovers of all the arts,
Who in both peace and war
Gave an example to the whole earth. … 
But … under the sway of two Theodosiuses
All of the heroes degenerated,
And there are no more apotheoses,
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Except for those of malicious tonsured pedants …
And under the sway of Saint Basil
The descendants of Achilles
Became slaves of the Ottomans. 
(Voltaire XIII, 407)
Voltaire was so carried away by classical Greek models that he even wanted 
military action to be carried out in the antique manner. In his letters, despite his 
obvious lack of competence in military questions, and basing his opinion on 
that of some “old officer,” he stubbornly and almost impudently urged Catherine 
to use “chariots” in her campaigns, which, in his opinion, would be particularly 
effective on the steppes of the Black Sea area (Catherine 1971, 28–29, 45, 48, 
51–52, 71, 187, etc.) Understandably, Catherine did not find it necessary to 
respond to this kind of recommendation. In general, the empress had to restrain 
the militant enthusiasm of her interlocutor, explaining to him that they were 
still far from taking Constantinople (ibid., 76) and that she preferred peace to 
war. However, she fully shared his partiality for the Greek theme. In early 1773 
when the war was winding down and it was more or less clear that the liberation 
of Greece would have to be put off until better times, she wrote to Voltaire, “I 
am now reading the works of Algarotti. He claims that all of the arts and sciences 
were born in Greece. Tell me, I beg of you, is this really true?” (ibid., 180).
Catherine’s interest in this question is fully understandable—if the 
Greeks had been the fathers of the Enlightenment, then the historical signifi-
cance of Russia, so closely connected to them, immeasurably rose. In an 
answering letter, expressing the oft-repeated hope that Count Orlov would 
erect himself a triumphal arch “not in icy regions but in the Istanbul hippo-
drome,” and that Catherine would “give rise in Greece not only to Miltiades 
but also Phidiases,”5 Voltaire nevertheless had to disillusion his august corre-
spondent by stating that the Greeks owed much to ancient Egypt, to the 
Phoenicians, and to India (ibid., 183). This time Catherine reluctantly had to 
agree: “With a few words you have saved me from error: I am now convinced 
5 Miltiades—Athenian general who led his troops to victory over the Persians at the Battle 
of Marathon in 490; Phidias—commonly regarded as one of the greatest sculptors 
of ancient Greece. (Translator’s note)
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that it was not in Greece that the arts were invented. Still, I am upset, because 
I love the Greeks in spite of all their faults” (ibid., 185). 
The empress continued to be interested in the Greeks; in less than a year 
Potemkin’s “Greek system” was destined to become state policy. Voltaire’s influ-
ence on the formation of certain elements of this policy might have been 
significant, but would also have been of a strictly limited nature. From Voltaire 
Catherine might have derived her vision of a liberated Greece as a revived 
kingdom of antiquity, a kind of substitution of Athens for Constantinople. 
However, basic facets of the “Greek Project”—the notion of the complex histor-
ical succession of Greece and Russia, the link between religious and cultural 
succession, the utopian idea of the fraternal union of two empires based on 
their religious and cultural identity—were completely foreign to the French 
philosophe.
In connection to his ideal of enlightened absolutism, Voltaire considered 
the mission of the monarch to bring the light of civilization to barbarian 
peoples. The liberation and enlightenment of Greece was to be the acme of the 
royal path of the “Northern Sermiramis.” “You will doubtless restore the Isthmian 
Games, at which the Romans assured the Greeks their liberty by a public 
decree; and this will be the most glorious act of your life,” he wrote Catherine 
(ibid., 59–60; Lentin 83). Voltaire was concerned with Enlightenment and 
monarchs who sponsored it, but certainly not with Russia and its historical 
destiny. One could argue, perhaps, that from a historical and cultural point of 
view Catherine and Potemkin’s plans belong more to the epoch of Herder 
than to that of the Sage of Ferney. However, the popularity of Herder’s works 
which were published, like those of Winckelmann, in the mid-1760s, had not 
yet reached Russia (see Danilevskii 1980). So Catherine and Potemkin had to 
find inspiration in domestic sources.
 3 
In the fall of 1768 Turkey declared war on Russia. For the empress and her 
advisors the beginning of military action was somewhat unexpected and was 
certainly undesirable. It is not surprising, then, that their ideological interpreta-
tion of the war was somewhat belated, and that at first Catherine resorted to 
hallowed religious themes. The manifesto “On the beginning of war with the 
Ottoman Porte,” signed on November 18, 1768, contained no neoclassicist 
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motifs at all. It speaks of Turkey’s interference in Polish affairs, of the arrest of 
the Russian envoy Obreskov in Constantinople, and about the Muslims’ 
treachery. The empress’s subjects were summoned to “war against the devious 
adversary and enemy of the Christian” (PSZ № 13198). Moreover, the mani-
festo was addressed to all strata of the empire’s population, the majority of 
whom were not capable of appreciating classical allusions. But the authors 
of the first odes on the event, aimed at a far narrower audience, also focused 
their attention on religious themes:
А паче просит вас туда
Народов близкая беда,
Соединенных нам законом,
Они в оковах тяжких там, - 
(The nearby misfortune of peoples / United with us by law / Even more calls 
us there / Where they are in heavy fetters)
Thus wrote M. M. Kheraskov, one of the best known poets of that time. The 
ideological conception of the war was not at all clear as yet to him, and for 
Constantinople he simply substituted not Athens, as did Voltaire, but Jerusalem:
На вечный плач и бедство нам
И нашим в торжество врагам
Сии места, места священны,
Где искупитель наш рожден,
И гроб, чем тартар побежден,
Иноплеменникам врученны.
(To our eternal lament and misfortune / And to the delight of our foes / 
These places, holy places / Where our redeemer was born, / And the grave 
which overcame Hell / Is in the hands of aliens.)
Additionally, Kheraskov directly juxtaposed the vain and empty achievements 
of classical heroes to the new crusade for the faith:
Не для златого нам руна,
Не для прекрасной Андромеды,
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О, Россы! предлежит война
И представляются победы.
Пусть древность суеты поет,
Не гордость вас на брань зовет. (Kheraskov 1769)
([It is] not for a golden fleece, / Not for a beautiful Andromeda, /  
O, Russians, [that] war awaits / And victories summon. / Let the ancients 
sing of vanity, / It is not pride that calls you to arms.)
Then again, the very mention of peoples under the Turkish yoke and the very 
parallel with Greece seemed to hint at future shifts in meaning which were for 
now still under wraps.
In his ode on the declaration of war, Vasilii Petrov, the poet who was 
most influential and closest to the court and who served as the empress’s 
reader and ode-writer, compared the countless horde of “locusts” sent “to the 
North” “by the devotee of Mohammed” (Petrov I, 37) not to the Persian 
troops attacking poor tiny Greece but to the assembly of infidels laying siege 
to ancient Israel. In conformity with Catherine’s political views, and overall in 
conformity with the facts, Petrov attributed Turkey’s decision to declare war 
to French instigation. He depicted the coming campaign as a grandiose battle 
between three points of the compass and the Northern kingdom:
От Юга, Запада, Востока,
Из Мекки и Каира врат,
Где хвально имя лжепророка,
Где Нил шумит, где Тигр, Ефрат,
Уже противники России
Стекаются ко Византии … 
Теснятся предним над Дунаем,
Но задним воинства их краем
В Стамбуле движутся еще. (Ibid., 36)
(From the South, West, East, / From the gates of  Mecca and Cairo, / Where 
the name of the false prophet is praised, / Where the Nile splashes, and the 
Tigris and Euphrates, / The enemies of Russia / Are already gathering 
toward Byzantium … / The troops in front crowd above the Danube, / But 
their rear edge / Still moves in Istanbul.)
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Byzantium, ancient Byzantium, that is, Constantinople, is here called Istanbul 
(Stambul) and is perceived as the center of the Muslim world. A half-year 
later, when news came of the taking of Khotin, in his ode Sergei Domashnev 
likened Byzantium to Mecca and Medina as Asiatic lands that were under 
Muslims’ power and in general belonging to them:
И бегством спасшись в Византию,
Сколь грозно раздражать Россию
Вещай своим потомкам в страх,
Да зрят неверством ослепленны
Знамена Росски водруженны
Хотина ныне на стенах,
Стеня по всем странам Азийским,
Рассыпьте страх и трепет свой … 
И в Мекку идя и в Медину,
Оплачьте черную годину
И беззакония свои. (Domashnev 1769)
(And saving themselves by flight to Byzantium, / How dangerous to annoy 
Russia / Let your descendants know and fear / And let them see, blinded by 
infidelity, / Russia’s banners unfurled / Today on Khotin’s walls. / Groaning 
throughout Asian lands, / Spread your fear and trembling … / And going 
to Mecca and to Medina/ Bewail the black event / And your lawless acts.)
In another ode on the taking of Khotin, Fedor Kozel’skii compared the ancient 
Greeks not with Russians but with Turks:
Афины рвали так союз,
Спокойство мира отвергая
И от смиренных Сиракуз
Презорно око отвращая.
Витийства движет там разврат
Буян возжег Алцибиад. (Kozel’skii I, 64)
(Athens thus rent the alliance, / Rejecting the world’s tranquility / And from 
the humble people of Syracuse / Disdainfully turned away its eye. / 
Debauchery there informs eloquence / The bullies were inflamed by 
Alcibiades.)
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However, in Petrov’s ode to the same event new accents appear, if tentatively 
and in the background. Precisely thirty years earlier, in 1739, Russian troops 
had taken Khotin once before. That victory had been the subject of 
Lomonosov’s famous ode in which he described the battle as a cosmic clash 
between the sons of Russia “chosen for labor” and the “tribe of an outcast 
slave,” Hagar (Lomonosov 1986, 62). A pupil of Lomonosov, Petrov used this 
obvious parallel to give his poem an unusually powerful Old Testament charge:
Приникни с высоты престола,
О Боже, на дела земли,
Воззри, средь освященна дола
Враги завета возлегли … 
Но, прелагаяй море в сушу,
Вещает Сильный от небес:
Я скиптр дарю, я царства рушу,
Вся тварь полна моих чудес … 
Восстани днесь, восстань Деввора,
Преступны грады разори … 
Не бойся, я защитник твой.
Моей десницей чудотворной
Казнен египтянин упорный.
Восстала се, полки предводит,
Разит преступников гоня,
На храм Софийский се нисходит
Дух Божий в образе огня.
Прими, несчастна Византия,
Тот свет от Россов, кой Россия
Прияла прежде от тебя,
Приимешь, узришь в нем себя.
(Come down from your throne’s height, / O God, and look at matters on 
earth: / Amid the consecrated vale / Enemies of your testament repose … // 
But, turning sea into dry land / The Powerful One announces from the 
heavens:/ I give the scepter, I destroy kingdoms, / All creation is filled with my 
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wonders … / Arise today, arise Deborah, / Ravage lawless cities … / Do not 
fear, I am your defender. / With my miraculous right hand / The stubborn 
Egyptian was chastened. //It arose, led the regiments, / Smote the offenders, 
driving them away, / Descended to the Sophia Temple / Divine Spirit in the 
image of fire. / Unhappy Byzantium, accept / This light from the Russians, 
which Russia / Earlier accepted from you, / Take it, you will see yourself in it.)
Behind this traditional biblical rhetoric, taken to an emotional extreme, one 
may already see an entire complex of new motifs—Constantinople, with 
the Hagia Sophia as the goal of the war; Russia’s returning to Byzantium the 
divine grace it had once been given; and the liberated country’s acquisition of 
itself as a gift from Russia. But Petrov kept his most important conceptual inno-
vations for the final stanza:
С торжественныя колесницы
Простри на юг свои зарницы … 
Орлы твои Афин достигнут
И вольность Греции воздвигнут,
Там новый возгремит Пиндар
Российския победы дар,
Несчетны воспоют народы
Тебя, виновницу свободы. 
(Petrov I, 44–49)
(From your triumphant chariot / Spread your rays to the south … / Your 
eagles will reach Athens / And establish Greece’s freedom, / There a new 
Pindar will resound / The gift of Russian victory / Countless peoples will 
sing out praise / For you, their liberator.)
This ode, overflowing with religious symbolism and attributes, also culmi-
nates in classical motifs. The final result of God’s intervention in human 
events is the freedom of Greece and hymns by the new Pindar. In Petrov’s 
next ode “On the Taking of Iassy,” written in the same year of 1769, the 
ancient Greek coloration is even stronger:
Воззри – несчастные народы, 
Где Пинд стоит, Олимп, Парнас,
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Лишенные драгой свободы,
К тебе возносят взор и глас. …
Спокойся днесь, геройско племя,
И жди с терпением премен,
Приспеет вожделенно время,
Ваш, Греки, раязрешится плен.
Вы дух явили благодарный,
Когда вам римлянин коварный
Свободу мниму даровал:
Ни пользы требуя, ни хвал,
Вам лучшу даст Екатерина. (Ibid., 58)
(Look, unhappy peoples / Where stand the Pindus, Olympus, Parnassus, / 
Bereft of cherished freedom, / They turn their gaze and voice to you … // 
Be calm now, heroic tribe, / And await changes with patience, / The desired 
time will arrive / And, Greeks, your captivity will end. / You showed a 
grateful spirit / When the deceitful Roman / Granted you false freedom: / 
Without demanding service or praise / Catherine will give you better [i.e., 
the real thing].) 
Petrov recalled the privileges that the Romans granted the Greeks during the 
Olympic (Isthmian) Games and juxtaposed them to the blessings that 
the Russian empress would give to them; this was almost a year before 
Voltaire made the same comparison in his letter to Catherine (see above). In 
his odes of the second half of 1769, the poet partly grasped and partly 
foresaw and anticipated the change that was about to occur in the official 
interpretation of the goals and idea of the war. This change was without any 
doubt connected to Aleksei Orlov’s naval expedition.
 4 
The idea of equipping a naval squadron in the rear of the Turks and of encour-
aging the Orthodox peoples living in the Mediterranean (Greeks and Southern 
Slavs) to rebel—had been suggested by Catherine’s then-favorite Grigorii 
Orlov in early November 1768, before the signing of the declaration of war. 
At that time his brother Aleksei Orlov wrote to him about the tasks of that kind 
of expedition and of the war as a whole: “If we go, then go to Constantinople 
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and liberate all of the Orthodox and all the devout from their heavy yoke. I’ll 
put it like Sovereign Peter I said in his document (gramota): drive those infidel 
Mohammedans into the sandy steppes, back to their former abode. And 
godliness will reign there again, and we will say glory to our omnipotent God” 
(Orlov 1870, 142; Barsukov 1873, 61–62; cf. Solov’ev XIV, 269–272; Petrov A. 
1869, 97–106). At the beginning of 1769 Catherine reported to Aleksei Orlov 
that manifestoes “for the purpose of raising Christian inhabitants up in revolt” 
were already prepared and she recommended that he “find people who have 
excellent credit among the godly Greek and Orthodox peoples” (SbRIO I, 5, 
14). That summer the navy left Kronstadt, circumnavigating Europe on its way 
to the Mediterranean Sea.
In an old monograph by V. A. Ulianitskii, it was shown that the organizers 
and ideologists of the expedition constantly vacillated about its purpose. If the 
Orlovs actually strove primarily to liberate fellow believers and to unite them 
under a Russian protectorate, Catherine saw in the navy’s task of raising a 
rebellion in the enemy’s rear more of a military diversion and let herself be 
carried away by far-reaching plans to a much lesser extent. It seems that for a 
long time the empress did not really believe in the naval expedition’s prospects 
for overall success and concerned herself mainly with its narrowly military 
purposes. However, even the more radical plans that the Orlovs promoted 
bear only a faint resemblance to the future “Greek Project.” Rather, they look 
like a continuation of Russia’s traditional policy toward Constantinople, based 
on religious gravitation toward the capital of the Eastern Church and the 
desire to unite all fellow believers under its aegis. It is significant in this 
regard that the Greeks are only mentioned in the Orlovs’ plans together with 
other Orthodox peoples of southern Europe (Ulianitskii 1883, 107–130; 
cf. Smilianskaia 1996, 88–98).
“The uprising of each people separately,… without causing the enemy 
significant harm (and, even worse, causing them some kind of useful diver-
sion) which alone should be our primary goal, would only serve to open the 
Turks’ eyes,” Catherine instructed Orlov before the start of the expedition 
(SbIRIO I, 6), and in early 1770 when prospects for an uprising in Greece 
seemed rather uncertain, she encouraged him: “Despite the fact that over 
centuries of slavery and deceit the corrupt Greeks have betrayed their 
own interests, our mere naval diversion alone is sufficient to upset all of the 
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Turkish-held regions of Europe” (ibid., 35). Moreover, Orlov’s first successes 
in the summer of 1770 and the diplomatic situation that seemed favorable to 
her gave the empress hope for more significant gains. She informed Orlov,
To Our special and honest delight we know on good authority that all of 
the impartial powers of the Christian republic take justice to be on our 
side, and that this most general support keeps our enemies in check against 
their will and inclination. … It is necessary … that you, having united 
various Greek peoples under your leadership, make of them something 
visible as quickly as possible … that would appear to the world as a new 
and complete people, and that this new body, constituted by a public 
act…, and thus declaring its political right to exist (politicheskoe svoe 
bytie), would echo throughout the entire Christian republic with this kind 
of message: … That the numerous Greek peoples, by God’s will subjected 
to the heavy yoke of Hagarene iniquity … [have] joined together, consti-
tuting a new member of the Christian republic. … (Ibid., 41)
The phrase “Christian republic” is repeated here three times on one page. 
This formula derives from a very precise source—from the idea of a confed-
eration of Christian nations of Europe that was supposedly proposed to the 
French King Henry IV at the start of the seventeenth century by his minister 
the Duke de Sully and laid out in the last volume of his memoirs. Catherine 
highly esteemed both Henry and Sully. She ordered their busts from the 
sculptor Marie-Anne Collot, who had accompanied E. Falconet to Russia at 
the time of his work on the monument to Peter I (SbIRIO XVIII, 37). When 
Voltaire wrote to Catherine that he awaited meeting Peter the Great in 
heaven, she answered that for her part she dreamed of meeting Henry and 
Sully (Catherine 1971, 51). In this very year of 1770, a translation of Sully’s 
ten-volume memoirs (Zapiski), which Catherine had specially ordered from 
the translator M. I. Verevkin, began publication in Russia.
It is significant that Sully, who was not fully sure that Russians were 
Christians, was skeptical about the possibility of Russia taking part in his 
proposed Christian republic which was to guarantee eternal peace in Europe:
If the grand prince of Muscovy, or Russian tsar, whom writers consider an 
ancient Scythian ruler, refuses to participate in the common agreement which 
would be proposed to him in advance, then we should deal with him as with 
the Turkish sultan, that is, take back all of his possessions in Europe, and drive 
him into Asia, so that without any of our involvement (soprimeshenie) he 
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could continue his almost never-ending war with the Turks and Persians for as 
long as he wants. (Sully X, 364, 360–361)
Sully wanted to propose that Russia take its place either in the Christian 
republic of European states or in Asia, along with “the Turkish sultan.” For 
Catherine, Russia’s place on the global political map was certain. She had no 
doubt that Russia had already earned a worthy place in Europe and now herself 
planned to lock the sultan away in Asia and to add a “new body” to the Chris-
tian republic—Greece, restored “under Russia’s protection.” 
However, despite its brilliant victory in the Chesme encounter, the navel 
expedition did not bring the desired results. In essence, the Russian forces had 
to abandon the Greeks to the vicissitudes of fate. Aleksei Orlov, who had made 
such monumental plans, tended to blame the Greeks themselves for what 
had happened, because in his opinion they had not shown sufficient bravery 
and military discipline, and had preferred plunder to a war for liberation:
The local peoples are smooth-talking, deceptive, inconstant, impudent 
and cowardly, lusting after money and whatever they can get. … Credulity 
and flightiness, fear at the name of the Turk—are not the last qualities of 
our coreligionists. … They profess the law only with their lips, not having 
even a faint outline of Christian virtues in their hearts. They are possessed 
by servility and the yoke of Turkish rule … as well as by crass ignorance. 
These are the reasons which eliminate hope of their producing some kind 
of well-founded armed action for their own good. (SbIRIO I, 43; Solov’ev 
XIV, 358–363) 
The Russian navy abandoned Morea without achieving its goals. It might seem 
that plans for Greece’s rebirth and even more so, the notion of the Greeks as 
descendants of ancient heroes that Voltaire constantly suggested to Catherine 
would have died down, if only for a time. However, in fact it was during these 
very years that the opposite occurred. The cultural mechanisms set in motion 
by the naval expedition began to function independently and hardly depended 
at all on immediate military and political considerations.
 5 
On May 16/27, 1770, Catherine notified Voltaire of the expedition’s first 
successes. Russian sailors landed in continental Greece, joined with the 
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rebellious Greeks, and split into eastern and northern Spartan legions. The first 
headed off to liberate the territory of ancient Sparta, the second moved into 
Arcadia. In an encounter on the Isthmus of Corinth, the commander of the 
Turkish garrison was captured. “Here is Greece on the point of becoming free 
again,” concluded the empress, “but it is still very far from being that which it 
was. At the same time it is pleasant to hear the names of places which so filled 
our ears in our youth” (Ekaterina 1971, 56). 
Catherine formulated the essence of the case perfectly. In the course of 
almost a half century, Russian culture, having assimilated European norms, 
had persistently dressed itself in classical attire, comparing its heroes to the 
ancient ones, judging its achievements by the degree of equivalence to 
Greek and Roman models. In the discourse of the time, the words “Sparta,” 
“Athens,” and “Arcadia” did not signify any geographical reality but rather 
served as a reflection of absolute perfection. Now the Russian squadron 
headed to this never-existent land, to the Golden Age, a habitation of gods 
and heroes. By the very coupling of their names with mythological 
toponymics, the participants in the expedition, and first of all its leaders, of 
course, were likened to the ancient inhabitants of these places and trans-
formed into classical heroes. 
Petrov was the first to sense the possibilities of reviving school mythology 
and turning it into political reality, and he began to load his odes with 
Hellenistic references, even while the Russian squadron stood at roadstead in 
Portsmouth patching up the ships that had been battered on the way from 
Kronstadt. The landing on the coast inspired a burst of poetic imagination. 
His ode “On the Victories in Morea” was just as overflowing with classical 
images as the Khotin ode was with biblical ones, and was just as emotionally 
overcharged:
Уж взят, он [Орлов] мнит Модон, Коринф   
   предастся вскоре,
Аркадию пленят, а я eщe на море. — 
Герой! не негодуй: твой жребий не приспел.
Тебе осталися Фессальския долины,
   Вход черныя пучины 
   И ужас Дарданелл. … 
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О коль нечаянна, коль дивна там премена! 
Спартане, распустив российские знамена, 
Разносят по всему Пелопонису страх. 
B участие войны окрестных созывают 
   И слезы проливают 
   С оружием в руках. 
Колико, — вопиют, — о небо, мы счастливы! 
Герои наши днесь в прибывших россах живы! 
Сколь кроток оных нам, коль грозен туркам вид! 
Аргольцы, навпляне, к сражению устройтесь, 
   Коринфяне, не бойтесь 
   Во Спарте Леонид. 
(Modon is already taken, thinks he [Orlov], Corinth will soon give in, / 
They’ll capture Arcadia, but I am still at sea. / Hero! Don’t rage—your lot 
has yet to be drawn. / The Thessalian valleys have been left for you, /The 
entrance to the Black Sea (chernyia puchiny) / And the terror of the Darda-
nelles. … // Oh, how unexpected, how amazing the change! / The Spartans, 
unfurling Russian banners, / Terrify the entire Peloponnesus. / They 
summon the locals to join the war / And shed copious tears / With weapons 
in their hands. // How fortunate, they wail, are we, o heaven! / Our heroes 
are alive today in the Russians who have come! / How humble they are 
toward us, how terrible their sight to the Turks! / The inhabitants of Argos 
and Nauplia prepare for war, / Corinthians, do not fear—/ Leonidas is in 
Sparta. )
The music of Greek toponyms worked “amazing changes.” Under Russian 
banners Spartans again became Spartans. Greece revived, for with the 
Russians’ arrival, the Spartan heroes, with Leonidas-Orlov at their head, 
have come alive. Russians on this holy land turn into Greeks, in order to 
restore Greece at last. The arrival of the Russian navy promises a Golden 
Age like that described in Voltaire’s letters to Catherine. Recall that the 
empress had asked Voltaire if the Greeks really were the fathers of the arts 
and sciences. For Petrov this does not raise the slightest doubt:
Но о, отцы наук, порабощенны греки! 
Утешьтесь, паки вам златы начнутся веки. 
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Достанет и до вас счастливая чредаг 
Алфейски Зрелища, умолкнувши поныне, 
   В честь Екатерине 
   Восставьте навсегда. 
По ним свои лега опять считать начните 
И имени ея начало посвятите. 
Она за подвиги вам будет мзды дарить 
Во храме вольности, покоя и отрады 
   Вы образ сей Паллады 
   Век должны жертвой чтить. 
A Ты, смиряюща неистовство тирана, 
Законодавица, победами венчанна, 
Возьми скрижаль и суд полудню возвести: 
Во область, где цвели Ликурги и Солоны, 
   Пошли свои законы, 
   Их будут век чести. 
(Petrov I, 74–77)
(But, oh, fathers of the sciences, enslaved Greeks! / Be comforted, the 
golden ages will begin again for you, / Your happy turn is also coming. / 
Alpheius’ spectacles,6 fallen silent until today / You, in honor of Catherine, / 
Will reestablish for all time. // You will again begin to count the years by 
them, / And dedicate their start to her name. / She, in reward for your deeds, 
will give recompense / In the temple of freedom, peace and joy; / You must 
do honor to the image of this Pallas / With sacrifices, for an age. // But you, 
who subdued the fierceness of the tyrant, / Lawgiver, crowned with victo-
ries, / Take up the tablet and announce justice to noon; / To the lands where 
Lycurguses and Solons flourished, / Send laws / / And they will be honored 
forever.) 
Catherine is not only named in the fully traditional way as Pallas (Athena) or 
Minerva, but also here becomes an Olympian goddess whose image should 
be the object of worship in a resurrected Greek temple—judging by the 
6 A reference to the Olympic Games, as Olympia was located on the river Aphaieus (also: 
Aphaeus, Alphaois). 
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description, clearly a pagan one. The metaphor of repaying a debt is translated 
from the sphere of religion into that of lawgiving. The Russian empress is called 
to bring benefits with her laws (Petrov of course has in mind the Instruction for 
the Commission to Create a New Law Code) to the land of lawgiving, “the region 
where Lycurguses and Solons flourished.” 
Petrov’s arch literary rival Vasilii Maikov sketches the future of Greece in 
the very same spirit:
Подателей Вселенной света 
Екатерина просветит, 
Изгонит чтущих Maroмета 
И паки греков утвердит. 
Науки падши там восстанут. 
Невежды гордые увянут, 
Как листвия в осенни дни. 
Не будет Греции примера; 
Одна с Россиею в ней вера, 
Законы будут с ней одни. 
(Maikov 1770)
(Catherine will enlighten / The bearers of light to the Universe, / Drive off 
those who revere Mohammed / And again establish the Greeks. / The fallen 
sciences will again arise, / Proud ignoramuses will fade away, / Like leaves 
on autumn days. / Greece will have no equal; / Of one faith with Russia, / 
She will now have the same laws.) 
If Petrov, as the empress apparently did herself, held relatively unclear views 
concerning Greece’s future—the Greeks might admire Catherine and her laws, 
either as her subjects or simply worshipping their divine perfection—for 
Maikov there were no doubts on this score. He did not doubt that the Golden 
Age would return to Greece when it successfully merged into the Russian 
Empire:
Под властию Екатерины 
По всем брегам прекрасны крины 
И горды лавры возрастут. 
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Польются с гор ручьи прозрачны, 
И роши и долины злачны 
Сторичный плод ей принесут. (Ibid.)
(Under Catherine’s aegis / Beautiful lilies and proud laurels / Will swell on 
all the banks, / Transparent streams will flow from the mountains, / And the 
green groves and valleys / Will bear her fruit a hundredfold.) 
The fierce enmity between Petrov and Maikov (see Gukovskii 1927, 
143–147), who at about this time referred to his literary foe in the poem 
“Elisei” as a “louse” (pliugavets) (Maikov 1966, 89), behooves us to pay 
special attention to such convergences. The nymphs who in Maikov’s ode are 
“strolling in the bushes, singing Russia’s victory” and Parnassus that “summons 
the Russes to rally” are by no means perceived by the author as related to 
Petrov’s odic practice. Arguably, Petrov voiced the change that we have been 
noting earlier and more powerfully than others. But in the odes celebrating 
Aleksei Orlov’s victory in July 1770 in Chesme Bay, the spread of such 
imagery acquired epidemic proportions. 
Catherine herself, reporting on the new victory to Voltaire, wrote, 
“Alexei Orlov, having defeated the enemy fleet, has burned it all to ashes in 
the port of Chesme, the ancient Clazomenae” (Ekaterina 1971, 74; Lentin 
1974, 87). Similar rhetorical parallels appeared in Maikov’s ode already 
cited as well as in those by Domashnev (1770) and Kheraskov (1770), that 
is, in the work of poets who a year or more earlier had already juxtaposed the 
achievements of Russian heroes to legendary classical exploits. Kheraskov 
even redoubled the series of historical prototypes for the recent Russian 
naval victories by augmenting the classical genealogy with the national, 
thereby equating them:
Я вижу афинейцев новых 
У саламисских берегов; 
O! муза, вобрази Орловых, 
Гоняших целый флот врагов. … 
Я вижу, будто в древни лета 
Единоборца Пересвета, 
Биющася с его врагом. … 
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Так две громады преужасны
Слетелись в море пред собой. 
(Kheraskov 1770)
(I see the new Athenians / On the shores of Salamis; / Oh muse, imaging the 
Orlovs / Driving off a whole enemy fleet. … / I imagine how in ancient 
times / Peresvet in single combat / Fighting with the foe. … // Thus two 
most terrible masses / Clashed together on the sea.)
These odes were written more or less directly after the unprecedented victory, 
but after two years two much longer works appeared that were also dedi-
cated to this event: Kheraskov’s epic poem “The Battle of Chesme” and Pavel 
Potemkin’s drama “The Russes in the Archipelago.” By this time the Russian 
navy had already abandoned Morea and the expedition’s failure was completely 
obvious, but these things had no effect at all on the general conception of 
either author. Furthermore, even in more balanced genres that were composed 
at a greater historical distance from these events, the vision of political reality 
that had gushed from the odes took on a consistent and formulaic character.
Figure 2 “Allegory of the Victory of Chesme” (1771) by Theodorus de Roode. 
Tretiakov Gallery, Moscow.
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Во славе где сиял Божественный закон
И вера на столпах воздвигла светлый трон. 
Где храмы вознесли главы свои златые 
Курился фимиам и с ним мольбы святые 
Где муз божественных был слышен прежде глас 
Где зрелся Геликон, где древний цвел Парнас, 
В стране, исполненной бессмертных нам  
   примеров 
В отечестве богов, Ликургов и Гомеров 
He песни сладкие вспевают музы днесь, 
Парнас травой зарос, опустошился весь. 
Герои славные в Афинах на родятся,
Во Спарте мудрые законы не твердятся. … 
Святые здания в пустыни преврашенны… 
(Kheraskov 1961, 144)
(There where the Divine law shone in glory / And faith erected a bright 
throne on columns, / Where temples raised their golden heads, / And 
incense rose together with holy prayers, / Where the voice of the divine 
muses was formerly heard / Where Helicon was seen, where ancient 
Parnassus bloomed, / In a land filled with immortal models for us, / In the 
homeland of the gods, Lycurguses and Homers, / Today the muses sing no 
sweet songs, / Parnassus is overgrown with weeds, completely devastated. / 
Glorious heroes are not being born in Athens, / In Sparta no wise laws are 
devised. … / The holy buildings have been turned to waste…)
The relaxed and calm enumerating intonation with which the poet almost 
unnoticeably—with a comma—moves from religious imagery to the clas-
sical, is remarkable. At the same time, one and the same epithet is used to 
characterize both the one and the other. For Kheraskov the “Divine” law and 
the “divine” muses merge into a single semantic progression. 
Then the appearance of Russian ships on Greek shores completely changes 
the situation:
Там, кажется, встают Ахиллы, Мильтиады,… 
Уж храбрость вспыхнула во греческих сердцах. 
Почти умершая в неволе и цепях,… 
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Увидит Греция Парнас возобновленный. 
(Ibid., 152)
(There, it seems, [new] Achilleses and Miltiadeses rise up,… / Bravery, that 
had almost died in bondage and in chains / Burst into flame in Greek 
hearts,… / Greece will see Parnassus revived.)
The same construction, with emphasis on the same semantic elements, is devel-
oped in Potemkin’s play, too. Here Aleksei Orlov converses with the leader of 
the Greeks, named Bukoval, who greets the liberator, declaring to him:
Герой полночных стран, в ком греки представляют 
Иракловы дела и Россов прославляют, 
Дай помощь нам своей геройския руки. 
(Hero of the midnight lands, in whom Greeks see / Hercules’s deeds and 
glorify the Russes, / Give help to us with your heroic hand.)
Orlov is ready to “give help” but he is disturbed by the Greeks’ own readiness to 
reconcile themselves with oppression, and he addresses Bukoval with a fiery 
reminder of the sufferings that his people endured from the Turks and with 
bitter reproaches:
Воспомяните вы падение Афин, 
Насилие врагов, свирепство и тиранство, 
Все претерпело там несчастно христианство. … 
Являет все теперь чрез множество премен, 
Что греческий народ геройских чувств лишен. 
(You must remember the fall of Athens, / The enemies’ violence, fierceness 
and tyranny, / There Christianity miserably endured everything. … // Now, 
after many changes, it becomes clear / That the Greek people is lacking in 
heroic feelings.)
In Orlov’s monologue Christianity “endured” more than anything in Athens. 
He does not distinguish between Athens and the “capital city” Constantinople, 
whose capture by the Turks was mentioned just before. His words completely 
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convince Bukoval, reviving the spirit of the ancient Spartans in him and his 
warriors: 
Надежду днесь свою имея на тебя, 
Всему, что повелишь, подвергнем мы себя. 
Ты вожделенные восставишь паки веки, 
Мы те же, государь, что были прежде Греки. … 
Твои доброты нас и Росских войск геройство 
Одушевляют всех, дая нам прежни свойства. 
(Today, placing all our hope in you, / We will subject ourselves to everything 
you command. / You restore those longed-for times again. / We, my lord, are 
the same as the Greeks were formerly. … / Your goodness to us and the 
heroism of the Russian troops / Inspire us all, imparting to us our former 
qualities.)
The ideological basis for the “Greek Project” was thus established. More-
over, Pavel Potemkin was the cousin and close associate of the future favorite, 
Grigorii Potemkin, and Petrov was his old and close friend, with whom he 
constantly corresponded during these years when he was serving in Rumiant-
sev’s army, and it was through Petrov that he maintained contact with the 
empress (see Shliapkin 1885, 398). Knowing Potemkin’s literary interests, it 
is natural to suppose that he would have been an attentive reader of works 
written by people who were close to him and dedicated to events that greatly 
concerned him. For it was precisely Potemkin who was to transform this 
system of poetic metaphors into a comprehensive political program. 
 6 
One of the curious phenomena of Russian literary life of the 1770s was the 
active participation of literary men of Greek origin—Grigorii Baldan, Evgenii 
Bulgaris, Antonii Palladoklis (“native of Mitelene,” as he signed his works)—
and others. The most important of these authors, Bulgaris, came to Russia in 
1771. The author of a monograph on him, Stephen Batalden, directly links his 
invitation to the naval expedition. Among Bulgaris’s first literary projects 
undertaken in Russia was the translation of a series of works by Voltaire on 
the Russo-Turkish War into Greek (see Batalden 1982, 119–120).
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These poets knew Russian to various degrees; some wrote their works 
both in Russian and in Greek, others translated them into Russian, and also, in 
turn, translated works by Russian poets into their native tongue. It became 
usual practice to issue bilingual publications with facing Russian and Greek 
texts. In general, the rhetorical models that the Greek authors worked out fully 
coincided with those used by their Russian colleagues, although one may note 
several significant nuances. 
In 1771 a short poem by Palladoklis appeared entitled “Verses on the 
Greek Clothing that Her Imperial Majesty Deigned to Wear at a Masquerade.” 
We do not know exactly what the empress’s masquerade costume was, but the 
author clearly compares it with that of Olympiada, the mother of Alexander 
the Great: 
В монархине кипя, усердие к Элладе 
В одежду облекло, что на Олимпиаде. 
Самодержавна, в ту одета, так гласит: 
В чьей одежде я хожу так облеченна. 
Той я усердствую, за ту же ополченна. 
Великий Александр, кой сел на персов троне,
Великую, — он рек, — Екатерину зрю 
В одежде матерней. … О! Ты небес царю 
Сподобна, дай узреть ту и в моей короне, 
Так торжествующу над Мустафой строптивым, 
Как я вознес главу над Дарием кичливым. 
Как равну мне копьем и духа красотой. 
(Palladoklis 1771a; see the variations on these  
motifs in Palladoklis 1771)
(The monarch’s seething zeal for the Hellenes / Has clothed her in the attire 
of Olimpiada; / The autocratrix, dressed thus, declares: / Who can extin-
guish my fervor / For the one in whose garments I go clothed / The one for 
whom I strive, and arm myself? / Great Alexander, who sat on the Persians’ 
throne, / I see Great Catherine, he spake, / In mother’s clothes. … Oh! You, 
tsar of heaven, / Let me see her also wear my crown, / As one who loves us 
with heartfelt purity, / Conquering obstinate Mustapha, / Just as I triumphed 
over arrogant Darius, / As an equal to me in spirit and lance.) 
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Palladoklis compares Catherine both to Alexander the Great and his mother, 
simultaneously depicting her as a heroine and as mother of heroes. What is 
more important, he finds a clear historical prototype for her military accom-
plishments. The parallel between Russians and Greeks almost automatically 
caused Russian poets to compare Turks with the Persians, the long-time 
enemies of ancient Greece. S. Domashnev recalled “the most glorious Battle 
of Marathon” and the “awesome clash of Thermopylae, where Persian strength 
waned” (Domashnev 1770); Kheraskov wrote that “again Xerxes has sallied 
forth against the ancient Athenians, but awaits the same fate on their shores” 
(Kheraskov 1961, 153); and Petrov drew the very same parallel:
Остатки Перских сил где Греками разбиты. 
Там Россы, лаврами бессмертными покрыты, 
За греков с Мустафой кровавый бой вели … 
(Petrov I, 85)
(Where the remnants of Persian power were crushed by the Greeks / There 
the Russes [Russians], covered with immortal laurels, / Gave bloody battle 
against Mustapha for the Greeks…)
However, in all of these poems and in the majority of other works the compar-
ison was to the wars the Greek republics, primarily Athens and Sparta, waged 
against the Persians. Combining this historical parallel with that of Alexander 
the Great offered a whole series of undeniable advantages. Most importantly, it 
put the emphasis on the military actions as aggressive and even aimed at 
conquest. If Leonidas and Themistocles were only defending the Greek land 
from invasion, Alexander was spreading classical culture into new territories. 
Moreover, references to Alexander the Great’s empire allowed them to establish 
something like a line of succession between ancient Greece and Byzantium, 
which significantly facilitated the main logical substitution on which contem-
porary rhetoric was based. 
And finally, the most important thing: the comparison of Russian with an 
empire allowed them to remove, or at least to downplay, the republican subtext 
that was latent in the association with ancient Greece. The Russian empress 
could not declare herself the historical heir to the rulers of ancient Athens, while 
Alexander the Great unquestionably served the role of a predecessor and model. 
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The same Palladoklis worked out this parallel in detail in the brochure 
The Achievement of True Government (Istinnogo gosudarstvovaniia podvig), 
published in 1773. Here he reviewed all of Alexander the Great’s merits—he 
spread enlightenment into Asia, united many peoples under his aegis, was 
severe toward his enemies and merciful to the defeated, built cities and devel-
oped commerce, attracted to himself philosophers, natural scientists and 
artists, patronized art and science. The author espied all of these virtues, in an 
even greater degree, in Catherine. Thus he concluded this juxtaposition:
Престань ты, древний век, пред нами величаться 
И Александровой толь славой отличаться, 
(Palladoklis 1773, 16)
(Cease, ancient age, to magnify yourself before us / And to flaunt Alexan-
der’s so great glory - )
Palladoklis crowned his discussion by shifting from Alexander the Great to Constan-
tine the Great and a parallel between Catherine’s current victories and Constantine’s 
triumph over Maxentius. In the very same way, in his epic poem “Calliope,” written 
after hostilities ceased, he made the Persian King Darius express joy in the kingdom 
of the dead that his throne had gone to Alexander. And then Otman, legendary 
founder of the Ottoman Empire, “pronounces Darius’s words from his lips”:
Если приближился моей державе срок 
И твердо положил неумолимый рок 
Мне больше не носить короны Константина, 
Да будет в ней властна отсель Екатерина! 
(Palladoklis 1775, 72)
(If my empire nears its term / And implacable fate has firmly decreed / That 
I will no longer wear Constantine’s crown, / Then from now on let Catherine 
assume its power!)
Thus—as another Greek poet, Evgenii Bulgaris, put it, also in 1775—the new 
Alexander was expected to drive the “Saracen tribe” (i.e., the Turks) “from 
Constantine’s throne” and into “the barren Caucasus peaks, into the waterless 
Arabian wilds,” and to liberate this throne for a new Constantine.
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 7 
From the moment of his christening, the political significance of Grand 
Prince Konstantin Pavlovich’s name was obvious to everyone. In fact the 
ideology of the “Greek Project” had already been implicit two years earlier in 
the name given to his elder brother, the future Emperor Alexander I. In prin-
ciple, the tradition established over the course of many decades made it seem 
obvious that Paul I would be succeeded by Peter IV. Authors of odes on his 
first marriage addressed the grand princess:
К тебе Россия возглашает 
Дай нам великого Петра. 
(Sumarokov II, 125)
(Russia summons you / Give us a great Peter.)
Or:
… от Павловой любви 
Другого нам Петра яви. 
(Kheraskov 1773)
(… from Paul’s love / Make another Peter appear to us.)
The name Alexander was a kind of nominative masterpiece on the part of 
Catherine, who was always attentive to this kind of symbolism. On the one 
hand, her eldest grandson’s patron saint was Alexander Nevskii, the protector 
of St. Petersburg; thus the line of succession in relation to Peter the Great’s 
political line was fully satisfied. On the other hand, one can clearly make out 
another, southern prototype for the “youth born to the purple,” born “in the 
North.” Soon after Konstantin’s birth in a letter to Grimm, the empress under-
took to quell rumors proliferating in Europe: “Is it permissible to interpret in 
this way simple names that are given at christening? One must have a 
disturbed imagination to find fault with this, should I have named mister A 
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and mister K Nikodim or Faddei? The name-day saint of the first is located in 
his native city, and the second was born several days after his saint’s holiday. 
… So it is all very simple” (SbRIO XXIII, 147). Denying the obvious, the 
meaning of the name Constantine, the empress made the less obvious name 
of his elder brother transparent. Three years later she described her lessons 
with her five-year-old grandson to the same correspondent: “Mister Alex-
ander keeps demanding new reading from me. … Recently he became 
acquainted with Alexander the Great and asked me to introduce him in 
Figure 3 “Portrait of the Grand Princes Alexander Pavlovich and Konstantin 
Pavlovich” (c. 1781) by Richard Brompton.
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person. He was very vexed when he found out that he was already dead; he 
is very sorry for him” (ibid., 252). Little Alexander was required to revere 
Alexander the Great because he was destined to take his place. 
This letter to Grimm was written at the end of 1782, when a lively corre-
spondence was taking place between the Petersburg and Viennese courts 
concerning the revival of the Eastern Empire, and Potemkin was preparing to 
occupy the Crimea. The Russian dream of Constantinople was already firmly 
harnessed to the classical chariot.
 1 
The peace of Kuchuk Kainarji which concluded the Russo-Turkish War in 1774 was extremely favorable to Russia. Apart from several territo-
rial acquisitions and tariff-free transport throughout the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles, Russia received the right of remonstrance on behalf of coreli-
gionists in the Ottoman Empire; that is, it was in essence recognized as the 
protector of Orthodox believers outside its borders. This provided the basis 
for Russia’s further expansion in the northern Black Sea coast and eastern 
Mediterranean, whose plans acquired the status of state policy in the form 
of Potemkin’s “Eastern System” and the “Greek Project” of Potemkin and 
Bezborodko.
Nonetheless, Catherine did not manage to achieve all of the goals that she 
and her entourage had set themselves during the most successful phases of 
the military campaign. First of all, despite Aleksei Orlov’s naval expedition, 
Greece remained under Turkish control. Additionally, over the course of the 
war the empress’s plans had encountered serious obstacles, which in turn 
plagued Russia’s Eastern policy. Designs for Russia’s military, political and 
diplomatic expansion into southeastern Europe came up against the stubborn 
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resistance of many European powers which not only did not want to support 
Christian Russia, but also to a greater or lesser extent took Turkey’s side. 
V. P. Petrov undertook one of the first attempts to explain this conflict 
ideologically in his 1775 “Ode on the Conclusion of Peace with the Ottoman 
Porte.” Petrov’s role in working out the intellectual and cultural bases of 
Russian’s Eastern policy was exceptionally important. While in celebrating the 
peace other Russian ode writers mainly stayed within the bounds of those 
metaphorical schemes from Petrov’s odes of 1769 and 1770, Petrov himself 
strove further. He endeavored to comprehend the new situation in which 
Russia found herself after signing the peace treaty, as well as the European polit-
ical structure as a whole. 
In 1812 S. N. Glinka published a note in the journal The Russian Messenger 
entitled “France’s Unalterable Evil Intentions Against Russia.” He saw the 
reasons for the war that had just begun in France’s age-old enmity for Russia. 
“As conclusive proof,” he asserted, “I could simply copy out Petrov’s entire ‘Ode 
on the Conclusion of Peace with the Ottoman Porte,’ composed in 1775” 
(Glinka 1812, 110–111). Indeed, the publicist limited his argument to citing 
several quotations from the ode. This rhetorical strategy is quite striking, as it 
involves supporting a political thesis by referencing, not historical facts or 
analytical calculations, but instead a thirty-year-old triumphal ode. 
When Petrov’s ode was created and published, Glinka was still a child. It 
probably attracted his attention in 1811 when a three-volume Works by 
Petrov, prepared by the poet’s son Iazon Vasil’evich, came out in Petersburg. 
Be that as it may, here is a rare if not unique case of a poetical work’s longevity 
in the capacity of a political treatise. 
L. N. Kiseleva, who commented on Glinka’s unusual reasoning, noted that 
in The Russian Messenger “almost any judgment by a Russian (of course, only a 
true son of the fatherland) … was given the force of an historical document” 
(Kiseleva 1981, 66–67). However, the ode that Glinka cites can hardly be char-
acterized as a standard pronouncement. On the contrary, this is a work of quite 
extraordinary historical and cultural significance. 
Even in Petrov’s politically overloaded oeuvre, the 1775 ode “On the 
Conclusion of Peace with the Ottoman Porte” occupies a special place. The 
author’s views are not merely embodied in a system of tropes or rhetorical figures 
but are also presented as a more or less consistent doctrine. Furthermore, this 
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doctrine, it seems, first developed by Petrov, was destined to outlive the 
political circumstances and theoretical discussions that gave birth to it and 
become part of Russia’s governmental life. 
The news of the peace treaty found Petrov in London. He was working 
there as governor to G. I. Silov, who according to I. F. Martynov’s likely sugges-
tion, was the foster brother of the heir to the throne, the future Paul I (see 
Martynov 1979, 29–30; cf. Cross 1976; Cross 1996, 249–253; Zhukovskaia, 
manuscript). Soon after, Petrov and Silov received Catherine’s order to return 
home. In his answering letter to the empress of August 24, the poet congratu-
lated her on the successful conclusion of the war and reported that he still had 
not found sufficient inspiration to compose an ode on this occasion. Conse-
quently he asked for permission to delay his departure, so as “to hold my hand 
with the pen nailed to the table until the thing is finished” (Obolenskii 1858, 
528). Somewhat later, on September 5, Petrov’s pupil addressed a similar 
request to Catherine (ibid., 529–530).
There is no information about Catherine’s reaction to these petitions. It 
is known that Silov died on the way home, but the precise date of his death 
has not been established. I. F. Martynov found Catherine’s order to repay 
Petrov for costs connected to Silov’s funeral, dated May 7, 1776, and on this 
basis proposed that Silov had died six to eight weeks earlier (Martynov 1979, 
30). This is far from obvious, however. Petrov could have waited any length of 
time for the promised repayment, and a series of his published letters supply 
serious basis for concluding that he was back in St. Petersburg no later than 
the fall of 1775 (Petrov 1841, 49–50; cf. Shliapkin 1885, 394–395). Still, it is 
nevertheless possible that Petrov was able to receive some extension, at least 
until the spring of 1775. Even if we take the reference “to hold my hand with 
the pen nailed to the table” as an excuse to tarry abroad, it is still clear that the 
ode was the result of prolonged and intensive effort, begun in London and 
most likely finished on his way home or when he was back in Russia. When 
he sent the empress a copy, Petrov was obliged to apologize for such delayed 
congratulations (Shliapkin 1885, 393). 
Catherine had given permission for Petrov to go to England after his 
repeated requests. For a person interested in political problems, a stay in 
London during this time must have provided a unique education. The free 
press, accounts of parliamentary debates, the open struggle between the 
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government and the opposition—all gave quite a different experience of 
high-level politics than that which Petrov had been able to glean from his 
proximity to the court and from his position as Catherine’s reader and friend 
of Potemkin. 
The years which the poet spent in London were unusually rich in interna-
tional cataclysms. The first partition of Poland between Russia, Prussia and 
Austria; Gustav III’s coup in Sweden and the rout of the pro-Russian party in 
Stockholm, which brought Russia to the brink of still another war in the North; 
the start of disorders in England’s colonies in North America; the death of 
Louis XV who had ruled France for more than a half century and the change 
of the cabinet in Paris—all of these events instantly became the subject of 
violent and open debate in society, in the press, and in Parliament. The clash 
between the two completely different political cultures that Petrov witnessed 
determined much in his views and was decisively influential on the ode which 
brought the London period of his life to a close. 
 2 
The “Ode on the Conclusion of Peace with the Ottoman Porte” is one of 
Petrov’s longest triumphal odes. It contains 470 lines. At the center of our atten-
tion is the middle part that is free from the ritual glorification of the empress 
and contains a statement of the author’s main views. A well-known fact serves 
as the starting point for analyzing the consequences of the recently concluded 
war—that Turkey had declared war against Russia in 1768, having given in to 
the instigation of the Parisian cabinet:
Но где сомнительна победа, 
Тут сильного смути соседа, 
В кровавой тонет пусть реке. 
Сколь бой ни жарок и ужасен, 
Чужим уроном безопасен, 
Ты стой, и тешься вдалеке … 
Цветущие под солнцем Россы, 
Давно в очах его колоссы; 
Их должно сжати в общий рост. 
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Падут без дружния заступы; 
Чужи в полях кровавых трупы, 
Прекрасен Галлу в рай помост. 
(Petrov I, 98, 100)1
(But where victory is doubtful / Instigate a powerful neighbor / Let him 
drown in a river of blood. / However hot and horrible the battle, / Someone 
else’s loss is harmless, / You just wait and take comfort from afar … // 
Russes [Russians] blossoming under the sun / Have long been a colossus in 
his eyes; / They need to be cut down to the common measure. / They’ll fall 
without friends’ relief; / Alien corpses in bloody fields, / Would be a nice 
bridge to paradise for the Gauls.)
There was nothing new in these Francophobe attacks. Even before the start 
of the war, Catherine was well-informed about the constant pressure that 
the head of the French cabinet and Minister of Foreign Affairs the Duc de 
Choiseul had applied through France’s envoy in Constantinople, Vergennes, 
on the Turkish sultan, urging him to begin war against Russia. Choiseul calcu-
lated that war in the South would bind Catherine’s hands and distract her from 
an aggressive policy in Poland. These calculations proved to be completely 
mistaken, as it was precisely the Russo-Turkish War that created the situation 
that ultimately led to the partition of Poland. However, in 1768 the sultan’s 
indecisiveness and fear of a military conflict so irritated Choiseul that he 
decided to recall Vergennes, thinking that the new ambassador Saint-Priest 
would better manage this complex task. But war was declared before Saint-
Priest managed to arrive in Constantinople (see Murphy 1982, 151–161; on 
Catherine’s views on the reasons for the war, see her correspondence with 
Frederick II in SbRIO XX, 252–280 and passim). In his “Ode on the War with 
the Turks” that was published in 1769, Petrov had already written about 
France’s role in inciting the conflict:
To жаляща меж трав змея 
Да скроет зависть от Европы, 
1 All quotations without separate references are from this edition, which reproduces the last 
publication of the ode during Petrov’s life (Petrov 1782). Between this and the first publi-
cation (Petrov 1775) there are only a few differences that are not significant for our 
analysis and they will not be mentioned here. 
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Она лишь будет весть подкопы 
Мощь турков, умыслы ея. 
(Petrov I, 35)
(Then the stinging snake in the grass, / Let it go and hide its envy from 
Europe, / It will only scheme / [To manipulate] the power of the Turks and 
[to carry out] its own designs.) 
The general set of motifs remains unchanged in its overall features. As before 
he sees the reasons leading to war in the back-stage intrigues of a French 
diplomacy that was envious of Russian power and trying to stir up trouble 
through a third party. However, with the passing of six years the poet strove 
to understand France’s politics on a deeper theoretical basis; now he saw its 
roots in the doctrine of the balance of power which then dominated Euro-
pean political thinking. 
Eighteenth-century theoreticians of diplomacy were convinced that the 
system of international relations was based on the balance of power among 
states that would not permit any one of them to lay claim to global dominance. 
In his celebrated book The Age of Louis XIV, Voltaire had linked hopes for 
prolonged peace with the fear that the two halves of Europe inspired in each 
other. According to accepted opinion, the complex and vacillating nature of 
alliances and international agreements was only the external expression of this 
fundamental equilibrium. “Never before or since has a single idea been so 
clearly the organizing principle in terms of which international relations in 
general were seen. … The balance was also an orthodoxy whose acceptance was 
now more formal and explicit than ever before … fear and envy, institutional-
ized in the balance, were the necessary foundation of international relations,” 
writes the historian of European diplomacy M. S. Anderson (1989, 163–164) 
on the development of eighteenth-century political thought.
In the words of an English publicist of the time, “It is a Maxim of true 
Policy that whensoever any prince is exalted too high … the other princes 
ought to enter into League together, to pull him down, or at least to hinder him 
from growing greater” (ibid., 164). The Peace of Utrecht of 1713 guaranteed 
the separation of the Spanish and French dynasties for all time, “for the end that 
all care and suspicions may be removed from the minds of men and that the 
Peace and Tranquility of the Christian World may be ordered and stabilized in 
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a just Balance of Power (which is the best and most solid foundation of mutual 
friendship and a lasting general concord)” (Wight 1968, 153). From that time 
references to the necessity of maintaining the balance of power began to be 
included in the texts of international agreements. Fenelon, who was exception-
ally popular in Russia, wrote about the monarch’s obligation to preserve such a 
balance in his exhortation to the Dauphin, the grandson of Louis XIV (see 
Butterfield 1968, 140).
Newtonian physics had a significant influence on the theory of the polit-
ical balance of power. The equilibrium of European countries was likened to 
the equilibrium of planets in the solar system: “What gravity or attraction, we 
are told, is to the system of the universe,” wrote another British political jour-
nalist, “that the balance [sic] of power is to Europe: a thing we cannot just 
point out to ocular inspection, and see or handle; but which is as real in its 
existence, and as sensible in its effects, as the weight is in scales” (Anderson 
1989, 167–168). Petrov reproduced all of these arguments rather precisely:
Везде на мочь железны крепи; 
Текла бы в бой, да держат цепи. 
Так часто яр и бурен конь, 
В бег равными зовом местами. 
Стоит востягнутый браздами 
И паром кажет внутрь огонь. … 
Взаимным меж стихий упором 
Всемирный держится состав; 
Спокойство — бранью, вольность — спором, 
Крепится силой святость прав. 
Сластям здесь горесть соразмерна; 
Прекрасна роза не без терна. 
Есть гром, трясения земли. 
(Everywhere there are iron constraints [krepi] on power; / It would slip into 
fighting if not for the chains. / Thus a steed often violent and wild / Is 
restrained by reins / And the fire within is turned to vapor. … // By mutual 
opposition among the elements / The universal structure holds; / Tran-
quility – violence, freedom – quarrels, / The holiness of law is anchored by 
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force. / Grief here is commensurate to pleasures; / A beautiful rose is not 
without thorns. / There is thunder, the earth shakes.)
Appeal to the doctrine of the balance of power allowed Petrov to see French 
intrigues as a manifestation of the general mechanisms of European politics. 
Moreover, the entire Old World appeared in the ode as a single political and 
cultural whole that was successor to the great ancient empires and inculcated 
with their aggressive, expansionist spirit:
Тут мрет Ассур под гневом Кира! 
Там персов Александр секира! 
Здесь Рим готовит свет протечь 
Кровава быстротой потопа; 
По нем, кто б ждал? В ту ж мочь Европа 
Спешит Царей своих облечь. 
Обилуя предтеч в примерах, 
На Рим возводят очеса, 
И в малых заключенны сферах, 
Творят велики чудеса; 
Огней искусством Прометеи, 
Пременой лиц и дум Протеи; 
Сердец и счастия ловцы; 
Предосторожны, терпеливы, 
Неутомимы, прозорливы. 
Как куплю деющи пловцы. 
Колико строго испытуют
Ко преможенью всякий путь…, 
(There Assur is perishing from Cyrus’ anger! / There Alexander is the 
scourge of the Persians! / Here Rome is preparing to stream across the world 
/ With the speed of a bloody flood; / After this, who would wait? Europe 
hurries / To array their kings in this power. // Abundant in exemplary ances-
tors, / All eyes are raised to Rome, / Even enclosed in little spheres / They 
are creating great miracles; / Prometheus, by the art of fire, / Proteus, by 
69Chapter 2: The Image of the Enemy
changing faces and thoughts; / Fishers of hearts and fortune; / Cautious, 
patient, / Tireless, perspicacious. / Like sailors engaged in trade // How 
seriously they try / To obstruct every path …) 
Petrov’s evaluation of European civilization was rather complicated, and his 
very approach went far beyond the bounds of eighteenth-century Russian 
thought. The poet took account of the many faces of the European spirit, as 
well as its variability, its Promethean passion for experiments and discoveries, 
its pathos of enrichment (“Like sailors engaged in trade”), and its desire for 
overseas acquisitions that would invest modern monarchs “in the power” of 
Roman emperors. During Petrov’s years in England the European powers 
continued their zealous and recurrent competition for overseas colonies. The 
poet wrote about all of this with a characteristic alternation of admiration, 
horror, and distinct—albeit hidden—moral disapproval. His tone brings to 
mind the description of the European spirit that emerged from the pens of 
the Slavophiles much later. 
Different countries interpreted the balance of power in their own various 
ways. Thus England and France both strove to avoid being just another member 
of this balance and fought instead for the right to arbitrate and guarantee the 
Figure 4 “A Critical Map” (1791) – an allegory of the “balance of power.”
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status quo. In 1774, Vergennes, the former ambassador to Constantinople and 
recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote to the new King Louis 
XVI about the special place of France in the European system (Murphy 1982, 
218). Fifteen years earlier another minister, Cardinal Bernis, instructed one of 
his ambassadors: “The political goal of this monarchy has always been and will 
be to play the supreme role in Europe that corresponds to its ancient age, honor, 
and greatness, and to resist any power that would attempt to place itself above 
us, pretend to control us, claim undue prerogatives, or, finally, that would to try 
and appropriate our position in Europe” (ibid., 213). 
This admonition should be seen in the context of the traditional 
French-English rivalry. However, in the last third of the century the main 
sphere in which the balance of power doctrine was applied in European—
especially French—politics was the attempt to restrain Russia. After the 
partition of Poland and successful war against the Turks, Russia’s growing 
power and influence was perceived as the main threat to European political 
equilibrium (Anderson 1989, 174–176). This is how Petrov described the 
situation:
Почто сей воин безотраден? 
Другой возникнул в свет Герой; 
Так блеск чужой ему досаден; 
По нем он должен стать второй. 
Он был как кедр высок дотоле. 
Теперь он трость творений в поле; 
He красен скиптр и шаток трон. 
Другие солнцы просияли… — 
(Why is this warrior cheerless? / Another Hero has become famous; / And 
another’s brilliance vexes him; / He has to be second after him. / Before he was 
tall as a cedar. / Now he is a reed of creatures in the field; / Your scepter is unat-
tractive and your throne unstable. / Other suns have begun to shine… —)
The main aim of French diplomacy became stirring up anti-Russian sentiments 
in all of its contiguous lands. “We must support the Swedish king, encourage 
the Turks, and not allow … the destruction of Poland,” wrote the French 
diplomat Favier in a 1773 message to the King (Chevalier 1939, 125). In the 
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South France pushed Turkey toward war with Russia; in the North it played a 
decisive role in the anti-Russian coup that put Gustav on the Swedish throne 
(Gustav had arrived in Stockholm directly from Paris); and in the West, in 
Poland, it tried to support the centers of opposition to Petersburg, such as the 
defeated Barskaia Confederation (Konfederacja barska).
According to the French, opposition to Russia was meant to save Europe 
from Russian expansion and preserve the cherished balance of power. It is not 
hard to predict the Russian ode-writer’s response to such ideas:
И перст простря своей десницы 
На Росски абие границы,
Глаголет к Мудрости Судьба: 
«Низзри, как ищут дола Князи 
Стать равны во всеобщей связи; 
Коль сила мыслей их слаба». 
(And, quickly pointing its finger / At the Russians’ borders, / Fate speaks to 
Wisdom: / “Behold, how princes of the world beneath seek a way / To become 
equal in universal association / When so weak is the force of their thoughts.”)
 3 
However popular and influential the doctrine of balance of power may have been, 
it also had its critics. The German philosopher Johann Heinrich Gottlieb von 
Justi wrote about the “mutual enslavement” to which this teaching condemns 
states. “What streams of blood the balance of Europe, this new idol, has caused to 
be shed,” wrote the French theoretician Réal de Curban. “For long, to avoid evils 
which are distant and uncertain the princes have brought upon themselves 
immediate and genuine ones and, in trying to avoid war, have waged it” (Anderson 
1989, 176). But the most consistent critics of the idea were thinkers who 
proposed utopian projects for establishing “eternal peace” in Europe that were 
designed to replace a balance of power based on fear, jealousy and suspicion.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, one of the early and most popular 
versions of the idea of eternal peace was the plan to create a so-called “Christian 
republic.” This was a confederation of the Christian peoples of Europe that had 
supposedly been proposed by the Duke de Sully to the French King Henry IV, 
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as laid out in the last volume of his memoirs. For Catherine the idea of the 
Christian republic was a powerful propagandistic trump card (see Bartlett 1981). 
The political testament of this, the greatest of French monarchs, cast the support 
that contemporary France offered Muslim Turkey in a most unfavorable light. 
Sully’s idea was developed most fully in the “Project for Creating Eternal 
Peace in Europe” written in 1713 by Charles-Irénée Castel, abbé de Saint-
Pierre. As opposed to his predecessor who entertained serious doubts about 
Russia’s role in the new organization of Europe, Saint-Pierre looked favorably 
on the prospects for Russian’s participation in the future confederation. He 
included Russia in the list of powers, explaining why, from his point of view, 
joining the union was in the interest of Russian monarchs, referring to the fact 
that “Henry IV did not deny the Tsar a place in the universal league” (Saint-
Pierre 1986, 679; cf. 386, 419, etc.; cf. Souleyman 1936). Saint-Pierre actively 
promoted and distributed his project to monarchs and ministers, although its 
huge size and complex organization made it difficult for readers. In the 1750s 
the abbé’s heirs asked J.-J. Rousseau to prepare a short rendering of the project.
This turned out to be an astute move. Rousseau wrote “An Abridge-
ment of the Project for Eternal Peace” and “Consideration of the Project for 
Eternal Peace.” The “Consideration,” which highly assessed Saint-Pierre’s 
idea but questioned its applicability, remained unpublished until 1781, 
while the “Abridgement” was published in 1761 and immediately attracted 
broad interest. In 1771, during the height of the Russo-Turkish War, I. F. 
Bogdanovich’s translation of the “Abridgement” came out, pursuing the 
same political and propagandistic aims as the translation of Sully’s memoirs. 
Most likely, Petrov became familiar with the “Abridgement” in the French 
original, but in any case, we may claim with a great degree of certainty that 
it was this work that served as the source for many of the ideas in his ode. 
The starting point for Rousseau’s thesis was the notion of European unity 
that we have already encountered: “All the powers of Europe form a kind of 
system among themselves which unites them … by a kind of equilibrium…, 
which, although no one in effect tries to protect it, will not be as easy to destroy 
as many people think” (Rousseau 1962, I, 366).2 In Rousseau’s opinion, Euro-
2 We will refer to Rousseau as the author of the “Abridgement” without mentioning Saint-
Pierre. As the “Consideration of the Project for Eternal Peace” attests, the major part of the 
opinions expressed in the “Abridgement” fully accord with those of Rousseau. 
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pean unity rests historically on the legacy of Rome, on the “political and civil 
union” that existed among the various parts of the Roman Empire: 
So great was the respect that this great body still inspired that up until the 
last moment those who destroyed it were honored by the titles [Rome had 
given them]; one sees degraded conquerors become officers of the empire. 
… The old image of the Roman Empire continued to produce a kind of 
connection among the parts that used to compose it; and after the destruc-
tion of the empire Rome continued to dominate in a new manner. … 
(Rousseau 1962, I, 367)
In support of this idea Rousseau refers to the authors of a multiplicity of works 
that had posed the question of whether or not the German emperor—who was 
called head of the Holy Roman Empire—could actually be considered “the 
natural sovereign of the whole world” (ibid., 367n). 
In the already cited fragment Petrov reproduced these arguments with a 
significant degree of accuracy:
Здесь Рим готовит свет протечь 
Кровава быстротой потопа; 
По нем, кто б ждал? В ту ж мочь Европа 
Спешит царей своих облечь. 
Обилуя предтеч в примерах 
На Рим возводят очеса… 
(Here Rome is preparing to stream across the world / With the speed of a 
bloody flood; / After this, who would wait? Europe hurries / To array their 
kings in this power. // Abundant in exemplary ancestors, / All eyes are raised 
to Rome… )
According to Rousseau, this historical unity was based on the unity of the 
European spirit. “Add to this,” he wrote,
the special situation of Europe…, the constant coincidence of interests 
that the connections of blood and of commerce, of the arts, of colonies, 
have created among sovereigns; the multitude of rivers and the variety of 
their courses that make communication easy; its inhabitants’ spirit of 
inconstancy [cf. “Proteus’ changing faces and thoughts”] that makes 
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them travel without ceasing and to frequently journey from one to 
another; the invention of printing and the general taste for letters which 
has created a communality of learning and knowledge [cf. “With 
Prometheus’ art of fire”]; finally, the multitude and small size of states 
[cf. “Even enclosed in little spheres”] which, together with the need for 
luxuries and the diversity of climates, make them perpetually necessary 
for one another. (Ibid., 368)
The equilibrium of forces that thus arose in a united Europe represented “in 
some respects the doing of nature. … This equilibrium exists, and doesn’t 
need anyone outside to preserve it or to interfere in it; and when it is briefly 
violated on one side, it soon restores itself on another; so that if princes that 
are accused of aspiring to a universal monarchy really did so aspire they 
would show more ambition than good sense” (ibid., 370–371). In some 
detail Rousseau argues that it would be impossible for any single state, or 
even an alliance of several powers, to establish its superiority. 
Nonetheless, and this is the crux of the matter, even the impossibility of 
such projects and the inevitability of the balance of power that prevented their 
realization were insufficient to guarantee a firm and lasting peace. The successes 
of European Enlightenment stand in strange contradiction to the animosity 
that invariably rages in this part of the world:
If on the one hand we look at the perpetual dissensions, robberies, usurpa-
tions, revolts, wars, and murders that daily afflict this respected dwelling 
place of sages, this shining refuge of the arts and sciences; if we consider our 
beautiful speeches and our horrible behavior, so much humanity in our prin-
ciples and so much cruelty in our actions, a religion so mild and so bloodily 
intolerant, a politics so wise on paper and so harsh in practice, our leaders so 
beneficent and our people so miserable, our governments so moderate and 
wars so pitiless; we can hardly reconcile these strange contradictions;  
and this pretended fraternity of European peoples seems but a derisive 
opportunity to express their mutual animosity with irony. (Ibid., 368)
Echoing Rousseau, Petrov also writes about the impossibility of achieving 
the desired success and about the fact that all of the restrictions imposed by the 
balance of power were powerless to restrain the militarist inclination on 
the part of various sovereigns:
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Но сила, мати дерзновений, 
Боязнью скована всегда ль? 
Претят ли страхи преткновений
Ей бурею нестися вдаль? 
Что не один бог мнимый мира, 
Скудельна в образе кумира 
Пал прежде, нежель в храм внесен, 
И зависть, бешенство и злоба 
Насильна не избегли гроба; 
Порок тем вовсе ль ужасен? 
Увы! Еще природа страждет. 
Знать, мыслей свет в Европе мал? 
Словесный дружней крови жаждет! 
Знать, зверя в лютость он ниспал. 
(But is power, mother of impudence / Always fettered by fear? / Do the 
terrors of failure / Prevent its storm-like onward rush? / Has the fact that 
many false gods, / In the image of fragile idols / Have fallen before installa-
tion in the temple, / And that envy, rage and malice / Not avoided a certain 
grave / Thus make vice any less horrible? // Alas! Nature still suffers. / Does 
this mean that there is little light in Europe? / Literates thirst for their neigh-
bors’ blood! / They descend to the ferocity of beasts.)
The European Enlightenment itself, whose origins were indebted to peace, 
turned out to be fraught with military conflict. Petrov here recalls Lomonosov’s 
celebrated ode of 1747 on “beloved tranquility,” under whose aegis the sciences 
bloom, in order to contrast Lomonosov’s rapture to his own skepticism: 
Науку тишины воздвигли. 
Что ж та нас реет в брань сама? 
Знать, строя ону, не достигли 
Во средоточие ума? 
(Tranquility has fostered science. / Why then does it [science] lead us into 
battle? / Does that mean that, in establishing it, / The core of the intellect has 
not been achieved?)
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The system of balance of power, in Rousseau’s words, although indestruc-
tible, is extremely dangerous, because “action and reaction among European 
powers, unable to displace one another completely, keep them in a state of 
continual agitation; and these are always useless but always renewed, like 
ships on the sea which agitate its surface but can never change its level” (ibid., 
372). Actually, Petrov finds a much more radical metaphor for this futile 
equilibrium, founded on animosity that corresponded to the cosmic scope of 
his political thinking:
Как до планет и круга звездна 
Hocилась мрачна нека 6eзднa, 
Нестройством тяготевша смесь; 
Одна боролась вещь с другою; 
Так мы, борющись меж собою. 
Знать, держимся во тьме поднесь? 
(As before the planets and circle of stars / A gloomy abyss was rushing 
about, / A disharmonious jumble, / One thing clashing with another; / Thus 
are we, fighting among ourselves. / Does this mean we still dwell in 
darkness?)
Moreover, this balance of struggle or fear itself often serves as the source of 
conflict as dissimilar states tend to suspect each other of dangerous intentions. 
As Rousseau wrote:
In this respect the general lack of security leads to a situation in which each 
one, unsure that he can avoid war, tries to start it advantageously for him, 
when circumstances are favorable, and to forestall his neighbor, who would 
not fail to make use of a similar moment that favored him; thus many wars, 
including even wars of aggression, are [undertaken] merely out of unwar-
ranted precaution aimed at guaranteeing one’s own possessions. (Ibid.) 
This idea could not help but make an impression on Petrov, who recalled 
that the Turkish sultan had made the decision to begin the war in 1768 after 
the seizure of the town of Balta by disobedient Zaporozhian Cossacks. The 
Russian government hurried to apologize and punish the offenders, but it 
was too late—the Turks had already given into the insistent urging of 
French diplomacy.
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Малейша тень опасных следствий 
Родит прямых источник бедствий, 
И капля буйства море слез! 
Как будут скиптры равновесны, 
Коль тьмы миров насильству тесны. 
Когда во нравах недовес? 
(The least shade of threatening consequences / Becomes the source of 
immediate misfortunes, / And a drop of mischief breeds a sea of tears! / 
How can scepters be in balance / If thousands of worlds are still not enough 
[to prevent] violence. / When are moral habits in short supply?)
The logic of balance of power turns out to be one of war and incitement, the 
logic of justifying violence. Petrov, like Rousseau, is deeply convinced of its 
harmful, unacceptable consequences for the European order:
Так нужно искрам злобы тлиться, 
Ковати козни и мечи; 
Рекой кровям невинным литься, 
Всему, как нудимо, течи; 
Дышать неправой нужно местью. 
Корысти жертвовати честью, 
Закон вменяти за плеву! 
Полудню нужно праться с Нордом, 
Врага зреть Россу в Турке гордом, 
Секване [Сене] злиться на Неву! 
(Thus it is necessary for sparks of malice to burn, / To forge conspiracies and 
swords; / For innocent blood to be poured like a river, / Everyone’s to be 
forced to flow; / To breathe unjust revenge, / To replace law with spittle! / 
The South must challenge the North, / The Russes see the proud Turk as 
their enemy, / The Seine is enraged at the Neva!) 
Petrov’s antimilitarist rhetoric (“Foreign corpses in bloody fields,” “innocent 
blood poured like a river”) sharply differentiates him from other eighteenth- 
century ode writers who were usually on the bellicose side. It is not impossible 
that there was influence here from Petrov’s friend and patron Potemkin, whose 
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repugnance for bloodshed so astonished contemporaries (on the anti-war 
motifs in Petrov’s later ode “On the Taking of Izmail,” see Bershtein 1992, 
8–87). 
On the whole this passage reveals how the Russian ode-writer’s strategy 
differs from that of the French philosopher. While Rousseau, following 
Saint-Pierre, demonstrates the moral and political unacceptability of the 
balance of power doctrine, Petrov’s interest is focused on those who, guided 
by this doctrine, want to exclude Russia from the system of European states:
Так страж, так око мнит Царево, 
Что правит сердце в нем и ум; 
Что, яко вкруг плодами древо, 
Figure 5 Portrait of  V. P. Petrov.
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Отягощен тьмой новых дум. 
Угрюм, уединен, бессловен 
И как волшебник баснословен 
Сидит с орудьми в терему; 
Лишь тайной коснется пружин 
В другом текут все твари чине; 
Взгляни, Европа вся в дыму! 
(Thus a guard and the tsar’s eye thinks / That he guides his heart and mind; / 
That like a tree circled with fruit / He is weighted down with a swarm of new 
thoughts. / Glum, alone, silent, / And fabled like a magician / He sits in the 
terem with his weapons; / But when a secret spring is touched / All creatures 
move in different order; / Look, all Europe is up in smoke!)
The person Petrov describes here is rather puzzling. If the “secret springs” 
may with a certain license be interpreted as any diplomat’s desire to surround 
himself with a veil of secrecy, then all of the other attributes with which the poet 
describes the gloomy figure of the tsar’s advisor may apparently only be 
explained by reference to a completely different order of historical facts.
 4 
Louis XV’s diplomacy possessed one striking and somewhat hard to explain 
feature—it was carried out through two competing institutions. Apart from 
the official Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the so-called “King’s Secret” (le Secret 
du Roi) also took part in foreign policy decisions. The main feature of the 
“King’s Secret” was that the members of French embassies in various coun-
tries that were inducted into it (sometimes the ambassadors themselves, 
more often officials or other, even lower-level staff members) received secret 
instructions, often contradicting the official ones that came from the minister. 
At first the coordinator of this secret correspondence was Conti, and then 
Tercier, the main advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and after Tercier’s 
death in 1767, the Count de Broglie, who had been initiated into the Secret in 
1752 when he had been appointed ambassador to Poland, and who soon 
became the inspiration and soul of this unusual structure. 
That the Polish ambassador assumed this special position in the King’s 
Secret was not by chance. In his monograph on the secret correspondence, 
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the grand nephew of the count, the French historian A. de Broglie, wrote 
that “Poland was in reality the chief, almost the only, object of the secret 
diplomacy” (Broglie I, 4). The ambassador’s job was to strengthen the 
pro-French party there, and first of all, to counter Russian influence. 
Furthermore, if the official French diplomatic position in relation to Russia 
oscillated between opposition, flirtation, a cautious union during the Seven 
Years’ War and new hostility in the second half of the 1760s, the Secret’s 
anti-Russian line that was dictated by its concentration on Polish affairs 
remained unchanged, even after Count Broglie’s withdrawal from Poland in 
1758. In May and June of 1762, after Peter III had unexpectedly taken 
Russia out of the Seven Years’ War, having concluded a peace with Prussia, 
and right at the time when the coup was being prepared in St. Petersburg 
that would bring Grand Princess Ekaterina Alekseeva to the throne, Broglie 
wrote to Tercier:
What an opportunity it will be to re-establish the affairs of the State as they 
were in 1756 [when the Russo-French alliance began] … when Poland, 
long neglected, began to lend herself to the wish, which the King had 
previously manifested, that the natural liking of that nation for France 
should be revived! It was not without great labour that I succeeded in rean-
imating it. But, as for Russia, we reckoned her among the European Powers 
only in order to exclude her from their ranks, and to forbid her from 
forming so much as an idea of interfering in events. This is what we must 
re-establish; we must avert every opportunity of which she might avail 
herself to play a part in Europe; we must never enter into a treaty with her 
Court; but let her fall into a lethargic slumber from which she must only be 
aroused by the convulsions caused by internal disturbance carefully 
excited long in advance. By constantly stirring up these troubles, we shall 
prevent the Government of the Muscovites from thinking of foreign 
policy, and Russia will then be, in relation to ourselves, in that exact posi-
tion which we should wish.
In his next letter, Broglie listed the forces that could be brought to bear against 
Russia:
At present, Austria, deeply offended; to-morrow, perhaps, Prussia, who, 
although she makes use of Russia to gain her victories to-day, cannot wish to 
bring such a Power into the heart of Germany; and Turkey, including all the 
Tartar races, by no means the least effective instruments to employ against 
the Muscovites. (Broglie II, 11, 12–13)
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Broglie worked out his grandiose projects (that had, by the way, the full 
approval of King Louis XV) while practically under house arrest in his ances-
tral castle (cf: “He sits in the terem with his weapons”). His oscillating periods 
of disfavor and exile, the last of which coincided with Petrov’s time in London, 
did not end his connection with the king, change his role in the secret corre-
spondence, or interrupt his influence on French politics. During his exile 
Broglie developed a plan for French intervention in Britain (cf. “But when a 
secret spring is touched … Look, all Europe is in up in smoke!”). 
Broglie was not alone in his thoughts about the Tatars as a weapon against 
Russia. On June 28, 1762, the very day of Catherine’s coup, copies of the Social 
Contract, subsequently banned, arrived in St. Petersburg (see Kopanev 2000). 
Here Russians could read Rousseau’s gloomy prophesy concerning the fate of 
Russia and Europe: “The Russian Empire wants to conquer Europe—but will 
herself be conquered. The Tatars, her subjects or her neighbors, shall become 
her, and our, masters” (Rousseau 1969, 183). This opinion provoked a sharp 
objection from Voltaire, who thought it unlikely that “the miserable Tatar 
hordes, who exist in extreme degradation, would be able to subjugate an empire 
at once defended by two hundred thousand soldiers who rank among the best 
in Europe” (Wilberger 1976, 225). This debate had a rather long history. In his 
own works, as well as “An Abridgement of the Project for Eternal Peace,” 
which, following Saint-Pierre, had included Russia in the system of European 
states, Rousseau consistently advocated anti-Russian positions.
The coincidence in views of the banned thinker and the highly-placed 
diplomat was not completely fortuitous. The French diplomat Claude-Carloman 
de Rulhière who in 1762 served in the French embassy in St. Petersburg, and 
who was subsequently notorious for his scandalous book on Catherine’s ascen-
sion to the throne which the Russian empress used all of her influence to 
suppress, was a passionate follower of Rousseau. Rulhière was also a passionate 
Polonophile and member of the King’s Secret. It was through him that in 1771, 
one of the leaders of the Polish Confederation, Count M. Vielgorsky, turned to 
Rousseau with a request to write a project for a future constitution which could 
save Poland from being completely swallowed up by Russia. At that time 
Rulhière himself on order of the minister was working on a history of the Polish 
problem that was intended for the heir to the French throne, Louis XVI (see 
Chevalier 1939, 118–125, 192–196; Madariaga 1983, 36–37). Rousseau wrote 
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the “Considerations on the Manner of Rule in Poland” in order to help the 
dying country. This work was not published, but they knew of its existence in 
Russia from F. M. Grimm’s journal the Correspondence Littéraire (Madariaga 
1983, 36). Furthermore, even before this Grimm had also sent a copy of the 
“Considerations” to Catherine (Stroev 2001). 
Among the other members of the King’s Secret were also the former 
ambassador to Petersburg Baron Breteuil and Jean-Louis Favier, who had also 
worked in Petersburg, and who was author of a memorandum that included a 
proposal to create a ring of enemy nations around Russia. Breteuil, Favier and 
Rulhière were also connected with the abbé Chappe d’Auteroche (Chevalier 
1939, 226–229), author of the famous Voyage en Sibérie that earned Catherine’s 
ire, prompting her to write an entire book to refute it. Finally, the Comte de 
Vergennes also played an active role in the secret diplomacy; he had been 
ambassador to the Ottoman Porte during the Russo-Turkish War and served in 
Stockholm during the coup by Gustav, whom he advised to start a preventative 
war with Russia (Murphy 1982, 204).
Of course, neither Rousseau nor Chappe had any relationship to the inner 
sanctum of French diplomacy. However, to an outsider the small world of the 
Parisian intellectual elite in which Rulhière and Chappe read their anti-Russian 
works in the very same salons could seem like a secret association of philoso-
phers and politicians, dispersing their agents in Russia, smearing her in print, 
and attempting to stir up trouble within and turn her Muslim neighbors against 
her from without.3 
Стремясь ко участи блаженной,
Назначили, как царствам цвесть; 
России как изнеможенной 
He дать главы своей возвесть. 
Стояли сто умов на страже, 
Да тьма над ней густится та же, 
Что смежных ей объемлет орд; 
Да брань ее мятет жестока, 
3 From this perspective Catherine’s suspicion of Rousseau throughout his life becomes more 
understandable (see Kopanev 2000).
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В Европу да не возьмет втока 
Подвластный ей широкий Норд. 
(Striving for a blessed fate, / They decided how kingdoms should fare; / Not 
to allow Russia, prostrated, / To raise its head. / A hundred minds stood 
guard, / So that the same darkness will thicken above her [i.e., Russia] / That 
envelops the hordes at her borders; / That she be troubled by cruel war / So 
the broad North that she commands / Will not pour into Europe.)
This entire stanza seems such an exact a statement of Broglie’s letter to Tercier 
cited above that one has to ask what Petrov could have known about the King’s 
Secret. At the present time it is not possible to answer this question with 
certainty. Nevertheless we may suggest some hypotheses. 
First of all, one cannot exclude the possibility that the Russian court 
learned about Louis XV’s double diplomacy fairly early. A. Broglie reports that 
already at the end of 1763 the candidate for the Polish throne and former 
favorite of Catherine Stanisław Poniatowski turned for support over the head 
of the French ambassador to the envoy Hennin, possibly because he was privy 
to information that this “humble Hennin was an instrument of the secret 
policy” (Broglie II, 199). If Poniatowski had received this intelligence from 
Polish sources, he certainly would have shared it with Catherine, who 
supported him at a time when France maintained an antagonistic position 
against him. On the other hand, Catherine herself could have found out this 
crucial information through her agents and have communicated it to her 
protégé. Stealing, perusal and decoding of diplomatic correspondence was a 
fairly common occurrence then, as at other times. In this instance Poniatows-
ki’s move appears to have been calculated to neutralize France on the eve of the 
elections for a new king. 
By 1770 not only the fact of the secret correspondence but its complete 
contents became known to the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kaunitz 
and to the Austrian ambassador in Paris, the Comte de Mercy-Argenteau. 
Moreover, the Austrians themselves also were unable to keep their own agents’ 
success a secret. At the end of 1773, the secretary of the French embassy in 
Vienna Abbé Georgel was able to acquire decoded copies of Broglie’s corre-
spondence with Vergennes and the reports of secret agents in Stockholm and 
Petersburg. Among the documents which the Austrians deciphered was 
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Broglie’s circular to participants of the secret correspondence in all capitals in 
which he reported that his new exile did not mean his removal from leadership 
of the King’s Secret and that the correspondence would continue as before. To 
explain how he came by these documents, Georgel told a not very believable 
story about a stranger in a mask who sold them to him for a thousand ducats 
(Broglie II, 455–460). 
In any case, it is clear that these documents were decoded, and that the 
person who supplied them to Georgel could have sold them to others as well. 
And in this case, these documents, or at least knowledge about their existence, 
could also have reached Russian diplomats. The Russian ambassador in London 
A. S. Musin-Pushkin and other officials at the embassy were among those with 
whom Petrov associated while he was in England (Cross 1996, 250). And, 
finally, probably the most significant fact. Just at the time of Petrov’s visit to 
London, a grandiose scandal unfolded around the most famous and colorful 
participant in the secret correspondence—the Chevalier d’Éon.
Like many other diplomats initiated into the King’s Secret, d’Éon began 
his career in the second half of the 1750s in St. Petersburg. At some time he 
served as courier for the secret correspondence between Elizaveta Petrovna 
and Louis XV. Then the Chevalier was a captain of dragoons during the Seven 
Years’ War, after which he was assigned to London where, among his other 
duties, he had to prepare for a French invasion of England that Count Broglie 
was planning. However, here he came into sharp conflict with the ambas-
sador, whom he charged with trying to assassinate him. In 1764 d’Éon 
published a scandalous book in London, in which he laid out his version of 
his collision with the ambassador, and in which he printed several fragments 
of diplomatic correspondence. D’Éon refused to obey a recall order and 
began to blackmail the French government, threatening to expose the King’s 
Secret, including its plans for an intervention in England. The King was forced 
to compromise and to continue d’Éon’s salary and his status as secret agent. 
On his side, the Chevalier agreed to quit the diplomatic service. 
This scandal that rocked the English capitol had not yet had a chance to 
die down when in the early 1770s, during Petrov’s sojourn in London, a new 
one broke. Rumors circulated throughout London, apparently set in motion 
by the Chevalier himself, that he was a woman. Judging by d’Éon’s (none too 
reliable) memoirs, Princess Dashkova, who appeared in London in 1770, 
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played some role in spreading this gossip (on d’Éon, see Broglie II, 87–182, 
486–515; Kates 1995, 57–140, 175–254; Stroev 1998, 84–89, 110–115, 
336–339, etc.). 
The extent of social excitement that seized London on receipt of this 
sensational news was absolutely unimaginable. In London City they took 
bets on d’Éon’s gender, and the money staked added up to as much as 60,000 
pounds. Newspapers and boulevard sheets were full of the most diverse 
speculations on this issue, and at the Chevalier’s house there was a constant 
crowd on watch. The emissary specially sent from France to find out what 
was going on confirmed that d’Éon was indeed a woman. On May 13, 1774, 
the third day after the start of Louis XVI’s reign, Broglie sent him a letter 
with details both about the King’s Secret and the strange situation with 
d’Éon. The young king immediately ordered that the Chevalier be recalled 
from England, which brought a new wave of blackmail, the most sinister 
threats and impossible demands for both money and status. Fearing French 
agents, d’Éon gave a sealed packet with secret documents to his English 
friend, a member of Parliament from the opposition. Paris again had to back 
down. D’Éon’s correspondence with Broglie and the king continued from 
the summer of 1774 to April of 1775, when, probably after Petrov’s depar-
ture from London, Beaumarchais arrived for discussions with d’Éon.
As a clever swindler, d’Éon kept the most explosive documents from 
exposure, holding them back as trump for extreme circumstances. None-
theless, it is very probable that in conversations with his many English friends 
he could allow himself to hint at their content in one way or another. In 
early 1776, after he had given the documents to Beaumarchais, vague infor-
mation about the King’s Secret made its way into the English press (see 
Kates 1995, 243–246). How long they might have circulated as rumors 
and spoken tales is impossible to determine without special investigation 
of London public opinion of the time. It is curious that during the 
entire period d’Éon did not cease his literary activities. In 1774 his multi-
volume Leisure Hours of the Chevalier d’Éon de Beaumont was published 
in Amsterdam; it contained works on state administration, finances, taxa-
tion, and other similar matters. 
Petrov’s English acquaintances kept him adequately informed (see Cross 
1976, 239–242). From late 1773 he travelled on a yacht in the capacity of 
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Russian teacher to one of the best-known British adventuresses, the Duchess 
of Kingston, who fled London after being accused of bigamy (see Cross 1977). 
In Rome the Pope received her. On the return trip she and Petrov visited a 
series of European cities, and on May 17, 1774, they set off from Geneva to 
Paris (see Cross 1996, 251), where Louis XVI was trying to make sense of his 
predecessor’s strange diplomacy and forming his new cabinet. In June 
Vergennes, former ambassador to Constantinople and Stockholm, participant 
in the King’s Secret and longtime enemy of Russia, was appointed Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. However, contrary to expectations, Vergennes’s Russian policy 
after the liquidation of the Secret was rather cautious and ultimately led to a 
certain warming of French-Russian relations (see Murphy 1982, 447–454). 
Let us draw some conclusions. Petrov would hardly have known details 
about the activity of Louis XV’s secret cabinet or the identity of those initi-
ated into the Secret. Most likely he was not familiar with the secret 
correspondence and may not have heard about the plan to invade England. 
Nevertheless we have sufficient grounds to presume that he would have 
known that the French king had a secret circle of advisors who directed 
French foreign policy, a foreign policy that was radically anti-Russian. 
Furthermore, from the end of the 1760s the difference in approach to Russia 
on the part of Broglie and the Minister of Foreign Affairs the duc de Choiseul, 
who carried out official policy, ceased to exist. Choiseul demanded that 
Vergennes draw Turkey into war with Russia with even greater persistence 
than Broglie. Understandably, in any discussion of behind-the-scene 
intrigues and policies carried out with clandestine methods, of secret 
sources of power and similar subjects, the lack of information only inflames 
the imagination. Louis XV’s peculiar diplomatic creation took on hyperbolic 
dimensions in the Russian poet’s mind.4
 5 
The tsar’s secret advisor, in Petrov’s words cited above, “That guides his heart 
and mind,” is also “fabled like a magician.” One is tempted to see in this descrip-
tion, as in the mention of Proteus who changes his “face and thoughts,” a hint 
4 Considerable information about the King’s Secret became available even during Petrov’s life, 
as the secret correspondence of Count de Broglie was published during the French Revolu-
tion (see Roussel 1793). 
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at d’Éon, whose “fabled” nature and changeability exceeded all usual expecta-
tions and suggested some sort of magic. Still, it is not right to limit the meaning 
of Petrov’s metaphors to direct historical references. As L. V. Pumpianskii put 
it, “the token of the classical style is … the paradoxical combination of extreme 
generality with equally extreme everyday concreteness” (Pumpianskii 1983, 
30–31). In his ode Petrov constantly takes flight from immediate political 
affairs into the sphere of historiosophical generalizations. The “sorcerer” who 
“constructed in his mind the Labyrinth in which to entrap monsters” and 
dreams of having power over “ the entire universe” is, of course, not d’Éon, not 
Broglie, and even not Louis XV. Thus after concluding а tale of the perfidious 
designs which “a hundred minds” are constructing against Russia, Petrov unex-
pectedly departs from the contemporary world into recent history:
Се, како совещали царства, 
Когда восстал Великий Петр; 
Внезапу их расторг коварства, 
Как паутину сильный ветр. 
(This is like the kingdoms’ congregation / When the Great Peter arose; / He 
suddenly did away with all their treachery / As a strong wind does a cobweb.)
As the poet writes, Peter
…создан был из общей персти, 
Европе чтоб глаза отверсти, 
Сколь ограничен смысл ея. 
(…was created out of the common dust / To open Europe’s eyes, / How 
limited its understanding.)
The King’s Secret, setting the Turkish sultan on Russia, intent on driving her 
into the darkness that surrounds “the adjoining hordes,” and not letting “the 
North” creep into Europe, turns out to be just another personification of 
the Old World’s ancient if not eternal treachery. It was not by chance that Sully 
had proposed driving the Muscovite tsar “into Asia” and leaving him to fight 
with Turks and Persians. Here we must return to Petrov’s already cited charac-
terization of European civilization:
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И в малых заключенны сферах, 
Творят велики чудеса; 
Огней искусством Прометеи, 
Пременой лиц и дум Протеи; 
Сердец и счастия ловцы; 
Предосторожны, терпеливы. 
Неутомимы, прозорливы. 
Как куплю деющи пловцы. 
(Even enclosed in little spheres; / They are creating great miracles; / 
Prometheus, by the art of fire, / Proteus, by changing faces and thoughts; / 
Fishers of hearts and fortune; / Cautious, patient, / Tireless, perspicacious. 
/ Like sailors engaged in trade.)
We need to comment separately on the “sailors.” In 1773, while Petrov was in 
London, an extremely bad financial crisis broke out in all European markets, 
connected with the British East India Company. It drew the stark attention of 
Parliament, society and the press to this unusual commercial undertaking that 
had in its control the army and navy, published laws, and without supervision 
ruled over a territory many times larger than that of Britain itself. 
The British East India Company was only one of the institutions that were 
in command in the Eastern colonies. Next to this were the Dutch, Portuguese, 
and French; these various East India Companies fought among themselves 
but functioned according to the same principles. The events of 1773 forced the 
English government to intervene and at least to some extent to put the 
company under its control (see Namier 1962, 161–172; Gardner 1971). Again 
it would be going too far to say that Petrov had this very incident in mind, but 
the social resonance that the financial crisis evoked and Parliament’s 
investigation of the company’s behavior must have alerted him to the 
characteristic type of financial adventurist who toys with the fate of conti-
nents. That these events would not have passed unknown to Petrov is suggested 
by the fact that among his London acquaintances was the well-known econo-
mist and political thinker Jeremy Bentham. And even Petrov’s circle of Russian 
friends in London, which included, for example, N. S. Mordvinov, was made 
up of people who were by no means foreign to these issues (see Cross 1976; 
Cross 1996, 249–253). 
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The line “Prometheus, by the art of fire” also deserves attention. At the 
end of 1774 when Petrov was beginning work on the ode, the so-called “fire 
machine”—an early model of a steam engine, a new marvel created by British 
technical genius—was sent from Scotland to Kronstadt. The acquisition 
of technology that was ordered directly by the empress (Catherine II’s note 
on this issue was entitled “On the machine devised in England, by which 
water is poured out of dry docks and canals by means of fire”) occupied the 
officials at the Russian Embassy in England, including the ambassador 
himself, A. S. Musin-Pushkin (see Zabarinskii 1936, 44–72). 
One may compile a set of characteristics that Petrov assigns to members 
of the secret circle who so stubbornly and persistently intrigued against 
Russia. They are magi, sorcerers who “perform great miracles,” magicians 
who invent “fiery machines.” They are adventurists, “seekers of fortune” (on 
people of this type in this era, see Stroev 1998). They are charlatans, changing 
their appearance and aims, “Proteuses changing faces and thoughts.” They are 
overwhelmed with the desire for profit, “Like sailors engaged in trade.” They 
are, finally, “Fishers of hearts and fortune,” drawing others into their nets. If 
Figure 6 An English 
caricature of the Chevalier 
d’Éon exposing him “as a 
Woman- Freemason.”
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we combine all of these traits into one, the cherished notion of freemasons 
comes immediately to mind. A decade earlier Catherine, composing her 
anti-Masonic comedies “The Deceiver” and “The Siberian Shaman,” utilized 
the very same features.
At this time, England was the homeland and capital of European Masonry 
and by the time of Petrov’s sojourn, had accumulated a huge mass of Masonic 
apologetics and anti-Masonic polemics in which the freemasons were accused 
of practicing black magic, of secret political plots, and of vulgar self-interest 
(Roberts 1972, 58–59). In the course of the second half of the eighteenth 
century, the Masonic movement had spread across all of Europe, bringing ever 
new countries into its orbit. In France, lodge members included the first leader 
of the King’s Secret Prince Conti as well as many leading aristocrats, as well as 
possibly Louis XV (ibid., 49). According to M. K. Schuchard, who studied 
eighteenth-century European mysticism, the King’s Secret was made up mostly 
of “Scottish Masons” (Schuchard 1992, 95). She asserts that the famous 
Swedish mystic and Mason Emmanuel Swedenborg, who died in 1772, had 
been a longtime secret agent of the King’s Secret (ibid., 95–98). 
It is impossible to establish what information Petrov might have had at 
his disposal, but he must have known of the Chevalier d’Éon’s entry into the 
Great Lodge in London; in 1773 a caricature of d’Éon went on sale in London 
and Paris that mocked the Masonic membership of a person of uncertain sex 
(Yates 1995, 204–207). Masons played a significant role in the leadership of 
East-Indian companies, and filial lodges had opened in Bengal and Surinam 
(see Roberts 1972, 31; Jacob 1991, 177). At this time the Mason George 
Robison, an English mathematician and engineer who was teaching in 
Kronstadt, where there was an active English Masonic lodge, was trying to 
attract the creator of the “fiery machine” James Watt to Russia (see Cross 
1971, 54–56; Zabarinskii 1936, 71–72). 
Russian Masonic lodges also expanded rapidly. In 1772, one of 
Catherine’s close advisors, I. P. Elagin, received a patent from that very same 
London Great Lodge to be called the Provincial Great Master of Russia. 
Elagin’s secretary, the playwright V. I. Lukin, went to London to receive his 
patent (Cross 1971, 48–52). Among the Russian Masons were political 
enemies of Petrov’s patron G. A. Potemkin, notably, N. I. Panin, and many 
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literary foes of Petrov himself—A. P. Sumarokov, V. I. Maikov, N. I. Novikov, 
and others (see Vernadskii 1999, 311–312). 
However, unlike England and France, Russia had almost no tradition of 
anti-Masonic propaganda (see Smith 1999). It seems as if Petrov was the first 
Russian writer who saw the spread of Masonry as a threat to Russian state 
interests. The balance of power and European confederation, Rousseau and 
Bentham, Louis XV’s secret diplomacy and the East-Indian companies, the 
steam engine and the scandal around the Chevalier d’Éon, the free press in 
London and ancient Russian notions of a Holy Land surrounded by enemies 
on all sides—all this constituted that infernal mixture which Petrov’s poetic 
gift transformed into a work that deserves to be part of the annals of Russian 
political thought.
Eden in Taurus:
The “Crimean Myth” in Russian Culture of the 
1780s–90s1
The “Greek Project” became a long-term strategic goal of Russian policy in the first years after the Peace of Kutchuk Kainarji. However, the course of 
military actions, peace talks, and the diplomatic conflict in Europe all showed 
Catherine and her closest advisors that the project as a whole could not be 
achieved without a number of intermediate stages. Undoubtedly the most 
important of these steps was the annexation of Crimea. 
The creators of Russian foreign policy did not quickly grasp the strategic 
and cultural importance of Crimea. During the first Russo-Turkish War in the 
early 1770s, Catherine had written in a rescript to Count P. I. Panin: 
It is not Our intent at all to have this peninsula and the Tatar hordes that 
belong to it under our jurisdiction, but it would be desirable if they were 
removed from Turkish dominion and remained forever independent. 
Due to Crimea’s position and that of those places where Tatars live 
outside of it, and no less due to their character, they will never be of use 
to Our empire, [because] no significant taxes can be collected from them. 
(Ekaterina 1871, 1)
1 Translated by Iain Fraser and Marcus Levitt, edited by Marcus Levitt.
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Catherine essentially repeats the evaluation of M. L. Vorontsov as given in his 
report “On Little Tartary,” presented to the empress in 1762 right after her 
ascension to the throne (see Druzhinina 1955, 65–68) and which had consti-
tuted the basis for Russia’s policy toward Crimea in the 1760s. 
This minimal program was realized in 1774 when the Peace of Kutchuk 
Kainarji detached Crimea from the Ottoman Empire and declared it a formally 
independent state headed by the pro-Russian Khan Shagin-Girei. However, by 
this time or soon thereafter, the empress’s views changed radically. The annex-
ation of Crimea was envisaged both in Potemkin’s plan, according to some 
sources given to the empress in the mid-1770s, as well as in Bezborodko’s 
memorandum, probably written in 1780, in which Russia’s Eastern policy took 
final form (see Samoilov 1867, 1012; SbRIO XXVI, 385). 
Crimea was annexed to Russia after complicated political maneuvers in 
April 1783 (on the annexation see Dubrovin 1885–1889, where the basic 
Russian documents are published; the “Turkish and Tatar” side is represented 
in Fisher 1970. On the colonization of Crimea, see Druzhinina 1959 and the 
survey article by Raeff 1972). In the opinion of the English ambassador James 
Harris, the annexation of Crimea was a peculiar type of political adventure, 
undertaken by Potemkin in opposition to the whole cabinet of ministers, on 
the outcome of which depended the continuation of his favor and influence. 
“If all fails,” wrote Harris, “he is lost; if he achieves success he will become 
stronger than before” (Harris I, 516). We know that Potemkin acted on direct 
instructions from the empress, but his role in making the relevant decisions is 
not in any doubt. 
The success of the Crimean campaign surpassed all expectations. In 
December, after about six months of political uncertainty, the annexation of 
the peninsula to Russia was accepted by Turkey. Thus, contrary to expecta-
tions, the matter ended without war. This very circumstance produced the 
greatest impression on Russian public opinion. The acquisition of such an 
important province without a single shot testified to Russia’s power better than 
any victories. At the same time, it symbolically suggested the natural character 
of this extension of the empire. 
Пpoцветаюша Taвpида, 
Возгордись своей судьбой! 
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He облекшись громом брани, 
He тягча перуном длани, 
Покорил тебя герой, — 
(Blossoming Tauride, / Take pride in your fate! / Without the clash of arms, 
/ Without the stress of thunder, / The hero subdued you, - )
Wrote the poet Ermil Kostrov (I, 94–95). Even earlier, in the ode “On the 
Acquisition of Crimea” of 1784, Derzhavin had exulted:
Который бог, который ангел.  
Который человеков друг  
Бескровным увенчал вас лавром,  
Без брани вам трофеи дал, — (Derzhavin I, 182)
(Which god, which angel / Which friend of humanity / Crowned us with 
bloodless laurels, / Gave us trophies without battle.) 
Later, in his “Commentaries on My Works,” Derzhavin recalled that the 
conquest of Crimea was part of a larger-scale design. The poet provided the 
following extremely characteristic clarification of the line “And Konstantin is 
ascending”: “A reference to Constantine Paleologus, the Constantinopolitan 
tsar, with whose death the Greek kingdom fell, and that in his place was 
ascending Konstantin Pavlovich, whom the empress wanted to raise to the 
throne, having driven the Turks from Europe, and who for this reason had been 
taught Greek. What grand plans! Man proposes, God disposes” (ibid., III, 
604). At the start of the Alexandrine epoch when the “Commentaries” were 
dictated, the “Greek Project” had moved from practical politics into the realm 
of great fantasy, although in the mid-1780s the annexation of Crimea seemed 
but a prelude to even greater achievements. The author of an anonymous ode of 
1784, “To Her Great Majesty Catherine II on the Acquisition of Crimea,” like 
Derzhavin, saw in Russia’s triumph the pledge of future dominion over the 
East:
Поклонник буйный Алкорана
Царем стал мудрым из тирана,
Познал блеск истинный венца; 
И просвещен Екатериной,  
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Оставил, мнится, нрав звериный, 
Облекся подданным в отца. 
Ax, ежели во мне не ложно 
Пророчество правдивых муз, 
Султана убедить возможно 
Избавить пленников от уз. 
Пошли к нему того Героя, 
Кем ханов упразднился трон [Потемкина – А.З.],
Услыша твоего витию, 
Он сам оставит Византию
И выйдет из Европы вон.  (Оde 1784, 7) 
(Tempestuous follower of the Alkoran / From a tyrant became a wise tsar, / 
Knew the true luster of a crown; / And, enlightened by Catherine, / Aban-
doned, it seems, his bestial ways, / Became a father to his subjects. // Oh,  
if the prophesy of truthful Muses / Is not false in me / It is possible to 
convince the sultan / To free the prisoners from their bonds. / Send that 
Hero to him / Who did away with the throne of the khans [i.e., Potemkin]. / 
Hearing your prophet / He will quit Byzantium by himself / And depart far 
from Europe.)
It is worth noting that on the copy of this ode that is preserved in the library 
of Moscow University, “Mr. Petrov” is written on the cover in an eighteenth- 
century hand (see SKRK II, 338). This attribution cannot be proved uncondi-
tionally, but seems highly likely, judging by the ode’s poetics and phraseology. 
Petrov’s possible authorship makes the text especially significant. In his odes 
the poet often expressed the cherished ideas of his patrons, and his geo-polit-
ical metaphors exerted their own influence on his addressees.
 2 
Apart from its advantageous strategic position, Crimea possessed enormous 
symbolic capital for Russia. It was able at the same time to represent Christian 
Byzantium and classical Hellas. Above all, it was a territory colonized in the 
depths of antiquity by Greece and rich in ancient monuments. With the acqui-
sition of Crimea, Russia obtained its own share of the antique inheritance, 
giving it the right to stand in the ranks of the civilized European nations. On the 
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other hand, it was from the shores of the Black Sea that the start of Russian 
Christianity had come. “The Tauric Chersonese, the source of our Christi-
anity and of our very humanity, is already in the embraces of her daughter. 
There is something mystical in this,” Potemkin wrote to Catherine in August 
1783, after the capture of Crimea (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 180). In the 
Tauric Chersonese Prince Vladimir had once taken the cross and entered into 
matrimony with the Greek Princess Anna, laying the foundation for the heri-
tage that was the ideological basis of the “Greek Project.” Having finally 
reached the places where it had taken its faith and had its first acquaintance 
with Greek culture, Russia had now to move onward to the historical center 
of that faith. 
Understandably, the conquest of Crimea could not help but be interpreted 
as the return of primordial Russian lands. 
Россия наложила руку 
На Тавр, Кавказ и Херсонес,
И распустя в Босфоре флаги, 
Стамбулу флотами гремит, — 
(Russia laid her hand / On Taurus, the Caucasus and Kherson, / And 
unfurling its flags in the Bosphorus, / Its fleets resound to Stanbul, - )
wrote Derzhavin (I, 182), and later in his “Explanations on My Works,” he 
clarified that “At this very time the Caucasian hordes were brought under 
control and Kherson, the ancient city of Russian princes, was returned to 
Russia” (ibid., III, 604).
A fairly full notion of the complex of ideas underlying Russia’s policy 
can be gleaned from Potemkin’s biography. Its author was Potemkin’s 
nephew and collaborator General A. N. Samoilov, a participant in the talks 
on annexing Crimea to Russia and an active figure in Potemkin’s adminis-
tration in Novorossiia (see, for example, Ludolf 1892, 174; Semevskii 1875, 
668). The biographical value of Samoilov’s work is usually rated low on 
account of its apologetic tone; in fact, the work crosses the line that sepa-
rates biography from hagiography. However, the value of Samoilov’s 
testimony lies elsewhere: his proximity to his uncle and benefactor as well 
as his complete reverence for him permit us to take the biographer’s 
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explanations as more or less reliable accounts of Potemkin’s own cherished 
thoughts and judgments. 
According to Samoilov, Potemkin 
could not without pain swallow the fact that those barbarians, enslaving the 
new Rome, ancient Greece …, subjecting Greeks and other Christians to 
humiliating servitude, were taking pride in the destruction of Enlighten-
ment. … Being on the shores of the Danube, from his studies in national 
history he eagerly sought the places where Sviatoslav had held his victory 
feasts, built cities2 …, [and he] sought in his heart for the sanctuary of 
Kherson whence St. Vladimir had accepted the illumination of the Christian 
faith for Russia. … (Samoilov 1867, 1010–1011)
Samoilov speaks about Potemkin’s actions in Novorossiia and Crimea—
founding towns and building up industry and trade. Yet his tone reaches its 
highest passion when it comes to the revolution in Crimean toponomy wrought 
by Potemkin: 
But in order the more to impress minds with the brilliance of Great 
Catherine’s acts, to root out and extirpate all memory of the barbarians …, 
the ancient names were revived in the conquered peninsula. Crimea was 
renamed Tauris (Tavrida); near the valleys where ancient Kherson stood, 
from the same heaps of stones near the port of Akhtiyar, Sevastopol rose; 
Akhty Mechet was called Simferopol, Kaffa Feodosyia, Kozlov Efpatoriya, 
Yenikale Pentikapium, Taman’ Fanagoriya, and so on. … In a word, new light 
shone in the ancient kingdom of Pontus under the leadership of the 
conqueror of Tauris, and the first unstoppable step was taken toward 
cleansing Europe of Mohammedans and the conquest of Istanbul. 
And in a letter to Greek Archbishop Nicephorus, Potemkin even promised to 
“call Taganrog Sparta” (Batalden 1982, 69). 
Potemkin’s line of thinking as presented by Samoilov is extremely inter-
esting. Russia was restoring to itself its own ancient holy place, and this return 
was accompanied by intensive Hellenization of the conquered land. Russians 
came into a province that had once belonged to Greece, gave it back its Greek 
countenance and restored their own faith and history, themselves in part 
2 The mention of Sviatoslav on the Danube was clearly connected with the part of the “Greek 
Project”’s plan to create the state of Dakiia from Moldavia and Wallachia, whose crown 
Potemkin coveted for a while (see Madariaga 1981, 377–388). 
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becoming Greeks. And the Greeks, freed from slavery, would regain their 
national character under the Russian aegis. 
Цирцея от досады воет, 
Волшебство все ее ничто. 
Ахеян, в тварей превращенных, 
Минерва вновь творит людьми. 
Осклабясь, Пифагор дивится. 
Что зрит он преселенье душ, 
Гомер из стрекозы исходит 
И громогласным своим пеньем 
He баснь, но истину поет, —
(Circe howls in vexation, / All her magic reduced to nothing. / The 
Achaeans, changed into beasts, / Minerva turns back into people. / 
Smiling, Pythagoras is amazed / To see the transmigration of souls, / 
Homer is transformed from a dragonfly / And with his thunderous singing 
/ Chants not fables but the truth, - )
wrote Derzhavin in his ode “On the Acquisition of Crimea” (Derzhavin I, 183). 
The theme of the Greek renaissance in connection with Russia’s plans of 
conquest had been relatively widespread in odes from the time of the Russo-
Turkish War of 1768–1774, but Derzhavin’s characteristic hyperbolic panache 
takes the notion to the limit. Minerva-Catherine not only turns the Greeks 
from slaves into heroes, but also from cattle into human beings, and her peaceful 
feat becomes the fulfillment of Pythagorean mysteries. Returned to his natural 
self, Homer can finally sing, not the fairy-tale adventures of the Trojan War, but 
the actual accomplishments of the Russian Athena.
The idea that the Russian Empire’s expansion to the south is the fulfill-
ment of Homer’s cherished notion was not Derzhavin’s invention. In 1775, in 
the foreword to a poem dedicated to the Peace of Kutchuk Kainarji, the 
Russian man of letters of Greek extraction Antonii Palladoklis also recalled 
Homer:
According to Alexander the Great’s phrase, Achilles was fortunate to have 
had Homer as chronicler of his courage. In the current war between those 
who are taking revenge for many peoples’ stolen freedom and those who 
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stole it …, Homer could rightly be called happy if he were resurrected today, 
for he would find here many Agamemnons, Achilleses, Ajaxes, Diomedeses 
and Odysseuses, who distinguish themselves heroically under Pallada’s lead-
ership. … His loud and sweet-sounding song would be drowned out by the 
eternally thundering victorious glory of Her Imperial Majesty’s arms, which 
the Epoch of Kherson and the noise of the waves separating the Azov and 
Black Seas … proclaim. (Palladoklis 1775, n. p.)
In 1787, during Catherine’s Crimean tour, Ermil Kostrov’s verse translation of 
the Iliad was published. In dedicating the work to the empress, Kostrov in 
particular wrote:
Он (Гомер. — А. 3.) в песнех сладостных  
   витийственным искусством
Еще в свой мрачною покрытый мглою век
О славе дней твоих, владычица, предрек!
Живая кисть его, Минерву описуя,
И щит ее и шлем очам изобразуя,
Явила в истине россиян божество
И храбра севера над югом торжество. 
   (Kostrov 1972, 157)
(In delightful songs with eloquent art / In an age still obscured by gloomy 
haze / He [Homer] foretold the glory of your days, sovereign! / His living 
brush, depicting Minerva, / And presenting her shield and helmet to our 
eyes, / Revealed in truth the Russians’ deity / And the triumph of the brave 
north over the south.)
Despite geographical reality, the Greeks’ victory over the Trojans became a 
victory of north over south, that is, the prototype of the wars Russian 
commanders were waging against the Turks:
Под сению твоих бесчисленных эгидов 
Ахиллов зрели мы, Аяксов, Диомидов, 
Со именем небес, со именем твоим 
Стремивши молнию в Стамбул и буйный Крим. … 
Взвивающийся твой над Геллеспонтом флаг 
Есть ужас варварам, источник грекам благ. 
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Почий Гомер, почий средь лавра и оливы, 
Сколь вымыслы твои приятны, справедливы! 
О россах истинно предчувствие твое, 
В Екатерине зрим его событие. (Ibid.)
(In the shade of your numberless aegises / We saw Achilleses, Ajaxes, 
Diomedeses, / With the heavens’ name, with your name / Striving like light-
ning toward Stambul and unbridled Crimea. … / Your defiant flag above the 
Hellespont / Is a horror to barbarians, source of good for Greeks. // Homer, 
resting in peace among laurel and olive, / How pleasant, how just are your 
inventions! / Your true premonition about the Russes / We see as fact in 
Catherine.)
The connection between Russian expansion to the South and the Trojan War 
evidently became a commonplace at the time of the Turkish campaign of 1768–
1772. The plot of Kheraskov’s epic poems, which by their generic nature were 
designed to become the basis for national myth, is comprised of the siege of a city 
that hides a cherished beauty within. Moreover, if in the “Rossiada” (1779) the 
city turned out to be Kazan, besieged by Ivan the Terrible, in his second epic 
poem written in the first half of the 1780s, Kheraskov finds a more adequate focus 
for Russia’s geographic, political, and erotic gravitation. In Tauric Chersonese 
Prince Vladimir needs to acquire both the Christian faith and a Greek princess:
В уме его Херсон и греческа княжна. 
Одно рождает в нем несытый гнев отмщенья. 
Другое — нежные любови ощущенья.  
   (Kheraskov 1785, 174)
(In his mind are Kherson and the Greek princess. / The one inspires insa-
tiable anger of revenge, / The other – sensations of tender love.) 
Faith, like the bride, is won in Tauris by force, and in the end – 
Соединился князь со греческой княжной. 
Запечатлелся ад священною печатью, 
И озарилася Россия благодатью. 
(The prince was united with the Greek princess. / Hell was sealed with a 
holy seal, / And Russia was illumined with grace.)
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Предрек уже тогда, предрек мятежный Тавр, 
Что в недрах сокрывал Екатерины лавр, 
Который обовьет Российскую корону 
И будет от срацин оградою Херсону.  
   (Op. cit., 242, 232)
(Even then rebellious Taurus [ i.e., the mountain] foretold / That in its 
depths it was hiding Catherine’s laurel, / That will wind round the Russian 
crown / And protect Kherson from the Saracens.)
Kheraskov’s epic was begun approximately in 1779, when the “Rossiada” 
was completed, and came out in 1785. It seems natural to suppose that the 
last cantos of the poem, in which the Kherson campaign is described, were 
composed in 1783–1784, when the annexation of Crimea occurred. 
As mentioned, Catherine considered the choice of names for her 
grandsons with exceptional care. It is indicative that the daughter born to 
Pavel Petrovich and Maria Fedorovna in 1784 was named Elena (Helen). 
Of course, the name was suggested first of all by Byzantine history (see 
Ruban 1784), but insofar as Greek Christianity and the classics were very 
closely connected in the consciousness of people of the time, the Homeric 
connotations of the newborn grand princess’s name could not have been 
absent. Indeed, in a letter to Grimm, Catherine admitted that she had given 
her granddaughter her name, and referred to her as “the beautiful Helen” 
(SbRIO XXIII, 326).
In his “Ode on the Acquisition of Crimea” Derzhavin used blank verse, 
which was extremely rare for him, specifically connecting this innovation with 
the poem’s classical coloration. When sending the ode to the journal Collocutor 
of Lovers of the Russian Word (Sobesednik liubitelei rossiiskogo slova), he wrote in 
the accompanying letter: “It is not unknown that the ancients wrote their 
poetry without rhyme, which even the most recent authors have imitated and 
still imitate. This ode was written as an experiment—will it seem to our 
respected public that this work (sei obraz) is in our poetic language, and should 
it be continued…”? (Derzhavin I, 182). Derzhavin was not alone in the attempt 
to Hellenize Russian poetry; even earlier, since 1775, Petrov had experimented 
with forms of the Pindaric ode (see Gasparov 1984, 99; Bershtein 1992, 83–84). 
His odes to Potemkin of 1777 and 1778 came out in 1780–81 in bilingual 
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editions. The facing translation in Greek was done by G. Baldani, and in an ode 
of 1782 Derzhavin tried—for the first time in Russia, it seems—to precisely 
reproduce the form of ancient Greek choral lyrics complete with strophes, 
antistrophes, and epodes. 
 3 
After the conquest of Crimea, Catherine and Potemkin started to erect the 
new Hellas. Immediately after the Peace of Kutchuk Kainarji, the new towns 
of Kherson and Slaviansk were founded in the new territories (SbRIO XXVII, 
50–51). The meaning of these towns’ names is quite evident. Kherson was to 
recall the Tauric Chersonese, and Slaviansk, the legendary city of the ancient 
Russians near Novgorod. “With this name we are also renewing those most 
famous designations that Russian history conserves from the depth of anti-
quity, that our people is of one stock and is a direct offshoot of the ancient 
Slavs, and that Kherson was the source of Christianity for Russia, where after 
Prince Vladimir took baptism the light of the divine faith and true religion 
shone and became established in Russia,” wrote Catherine in an ukase of 
September 9, 1775, on the creation of the Eparchy of Kherson and Slaviansk 
(PSZ №14366). The Eparchy was given an exceptionally high status and 
Eugenius Bulgaris, one of the leading figures of the Greek Enlightenment 
who had moved to Russia some years earlier, was appointed as its archbishop. 
The simultaneous foundation of fortresses with Greek and Slavic names was 
to symbolize the unity of the Christian peoples on the border with Turkey. 
Several years later Potemkin wrote to Eugenius to request that he write a 
history of Novorossiia:
As you combine in yourself knowledge of various ages, you are our Hesiod, 
Strabo and Chrysostom. Take on the task of writing an historical description 
of our region, what it was in ancient times, when from time immemorial 
there were marvelous men and prolific cities—Olbia, Melitopol, the islands 
of Achilles’s journey. … Borysthenes [ancient Greek name for the Dniepr], 
home to the ancient Rosses’ fleets, was not named this for nothing; its shores 
recall the shining path of Andrei the First-Called who preached salvation to 
our fathers. (Potemkin 1879, 19)
Of the two cities planned by Catherine, Slaviansk was in fact not built, whereas 
Kherson was to see furious development. 
103Chapter 3: Eden in Taurus
In that same year of 1775, the College for the Foreign Orthodox was 
founded in Petersburg, essentially to educate Greek youth, and in 1779 it 
was transferred to Kherson (PSZ № 15658; see Arsh 1970, 134–135).  In the 
second half of the 1770s, massive resettlement of foreigners to the new Russian 
lands was taking place, many from Crimea, which was still under the power of 
the Khans. Petrov wrote in an ode to Potemkin in 1778 (I, 180–181):
He совершается ль 
Пророчествие мира? 
Херсонски жители,
Единой веры чада  
He все ль, оставя юг, 
На север к нам грядете? 
Весь двинулся Херсон, 
Конца ему не видно,… 
Молдавец, Армянин, 
Индеянин иль Еллин, 
Иль черный Ефиоп 
Под коим бы кто небом 
На свет не произшел 
Мать всем Екатерина. … 
Co всей земли племен 
Слыви усыновитель. 
Чужих растенья стран 
Преносятся на север. 
Языки чужды ты 
Преображай во Россов, — 
(Is not the world’s prophecy / Coming true? / The inhabitants of Kherson, / 
Children of one faith, / Will you not all, forsaking the south, / Come to us in 
the north? // All Kherson has taken off, / There’s no limit to it,… / Molda-
vian, Armenian, / Indian or Hellene, / Or black Ethiopian / Under whatever 
native sky / They were born / Catherine is mother to all. … // Be known as 
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adoptive parent / Of all tribes on earth, / Plants from alien lands / Are trans-
planted to the north. / You, transform these alien peoples / Into Rosses, - )
Of course, the picture Petrov drew was not as much a depiction of Potemkin’s 
actual colonization activities as an odic metaphor of world domination. 
In actuality, Potemkin did found various Greek, Armenian, Moldavian, 
Albanian and Serbian settlements. As far as Ethiopians are concerned, the 
poet might have had in mind General Hannibal, who served in Novorossiia. 
As for the “Indians,” we have no information of them in Russian service of 
the time. However, turning diverse nationalities into one whole was the 
mission of empire, now formulated anew and on fresh ideological founda-
tions in the Black Sea littoral. 
In an ode of 1782 to Potemkin, Petrov’s main focus was again the ethnic 
variety of Potemkin’s settlements, where “even foreign peoples from distant 
countries of the world” found refuge:
… тамо Азиатец
И солнцем осмуглевший Афр, 
Климатов разных европеец,
Герой, пустынник, селянин
Без маcк очам твоим предстанет
В единой храмине увидит 
Восток и запад, норд и юг,… 
Черты их лиц, одежды нравы,
Языки их И веры разны. 
Но угоститель всех — один. … (Ibid., 18–19)
(… there an Asiatic / And an African, swarthy from the sun, / Europeans of 
various climes, / A hero, a hermit, a villager / Will appear before your eyes, 
without disguise, / And see in a single dwelling / East and west, north and 
south,… / Their facial features, clothes and customs, / Languages and faiths 
all different, / But the host of all—is one. …)
Potemkin’s desire to settle the land entrusted to him of Novorossiia with 
immigrants from other countries became a symbol of the future unity of the 
peoples of the Russian Empire’s new provinces. The Tower of Babel is 
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overcome as all peoples merge, completing the circle of universal civilization 
under Russia’s aegis. 
Competition with Peter and Petersburg, and the Baltic territory as a 
whole, permeates all of Potemkin’s activity. It was no accident that Samoilov 
called his political doctrine “the Eastern System,” which was clearly juxtaposed 
to N. I. Panin’s “Northern System” that saw Russia’s natural place among 
northern European states (see Griffiths 1970). Furthermore, with the change 
in the political situation in the 1780s, the prospects for speedy accomplish-
ment of the “Greek Project” were becoming increasingly dim and were put off 
indefinitely. Correspondingly, the theme of Crimea ceased to be subordinate 
to that of Constantinople and took on increasing autonomy. 
“Petersburg, established on the Baltic, is the northern capital of Russia,” 
wrote Potemkin to Catherine in 1783. “The middle one is Moscow, and 
Kherson of Akhtiar will be the southern capital of my Sovereign. Let them 
see which ruler has made the better choice” (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 
172). In another letter written the same day, he cheerfully asked the empress 
to “look on this place as one where the glory is yours originally (tvoia origi-
nal’naia) and you will not have to share it with your predecessors; here you 
will not follow in the footsteps of anyone else” (ibid., 173). Samoilov wrote 
that Potemkin “to the glory of his empress strove to bring about in the South 
what Peter the Great had accomplished in the North” (Samoilov 1867, 
1203). However, the point evidently concerned something bigger—the 
global reorientation of all Russian politics, culture and self-awareness. 
Of course, this program was initiated and supported by the empress 
herself. “How can that hamlet (Ochakov, still under Turkish control— 
A. Z.) dare raise its nose against the young colossus of Kherson?,” she wrote 
to Potemkin. “Peter I, who subjugated nature in his Baltic enterprises and 
constructions, faced greater obstacles than we at Kherson. But had he not 
initiated them, we would have been deprived of many of the capacities we 
needed for Kherson itself ” (Ekaterina I Potemkin 1997, 153). From this 
perspective, Peter, with his enterprises on the Baltic littoral, merely served 
as a predecessor to Catherine and Potemkin. But all these statements were 
made in private correspondence, known only to its participants. The 
symbolic demonstration of the chosen course was to be Catherine’s trip to 
Crimea in the first half of 1787. 
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The route and timing of this journey were worked out with extreme care. 
Catherine was to leave St. Petersburg immediately after the New Year’s 
festivities; travel through the winter provinces of Great Russia; pass the end 
of the winter and the first half of spring in Kiev, in lands ruled by the hero 
of the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, Field-Marshal Rumiantsev; enter 
Potemkin’s possessions in Novorossiia in early May, and spend the last two 
weeks of the month in Crimea. The movement of the royal suite southward 
coincided with the spring revival of nature. In Kherson itself, the empress 
and the foreign ambassadors accompanying her were to meet with the new 
ally of Russia—the Austrian Emperor Joseph II, travelling under the name 
of Count Falkenstein (for an analysis of the Crimean myth as interpreted by 
Catherine’s European travel companions, see Wolff 1994, 126–141). 
An important component of the journey, linking it with the “Greek 
Project,” was to be the presence in the empress’s suite of grand princes 
Alexander and Constantine, on which Catherine insisted despite the 
Figure 7 “Catherine II on a Journey across Russia in 1787” (1790) by  
Jean-Jacques Avril the Elder, based on a drawing by Ferdinand de Meys.  
State Historical Museum, Moscow. 
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stubborn opposition of their parents, Tsarevich Pavel Petrovich and his wife 
Maria Fedorovna. But the measles one of her grandsons had caught forced 
Catherine to drop this idea. It was precisely in Crimea, on May 21, in the pres-
ence of the ambassadors and Count Falkenstein, that the feast of St. Helena 
and Constantine was to be celebrated (see, e.g., SbRIO XXIII, 411); this was 
meant to confirm Russia’s succession in relation to the Eastern Roman Empire. 
Still more significant than the itinerary was the program for Catherine’s 
journey. A. M. Panchenko’s article “Potemkin Villages as a Cultural Myth” 
was the first to describe this program as a kind of symbolic text (Panchenko 
1983). In analyzing Potemkin’s mythology, the researcher directed his atten-
tion to military and state themes: the navy, the army, and civilization, leaving 
a whole series of crucial historical and cultural associations without explana-
tion. Thus, Panchenko interprets the famous episode with the squad of 
Amazons as a “manifestation of the capricious willfulness Potemkin was 
famous for” (ibid., 96; on the “Amazon regiment,” see Dusi 1844). In fact, 
the parade of exotic, partially clad “armed women” marching before the two 
emperors introduced the theme of the Scythians into the journey’s array of 
associations. 
Paragraphs 110–117 of Book IV of Herodotus’s Histories tell of warlike 
women who entered into marriage with the Scythians, bringing into the world 
the Scythian tribe of Savromaty (Sarmatians). Further, the ancient Scythians 
had not only once been inhabitants of the northern Black Sea coast, but were 
also counted in official eighteenth-century historiography as among the fore-
bears of the Slavs. In that very year, 1787, Catherine’s Notes on Russian History 
had appeared. Here already was a clear orientation toward the new ethnic 
conditions that arose in the conquered territories; thus the empress asserted 
that the Greeks had called the Scythians “Slavs, Sarmatians and Tartars” 
(Ekaterina VIII, 12). Catherine describes the life of the Scythian tribes with 
evident sympathy, projecting onto it the conception of the Russian national 
character that she was formulating in those years: 
Darius, the Persian emperor, they had chased off with disdain. Cyrus with 
his whole army could not prevail against the Scythians. … The Scythians 
were never subject to the Romans. Only Alexander of Macedon had 
success against the Scythians and made an alliance with them. … The 
northern Scythians had the same language as the Slavs. … They had their 
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own absolute rulers (samovlastnye gosudari). The Scythians could not 
tolerate other nations being called older. They admired friendship and 
virtue, loved the fearless, despised wealth, raised cattle, dressed in the 
same clothes winter and summer. They were always on horseback, their 
best weapon their pride; they gave judgment reasoning with common 
sense, as they had no written law, and severely punished vice. The bravery 
and justice of the Scythians were praised by neighboring peoples. … Their 
women rode out to war with the men. (Ibid., 20–22)3
Having such a genealogy was of course flattering, but the empire that had 
conquered Crimea was heir not just to Scythians and Slavs who were “more 
inclined to military service than to the arts and sciences” (Ekaterina VIII, 12), 
but also to the Greeks. Not coincidentally, the Amazon regiment itself was made 
up of Greek women from Novorossiia. The “historical presentation” written 
by the empress in 1787, “The Beginning of Oleg’s Reign,” pointedly shows 
the conclusion of an alliance between the warlike Slavic tribes and Christian 
Byzantium (on the political connotations of the work, see Cross 1990; Maiofis 
1996). In the finale of this play, Prince Oleg and Emperor Leo of Constantinople 
together watch Olympic competitions and a performance of Euripides’s 
“Alcestis” to the music of choirs singing passages from Lomonosov’s odes. 
Catherine’s interest in Euripides at the time deserves special attention, 
since during her stay in Crimea his tragedy “Iphigenia in Taurus” had become 
sharply topical. Already in the 1784 ode “To Her Great Majesty Catherine II on 
the Acquisition of Crimea,” it stated that
Так ты теперь Херсона страж. 
Так Ифигения в Тавриде 
И гроб сея царицы наш? (Oda 1784)
(So you are now the guardian of Kherson, / So is the grave of this queen, / 
Iphigenia in Taurus, ours?) 
3 It was probably in Catherine’s history that the parallel “Russians—Scythians”—so forcefully 
projected by Blok a century and a half later—was first articulated. It played a special role 
during the 1812 invasion, when certain elements of the Russian military strategy (dividing 
the troops into two armies, retreating deep into the country, destroying supplies, partisan 
attacks on the enemy, etc.) were directly associated with the Scythians’ war against Darius as 
described by Herodotus (on the so-called “Scythian plan” of attack, drawn up by 
M. A. Barklay de Tolly, see Tartakovskii 1996). 
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According to the main versions of the myth, Iphigenia, who fled Taurus to 
Attica together with Orestes and Pilades, was buried in her native land. But for 
the Russian poet, Iphigenia’s grave becomes a variant of the Holy Sepulcher, 
and the conquest of Crimea the equivalent of the Crusades. 
The most important events of Russia’s Eastern politics took place in 
parallel to the growing European popularity of the myth of Iphigenia. On 18 
May (European style), 1779, ten days after the birth of Grand Prince Konstantin 
Pavlovich, Glück’s opera “Iphigenia in Taurus,” with libretto by the French poet 
N.-F. Guillard, was performed in Paris to great success. The premiere of the 
German version of “Iphigenia” was held on December 31, 1781, in Vienna. 
Present were the heir to the Russian throne Pavel Petrovich, his wife, and her 
brother, Prince Eugene of Württemberg, who had earlier, incidentally, attended 
the premiere of Glück’s “Alceste.” The royal guests were so struck by the music 
that they paid a visit to the aged composer, which caused a sensation in the city 
(see Kroll 1964, vi-vii). Pavel’s journey to Vienna, literally forced on him by his 
mother, was meant to indicate Russia’s turn towards an alliance with Austria, a 
necessary condition for eastward expansion. 
In late 1783 “Iphigenia” was revived in Vienna by the command of Emperor 
Joseph II, a gesture possibly hinting at a welcome for his ally Russia, whose 
annexation of Tauris had only just become a legal fact. And finally, in 1787, 
virtually overlapping with Catherine’s journey to Crimea, though by pure coin-
cidence, the most famous interpretation of the myth was published—Goethe’s 
Iphigenia in Taurus (on the eighteenth-century Western European projection of 
the myth of Iphegenia onto Crimea, see Wolff 1994, 138). 
Not long before Catherine’s journey she wrote to Prince de Ligne, a 
French officer and wit in Austrian service at the Russian court: “I shall be 
taking your associates to a country where, they say, Iphigenia once dwelled. 
The mere name of that land arouses the imagination, so there is no sort of 
fancy that might not be set free on account of my journey to Tauris and my stay 
there” (SbRIO XXVII, 378–379). Catherine did not miss the chance here to 
recall Potemkin’s taste for all things Greek: “I do not really know if my gover-
nor-general will appreciate your critical remark about Homer, because he was 
dissatisfied with me because I thought that the Count of Stolberg made an 
excellent translation of that poet into German” (ibid.). Criticism of the 
German translation of Homer at this moment, when a Russian translation was 
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about to appear, also implicitly suggested a special connection between 
Russians and Greeks.4
The empress not only reminded de Ligne about Iphigenia in her letter, 
but even gave him an estate “on the shores of the Black Sea, in the very spot 
where according to tradition there stood the temple in which Queen Iphigenia 
was priestess” (Ségur 1907, 193). One of the most enlightened people in 
Europe was to be given a place in a little corner of Tauris settled by Tatars, 
where once an envoy of enlightened Greece had ruled the minds and souls of 
barbarian peoples, being at the same time their captive. As can be seen from 
his letters, de Ligne highly valued this gift (Ligne 1989, 505–506, 510; cf. 
Waegemans 1992).
For Catherine, Iphigeneia’s fate may have resonated with a strange simi-
larity to her own. She, like Euripides’s heroine, was given in sacrifice by her 
singular destiny and thrown into ruling a people that must inevitably have 
seemed to her barbarous, and whose peculiar sort of prisoner she also found 
herself. Be that as it may, she felt the time had come to realize old dreams and to 
restore ancient Greece. But since Constantinople was still beyond reach, 
she planned to do so on the territories she already controlled. The cornerstone 
of that revival was to be laid during the empress’s journey—the city of 
Ekaterinoslav (literally, “Glory to Catherine”), intended to become the capital 
of Novorossiia, and possibly of the whole empire. 
According to the plan for the new city, its shops were designed to 
“resemble the Propylaea or palace square (predvor’e) in Athens, with a stock 
4 A. M. Panchenko is hardly correct when he juxtaposes Potemkin’s “Novorossiia Project” to 
Bezborodko’s “Greek Project” (Panchenko 1983, 95). The assertion widely encountered in 
historical studies that the “Greek Project” was chiefly connected with Bezborodko’s activi-
ties (e.g., Markova 1958; Raeff 1972, 201, etc.) is contradicted by Bezborodko’s own 
testimony that at the moment his diplomatic career started the empress was already fully 
caught up in this idea: “From the first moment I understood that the sovereign’s intentions 
in regard to the Greek monarchy were serious, and I fully appreciated that this project was 
worthy of a great spirit, and moreover, that of course it could be carried out” (SbRIO XXVI, 
444). The “Greek” and “Crimean” projects were part of one larger conception, and for all of 
the mutual bad feelings between Potemkin and Bezborodko they worked on both projects 
toward a single end. “The idea of Crimea was our common one,” wrote Bezborodko in his 
“Autobiographical Note” (Ibid). Moreover, in both projects Potemkin took the role of ideol-
ogist, whilc Bezborodko had to prepare the necessary documents for Catherine. “A cane, led 
by a broad intellect,” wrote the well-informed Derzhavin in an ode to Crimea, and explained 
that this referred to “The pen of Count Bezborodko, led by Prince Potemkin’s ideas” 
(Derzhavin III, 603).
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exchange and theater;” the governor’s palaces were to be designed “in 
accordance with the taste of Roman and Greek buildings.” The town was also 
to accommodate a university and a music academy (see Ekaterina i Potemkin 
1997, 209). However, Ekaterinoslav, while evidently intended to combine 
Rome and Athens, was yet to be built, while in a few years Kherson had already 
managed to grow at a speed that astonished even the none too sympathetic 
observers from politically hostile France (see Ségur 1907, 243; Ludolf 1892, 
172). Concerning Kherson, Count Ludolf reported that “evidently the empress 
intends to devote all her attention to this city,” and predicted without hesita-
tion that “the buildings to be erected in Ekaterinoslav will be magnificent” 
(ibid., 173, 177). 
Катись свозь новы, Днепр, Афины,… 
Цвети Темпейской рай долины, - 
(Flow, Dnieper, through the new Athens, / Blossom, paradise of Tempe’s Vale, -) 
wrote V. Petrov about Kherson in an ode of 1777, later translated into Greek 
(Petrov I, 159). A land finally restoring its Russian and Christian nature 
becomes the prototype for the coming earthly paradise. 
 5 
Themes of paradise seem to be an unavoidable attribute of imperial utopias; it 
is worth recalling how obstinately Peter went on calling his beloved marshes in 
Ingermanland Paradise (Paradiz), but of course the nature in Novorossiia and 
especially Crimea was literally begging for such an interpretation. Almost 
immediately after the annexation of Crimea, Potemkin’s estate near the Baidar 
Gates began to be called the Vale of Tempe. In 1789 Ségur, in a letter to 
Potemkin, exulted over “the commerce brought to Kherson by a fleet built in 
Sevastopol in two years, as if by a miracle. … Your Vale of Tempe, your 
Ekaterinoslav, where in two years you built more monuments than other capi-
tals in two centuries” (Potemkin 1875, 232). 
The empress’s entire journey to Novorossiia and Crimea played out under 
the sign of the Paradise topos. One can follow how these themes develop in 
Catherine’s letters to Ia. A. Bruce:
April 30. from Kremenchug: 
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The governor’s house … is in a handsome oak grove and regular fruit 
orchard, with all the trees and even the oaks spreading, and it is as warm here 
as July in Russia. All in all, since we journeyed into the Ekaterinoslav area the 
air and all things and people have changed their appearance, and everything 
seems more alive. 
May 4, on the road from Kremenchug to Kherson: 
I consider the climate here the best in the empire, here without exception 
all fruit trees grow in the open air, and I have never in my life seen pear 
trees the size of the biggest and thickest oak, and the air is the most 
pleasant. 
May 14, from Kherson: 
Kherson may be considered among the finest of our cities. This child prom-
ises much: where they plant, everything grows, where they plough, there is 
abundance. The buildings are all stone, we have not yet felt the heat, all are 
healthy, the people here have no sick appearance and everything is in motion, 
there are many people and they come from all lands, though for the most 
part from the South. 
We can note in the last quotation that the rapid increase of stone buildings and 
the variety of people who settled in the area are described here as fruit of the 
Figure 8 “View of Tauride” by V. P. Petrov (1791).  
Saratov State Art Museum, Saratov.
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powerful local nature, bringing forth both vegetation and people in incredible 
abundance and variety. 
Catherine’s final judgment may be found in a letter of May 16, also from 
Kherson: “I am very happy to have seen it all with my own eyes,… this land is 
an earthly paradise” (Ekaterina 1889, 21–25). Catherine even took part herself 
in cultivating paradisiacal gardens, planting an apricot tree in Kherson which 
took extraordinarily well and lived at least until 1840 (Pelino 1844, 607). The 
memoirs of A. I. Mikhailovski-Danilevskii tell of his visit to Kherson with 
Emperor Alexander I in 1818: “The sovereign took us into the garden near the 
dining room, and stopped at a large apricot tree. Touched, he looked at it silently 
for a long time. Not knowing why he thus stood, we were also silent. Finally he 
said, ‘This tree was planted by the empress Catherine. She hoped to found the 
capital of Southern Russia in Kherson, and she often told me of these intentions 
of hers’” (Shil’der IV, 100). 
Taurus was to serve as the apotheosis of these paradisiacal gardens. A year 
before her journey, the empress wrote to I. G. Zimmermann that she saw the 
cultivation of “gardens and especially botanical gardens” as “one of the most 
important objectives in Tauris” (SbRIO XXVI, 360). Prince K.-G. Nassau-Siegen, 
in Catherine’s retinue, wrote from Crimea that “the orchards of this place can 
give the impression of the gardens of paradise” (Timoshchuk 1893, 297). One 
can get an idea of Potemkin’s typical flair when arranging this paradise from a 
contract he concluded with the gardener I. Blank, obliging him to plant “all 
kinds of trees … such as olives, figs, sweet and bitter oranges, various kinds of 
lemon, bergamot and others … 1000 almond trees, 2000 silk trees and 500 
peach trees for sowing every year and 200 walnuts every two or three years” 
(Potemkin 1875, 254; cf Schönle 2001). 
Accordingly, literary works connected with the annexation of Crimea 
also reflect the paradise theme and motifs of the transfiguration of nature. 
Derzhavin begins his Crimean ode (I, 182):
Летит и воздух озаряет, 
Как вешне утро тихий понт!
Летит, и от его улыбки 
Живая радость по лугам, 
По рощам и полям лиется, — 
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(It flies and lights up the air, / Like a spring morning [lights up] the quiet 
sea! / It flies, and from its smile / Living joy pours through the meadows, / 
Groves and fields, -)
In letters and statements from the empress in those months there is continual 
comparison of the false Petersburg paradise with the real Crimean one. “We 
talked of the balmy air and the warmth of the climate,” noted Khrapovitskii in 
his diary on May 4, recording his conversation with the empress. “A pity 
Petersburg was not built here, because passing through these places you imagine 
the times of Vladimir I” (Khrapovitskii 1874, 34).5 Prince Vladimir’s name did 
not come up by accident. In 1782, just on the eve of the conquest of Crimea, 
the Order of St. Vladimir was founded, and during the journey south a ship 
christened the “Vladimir” had its launch ceremony (Khrapovitskii 1874, 35). 
The idea of a competition between the new lands and Peter’s Baltic 
conquests was given fuller development in Catherine’s letter to P. D. Eropkin 
from Bakhchisarai on May 20: 
Those who belittled the acquisition of this land know very little about the 
value of things: not only will Kherson and Taurus pay for themselves in 
time, but one may hope that if Petersburg yields one eighth of the empire’s 
revenue the aforementioned places will surpass those barren places with 
their fruits. … I still recall that no one liked that area [St. Petersburg], and 
this [Crimea] truly is incomparably better. (Ekaterina 1808, 259)6 
On June 8, already on the return journey, Catherine expressed her highest 
approval of Potemkin’s labors and bestowed on him the honorary title of Prince 
of Taurus (Kniaz’ Tavricheskii). Evidently, the question of Russia’s future 
geopolitical orientation was basically clear to her. And her contemporaries 
understood that. 
The celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of Catherine’s ascension to 
the Russian throne in Moscow on June 28 served as a kind of culmination of the 
trip. As he had a quarter century earlier, M. M. Kheraskov took part in arranging 
an ideologically significant celebration, writing the scenario for a performance 
5 On reverence for Vladimir as a kind of substitute for the already traditional cult of Peter the 
Great, see Rasmussen 1978.
6 The question whether Peter’s choice for the place of his capital was voluntary or connected 
with military failures in the south was of wide interest in the nineteenth century (see Ospovat 
1994). 
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of “Happy Moscow” (Shchastlivaia Moskva). According to this libretto, four 
Geniuses appeared before the public, representing the four corners of the earth, 
each telling why he was glorified in the Russian Empire. Last to appear was the 
“Genius of the South,” who solemnly proclaimed: 
Celebrate your good fortune, blessed Geniuses! You are truly happy, yet it 
may be I have some advantage over you; everything you glory in individually 
I combine in my southern domains: abundance is my fortune, fat flocks 
pasture in my fields, salubrious air invigorates my inhabitants, I fly amid 
fragrant flowers, I rejoice! And I taste the sweetest fruits in my woods: but 
most important of all, a whole realm has come under my sway again, a 
kingdom flowing with milk and honey. (Kheraskov 1787, 11)
It should be recalled how persistently throughout the century Russia had been 
called “the North” and “the septentrional power” (polnoshchnaia, “midnight”), 
while the Turks were “sons of the South” (poludnia, “midday”), if one is to 
appreciate how radical this rhetoric was. The appearance of Taurus within the 
bounds of the Empire, “a kingdom flowing with milk and honey,” promised to 
fundamentally alter Russia’s national self-perception and cultural geography. 
Yet none of these transformations was to be fully realized. The second Russo-
Turkish War, starting two months after Catherine’s return, delayed the 
development of the southern provinces, and Potemkin’s death in 1791 dealt her 
plans an irreparable blow. In 1796 the empress herself also died, and all of the 
southern projects were shelved forever, although they remained in Russian 
culture as an intention, a lost possibility, a latent—but for that all the stronger—
realm of attraction. 
 6 
In 1798 S. S. Bobrov’s descriptive poem “Taurus” (Tavrida) was published in 
Nikolaev. It was dedicated to N. S. Mordvinov. Both the place of publication 
and the dedication were profoundly significant. During Catherine’s journey 
Mordvinov had received the rank of counter-admiral and his fortunes were 
closely connected to the Crimean peninsula. Despite complications in their 
personal relations at the end of Potemkin’s life, Mordvinov was his true intellec-
tual heir (see Ospovat 1994, 481). After Potemkin’s death, it was to Mordvinov 
that Petrov directed his muse, and the poet’s ode to him was one of the first 
publications by the Nikolaev typography. Throughout the 1790s Mordvinov 
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occupied himself with improvements to Nikolaev, a city whose position 
seemed to him more fitting as a “second Athens” than Kherson or Ekaterinoslav 
(Ikonnikov 1873, 70). By 1798 Mordvinov was out of favor with Paul I, who 
did not care much either for his mother’s projects or for her disciples.
Bobrov’s “Taurus” is for the most part a description of nature in Crimea. 
But at the time, any story about Crimean flora was full of tense political 
meaning:
Ax! — Тамо рай за ним сияет,… 
Блаженное жилище Флоры, 
Блистающий престол Помоны, — 
В прекрасном Афинее Темпе … 
 под висящими плодами 
Черешней, вишней, слив и груш; 
На коих дикий виноград, 
Объемля ветви до вершин 
И их приятный взор сугубя 
Своим сиянием багровым. 
Растут без попеченья сами 
(Bobrov 1798, 57–60; )
(Oh! There paradise shines behind it,… / The blessed dwelling of Flora, / 
The sparkling throne of Pomona,—/ In the beautiful Vale of Tempe  
… / under hanging fruits / Cherries, plums and pears; / On which wild 
grapes, / Entwining branches to the top / Intensifying the pleasant sight / 
With their purple glow, / Grow by themselves without tending.)
However, this paradisiacal garden has its history, and Bobrov tells of Iphegenia 
who suffered from the coarse manners of the Sarmatians and Scythians; about 
the enlightenment brought to the peninsula by the Greeks; about Vladimir’s 
baptism; and about the Muslim conquest of Crimea. According to Bobrov, this 
conquest led not only to political but to so-to-speak biological degradation:
Природа резвая дотоле 
На сих горах, на сих лугах 
Оцепенела, побледнела 
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Под мрачной сению луны … 
О сколь ужасна перемена 
Тогда была во дни их буйства, 
Тогда ни виноград, ни смоква, 
Ни персики, ни абрикосы 
Природных вкусов не имели. (Ibid., 136–137)
(Henceforth spirited nature / In these hills, in these meadows / Grew 
frozen, became pale / In the gloomy shade of the moon … / Oh, what a 
horrible change / Was then, in the days of that mayhem. / Then neither 
grapes nor figs, / Neither pears nor apricots / Had their natural flavors.)
This interpretation of Crimea’s evolution fully corresponds to Mordvinov’s 
views as he expressed them in “An Opinion Related to Crimea” of 1802: 
“Crimea went into decline as soon as Christians were sent out of the hilly region 
and Tatars took over their gardens and homes” (Mordvinov 1901, 211). Only 
the return of the peninsula to the protection of the Christian monarchs of 
Russia can lead to a revival of the Crimean paradise. Taurus not only takes its 
place in the Russian Empire, it becomes the jewel in the crown of European 
civilization. With Crimea’s unification with Russia, history completes its logical 
circle and a Golden Age begins:
Но если б росски Геркулесы, 
Одушевленные Минервой, 
Ступая на сии хребты. 
Здесь лики водворили муз 
И преселили в мирны сени 
Столетни опыты Европы 
На помощь медленной природе. 
Тогда бы гордый Чатыр-даг 
Меонией прекрасной был бы. 
Салгир чистейшей Иппокреной, 
Тогда исполнился бы тот 
Период славный просвещенья, 
О коем бесподобный Петр 
Пророчески провозвещал. 
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Тогда бы музы совершили 
Столь дивно царствие свое 
И эллиптический свой путь 
Скончали там, где начинали. 
Из знойного исшед Египта 
В Элладу на брега Эгейски 
И поселясь при гордом Тибре, 
Тамизе, Таге и Секване, 
Дунае, Рене и Неве 
Обратный путь бы восприяли 
И возвратилися в источник. 
Тогда бы новые Омиры, 
Сократы мудры и Платоны 
На горизонт наук взошли 
И потекли бы как светила 
По новому порядку лет. (Bobrov 1798, 163–164)
(But if Russian Herculeses, / Animated by Minerva, / Stepping on these 
crests, / Established here the assembly of muses / And brought to this 
peaceful abode / Europe’s experience of centuries / To help sluggish nature, / 
Then prideful Chatyr-dag / Would be beautiful Maeonia / And the Salgir 
[River] the purest Hippocrene, / Then the period of glorious enlightenment, 
/ About which matchless Peter / Prophetically proclaimed / Would be 
fulfilled, / And then the muses would marvelously / Complete their 
kingdom / And their elliptical path / Would end there where it began, / 
Departing sultry Egypt / To Hellas, to the Aegean shores / And settling near 
the proud Tiber, / Tamiz, Tar, Sequana, / Danube, Rhine, Neva / Would 
perceive the way back / And return to their source. / Then new Homers, / 
Wise Socrateses and Platos / Would rise to the horizon of learning / And 
would stream like a luminary / On the new order of the ages.)
Peter’s prophesy that Bobrov mentions was based on the words he said to the 
ambassador from Hanover, K. Weber, that became widely known in Russia:
Historians suppose that the cradle of all knowledge was in Greece, from 
where (due to the vicissitudes of time) it was driven out, and moved to Italy, 
and then also spread throughout all of the European lands. … The move-
ment of knowledge indicated above I compare to the circulation of blood in 
the human body, and it seems to me that with time they will quit their 
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current dwelling in England, France and Germany, spend a few centuries in 
our country and then return again to their true fatherland—to Greece. 
(Weber 1872, 1074–1075)
Bobrov makes substantial corrections to these prophesies. The Muses, as 
a matter of fact, have no reason to leave Russia and return home to Greece, 
because the Russians are in a certain (mainly religious) sense Greek them-
selves, and they have acquired their own Greece in Taurus. From this 
perspective there is no reason to fight for Constantinople, because the reborn 
Tauric Chersonese becomes the perfect embodiment of Constantinople.
 7 
The academician Pallas, travelling in Crimea in the 1790s, described the 
ruins of Chersonese, which in his opinion were located in Quarantine Bay 
(Karantinnaia bukhta) very near Sevastopol (Pallas 1883, 56). Precisely 
two centuries later Russia and Ukraine contended over the bay for its part 
of the Black Sea fleet. On the long list of lands that fell away from Russia in 
1991, Crimea remains almost the only loss that it seems still troubles 
Russian social consciousness. 
Explanations for Russians’ sharp nostalgia usually boil down either to 
the mundane “now we have nowhere to vacation” or to the militaristic 
“Sevastopol—a city of Russian glory.” Nevertheless, Crimea is still more 
accessible for holiday visits than Abkhaziia, ravaged by war, or even the 
Baltic, places that were just as popular with Soviet vacationers. As far as 
“Russian glory” goes, Sevastopol of course cannot compete with, say, Poltava. 
Still, these other places do not evoke emotions anything like those that Crimea 
does. One may suggest that behind these explanations lies a deeper one, deeper 
and for that reason less reflected on, that possessing Crimea constitutes the 
crown of Russia’s historical mission, its civilizing task. It is worth contemplating 
how these cultural and symbolic concepts—literally, those “of the times of the 
Ochakovs and the conquest of Crimea”—come to life in the consciousness of 
Russians today. 
Without pretending to an exhaustive answer to the extremely complex 
issue of the mechanisms that “retranslate” cultural memory, we make so bold as 
to put forward one suggestion. The decisive factor in preserving the memory of 
Potemkin’s projects in mass consciousness, in our opinion, is the architectural 
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design of Crimean sanatoriums and Pioneer camps. The world of white houses 
by the sea, gravel paths among laurel bushes, alleys of Cyprus trees with plaster 
vases and statues, buglers in crimson kerchiefs at morning line-up, vacationers 
strolling in light-colored pajamas—this was our ancient Greece, our paradise, 
even though it may have been cleansed from excessive ethnic diversity by the 
father of the peoples after the war. But it was accessible—available through a 
tourist group from the trade-union or via a directive from the Pioneer organiza-
tion for a citizen of the empire. Here he or she could rest peacefully, for on 
guard (na reide) atop the waves was the Black Sea fleet of the Red Banner, with 
sailors in white and blue uniforms and rimless caps for whom girls in far-off 
villages were pining. Precisely in such things do the everyday and militaristic 
interpretations of Crimea’s allure for Russians become indistinguishable. 
Vladimir Papernyi’s book Culture Two describes the sharp and the 
climactically unexplained “warming” of Soviet, and especially Muscovite, 
architecture in the 1930s, at the height of totalitarianism. Architects seem to 
have ceased to notice the winter, worrying only about coolness, moisture, 
greenery. In Papernyi’s words, “cultural sensation of the world seemed to slip 
southward by several dozen degrees, from sixty degrees latitude to at least 
those of the Mediterranean” (Papernyi 1996, 171). It is hard to say if these 
were the latitudes of the Mediterranean or of the Black Sea, but in any case it 
is clear that Catherine and Potemkin’s dream did come to pass, if only 
strangely and temporarily. Constantinople was never attained, although the 
empire turned to the South and the midday genius transformed “happy 
Moscow” into “a kingdom flowing with milk and honey.” 
 1 
Semen Bobrov’s long poem in which the conquest of Crimea is interpreted not as a stage in the “Greek Project” but as the symbolic apotheosis of 
Russian expansion in the south was only published after Catherine II’s death. 
The late empress would hardly have approved of this kind of revision of her 
cherished plans. Until her last days the empress remained convinced both of 
their feasibility and of their benefit for Russia (see Ragsdale 1988).  At the same 
time her notion of how long it might take to realize them fluctuated, depending 
on changes in the political situation. One of these changes occurred during 
1789. On January 26, after having ordered that triumphal gates be built for 
Potemkin in Tsarskoe Selo, Catherine commanded that they be inscribed with 
the line from Petrov’s ode “On the Taking of Khotin”: “You will descend to the 
Temple of Sophia amid applause.” While giving these instructions, the empress 
commented that “He [Potemkin] will be in Tsargrad [i.e., Constantinople] this 
year” (Khrapovitskii 1874, 245). However, on October 10 of the same year she 
made quite a different prediction: “On the Greeks: they can be revived. 
Constantine is a good boy; in thirty years he will go from Sevastopol’ to 
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Tsargrad. Now we are breaking the horns [i.e., Ottoman power] and then it will 
be easier for him to smash them” (ibid., 312). 
Thus the time frame for realizing the “Greek Project” grew from one to 
thirty years, clearly far beyond the time the empress could aspire to rule. This 
change might have been caused by a variety of circumstances—the not very 
auspicious course of the Turkish and Swedish wars, the start of the Revolution 
in France, and the revived hostility of European powers toward Russia’s expan-
sionist plans. But the main factor was apparently the danger that Catherine 
perceived in the events transpiring in Poland. In the words of S. M. Solov’ev, 
“the Eastern question lost its importance for a while [and] then Polish question 
took first place” (Solov’ev 1863, 251). 
In the second half of the 1780s, Poland, which it seemed had completely 
vanished from the European stage due to the partitions and to inner strife, 
suddenly acquired political existence once again. At the opening of the Sejm in 
late 1788, the patriotic party that demanded the replacement of the archaic aris-
tocratic system with a more effective governmental system, as well as political 
and social reforms and the creation of a national army, acquired enormous 
influence. The leaders considered the only solution to be an alliance with 
Prussia. The Sejm demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland 
and prohibited Russia from using Polish territory for communicating with the 
army fighting the Turks. 
Russia, which was waging war on two fronts, had to accept these demands. 
In May 1789 the occupying Russian garrison was ordered to leave Poland, 
where it had been quartered for a quarter of a century. Before concluding peace 
with the Turks and Swedes, Catherine strove to avoid yet another open armed 
conflict. Nevertheless, it was clear to her that the empire would be acquiring yet 
another hostile neighbor on her western border, and one which at any moment 
might demand a review of the results of the partition (see Lord 1915, 92–111). 
Russian diplomacy had to work out a new course that would take into account 
the newly changed power alignments. This task also demanded a fundamental 
ideological reorientation. 
The new points of reference for Russian politics were again outlined by 
Potemkin. However, his significant loss of influence on the empress and then 
his sudden death evidently prevented the official and conclusive formulation 
of his ideas. Still, Potemkin’s exceptionally interesting projects defined the 
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symbolism of the celebration that he organized for the empress in the Tauride 
Palace on April 28, 1791. 
Richard Wortman dedicated several pages of his study Scenarios of Power: 
Myth and Ceremony in the Russian Monarchy to Potemkin’s celebration 
(Wortman 1994, 143–146). His analysis centers on the extremely detailed 
“Description of the Celebration in the House of Prince Potemkin” by Gavriil 
Derzhavin. Wortman comments that the personal intonations characteristic 
Figure 9 Portrait of G. A. Potemkin-Tavricheskii by Johann-Baptist von Lampi  
the Elder (c. 1790). Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg.
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of Derzhavin only became usual for ceremonial texts in the nineteenth 
century (ibid., 143; for an analysis of the philosophical and cosmological 
ideas reflected in the celebration, both in the Tauride Palace’s architecture 
and in Derzhavin’s “Description,” see Pogosian 1997). This “personal slant” 
of Derzhavin’s “Description” might be connected with the fact that Potem-
kin’s celebration, despite its scale, characteristic of the prince, and despite the 
participation of the royal family, was not, strictly speaking, official. Its extent 
and program were clearly marked as belonging to a faithful subject of the 
great sovereign, one who was offering her a tribute of love and thankfulness 
for her unparalleled beneficence. On the other hand, the pretext for the cele-
bration was an event of utter state importance—a great victory of Russian 
arms. “The lord of all-powerful Rome … could not have created a bigger 
house or have presented greater magnificence for his celebration. It seemed 
that all the wealth of Asia and all the art of Europe were combined to adorn 
the temple of celebrations for the Great Catherine. There is hardly [another] 
private person [living] today who has such a vast building as his dwelling 
place,” wrote Derzhavin (I, 391, note). In 1808, when editing the “Descrip-
tion” for the fourth volume of his works, the poet changed this phrase to: 
“There is hardly [another] ruler [living] today. …” It was precisely the oppo-
sition and connection between “private person” and “ruler” that constituted 
the main tension in the celebration’s meaning.
By celebrating the taking of Izmail in his own home, Potemkin was 
declaring himself the single party responsible for the victory. Suvorov, the one 
who had been in direct command of the assault, had been sent off to inspect 
the Swedish border. “The prince [Potemkin] urged mistrust of the Swedish 
king,” Catherine’s secretary Khrapovitskii wrote in his diary. “They say that 
this was to keep Suvorov away from the celebration and from displaying the 
captured pashas” (Khrapovitskii 1874, 362; cf. Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 
455).1 However, Potemkin’s initiative also had another possibly even more 
1 V. S. Lopatin, who has done much to clarify the true facts of Potemkin’s biography, falls into 
excessive apologetics for his hero when he asserts that Suvorov’s departure from Petersburg 
was not connected with Potemkin’s desire to exclude his renowned subordinate from the 
celebration but due to military necessity (see Lopatin 1992, 230–231). There was no such 
crucial necessity that would have prevented delaying Suvorov’s departure for three days, and 
furthermore, there was nothing to keep Potemkin from mentioning Suvorov’s role in 
storming Izmail during the celebration. 
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important aspect. The “privatizing” of the celebrations allowed their organizer 
to affirm not only his version of the Izmail triumph but also of Russian politics 
as a whole in the minds of the empress and of elite Petersburg society.
Potemkin sent Catherine his first dispatch about the taking of Izmail on 
December 18, 1790, and on January 11 he began to lobby for permission to 
return to Petersburg (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 444, 447). But His Serene 
Highness (as Potemkin came to be called) could not wait, and two days later 
informed her that he was going to inspect shipbuilding on the Dnieper “so that 
once I receive your permission I shall already be that much farther along on 
the way to Petersburg, and shall thus shorten my journey” (ibid., 449; Cath-
erine 2004, 3782). However, Potemkin did not leave Iassy and continued to 
bombard Catherine with pathetic requests that he be allowed to come. Having 
received permission to leave the theater of military action as long as his depar-
ture would not harm the start of peace negotiations, the prince set off for the 
capital, where he arrived on February 28 (Khrapovitskii 1874, 358). According 
to contemporary memoirs, reports concerning Platon Zubov, Catherine’s 
latest favorite, and his increasing influence on the empress were what hastened 
his arrival in Petersburg. As Derzhavin recalled, Potemkin, “on leaving the 
army told his retinue that he was unwell and was going to Petersburg to pull 
some teeth [zuby dergat’, i.e., to remove Zubov]” (Derzhavin IV, 617).
Despite the recent successes in the Turkish War and the already signed 
peace with Sweden, Russia’s political position in the winter and spring of 1791 
was far from satisfactory. She was threatened with an incalculably more 
powerful coalition. The English fleet was preparing to sail to the Baltic, Prussia 
had declared a mobilization, and in Poland anti-Russian sentiments were 
growing. Many of Catherine’s closest advisors tried to convince her to yield to 
this pressure and accept unfavorable conditions in the peace with Turkey. 
Potemkin, who was well-informed about the true condition of the army and 
who did not believe in the possibility of “recruits battling Englishmen” 
(Khrapovitskii 1874, 361), added his voice to this chorus. While still in the 
South, he advised her to cede territorial acquisitions in Moldavia to Poland, 
open talks with Prussia, and to “stroke” England by enticing her with profitable 
2 References to Catherine 2004 indicate that the translations of the Catherine-Potemkin 
correspondence have been taken from this edition.
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trade agreements (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 402, 442–43). After arriving in 
Petersburg, he used all of his influence to force Catherine “to correspond with 
the Prussian king,” and together with Chancellor Bezborodko he also compiled 
a “memorandum to prevent war” (Khrapovitskii 1874, 359, 361). 
Catherine, however, was able to withstand both domestic and foreign 
pressure. As Robert Lord writes, Catherine “won a complete victory, perhaps 
the most brilliant of her reign, thanks to her own splendid courage and 
constancy” (Lord 1915, 190). Finally, due to strong opposition to war with 
Russia that was deftly boosted by Russian diplomacy, the English government 
backed down from its ultimatum and agreed to accept conditions for peace that 
were much more acceptable to Catherine, and these were quickly approved by 
the Turks as well (see ibid., 153–191; Madariaga 1981,416–421; and others). 
“A courier with the news that England apparently … will not begin war” arrived 
in Petersburg on April 30, two days after the celebration in Potemkin’s resi-
dence (Khrapovitskii 1874, 362). 
It was in these extremely dramatic personal and political conditions 
that Potemkin anxiously prepared for the celebration. The completion of 
the construction of the house, the outfitting the park and space in front of 
the palace, the digging of canals, the interior decoration of the space being 
prepared for theater and ballet—all took place under the direct supervision 
of His Serene Highness over the course of two months following his arrival 
in Petersburg. The celebration was originally planned for Catherine’s 
birthday, April 21, which in 1791 fell on St. Thomas Monday, the second 
Monday after Easter. But even Potemkin’s organizational genius could not 
overcome all obstacles, and it was necessary to put it off for a week. None-
theless, by April 28 all preparations had been completed. 
In the words of Ia. K. Grot, this “festival, whose unprecedented magnifi-
cence was supposed to eclipse all earlier celebrations of this type” was 
conceived by His Serene Highness as “the final word to prove to the empress 
that no one could compare with him in his devotion to her” (Derzhavin I, 
378). However, for all of Potemkin’s love for luxury and for hyperbolically rich 
ceremonies, he could hardly have counted on blinding Catherine with it. His 
goal was to once again snatch the political initiative away from the new favorite 
and to show that he was capable as before of dreaming up and carrying out the 
most grandiose undertakings. Of course, he could share the main idea of these 
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undertakings in his correspondence with the empress as well as in personal 
conversations. At the same time, a celebration could do away with the sugges-
tion of his projects’ immediate diplomatic or court jockeying and reveal their 
fundamental ideological dimension. Potemkin’s conception of Russia’s state 
mission was to acquire visual and graphic embodiment. Considering the fact 
that His Serene Highness died less than six months later, one could say that the 
celebration of April 28 represented his last political testament.
 2 
Potemkin’s rise in the mid-1770s was connected with his “Eastern System,” on 
which basis Catherine II’s “Greek Project” took shape. In order to impress the 
empress just as strongly with his new conceptions, he had to propose ideas that 
were qualitatively different from his former project yet retaining definite conti-
nuity with it.
In 1779, on the occasion of the birth of Grand Prince Konstantin 
Pavlovich, Potemkin had staged a celebration in honor of Catherine at his 
dacha in Ozerki. This was wholly staged in the spirit of stylized antiquity 
characteristic of “Greek Project” imagery. Ia. K. Grot described it on the basis 
of V. P. Petrov’s description:
The place where supper was prepared represented a cave in the Caucasus 
Mountains (i.e., one of the territories that had been entrusted to the host); 
the cave was decorated with myrtle and laurel trees, among which roses 
and other flowers were entwined; a stream that rushed down from the top 
of the mountain and crashed into cliffs cooled the air. During supper, 
which was arranged according to ancient customs, to the sounds of an 
organ a chorus sang stanzas composed in the Hellenogreek language in 
honor of the glorious visitor; Petrov, who enjoyed Potemkin’s special 
patronage, translated them into Russian. (Derzhavin I, 379)
The role that Potemkin had played in the “Greek Project” created a persistent 
reputation among contemporaries and affected the perception of all his plans 
and actions. In his ode “On the Taking of Izmail” written in early 1791, Derhavin 
addressed the European powers who were trying to intercede on behalf of 
Turkey. His admonitions were fully in keeping with Catherine’s long-time 
dreams of a resurrected Greece and a renewed Christian republic that had once 
been prophesized by Henry IV and M. de Sully:
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<…> Росс рожден судьбою 
От варварских хранить вас [европейцев] уз,
Темиров попирать ногою, 
Блюсть ваших от Омаров муз,3 
Отмстить крестовые походы, 
Очистить Иордански воды, 
Священный гроб освободить, 
Афинам возвратить Афину, 
Град Константинов Константину 
И мир Афету4 водворить. 
Афету мир? - о труд избранный,
 Достойнейший его детей, 
Великими людьми желанный! 
(Ross [the Russian] is born by fate / To preserve you [Europeans] from 
barbarian bonds, / To trample the Tamerlanes underfoot, / To protect your 
muses from Omar, / To avenge the crusades, / To purify Jordan’s waters, / 
To liberate the Holy Sepulchre, / To return Athena to Athens, / The city of 
Constantine to Konstantin / And to establish peace for Japeth. // Peace for 
Japeth? O chosen mission / Which is most worthy of his children, / Desired 
by great men!)
Later, while compiling the “Explanations” to his own works, Derzhavin indi-
cated that “the city of Athens should be returned to the goddess Minerva, by 
which is understood Catherine,” and “Constantinople should be subject to the 
rule of Grand Prince Konstantin Pavlovich.” He also clarifies that “Henry IV 
and other great men wanted to establish peace in Europe” (ibid., 357). At 
approximately this time a Russian translation appeared of The Peace of Europe… 
or A Project for Universal Conciliation by Ange Goudar, completed “in the 
encampment near Ochakov in 1788” (SKRK I, 262, № 1662). 
Somewhat unexpectedly for a military ode, but fully foreseeable given the 
political situation at the beginning of 1791, when everyone was nervously 
expecting an attack by England and Prussia, “On the Taking of Izmail” 
3 Caliph Omar (or Umar) (579–644), who led a Muslim army to conquer Alexandria, report-
edly had its famous library burned in 642.
4 Noah’s son Japeth, commonly believed to be the father of the Europeans.
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culminates with an apotheosis of universal peace in which victorious Russia 
occupies its worthy place. 
When he received the order to describe Potemkin’s celebration, 
Derzhavin in general interpreted it in this key. “In surprise one seems to find 
oneself in flourishing Greece,” he wrote, “where the odeum, lyceum, stages, 
exedras and theaters from various cities and places gathered in this building 
have been restored to life” (ibid., 390). The basic cluster of metaphors associ-
ated with the “Greek Project” again appeared in the choruses that he wrote 
for the occasion. Fourteen years earlier Catherine had not been able to take 
her grandsons on the Crimean journey; now their presence at the celebration 
seemed to sanctify the ideas that had been connected with them:
Кто Александр великий. 
Кто будет Константин,… 
Toт громы к персам несть. 
Сей вновь построит Рим. (Ibid., 402)
(Who is Alexander the Great, / Who will be Constantine,… / This one will 
take thunder to the Persians / That one will again build Rome.)
The subject here is the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire—Constanti-
nople. The mythology of resurrected Greece was also the mythology of the 
earthly paradise that Potemkin was still trying to recreate in his Tauride and 
“New Russian” territories. Now the task was to reproduce this theoretical 
Edenic Greece in the Tauride Palace. It was no accident that, when presenting 
the palace to Potemkin, Catherine wrote that she was giving him “an earthly 
paradise, as you call this dacha that you requested of me” (Ekaterina i 
Potemkin 1997, 436; Pogosian 1997, 459–460). 
The celebration in classical taste that Potemkin had arranged twelve years 
earlier in Ozerki took place in late June, while the celebration of the taking of 
Izmail—at the end of April (in New Style, early July and May, respectively). 
Considering St. Petersburg’s climate, the difference is quite substantial. In the 
words of one memoirist, “for the whole day” of the celebration “it was raining 
and the cold was appreciable” (Kir’iak 1867, 679–680; on Kir’iak as memoirist, 
see Fomenko 1999). Of course, it was much harder and more costly to imitate 
lush southern nature in the “cold, partly rainy, partly snowy” Baltic spring 
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(ibid.) than in the middle of summer, but this also emphasized the creative, 
transformative will of the celebration’s organizer and demiurge. 
Derzhavin (I, 409) exclaimed:
The highest possible palms, with their stately, regular stalks wrapped to the 
very tops with what looked like stars, burn like flaming columns. Aromatic 
groves with trees laden with bitter oranges, oranges and lemons; green, dark 
red and yellow grapes, hanging by their stems in flaming clusters, and in the 
shadows along black flowerbeds, lilies and tulips, pineapples and other fruits 
whose colorful blaze offers the astonished gaze indescribable variety and 
wonder. … 
T. Kir’iak, describing the celebration in a private letter, left a more prosaic inter-
pretation of this spectacle:
The garden consists of several knolls, thickly planted with lemon, bitter 
orange and other similar trees, of which several have fruit; but on the 
majority of trees there were fruits fabricated from glass, for example plums, 
cherries, and grapes of various colors of which whole clusters were also 
made of glass, like lanterns. From among the flowerbeds rise imitation 
cedars the tops of which, covered with leaves, support the ceiling; without 
them, judging by the size of the building, it seems like it would not hold. The 
pathways, whose sides were covered with turf, also attracted the eye. All of 
them were covered with pineapples, water-melons and other melons that 
were of a natural color, shape and size. Their leaves and stems were made of 
tin, and the fruit of glass; all of the fruits had a fire inside. (Kir’iak 1867, 687)
It is obvious that neither Potemkin, who ordered all of these imitation fruits, 
nor Derzhavin, who praised them, had any idea of deceiving anyone. The point 
was to symbolically transform the space, to create a kind of theatrical decoration 
that would let the guests feel like participants in a mythological performance 
(see the analogous interpretation of the so-called “Potemkin villages” in 
Panchenko 1983). The southern plants decorating this winter garden testified 
that the opulent land that had produced these fruits was also part of imperial 
space. In the words of another memoirist, “the abundance and taste reigned 
everywhere, and the fruits that one saw in the winter garden made of glass 
appeared on the tables in their natural form, in great profusion” (Derzhavin I, 
416; for the full texts of memoirs published in 1808 by the Hamburg journal 
Minerva, see Potemkin 1852; Potemkin 1991). Derzhavin, who in one of the 
poems that went into the “Description” described the celebratory feast as a 
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joint production of the various parts of boundless Russia, reserved a special 
line for “the sweet fruits” of Taurus, the land Potemkin had won for the empire 
(Derzhavin I, 417). 
Apropos, the living plants and trees that were abundantly planted in the 
garden required a special controlled climate. The air was heated by stoves “of 
which the winter garden required no small number” and which were “hidden 
behind a proliferation of mirrors that were of one size and of extraordinary 
cost” (Derzhavin I, 388, note). The incredible number of mirrors that all who 
wrote about the celebration noted not only hid the practical necessities but also 
contributed to the illusion of amplified space. “A facing colonnade separates the 
garden from the gallery, whose ornaments are the more brilliant because a great 
number of them are made up of mirrors. At both ends of this colonnade 
great mirrors adorned with greenery and flowers were placed between the last 
two pillars. They made it seem three times longer,” wrote Kir’iak (1867, 685). 
With the help of this pattern of infinite reflections that multiplied the light of 
140,000 lamps and 20,000 wax candles (Derzhavin I, 408, note), the garden 
and palace were symbolically expanded to represent the universe.5 
According to Kir’iak, the main hall of the festivities represented
some kind of temple. To lend magnificence to this temple and its entryway, 
in the last week the prince gave the order to place two huge columns painted 
to look like red marble in front of the aforementioned gates. This was done 
with a kind of creative flair. … The temple or pantheon itself is in the shape 
of a square with cut corners, but there are only two main walls, on the right 
and left hand, while the other sides are taken up by columns holding up 
small choruses with a vault. (Kir’iak 1867, 682–683) 
The entrance to the hall recalled “the royal gates in the big court church” (ibid.). 
The motifs of a classical temple were again exploited and intensified in 
the center of the festivities’ conceptual space: “In the garden facing the very 
center of the gallery was erected a kind of altar on eight columns of more than 
an arshin [c. 28 inches] in diameter and as tall as the columns in the gallery. 
On top was a cupola, and the floor was of grey marble. In the middle of this 
altar, on a pedestal of red marble, stood a full-sized image of Catherine, carved 
5 On the metaphor of the garden as the universe, see Pogosian 1997, 456–471; on the mirrored 
grotto and mirrored pyramid and the optical effects they created, see Kir’iak 1867, 687–688.
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out of the purest white marble, in the guise of a goddess and in long Roman 
robes” (ibid., 686).
In the more expressive if less clear description by Derzhavin, a guest at the 
celebration “imperceptibly approaches a round altar raised on steps and 
surrounded by eight columns that support its dome. Around it are fixed jasper 
chalices on stands, and above hang lamps and chains of flowers, and wreaths; 
on a pedestal of porphyry amid the columns shines the image of a goddess of 
Figure 10 and 11  
Catherine II the Legisla-
tress (1789) by F. I. 
Shubin. Russian Museum, 
St. Petersburg. Below – The 
winter garden of the 
Tauride Palace (1792) by 
F. D. Danilov.
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pure marble and with a golden inscription, the one through whose generosity 
this home was built” (Derzhavin I, 286).
During the first Russo-Turkish War, Petrov had written that the liberated 
Greeks “in a temple of freedom, peace and joy … should honor the image of this 
Athena [Pallada, i.e., Pallas] for an age” (Petrov I, 77), and Voltaire had predicted 
that “Phidases and Zeuxises” would cover Hellas with images of Catherine II 
(Ekaterina 1971, 71). Twenty years later, in the absence of a liberated Hellas, a 
temple of peace and joy was put up in the northern capital, and the image of 
Athena for the altar—in the place of the Greeks Zeuxis and Phidias—was 
fashioned by the sculptor from Archangel, Fedot Ivanovich Shubin.
 3 
Caught up in the circle of classical associations that he knew so well, Derzhavin 
touched on other symbolic aspects of the celebration, although with less detail. 
Nevertheless it is these aspects that lent the entire event its distinctive concep-
tual dynamics.6 The celebration, which began with the appearance of the royal 
family, was opened with a quadrille “composed of twenty-four pairs of the most 
famous and most beautiful women, young ladies and young men” (Derzhavin I, 
395). According to Derzhavin, “they were dressed in white clothing” (ibid.). 
Kir’iak writes that “the cavaliers were clothed in Spanish dress, the ladies in 
Greek” (Kir’iak 1867, 691). The quadrille began with a “Polish dance” to whose 
melody Derzhavin wrote his celebrated chorus “Thunder of Victory Resound” 
(Derzhavin I, 395–398). Then this “march became a Greek (dance)” that 
“lasted less than a quarter of an hour,” after which “the theatrical performance 
began” (Kir’iak 1867, 692).
After the performance the dancing was renewed, and an elegant quadrille 
choreographed by the famous ballet-master Charles Le Pique was succeeded by 
“dances to Little Russian and Russian folksongs (prostym pesniam), in which 
one followed another”; Derzhavin adds that “Since those who love their father-
land love their own folk singing more than the foreign, it was very satisfying to 
see the monarch’s approval of this entertainment” (Derzhavin I, 412). Potemkin 
also organized a similar amusement for his guests in a distant part of the garden 
6 We do not touch here on the whole circle of “Orientalist” imagery that is very important for 
understanding both this celebration as well as the “poetics” of Potemkin’s behavior, but 
which is not directly relevant to the current discussion (see Pogosian 1997, 459–462).
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where “many sailors and rowers, richly dressed” were to perform rowing songs 
out on the ponds; but as Kir’iak notes, “the bad weather did not permit this” 
(Kir’iak 1867, 694). 
Derzhavin explains the changeover to folk music with exclusively patri-
otic considerations, but it is characteristic that in the first place he lists “Little 
Russian”(Ukrainian) songs. It is natural to assume that this type of song was 
sung most often. Moreover, Derzhavin included in his “Description” an 
example of Little Russian song lyrics, “Na berezhku u stavka” (On the Shore 
by the Pond) (Derzhavin I, 413). According to Ia. K. Grot, “one may find this 
Little Russian song in I. Gur’ianov’s ‘Songbook’ (part IV, Moscow, 1835, 
p. 114), where it is listed under the title ‘A Cossack Rewarded [by a Kiss] for 
Saving a Girl from Drowning’” (Derzhavin I, 413).7 
It is not fully clear if this was the same song that Kir’iak had in mind 
when he wrote that “after the departure [of the empress] they sang, with all 
of the instruments [as accompaniment], a certain Little Russian song that 
was the favorite of the prince [Potemkin] and now of the whole city” (Kir’iak 
1867, 694). In any case, there is no doubt that the Ukrainian element was 
significant in the structure of the celebration. The movement from classical to 
folk motifs, especially Ukrainian ones, had in part already been prefigured by 
the earlier theatrical performance. 
“The curtain opened,” wrote Derzhavin. “The stage and place of action was 
illuminated by a radiant sun, in the midst of which shone Catherine II’s mono-
gram in green laurels. Dancers representing male and female peasants performed. 
Raising their hands to this noble luminary, they demonstrated their most heart-
felt feelings with their movements” (Derzhavin I, 405). The performance’s 
further presentations clearly demonstrated the main reason for their gratitude.
According to a contemporary account published in the Hamburg journal, 
the first comedy performed at Potemkin’s celebration was called “Les faux 
amants” (The False Lovers). There is no such play listed in the bibliography of 
7 In the article “On Russian Folk Singing,” published about the same time, Derzhavin’s close 
friend N. A. L’vov made a clear distinction between Great and Little Russian songs: “The 
character of Little Russian songs and melodies are quite different from the Russian: there is 
more melody in them than in our dancing songs; but I do not know of any Little Russian 
choral (armonicheskaia) song that could equal our ‘drawn-out’ (protiazhnye) songs” (L’vov 
1994, 314).
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eighteenth-century French plays, but there is one called “Le faux amant” (The 
False Lover). Its full title is “The Servant-Aristocrat, Or the False Lover, or Pride 
Punished,” and belongs to the pen of Madame A.-L.-B. Beaunoir; it was first 
staged in Paris in 1776 (see Brenner 1947, 175, № 3538). Unfortunately, we have 
not been able to locate a copy of this play, but there is another work whose 
performance at the celebration can be established with complete certainly. 
The author of the play “Le Marchand de Smyrne” (The Smyrna Merchant) 
was the famous French playwright and aphorist Nicolas Chamfort. Written in 
1770, it had been performed in the Comédie Français, enjoyed great success 
and provoked sharp criticism from Grimm and La Harpe (Arnaud 1992, 
50–51; Терре 1950, 100–101). The main feature of the comedy was its radi-
cally anti-feudal and egalitarian pathos. In fact, much later, Chamfort, who had 
become one of the most popular publicists of the French Revolution, was 
accused during the Jacobin terror of sympathy for aristocrats, and in his justifi-
cation he cited this very play. He wrote:
Chamfort—an aristocrat!—those who know me would burst out laughing. 
… Aristocrat! One whose love for equality was always the reigning passion, 
an inborn, unconquerable and automatic instinct! One who more than 
twenty years ago brought “The Smyrna Merchant” to the theater, which 
even today is often performed on stage and in which nobles and aristocrats 
of any kind are sold cheap, because they are worth nothing. (Arnaud 1992, 
246). 
For all of the excessive rhetoric of these declarations, made under compul-
sion, Chamfort’s essential point is true (and literally so). The plot of his 
comedy is quite uncomplicated. The noble Turk Hassan, whose freedom had 
once been purchased by an anonymous altruistic Frenchman, takes an oath to 
buy a Christian out of slavery once every year. In fulfilling his oath, by chance 
he buys out his benefactor Dorval, whose ship had been captured and who 
had been sold into slavery together with his companions. On the same day, 
Hassan’s equally noble wife buys the freedom of a Christian woman who 
unexpectedly turns out to be Dorval’s beloved. Hassan, touched, purchases 
all of Dorval’s companions in misfortune and gives them their freedom, and 
together they all celebrate the union of the newly liberated lovers.
At the center of the play is the scene of the slaves being sold by the merchant 
Kaled. The price for which the greedy slave trader sells his goods paradoxically 
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reflects the actual worth of each person. A German baron, a Spanish hidalgo, a 
jurist from Padua, and learned connoisseur of genealogy are all worth nothing 
because they are incapable of genuine labor. On the other hand, the servant 
“able to work, till the land, and … [who] is no nobleman” is truly worth good 
money. The moralist Hassan cannot believe that among Europeans there exist 
“such people who do not study anything, relying on their natural right to lead 
their lives in idleness at the cost of their near ones” (Chamfort 1789, 43).8
It would be very tempting, especially in view of the possible connection to 
the title of Madame Beaunoir’s comedy, to see the choice of repertoire for the 
celebration as the “upstart” Potemkin’s challenge to the aristocratic conceit of 
his more pedigreed rivals at court. However, such a suggestion must only be put 
forward with great caution, insofar as it is quite unclear what exactly the audi-
ence saw on the stage that had been set up in the palace.
An anonymous memoirist from the journal Minerva calls “The Smyrna 
Merchant” a “comedy” (see Derzhavin I, 404, note), while Derzhavin speaks of 
it as a ballet and only remarks on the scene when the slaves are sold. It is not 
impossible that this is not a slip. As early as 1771 the German composer Georg 
Joseph Vogler had written an operetta of the same name based on Chamfort’s 
play, which was “in the popular Italian style with brilliant arias, two bravura 
arias, a duet and trio” (Schafhäutl 1979, 14). One of the overtures to the oper-
etta earned very broad popularity and was often sung separately.
It is doubtful that Derzhavin would have confused a ballet with an oper-
etta, but it is possible that at the celebration it was not Volger’s complete work 
that was performed, but only a balletic divertissement. However, here we 
encounter another contradiction. In Minerva the performance is described as 
consisting of “two French comedies and two ballets” (Derzhavin I, 404, note), 
whereas Derzhavin’s “Description”—depending on how we qualify “The 
8 The history of “The Smyrna Merchant”’s reception in Russia is unique and very interesting. 
The first reworked version of the play appeared almost immediately after the original’s 
appearance, in 1771, under the title “Good Deeds Gain Hearts” (Blagodeianiia priobretaiut 
serdtsa). V. S. Sopikov ascribes this translation to A. S. Shishkov. Then in 1780 a comedy 
entitled “The Smyrna Merchant” (Smirinskoi kupets), translated by V. V. Lazarev, appeared 
in the journal Chto-nibud’ (Something). Finally, in 1789, another anonymous translation 
with the title “A Good Deed Returned” (Vozvrashchennoe blagodeianie) was published by 
the University Typography (see SKRK I, 106, № 591; III, 484, № 591; I, 172, № 1045; III, 
485, № 1045; Pukhov 1999, 183–184). We do not discuss these texts here insofar as at the 
Potemkin celebration the comedy was presumably performed in French.
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Smyrna Merchant”—notes two ballets and one comedy or two comedies and 
one ballet. The contradiction disappears only if we count Chamfort’s play twice 
and suggest that the performance of the comedy ended with the ballet, for 
which the impressive scene of the slave market was chosen. 
The interpretation that Derzhavin gives to the story of the “Smyrna 
merchant who trades in slaves of all nationalities” is unambiguous:
To the honor of Russian arms there was not one of our fellow Russians who 
was taken prisoner by this venal barbarian [in the play]. What a change in 
our political situation! Has it been so long since Ukraine and its lower 
reaches were subjected to the incessant raids of predatory hoards? Was it so 
long ago? Oh, how pleasant is the recollection of past misfortunes when they 
have passed by like a horrible dream! Now we take pleasure in a most joyous 
celebration of our well-being. Oh, posterity! Know that all of this is the 
creation of  Catherine’s spirit. (Ibid., 405–406)
Thus the ballet that demonstrated the peasants’ gratitude to the “radiant sun,” as 
well as Chamfort’s comedy (independent of the question what the select public 
saw), were taken to glorify the joint achievement of Potemkin and Catherine—
freeing the southern territories of the empire from Turkish overlordship and the 
threat of Tatar raids. Four years earlier, during the empress’s journey to Crimea, the 
Ukrainian element had been virtually absent in the symbolic presentations that 
Potemkin staged. At that time he was more interested in the possibilities of a 
Greco-Scythian synthesis. Now focus had shifted precisely to “Ukraine and its 
lower reaches,” that is, the territories where Cossack troops had been settled.
We do not know whether the balletic peasants who thanked the empress 
were dressed in a conventionally idyllic way or in folk—Russian or Ukrainian—
costumes; Derzhavin does not say, and the more observant but less eloquent 
Kir’iak did not attend the performance (Kir’iak 1867, 692). He did, however, 
notice the uniforms of the “extremely huge footmen” (gaiduki) who served the 
guests during the feast who were dressed “in Polish or Greek” dress (ibid., 693). 
Like the characters in others of Potemkin’s masquerades, these footmen lead us 
to the very center of the political problem that was occupying Potemkin.
 4 
Potemkin’s position on the Polish question is almost impossible to untangle. 
During the whole of this period he proposed various, sometimes mutually 
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exclusive, plans of action, and with his characteristic energy and decisiveness 
quickly set about to realize them. Moreover, if some of his ideas succeeded one 
another, he would undertake other steps in opposite directions, as if wanting to 
have responses at the ready for any contingency.
In 1787–1788 Potemkin’s main idea was to conclude a Russian-Polish alli-
ance under which a significant part of the Polish forces would merge into the 
Russian army, then fighting Turkey under his command. In return Russia would 
make financial subsidies available to Poland and agree to several important 
government reforms there. Potemkin simultaneously held negotiations with 
the reform-minded King Stanisław Poniatowski and with leaders of the aristo-
cratic opposition, such as Hetman F. Branicki, who saw dependence on Russia 
precisely as a guarantee against any kind of change. Most likely, in maintaining 
contacts with both sides Potemkin saw a way to preserve his future freedom of 
action. At the same time, this policy indicates that Poland’s internal problems 
seemed of little importance to him compared with the possibility of uniting 
military forces and having Polish forces under his command.
One may get a general notion of the way Potemkin saw the Russian-
Polish union from two notes he wrote to Catherine (Ekaterina 1874, 
269–280). These memoranda are undated, but according to their content 
probably relate to the same period. Still, we do not have enough basis for a 
firm dating, insofar as Potemkin kept producing many plans of this type from 
1787 practically until his death. Potemkin proposed beginning by forming 
Polish national brigades on whose basis a pro-Russian confederation could 
arise. Potemkin had attempted to realize this idea already at the time of Cath-
erine’s journey south in the spring of 1787 (see Lord 1915, 515). In a letter to 
Catherine of December 25, he recalled his achievement in creating the alli-
ance with Austria and emphasized that his current proposals were a 
continuation of the same policy:
You deign to mention that the alliance with the [Austrian] emperor is my 
doing. This proceeded from my zeal. It was from this as well that the Polish 
alliance in Kiev also sprang. … You may see what sort of alliance this would 
have been from the plan enclosed herewith. They would already have been 
fighting for us by now, and would have been helpful, for the harder we come 
down on the enemy, the easier we’ll achieve our goal. My counsel always 
proceeded from fervor. If I am out of place, then, of course in the future I’ll 
only speak on those matters that have been entrusted to me. (Ekaterina i 
Potemkin 1997, 257–258; Catherine 2004, 215)
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The tone of this letter indicates that Potemkin knew that his plans were not 
supported by Catherine, who was extremely skeptical toward the Poles and the 
utility of an alliance with them. However, he continued to insist, arguing that he 
could and must head a Polish national armed force. He wrote on February 5:
How good it would be, matushka, if we could quickly come to a decision 
about the Poles. And so, to entice the entire nation, they must be promised 
parts of the Turkish lands, for without this it cannot be done. When you 
deign to approve new brigades for their nation’s army, order that the one 
given to Count Branicki be attached to my army. What marvelous people 
and, one might say, horsemen. It is a pity that you are not favorably disposed 
to giving me command, if not over the cavalry of the entire nation, then at 
least over one brigade. I’m as much a Pole as they are. I would do much good. 
(Ibid., 265; cf. 260, 268; on the plan for a “people’s militia,” put together by 
Branicki, probably with Potemkin’s participation, see Ekaterina 1874, 
274–280; Catherine 2004, 230) 
As V. S. Lopatin justly remarks, “by calling himself a Pole, Potemkin is refer-
ring to his descent from Smolensk szlachta” (i.e., Polish gentry) (Ekaterina i 
Potemkin 1997, 807). Of course, in emphasizing the Polish element of his 
genealogy so hyper-bolically, Potemkin did not cease to think of himself as 
Great Russian. Most likely, he meant that he could play the role of a link 
between the two peoples, the more so since the above-named Count Branicki 
was married to one of his nieces. 
Potemkin bought up estates in Poland with tremendous eagerness and 
became one of the largest landholders in the republic, which gave him the right 
to vote in the Sejm and the status of a Polish magnate. In the already-cited letter 
of December 25, he wrote that he had purchased Liubomirskii’s estate in 
Poland, “since by becoming its proprietor this conferred upon me the right 
to participate in their affairs and in the military command” (ibid., 257; on 
Potemkin’s Polish properties, see Lord 1915, 514–515; Catherine 2004, 215). 
Catherine was not at all convinced by her correspondent’s argument. 
Partially following Potemkin’s urgings, at the same time she wrote that: “… 
Benefits may be promised; [but] if we oblige the Poles like this and they stay 
true to us, this will be the first instance of fidelity in their history. … Accepting 
them into the army and putting them in positions of responsibility should be 
under [your] personal supervision, because among them reign frivolity, a 
lack of discipline, and the spirit of revolt” (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 271). 
Potemkin tried to object: “As far as discipline,” he wrote, “matushka, be 
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assured that I am telling you the truth: in their military institutions it is 
observed even to the point of pedantry. On the personal level they have 
people of exceptional courage and no few outstanding people in the other 
services” (ibid., 274).
He was not, however, able to convince the empress. The project for an 
agreement did not contain any substantive concessions to Poland and could 
not put a stop to the growing anti-Russian feeling. “Things are bad in Poland, 
which, of course, they wouldn’t be had my plan been followed,” Potemkin wrote 
to Catherine at the end of 1788, after the opening of the Sejm. “But so be it” 
(ibid., 327; cf. 334–335; Catherine 2004, 271). 
The lack of success in this undertaking moved Potemkin to act in other 
directions with increased ardor. Presuming, as before, that “a national army 
necessarily demands expanding the militia” (ibid., 340), that is, creating a 
civilian home force, he transferred his main hopes from the Polish cavalry 
onto the Cossack troops. Potemkin had actively concerned himself with 
forming Cossack units ever since the start of the Russo-Turkish War (see 
ibid., 258, 266, 329, 341, 353, and ff; for more detail, see Petrov A. I, 125–129). 
Potemkin needed these forces on the Turkish front but also made plans for 
them of a completely different kind. At the end of 1789 he sent the empress 
“a plan concerning Poland” (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 381). Excerpts from 
this plan were recently published by V. S. Lopatin. Potemkin wrote:
On Poland. It would be good if it were not divided, but if it is, it would be 
better to destroy it completely, [because] its neighbors have already closed 
in. In this case the evil will be less if there were no mediators between us, 
because it would be more difficult for them to start a war with us than act by 
intrigues, instigating a third party against us, thus making it hard for us 
without losing either people or property. And so—leave Poland only the 
kingdom of Mazowieckie + a bit of Lithuania. If the first Prussian King took 
it, this would be even more useful, [because] then we would be able to 
involve the tsesartsy. …9
In Potemkin’s words, the inhabitants of the Polish republic’s Eastern voivode-
ships (voevodstva) desired
to renew their former condition when they were under their own hetmans; 
now they all insist that they need to be the way they were, awaiting assistance 
9  This refers to Austrians (Translator’s note).
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from Russia. This matter can be accomplished very easily. For my leadership 
of the Cossacks name me Hetman of the Cossack troops of Ekaterinoslav 
province. (Ibid., 893)
Potemkin thus planned to become hetman of Eastern Poland, which was inhab-
ited by a significant number of Orthodox Ukrainians. 
As we know, Potemkin’s propositions somewhat troubled Catherine. 
“Naming you Hetman of the troops of the Ekaterinoslav province is not diffi-
cult,” she responded, “and drawing up a rescript on this won’t take long. But 
one thing holds me back from signing such a document, and this I entrust to 
your own judgment: won’t the use of this title in Poland provoke the untimely 
attention of the Sejm and cause alarm that will harm our cause?” (ibid., 387). 
It is possible that this response to his ideas led Potemkin to conclude that the 
empress herself or his enemies at court interpreted his desire to receive 
the hetman’s mace as a manifestation of his excessive and far-reaching ambi-
tions. In his answer, Potemkin counters not only what Catherine said but the 
arguments his imperial interlocutor had woven in between the lines: 
This will increase both the Poles’ troubles and fear. An unexpected weapon 
always startles the enemy. The plan will be secret. It will be made known at 
the right time, and its name should not give anything away. I am not 
seeking anything for myself with this; if your benefit did not demand it, 
would I adopt this position, which is more ridiculous than distinguished? 
It’s a means to achieve our goal, however, and there is one thing I can say: 
however we resolve matters, we cannot give up Poland. Thus, it must, of 
course, be weakened or, better, destroyed. (Ibid., 394; translation adapted 
from Catherine 2004, 330)
Catherine accepted Potemkin’s conclusions. “Pray toil away, Sir Grand 
Hetman,” she wrote to him indulgently. “You are a most intelligent, good and 
loyal man, and as for us, we love and honor you” (ibid., 396; Catherine, 332). 
The ukase naming Potemkin Great Hetman of the Imperial Ekaterinoslav 
and Black Sea Cossack forces was signed on January 10, 1790, and was 
quickly disseminated by Potemkin to all of the affected territories (ibid., 
901–902). It is hard to say to what degree Potemkin really considered the 
new title “more ridiculous than distinguished.” At least he deemed it 
important to appear in a quickly tailored hetman’s uniform, in which dress 
he long remained in the memory of contemporaries and posterity (Engel’gart 
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1997, 82–83). It was in this costume, incidentally, that he appeared in the 
pages of Gogol’s story “The Night Before Christmas” (Gogol’ I, 235). 
Potemkin’s plans to incite a rebellion of Ukrainian residents of Poland 
and, with the help of Cossack troops, to incorporate Poland’s Eastern regions 
into his hetmanate date to the end of 1789. But as Robert Howard Lord 
perceptively suggested, they had probably existed even earlier when Potemkin 
formed the Cossack units and bought up Polish land (Lord 1915, 516). An 
indirect but important confirmation of this may be found in Derzhavin’s 
humorous poem “To Fortune” (Na Schastie), written in the spring of 1789, 
precisely during Potemkin’s first arrival to Petersburg from the south. In this 
poem Derzhavin allegorically depicted the situation in the then present-day 
Europe, exhibiting how well-informed he was about all of the nuances of 
Russian diplomacy. In the opinion of Ia. K. Grot, the poet’s sources of infor-
mation could have been both Catherine’s secretary, his old acquaintance 
A. V. Khrapovitskii, as well as his very close friend N. A. L’vov, who served 
under Chancellor Bezborodko (see Derzhavin I, 247). When listing Fortune’s 
various acts, which in the poem emblematize Catherine and Russian politics 
as a whole, Derzhavin in particular wrote that Fortune “swells the Uke in 
Warsaw” (khokhol v Varshave razduvaet).10 The meaning of the line becomes 
transparent if we compare it to Derzhavin’s self-commentary on the line 
“I v’etsia lokonom khokhol” (and the Uke’s hair is curled) from the same 
poem. Derzhavin explains that “khokhol” stands for Bezborodko and other 
Ukrainians “who happily played exalted roles” (ibid., 255).
Insisting on the union with Poland, at the same time Potemkin—“just in 
case”—prepared to unleash a civil war there. In the very same way, while actively 
putting forward plans for an intervention by the Cossacks and the partitioning 
of the kingdom, he kept in reserve a variant of the plan for a Russian-Polish 
union. “My behavior in Ukraine attracts all of the Poles,” he wrote to the empress 
in March 1790 (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 401), and six months later he 
assured her that “the majority” of the Polish nation “is inclined towards us” and 
that only the “Prussian” Sejm was an obstacle to this natural inclination. At the 
very end of the year, already having sent Suvorov to storm Izmail, he again 
10 “Khokhol” is a pejorative Russian term for a Ukrainian and refers to the tuft of hair it was 
customary to leave after having one’s head shaved. (Translator’s note)
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insistently urged Catherine to gain the Poles’ sympathy by promising them 
Moldavia (ibid., 442, 443; Catherine 2004, 361).
The question naturally arises: what was the relationship between these 
mutually exclusive projects? Can one uncover a single strategic plan in them? In 
other words, did Potemkin change his vision of Russia’s political goals for 
opportunistic reasons, or was it a question of finding the best way of imple-
menting these goals? Many contemporaries and later historians have presumed 
that Potemkin‘s motives were mostly of a personal nature, and that he was 
trying to create an independent power base for himself in Poland in case of 
Catherine’s death (and in view of the heir Pavel Petrovich’s well-known hatred 
for him). In 1787 the English emissary Fitzherbert wrote to London that 
“Perhaps Prince Potemkin will make a Tertium quid11 out of his newly- 
purchased lands in Poland that will be independent of both Russia and Poland” 
(Khrapovitskii 1874, 28). Discussions about Potemkin’s similar hopes during 
the last year of his life are repeated in reminiscences of such varied people as the 
Polish aristocrat M. Oginski (I, 148) and Potemkin’s relative L. N. Engel’gart 
(1997, 95).12 According to Engel’gart, rumors of Potemkin’s plans began with 
his forming the regiment of the Great Hetman’s Mace (Bulava, Polish Bulawa) 
which was so well equipped that, in essence, it comprised an entire army: “Some 
supposed that he wanted to become king of Moldavia and Walachia, others—
that he wanted to declare himself an independent hetman, and still others 
thought that he wanted to be king of Poland” (ibid., 94–95).
Potemkin of course knew of these rumors and rejected them with indig-
nation. “Do you really suspect me? It is forgivable for a weak king to think that 
I want his place. As for me—the devil take them. And it’s a sin if they think I 
act out of any interests except those of the state,” he wrote to Bezborodko 
(Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 920). Of course one must take any declarations 
of this sort, especially coming from such a major and experienced politician, 
with a large dose of caution. Still, Potemkin’s words deserve a certain amount 
of trust. As the historian A. N. Fateev emphasized (without knowing of 
this letter), “there is no basis whatsoever … to speak of Potemkin’s secret 
11 “Third thing,” i.e., a third element that changes an equation or formula. (Translator’s note.)
12 For a survey of the sources and literature on this question, see Lord 1915, 512–515. Lord 
misinterprets the cited passage from Khrapovitskii’s diary and attributes the argument taken 
from a perlustrated letter of the English emissary to Catherine. 
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intention to wear the crown of the Piasts. Potemkin bought up Polish land 
and received the status of a Polish noble in the Sejm. [But] he was hardly so 
simple-minded as to think that he could get along without Catherine, and he 
did not ignore the interests of his country. … [Furthermore,] the king of 
Poland could only be a Catholic, and Potemkin did not resemble an apostate” 
(Fateev n.d., 90).
However, if we suppose that the issue was not about the Piasts’ crown 
but instead concerned hetmanship over the territory of Ukrainian lands in 
Poland and a series of south-western provinces of the Russian Empire, then 
that would change the equation. Potemkin himself wrote to Catherine 
about similar intentions, and consequently had a basis to hope that she 
would go along with them. Moreover, given the political structure of Poland 
at the time, with the constantly changing map of confederations and re- 
confederations, this kind of hetmanship would have had significant inde-
pendence. This interpretation helps us understand the idea behind the 
somewhat strange testimony of Potemkin’s niece Countess Branicka, who 
said that the prince intended “to rule all of the Cossacks, to unite with the 
Polish army and declare himself king of Poland” (Lord 1915, 513). 
In formulating this kind of plan, Potemkin certainly displayed character-
istic ambition, but he definitely believed that he was acting in Russia’s highest 
state interests. In a possible complex union of Russia and Poland, the 
Ukrainian Cossacks that were under Potemkin’s control would have played a 
central role, geographically and politically. The proposed structure distinctly 
recalled the one that was to have arisen as the result of enacting the “Greek 
Project,” which had foreseen the creation of the kingdom of Dacia between 
the resurrected Greek and Russian Empires; moreover, its throne at one time 
had also been earmarked for Potemkin (see Madariaga 1981, 377–388). Now 
the prince came forward with a new initiative in which he was allotted an 
even greater role.
If the basis for the “Greek Project” or “Eastern System” that Potemkin 
advocated as an alternative to Panin’s “Northern System” had been the religious 
unification of Russia, Greece, and the Danube princedoms, from which it was 
proposed to create Dacia, the new project (which by analogy one could call the 
“Western System”) made its basis the fraternal unity of the Slavic peoples. Its 
living embodiment was the figure of His Serene Highness, who combined in 
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himself a Polish magnate, a Ukrainian hetman, and the closest associate 
(according to some, the secret husband13) of the Russian sovereign.
 5 
Throughout Potemkin’s career the bard for his victories, celebrations, and 
undertakings had always been Petrov. But this time Potemkin turned to 
Derzhavin, which as Grot rightly noted, “is easily explained by the latter’s poetic 
fame at the time” (Derzhavin I, 407). It was during these years that Derzhavin 
began to be welcomed at court, and his ode “On the Taking of Izmail” found 
favor with the empress, who upon meeting the poet said, “I did not know until 
now that your trumpet is just as loud as your lyre is pleasant” (ibid., IV, 614). 
This response established the singer of “Felitsa”’s status as an official poet and 
confirmed his universal popularity on the part the reading public, which had 
never been especially well-disposed toward Petrov. 
I. I. Dmitriev, who became close to Derzhavin at this time, later recalled 
the somewhat jealous attitude toward the older poet that characterized 
Derzhavin’s circle of friends: “His [Petrov’s] odes were then greatly respected at 
court and among many literary folk; but the public hardly knew him, only by 
hearsay, and Derzhavin and the poets around him, while they didn’t deny 
Petrov’s lyric talent, emphasized the harshness of his verses rather than their 
rich ideas, exalted feelings or force of intellect” (Dmitriev 1986, 302). 
Taking up Potemkin’s request, Derzhavin felt the need to rely on Petrov’s 
precedent. In any case, he copied out by hand the ode that Petrov had written 
for Potemkin’s masquerade in Ozerki in 1779, and also sketched out one of the 
choruses for the Izmail celebration on the other side of the paper (Derzhavin I, 
407). In truth, the task set before Derzhavin was both unfamiliar and complex. 
While he may have had significantly greater general recognition than Petrov, 
13 V. S. Lopatin, offering substantial arguments in favor of the old version of Catherine’s secret 
marriage with Potemkin, calls him her “husband and co-ruler” (Ekaterina i Potemkin 1997, 
531, 540 and passim). Earlier, A. N. Fateev used the same terms in his Prague reports (n.d., 
34–46). But even if we agree to the first label, one cannot concur that Potemkin was ever 
“co-ruler” with Catherine. Of course the empress trusted him and valued his talents, but 
neither according to her ideas, her character nor her political style did she have any need for 
co-rulers, and she would not have tolerated them at her side. And indeed the material so 
scrupulously gathered by Lopatin leaves no doubts on this score. In his letters Potemkin 
proposes, petitions, insists, and begs, but it is Catherine alone who makes all of the decisions, 
and at times she acts in ways that were not at all pleasing to her correspondent.
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and probably a more powerful poetic gift, he did not possess the solid educa-
tion nor was he such a deep and independent political thinker as his predecessor. 
And most importantly, he did not have the decades of close communion with 
Potemkin that Petrov had behind him. In his “Lament on the Demise of 
Potemkin,” Petrov wrote of the “debates” (pren’ia) he had had with the prince 
“about Providence and fate, about death and being, about the course of the 
whole world” (Petrov II, 111; cf. Kochetkova 1999, 425–428). 
It is not surprising, then, that the fuller reflection of Potemkin’s late ideas 
may be found not in Derzhavin’s “Description,” which was still fully oriented on 
the “Greek Project”14 that was already familiar to the author, but rather in 
Petrov’s odes, written both during the prince’s last years of life as well as after his 
death. Petrov’s ode “On the Taking of Ochakov” is made up of a monologue by 
the allegorical Dnieper River which is celebrating the liberation of its estuary 
from Turkish domination:
Я сам подвержен был несчастью, 
Мой желтый брег судьбины властью 
Постыдной сделан был межой;
Поитель Россов, друг их славе,
Я с радостью в их тек державе, 
Неволей кончил век в чужой. 
Ho ныне вполне я восставлен, 
О Россы, силой ваших рук. 
Or поношения избавлен 
И нестерпимых сердцу мук. 
(I myself experienced misfortune: / By force of fate my yellow shore / Was 
made a shameful boundary; / Provider of water to Rosses, friend of their glory, / 
I joyfully flowed through their land, / [But] was forced to finish my course in 
an alien one. / But today I am fully restored, / Oh. Rosses, by the strength of 
your hands, / Saved from abuse / And from intolerable torments to the heart.)
14 As is well known, the “Description” aroused Potemkin’s ire. After reading it, wrote Derzhavin, 
“he ran out of his bedroom in a fury … and galloped off God knows where” (Derzhavin IV, 
619–620). Derzhavin, his contemporaries (see Dmitriev 1896, 299) and biographers (see 
Grot 1997, 397–398; Khodasevich, 1988, 169–170) all gave different explanations for his 
anger. With necessary caution, one may add to their various hypotheses the suggestion that, 
at least in part, Potemkin may have been unhappy that Derzhavin did not fully understand 
his thoughts and intentions.
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This stanza describes the transfer of the Dnieper estuary from Turkish to 
Russian control. With the capture of Ochakov, located in this estuary, the 
process was completed. However, for a long time the Dnieper still served as 
the Russian border, or in Petrov’s words, as a “shameful boundary,” not only 
with Turkey but also with Poland. 
Petrov celebrated the final transformation of the Dnieper into a river 
fully within Russia in 1793 in the ode “On the Integration of Polish Regions 
into Russia,” written after the Second Partition of Poland, which he inter-
preted as the fulfillment of the cherished hopes of his late friend Potemkin. 
Catherine did not want large-scale celebrations on the occasion of the 
Second Partition. In the foreword to the first edition of the ode, Petrov 
notes that “concerning this event, however salvific, no service was held, no 
salutes fired from cannons,” and he is overcome by doubts whether it is 
necessary “to load ideas with poetic thunder in describing a matter that 
was completed without any noise,” and whether it would please the 
empress “to broadcast everywhere with amplification that which is 
evidently considered of little importance.” The poet was freed from this 
doubt by the appearance “of the Dnieper, a grandiose god with a wreath 
on his head, in triumphal garments, holding a long scroll in his hands on 
which the villages, cities and peoples through which he flows were 
depicted.” As Petrov writes, “the quality or weakness of the song which I 
sang [i.e., wrote] rests with the Dnieper—I did not take part in [writing] it 
and only copied it down” (Petrov 1793, n.p.). Like the Ochakov ode, this 
poem is structured as an apotheosis of the Dnieper which is celebrating its 
complete liberation:
Услышав Днепр веленье рока, 
Дабы, сколь логом ни далек, 
Oн весь от моря до истока 
Во области Российской тек,
Чело венками увивает, 
Пресветлу ризу надевает 
И должную воздав хвалу 
Великой Севера Богине, 
Его веселия причине, 
Восходит спешно на скалу. 
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(The Dnieper, having heard fate’s command, / That however long or 
remote its channel / From sea to source, he will flow / In the Russian 
realm; / He drapes his forehead in wreaths, / Dons most bright garments / 
And, giving deserved praise / To the Great Goddess of the North, / Due to 
his joyfulness / He hurriedly mounts a crag.)
The final reference is probably to Smolensk, Potemkin’s native city, located in 
the upper reaches of the Dnieper. Downriver lies Ekaterinoslav, the city founded 
by His Serene Highness as Russia’s southern capital. It was also along the 
Dnieper that Catherine had begun her journey to Crimea in 1787, which was 
the high point of Potemkin’s career and recognition of his achievements as the 
creator of a new state. Celebrating the annexation to the empire of the last 
regions bordering the Dnieper, Petrov recalls the empress’s river cruise that 
heralded the Dnieper’s future position in the heart of the country and trans-
formed its banks into an earthly paradise:
Каков величествен в вершине, 
Коль славен в устии моем,
Таков теперь в моей средине
 Я живо движусь телом всем. 
Весь с матерью, нет части сирой, 
Весь красной оттенен порфирой; 
Со дня как Боги принесли 
На брег Тя мой, сладчайша Мати, 
Предзнак грядушей благодати 
На ней оливы проросли. 
(How majestic at the source, / How glorious in my estuary, / So too am I in 
my center; / I move vigorously with my entire body. / All within my moth-
er[land], no orphaned part, / All tinted with beautiful porphyry; / Since the 
day the Gods brought / You to my shore, sweetest Mother, / Olives have 
grown all over it, / A sign of future plenty.)
It was precisely the Dnieper, uniting the Great Russians, Little Russians and 
Poles that in Petrov’s rhetoric symbolizes the Russian Empire and that can 
therefore prophesy about the future Slavic brotherhood, in which Russia is 
destined to play the leading role:
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Приидет некогда то время, 
Днепр если может то проречь, 
В которо все славянско племя 
В честь Норда препояшет меч. 
Росс будет телеси главою, 
Тронув свой род побед молвою, 
Он каждый в рассеяньи член,
Собрав в едино, совокупит 
И тверд родствами гордо вступит 
Меж всех в подсолнечной колен. 
(The time will come one day / If the Dnieper can foretell it / On which 
the entire Slavic tribe / Will gird on sword in honor of the North. / Ross 
will be the body’s head / Rousing its clan by news of victories, / Every 
dispersed member / He will gather into one, he will unite / And will 
proudly take his place, strong with his kin, / Amid all of the tribes in the 
universe.)
This panslavic utopia of the future unification of Slavs around Russia reserves a 
special place for Poland which became part of the Russian Empire earlier than 
the other peoples of one blood:
Но вам, наперсники России, 
Поляки, первородства честь; 
Вы дни предупредили сии,
Вам должно прежде всех расцвесть. 
Став с Россом вы в одном составе, 
Участвуйте днесь первы в славе,
В блаженстве имени его. 
(But to you, confidants of Russia, / Poles, the honor of primogeniture; / You 
anticipated these days, / [So] you should blossom before the rest. / Having 
become one entity with Russia, / Enjoy your glory first today, / In the happi-
ness of its name.)
In his summons to Polish-Russian fraternity Petrov achieves truly ecstatic 
inspiration:
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Причастники усыновленья, 
Того же ветви древеси,
Язык свят, люди обновленья! 
Которым небо, небеси 
И мира таинства открыты, 
И подвиги презнамениты, 
И счастья храм, где славы трон, 
Поклоньшися Екатерине, 
Присутствующей в нем Богине, 
He выходите тщетно вон. (Petrov II, 138–151)
(Adopted sons of Russia, / Branches of one tree, / Holy language, people of 
renewal! / To whom the sky and heavens / And world’s secrets are revealed, / 
And outstanding deeds, / And the temple of happiness, where the throne of 
glory / Bows to Catherine, / And to the Goddess present there; / Do not go 
forth in vain.)
 6 
The reality of the Second Partition of Poland had nothing in common with these 
dreams. Even earlier Catherine had received Potemkin’s ideas with great caution. 
She did not approve of a Polish-Russian union, or in any case did not think that 
Russia should make any concessions because she didn’t trust the Poles. Fearing 
the Cossacks’ anarchy, she thought that Potemkin’s Ukrainian plan could only be 
set in motion if Prussia and Poland attacked Russia. She did not see particular 
advantage in the planned partition because she did not want to allow the strength-
ening of Russia’s worst enemy, whom she believed to be the Prussian king. 
Apparently, she considered the best variant to be the restoration of the status quo 
of 1788; if Poland remained a weak and anarchic republic incapable of influ-
encing European politics, Russia would continue to exert unimpeded influence. 
However, developing events made such a reversion to the past impossible. 
On the day after the celebration in the Tauride Palace, a courier from the 
Russian envoy in Warsaw, Ia. I. Bulgakov, arrived in Petersburg to report that 
a revolution had taken place there on May 3 (New Style) (AGS I, 851). This 
revolution was completely unacceptable to Catherine, both because as 
a result of the political changes the Polish patriotic party that was inimical to 
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Russia had triumphed and because the empress saw this as the French revolu-
tionary infection coming dangerously close to the Russian border (Madariaga 
1981, 420–424). In May and July Catherine wrote two rescripts for Potemkin, 
who was preparing to go south, regarding the plan of proposed action. In the 
first of them she sanctioned his projects in principle, while modifying the 
order and conditions of their realization. Catherine tasked Potemkin with 
“bringing the nation around to our side” with promises “of helping to 
unite Moldavia to Poland … insisting [that it will only happen] at a conve-
nient opportunity.” At the same time, they both knew that such a “convenient 
opportunity” would not occur insofar as Russian diplomacy had already 
rejected the demand that Turkey yield Moldavia. In precisely the same way, 
His Serene Highness’s planned Cossack invasion and the uprising of the 
Orthodox population of Eastern Poland were supposed to take place only 
after war with Prussia, Poland, and possibly England, began. In the opinion of 
some historians, the phrasing of Catherine’s refusal was meant to soothe 
Potemkin’s pride, since by the time of Catherine’s writing the rescript she 
already knew that war had been completely taken off the agenda (see Lord 
1915, 247; cf. Łojek 1970, 580–581).15
The second rescript considered preparation of a confederation of 
pro-Russian Polish aristocrats who would oppose the decisions taken by the 
Sejm. Such a confederation would have to turn to Catherine for help in 
restoring the old constitution, whose guarantor during the First Partition had 
been Russia. In the extreme version of events, Catherine considered a new 
partition possible (cf. Ekaterina 1874, 246–258, 281–289). 
As the empress had assumed, Russian intervention in Poland began 
right after signing the peace with Turkey in May, 1792. This occurred at the 
summons of the so-called Targovitskii Confederation, whose formation 
Potemkin had begun in Iassy and Bezborodko had continued after Potem-
kin’s death. However, the role of the Targovitsians was purely formal. 
15 According to J. Łojek, there were arguments in Catherine’s circle about whether it would be 
preferable to accept the results of the May 3 revolution, that Catherine herself experienced 
major vacillations on this question, and that it was only the traitorous indecision of the 
Polish leaders, and first of all that of King Stanisław-Augustus, that drove her to intervention 
(cf. Łojek 1986, 172–182). Unfortunately, there are no documents that support this hypoth-
esis, including those first published by the historian himself.
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Guaranteeing Catherine a pretext for invasion, after that they basically 
followed along in the rear of the advancing Russian army. And of course, all 
military actions were carried out by regular Russian troops; Potemkin’s 
ideas about national Polish brigades and Cossack units that Catherine had 
refused to sanction had been buried with him.
As for the role in Russian policy on the part of loyal Polish magnates, the 
makers of the Targovitskii Confederation were simply and cruelly deceived. 
Having promised them the revival of the former szlachta freemen, Catherine 
conducted negotiations behind their backs about a new partition with Prussia 
and Austria (Lord 1915, 271–282; Madariaga 1981, 427–440). In a rescript to 
Ia. E. Sivers of December 22, 1792, the empress formulated her position on the 
Polish question with extreme clarity:
We do not concern ourselves so much with this mighty event as much as 
with the disposition of the current destructive French doctrine that [has 
spread] so far that in Warsaw have sprung up clubs like those of the Jaco-
bins where this despicable teaching is blatantly preached and from which 
it could easily spread to all parts of Poland, and consequently also touch 
the borders of its neighbors. … By past experience and according to the 
current disposition of things and minds in Poland, that is, according to 
the inconstancy and capriciousness of this people, by its proven mali-
ciousness and hatred toward ours, and especially due to the propensity 
they have shown for the depravity and brutalities of the French, we will 
never have in them either a tranquil or a safe neighbor unless we lead 
them into utter impotence and debility. (Solov’ev 1863, 303–304; cf. 
Bulgakov 1792)
The uprising led by Tadeusz Kosciusko and the Third Partition that followed, 
which erased Poland from the map of Europe, strengthened just this kind of 
interpretation of events (Madariaga 1981, 441–454; Lord 1924/1925). 
Petrov’s ode that was written on this occasion no longer contained 
eloquent hopes for Slavic brotherhood. Rather, the final elimination of Poland 
is figured here as necessary to eradicate the influence of revolutionary France, 
which was menacing the entire world. Precisely twenty years after the ode on 
the Kutchuk Kainarji peace, Petrov intensified his earlier framework, but the 
role of conductors of evil French schemes was now played by Poles and not 
Turks:
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Подобья сущие детей 
Им лестны новые затеи. 
И были б только чародей,
Они есть жертва их сетей. … 
В чудовищей преобразились, 
Секванским (парижским. — А. Z.)  
   духом заразились.
(Like absolute children / New capers flatter them. / And if there only was a 
sorcerer / They’d be victim to his traps … // They have been turned into 
monsters, / They’ve been infected with the Sequana [i.e., Parisian] spirit.)
This revolutionary spirit that came from France and seized Poland is depicted 
as a worldwide catastrophe that threatens altars, thrones, people’s personal 
safety, and ultimately, the existence of the universe:
Поправ священные права, 
Грозят срьггь храмы и расхитить, 
Чужим имуществом насытить 
Их алчны руки, рты, чрева. 
Грозят во все края достигнуть, 
Царей с престолов низложить, 
Восстать на Твердь, Творца в ней сдвигнуть 
И в век законом уложить. 
Чтоб все на свете были равны;
Bce наглы, хищны, зверонравны. 
Когда не так: весь дол трясти, 
Поделать пропасти ужасны, 
И, кои с ними несогласны. 
Живых во аде погрести.   
   (Petrov II, 165–167)
(Having trampled sacred rights / They threaten to plunder and raze 
temples, / To glut their greedy arms, mouths, bellies / On others’ 
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property. // They threaten to reach all lands / To depose tsars from their 
thrones, / Rise up against Creation, displace its Creator / And to establish 
a law forever / That everyone on earth is equal; / They are all rude, preda-
tory, beast-like. / And if not, shake up the entire world, / Create horrible 
pits / And in this hell bury alive / Those who don’t agree with them.) 
The only force able to avert this fatal threat to the whole world order turns out 
to be Russia who, dependent on the historical experience and mystical support 
of its heroes, had already once, at the start of the seventeenth century, brought 
the Sarmatian hydra to heel:
Блеснул, как новьx луч светил. 
Ha мгле, несомой от Эфира,
Великолепный Михаил [Романов]
Спускается, и с ним Пожарской, 
Восстановитель власти царской,
Простерт взор долу обоих; 
И Минин (зри, небесны круги 
He знатность ставят, но заслуги), 
И Минин смотрит из-за них. (Ibid., 171)
(In the mist brought by the Ether, / Magnificent Mikhail [Romanov] / 
Shone forth like a ray from new luminaries; / He descends, together with 
him Pozharskii, / Restorer of tsarist power. / The gaze of both extends to 
earth; / And Minin (look, the heavenly circles / Value not celebrity but 
merits) / And Minin looks out from behind them.)16
Again, ideological intuition did not fail the aging poet. The inventory of meta-
phors that Petrov left behind was to be actively exploited by Russian politicians 
and publicists of the next, nineteenth, century.
16 Prince Dmitrii Pozharskii and the merchant Kuz’ma Minin were heroes of the Time of Trou-
bles who rallied the Russians against the Polish invaders and helped establish the Romanov 
dynasty (Translator’s note).
 1 
The Second and Third Partitions of Poland turned the Russian public’s attention to the stories connected to the end of the Time of Troubles—
Minin and Pozharskii’s militia, the liberation of Moscow, and the election of 
Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov as tsar. After just over ten years, during the 
short period that separated the Austerlitz defeat from the Peace of Tilsit, 
these figures and events occupied the central place in the nation’s historical 
pantheon. In 1806 Derzhavin wrote the “historical presentation” entitled 
“Pozharskii” that was published two years later, and in 1807 one after another 
there appeared the poems by S. N. Glinka “Pozharskii and Minin,” S. A. 
Shirinskii-Shikhmatov’s “Pozharskii, Minin, Germogen [Hermogenes], or 
Russia Saved” as well as M. V. Kriukovskii’s tragedy “Pozharskii.” At the same 
time the very young A. S. Strudza began writing the tragedy “Rzhevskii,” 
which was dedicated to the same events and remained unfinished and 
unpublished (RO IRLI F. 288, op. 1, № 13; cf. Gukovskii 1995, 165–166).
In 1807 a competition to design a monument to Minin and Pozharskii was 
announced, which resulted in I. P. Martos’s celebrated work. The choice from 
The People’s War:
The Time of Troubles in Russian Literature,  
1806–1807
CHAPTER 5
156 By Fables Alone
among the many proposals that were entered was made by the Sardinian 
Ambassador Joseph de Maistre. In 1808 he reported to his king: 
His Imperial Highness deemed it proper to order a monument to be erected 
out of bronze or marble in honor of Prince Pozharskii and a certain butcher 
by the name of Minin, who in the first years of the seventeenth century saved 
Russia in miraculous fashion from the foreign yoke. A large number of plans 
for this monument were located at the house of Princess Kurakina, the wife 
of Prince Aleksei who was the minister of internal affairs. One fine morning 
the princess, at whose house I had supped the previous evening, sent me a 
huge bundle of these plans, requesting my opinion of them in a note. I 
immediately guessed where this request came from and who would be given 
my answer, but I didn’t let on. After carefully reviewing the plans, I sent the 
princess my response, basically supported by quite serious reasons, but in a 
manner written for ladies. Soon after this there was a dinner for fifty at Count 
Stroganov’s on his name day. The old count, president of the Academy of 
Arts, said to us after dinner: “Gentlemen, His Imperial Majesty considered it 
proper to erect a monument. He was presented with a multitude of projects. 
Here is the one he preferred and has just presented to me to have carried 
out.” Thus His Majesty wants it known de perpetuam rei memoriam [for 
posterity] that his minister decided the choice of monument to Minin and 
Pozharskii, those celebrated heroes whose name I just learned this year. 
(Maistre 1871, 117–118)
The first sketches for Martos’s monument, exhibited at the Academy of 
Arts, were discussed on the pages of the Journal of Fine Arts (Zhurnal iziashchnykh 
iskusstv) (see Koshanskii 1807; cf. Kovalenskaia 1938, 57–62)1 and in the sepa-
rately published “Panegyrical Speech on Prince Pozharskii and Kuz’ma Minin” 
by V. M. Severgin. Simultaneously the Academy of Arts asked its students in the 
class on historical drawing to address the following theme for their yearly 
project: “Pozharskii’s praiseworthy deed when he arose from his sick bed and 
rushed with the citizens of Moscow who had come to him to give aid to the 
capital city that was being threatened by the enemy” (Petrov 1864, 493). 
Of course these heroic pages of Russian history had attracted writers before 
this—it’s enough to mention M. M. Kheraskov’s tragedy “Moscow Liberated,” 
written in 1798, or Derzhavin’s idea for a long poem called “Pozharskii” that Ia. 
K. Grot dates to the 1780s (Derzhavin III, 469). And in the post-Tilsit years 
1 In N. N. Kovalenskaia’s opinion, one of the sources for Martos’s conception of the monu-
ment was an article by S. S. Bobrov of 1806.
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S. N. Glinka published the “national drama” “Minin” (1809), and P. Iu. L’vov, the 
historical narratives “Pozharskii and Minin” (1810) and “The Election of 
Mikhail Fedorovich Romanov as Tsar” (1812). In 1811 S. A. Dekhtiarev’s 
oratorio “Minin and Pozharskii” with libretto by N. P. Gorchakov was performed 
with great success; characteristically, the libretto was taken to a large degree 
from Shirinskii-Shikhmatov’s poem. But it was in 1806–1807 that the events of 
two hundred years earlier were canonized. The liberation of Moscow from the 
Poles and the ascension of the Romanov dynasty began to be perceived as 
the key moments in Russian national history. Throughout the eighteenth 
century a similar role had been exclusively assigned to Peter’s reign. 
In the first half of the 1830s Minin and Pozharskii’s Moscow campaign 
and the Zemskii sobor (Assembly of the Land) of 1613 were definitively 
canonized as the mythological beginning of the Russian state. The continuity 
of the new state ideology with the material of 1806 was indicated by the fact 
that the newly built Alexandrinskii Theater opened in 1832 with a performance 
of Kriukovskii’s “Pozharskii” (Kriukovskii 1964, 603). It was only later that the 
ideological baton of the long deceased playwright passed on to Mikhail Glinka’s 
“A Life for the Tsar” and Nestor Kukol’nik’s “The All-Mighty Hand Saved the 
Fatherland” (see Kisileva 1997). At the heart of the new official interpretation 
of the Time of Troubles lay the historical parallel with 1812, made explicit in 
the titles of M. N. Zagoskin’s first two novels: Iurii Miloslavskii, or the Russians 
in 1612 and Roslavlev, or the Russians in 1812.2 Moreover, contemporaries 
could easily perceive the parallel between the July 1830 Revolution in France 
and the Polish rebellion of November of the same year. It is all the more inter-
esting that even before Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, the interpretive models 
that took on official status in the 1830s had already been worked out in a 
literary atmosphere notably inimical to the state political course of the time. 
In one way or another, virtually all of the authors of the works listed above 
were connected with A. S. Shishkov’s circle. The old Derzhavin and the young 
Shikhmatov were the leading poets of this circle, and Sergei Glinka was close to 
him ideologically (Al’tshuller 1984; Kisileva 1981). Shishkov promoted the 
novice playwright Kriukovskii as an alternative for V. A. Ozerov. In the words of 
2 According to D. Rebekkini’s calculations, plots concerning the invasion of 1812 and the 
Time of Troubles predominated in the corpus of historical novels in the 1830s (see Rebek-
kini 1998, 421). 
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Nikolai Grech, “on Aleksandr Semenovich’s advice [Kriukovskii] changed and 
corrected a lot in his new, just finished tragedy, and through his mediation 
became known” to the Director of Imperial Theaters A. L. Naryshkin (Grech 
1930, 282). 
The reasons for such a burst of interest in historical thematics are obvious, 
and were also well understood by readers and writers of those years. 
S. P. Zhikharev, for example, connected the ecstatic reaction given to the plays by 
Ozerov and Kriukovskii to the current political situation and the anti-Napoleonic 
campaign of 1806–1807. He predicted beforehand that Kriukovskii’s tragedy 
would “have great success on stage because almost all of the verses for Prince 
Pozharskii’s role relate to current patriotic circumstances and to the patriotic feel-
ings of the people” (Zhikharev 1955, 410; cf. Bochkarev 1959 and others). 
Indeed, the defeat of Austerlitz only increased hatred for Napoleon in Russian 
society. It also served to heighten the bellicose mood which was essential to 
Alexander I at the time; the emperor had already begun preparing for a new war, 
and thus needed justficiation for refusing to ratify the peace agreement of July 
Figure 12 First proposal for a 
monument to Minin and Pozharskii 
(1804-1807) by I. P. Martos.
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1806, that had been signed by his envoy P. Ia. Ubri (see Dubrovin 1895; Zharinov 
1911). Still, the choice of this one particular episode from out of all of Russia’s 
rich military history requires explanation. 
 2 
In the consciousness of Russian society there existed a distinct metonymic 
connection between France and Poland based on their geographical position 
vis–à–vis Russia, their common religion, as well as political and historical 
factors. France most actively opposed Russia’s involvement with Poland and 
the disturbances in Warsaw of 1791 and 1794 were perceived in Russia as the 
spread of the French revolutionary spirit. 
The Orthodox Church played a huge role in the ideological justification 
for the campaign of 1806–1807. In the Synod’s announcement concerning 
the start of war of November 30, 1806, that was read aloud in all churches, 
Napoleon was accused of apostasy from Christianity, idolatry, and a desire 
“to throw down Christ’s Church”; thus the nascent campaign took on the 
character of a religious war “against this enemy of Church and Fatherland” 
(Shil’der I, 354–356). Alexander’s ukase of the same day explained and adver-
tised the purpose of the Synod’s announcement. Entitled “On the Formation 
and Development of Temporary Universal Guards or Militias (Militsii),” the 
emperor’s ukase appealed to all estates, summoning them “to manifest zealous 
love, a courageous spirit, and true passion for the Fatherland’s glory. The 
people, only moved and enflamed by such feelings,” the manifesto affirmed, 
“can make the universal guard an impenetrable bulwark against the enemy’s 
forces, no matter how strong they may be” (PSZ № 22374). 
Careful observers quickly threw doubt on the purely military effectiveness 
of this measure. From among “people of all conditions whom I know very well,” 
I. V. Lopukhin wrote to the emperor, “there is no one, except those guided by 
personal selfishness or frivolity who does not find the establishment of the 
militia burdensome and able to upset the general economy and especially the 
peace of peasant life” (Lopukhin 1990, 169). In a few years Karamzin repeated 
the same ideas in his “Note on Ancient and Modern Russia”: “There is no doubt 
that the noble sons of the Fatherland were ready then for magnanimous sacri-
fices, but the general ardor soon cooled; they saw that the government wanted 
the impossible; trust in it weakened, and the people who had read the 
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Manifesto for the first time with tears in their eyes began to laugh at the pitiful 
militia!” (Karamzin 1991, 64–65). 
According to the rather widely shared opinion, a small draft of recruits 
would have brought the army much greater benefit (Dubrovin 1895, № 4, 
237–239). Ideological and political goals, however, carried more weight with 
Alexander as he sought to transcend barriers of class and politics in his efforts 
to mobilize the country for battle with the enemy. Despite the emperor’s 
efforts, dialogue with the lower classes remained the prerogative of the Synod. 
The Imperial manifesto was primarily aimed at the nobility, which during 
Alexander’s five year rule had already developed a certain caution toward 
initiatives and projects issuing from the throne. 
In part, the manifesto declared, “In such difficult circumstances We 
turn to the distinguished estate of the noble gentry of Our empire with 
complete confidence in your service and loyalty on the field of battle and 
the supreme sacrifice of life and property, which have provided the basis for 
Russia’s greatness” (PSZ № 22374). Count F. V. Rostopchin responded 
from Moscow, “This celebrated estate, inspired by the spirit of Minin and 
Pozharskii, sacrifices everything for the fatherland and only prides itself in 
the title of Russian”; he further expressed satisfaction that the emperor had 
“finally” recognized the gentry “as the unequalled mainstay of the throne” 
(Rostopchin 1892, 418). 
Because the goal of national unity seemed more a distant hope than a 
plausible reality, the necessity for emotional gestures was felt all the more 
strongly. In the same letter, Rostopchin told Alexander: “All of this enthu-
siasm, the actions and mobilization, heretofore unheard of, will turn to 
nothing in a moment if rumors of alleged emancipation inspires the people to 
procure it by annihilating the gentry, which is the single aim of the common 
folk in all of its uprisings and disturbances, and to which it is striving even 
more impatiently after the French example.”
Annoyed, Alexander rejected the idea that he was devaluing the gentry: 
“… I don’t know why you say that I finally began to recognize its support of the 
throne, because I have never ceased regarding it as such”; and he decisively 
rejected the supposition about possible uprisings (Alexander 1902, 634). But 
however sharp the emperor’s reaction to these unsolicited warnings, he himself 
was deeply worried by the country’s current mood. 
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“Banish thoughts about any evil undertakings, do not be blinded by the 
insidious delusions of refractory, perverted people, leading to temporary or 
permanent ruin,” stated the Synod’s announcement (Shil’der II, 355–356). 
Simultaneously with the manifesto creating militias, the Senate issued the 
ukase “On the Expulsion of All French Citizens from Russia.” Those who 
wanted to stay either had to take an oath of Russian citizenship or, if they 
were in certain special categories for which there were exceptions, they had to 
swear that they had no connection to France (PSZ № 22371). These special 
allowances seriously frightened Rostopchin, who asserted that
the measures taken to expel foreign scum from the empire,… instead of 
benefit have produced an extraordinary evil: for out of forty people hardly 
even one would choose to leave a land where every foreigner finds both 
respect and riches. The oath of citizenship inspired by fear and self-interest 
provokes Frenchmen to harm Russia, which they do by influencing the whole 
class of servants, who are already waiting for Bonaparte so as to gain their 
freedom. Sovereign! Cure Russia of this infection. (Rostopchin 1892. 419).
To prepare the country for the encounter with the enemy it was necessary to 
cleanse it completely of foreign pollution. Rumors about the coming liberation 
that Napoleon promised to the lower classes were actively circulating in 
Petersburg (Dubrovin 1895, № 6, 24–25). 
Public opinion of that time saw an even greater danger in the Poles who, 
in the atmosphere of pre-war hysteria, were perceived as a fifth column within 
the empire. Together with rumors about liberation of the serfs, predictions 
about the future restoration of Poland also circulated in society (ibid.). These 
fears were fed by the exultation with which Napoleon was met in Warsaw, the 
pro-Napoleon proclamations of Polish patriots, and, most disturbing, discon-
tent in Russia’s newly acquired Polish provinces (see Zavadskii 1993, 164–167). 
“Rumors reach me that in the Russian provinces that formerly belonged to 
Poland hostile attitudes are revealing themselves,” wrote the Minister 
of  Foreign Affairs A. Ia. Budberg (Bogdanovich II, appendix, 20), while the 
journal The Messenger of Europe also asserted that it was specifically “the Poles 
[who] gave Napoleon the title of invincible” (Zimnii pokhod 1807, 45).
Anti-Polish attitudes had taken root in Russian society since the partitions 
and the rebellions of the 1790s. These ideas formed part of the plainly ideolog-
ical notions that P. Iu. L’vov had formulated three years earlier, writing of “the 
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ancient envier of the Russian kingdom, the eternal hater of Moscow, power-
hungry Poland, which always seeks to harm us” (L’vov 1810, 42–43). Under 
these circumstances it was particularly alarming that Prince Adam Czartoryski, 
who had only recently quit the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, remained 
one of the notable members of the emperor’s inner coterie.
“Prince Adam Czartoryski who ran foreign affairs … became hated by 
all,” F. F. Vigel later recalled. “In the middle classes they bluntly called him 
a traitor, and his secret joy at events that were unfavorable to us did not 
escape the eyes of the highest public. At that time the emperor still valued 
Russia’s opinion, which loudly called for him to remove the traitor, and at 
the end of the summer Czartoryski was forced to leave the ministry” (Vigel’ 
II, 206). For Czartoryski himself neither his reputation nor the reasons for 
it were any secret: “One circumstance that concerned Emperor Alexander 
was the constant censure and criticism directed toward him. This was 
because of my presence at his side and my appointment to a high post. … A 
Pole who had the emperor’s complete trust and who was privy to all of his 
affairs was a phenomenon insulting to Russian society’s deep-seated preju-
dices” (Chartorizhskii I, 310–313).
However, in this ferocious rejection there was one thing that gave the 
prince pause: “They [the Russians] suspected me of secret sympathy for France, 
of wanting to draw Alexander into relations with Bonaparte and to make him 
subservient to him, under the spell of his genius, so to speak” (ibid., 313). Such 
suspicions did not have the slightest basis in reality. Czartoryski’s foreign policy 
was predicated on confrontation with the French emperor. In Alexander’s 
retinue he unquestionably belonged to the “hawks,” both because of his general 
political convictions and due to his Polish predilections (Grimstead 1969, 
104–156; Zavadskii 1993, 61–136). He himself later wrote that he was “far 
from the thought” of “inclining Russian politics toward a close connection with 
Napoleon,” insofar as it was obvious to him that “any agreement between these 
states would be ruinous for Polish interests” (Chartoryzhskii I, 322). It was not 
by chance that it was the news of the minister’s retirement, as many supposed, 
that moved the envoy P. Ia. Urbi to sign the unfavorable peace treaty that 
Alexander subsequently rejected (Nikolai Mikhailovich 1903, 393).
Nevertheless, these subtle political considerations could not shake the 
course of public opinion. Those who were in the know about Czartoryski’s 
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position gave it an even more sinister explanation. The Bavarian envoy Olri 
denounced him, asserting that after the battle of Austerlitz, “they spoke every-
where and in public places only about the fact that that Prince Czartoryski had 
agreed to this war because he had foreseen that the Russians’ defeat would lead 
Napoleon’s army into his fatherland, that he didn’t doubt that the conqueror 
would raise the standard of rebellion there and force the Sejm to accept Prince 
Czartoryski as king, supporting his selection with his victorious army” (Ol’ri 
1917, 464). The stubborn correlation of France and Poland presumed that a 
Pole who found himself near the Russian throne would invariably have Bona-
partist sympathies.
 3 
To understand the conceptual parallel that literary figures of the Shishkov 
circle drew between the events of the early seventeenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, it is essential to examine the sources of their notions about the 
people and national unity more closely. The key role in our analysis becomes 
the influence of Rousseau’s philosophy on the political views of the older 
archaists. This question runs up against obvious difficulties. For literary 
people who were more or less oriented on Shishkov’s program, the intellec-
tual legacy of Rousseau—not only the committed democrat, apostle of 
natural religion, and prophet of the French Revolution, but also as a thinker 
who had a persistent and profound enmity toward Russia—was, understand-
ably, not only not acceptable but positively abhorrent. In their writings we 
almost never find direct references to the Genevan thinker. At the same time, 
the thinking of Russian traditionalists of the late eighteenth-early nineteenth 
century had been formed within the powerful magnetic field of Rousseauist 
doctrines (on the influence of Rousseau’s ideas on the linguistic conceptions 
of the so-called “elder archaists,” see Lotman 1992; Lotman 1969; Lotman i 
Uspenskii 1996, 345, 353, 405; Kisileva 1981; Kisileva 1983). 
From the start Russian readers’ interest in The Social Contract or Emile 
was inseparable from the harsh and one-sided assessment that the intellec-
tual leader of enlightened Europe had given of Russia’s historical 
development: “Russians will never be really civilized, because it was civi-
lized too soon. Peter[’s] … first wish was to make Germans or Englishmen, 
when he ought to have been making Russians. … In this fashion too a French 
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teacher turns out a pupil to be an infant prodigy, and for the rest of his life to 
be nothing whatsoever” (Rousseau 1969, 183; translation from Rousseau 
1979, 198–199). This judgment could not be accepted by Rousseau’s Russian 
admirers, the more so since it was pronounced at a time when the unani-
mous cult of Peter was still at its zenith and when Russians’ rights to a worthy 
place among European nations were upheld by the authoritative Montes-
quieu, who had written that “Peter I, in imparting European customs and 
manners to a European people achieved success with an ease that he didn’t 
expect” (Montesquieu 1955, 418). Nonetheless, Rousseau’s notion of the 
Russians’ lack of national character (“caractère national”), which he had 
emphasized as a defining weakness of the Russian state in his “Project for a 
Corsican Constitution” (Rousseau 1969, 268), was taken in Russia to some 
extent as appropriate criticism of the court, although with each successive 
decade Russian readers grew more responsive to his assessment. 
When the author of The Social Contract compared Peter to “a French 
teacher” (un précepteur françois) he was doubtless alluding to contemporary 
French teaching practices that he had condemned in Emile that same year. The 
issue had to do with French teachers for French pupils, and the word “French” 
functioned as a synonym for “bad.” At the same time, for a Russian audience 
that was already used to being characterized—not without some irritation—as 
pupils of “enlightened Europe,” Rousseau’s analogy suggested a foreigner 
teaching a Russian pupil, and the same word—“French”—here signified “alien.”
“Everything that is our own becomes bad and despised in our eyes. The 
French teach us everything: how to walk, how to stand, how to bow, how to 
sing, how to speak, and even how to blow our noses and to cough,” declared 
Shishkov in his “Treatise on Old and New Style” (Shishkov II, 14). His close 
associate E. Stankevich despaired that “foreigners take charge of Russian chil-
dren at their birth, foreigners supervise their childhood and direct their youth. 
… From the capital to the farthest settlements you will find foreigners every-
where, rearing, educating, guiding our gentry” (Stankevich I, 18). Moreover, 
for these authors the problem was not only about the bad quality of foreign 
teachers. In Shishkov’s words, “the most honest and well-intentioned of them 
cannot teach me to know my country and love my people” (Shishkov IV, 180). 
It is difficult not to see in these demands an echo of that patriotic education that 
the preceptor gives Emile. 
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This focus on pedagogical problems was not unique to any particular 
circle of thinkers—all Europe was drawn into discussions of education. But the 
idea of national education that depended on the traditional forms of folk life—
customs, holidays, games, songs—clearly signaled Rousseauian roots, although 
it was subsequently developed most fully by late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth-century German pedagogical thought (see König 1954). From the 
Russian perspective it was significant that Rousseau had discussed this issue in 
an especially broad and in-depth fashion in the “Considerations on the Form 
of Rule in Poland.” This work, written after the First Partition of Poland and 
dedicated to the way Poles could preserve their national being in face of the 
Russian threat, became—in the words of Jean Starobinski—“Jean-Jacques’s 
political testament” (Starobinski 1962, 32). Rousseau’s anti-Russian senti-
ments reached their culmination here, and this kind of work by the famous 
philosopher could not have failed to provoke the liveliest interest in Russia, 
although references to it, understandably, were absolutely out of the question. 
In “Considerations,” the chapter “Education” that opens with the phrase 
“This section is important” (Rousseau 1969, 465) precedes such sections as 
“On the King,” “The Administration,” “The Military System,” and so on. The 
political existence of Poland was coming to an end, but according to Rousseau, 
the task for the country was to preserve itself by supporting its national cultural 
identity. “You cannot stop the Russians from swallowing you up, but at least 
arrange it so that they will not be able to digest you. … If you can succeed in 
preventing even one Pole from becoming a Russian, I tell you that Russia will 
never succeed in subjugating Poland to itself. … It is precisely education that 
gives souls their national form. … A child, opening its eyes, should see the 
fatherland and until death should see nothing but the fatherland. … At twenty 
years of age a Pole should not be a person, he should be a Pole. … Their educa-
tors should all be Poles” (Rousseau III, 959–960; Rousseau 1969, 465–466).
Still, Rousseau’s ideas about the fundamental principles of national 
education were significantly different from those of the nationally-oriented 
Russian thinkers of the early nineteenth century. While for Shishkov and his 
supporters the basis was language, Rousseau had not paid special attention 
to this. Judging by the “Treatise on the Origin and Bases of Inequality” and 
the “Essay on the Origin of Languages,” Rousseau did not consider language 
part of the cultural tradition, relating it rather to the realm of natural 
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phenomena. Moreover, in developing his political doctrine, Rousseau 
doubtlessly oriented himself primarily on the Republic of Geneva, and the 
linguistic situation in Switzerland did not lend itself to considering language 
a factor of national originality. But even for Poland the issue of language did 
not play any significant role in Rousseau’s recommendations. 
Yet even here the Russians’ conceptions reveal their distinctly Rous-
seauian source. Shishkov’s attempts in the “Treatise on Old and New Style” 
to demonstrate the national nature of word creation and to crowd out 
French borrowings with the help of neologisms that he thought up with 
Slavonic roots were clearly derived from German sources, especially J. H. 
Campe’s Dictionary of Improvements and the Germanization of Our Language 
that had been published in Braunschweig in 1798 (Campe 1798). Shishkov 
translated Campe’s works for children and followed his work with interest 
(see Campe I-II; cf. Zemskova 2000), and the German pedagogue’s almost 
religious adulation of Rousseau is well known. Among other things, Campe 
initiated and provided commentaries for a translation of Emile into German 
(see Mournier 1979, 126–130, 286–298).
Shishkov followed Campe’s logic. Evidently having in mind Germany’s 
divided political situation, as well as the ideas of German nationalists about 
the existence of an ideal Germany everywhere that the German language was 
spoken, Shishkov asserted, “It has been proven by experiments that bringing 
regions together will not create a perfect unity of body and soul if their 
languages are different, and that, to the contrary, regions that are divided and 
separated from each other, if they have one language, will preserve their secret 
unanimity” (Shishkov IV, 184). The rhetoric of “a single body and soul” 
clearly reveals the notion of the people as a moral personality (in Rousseau’s 
phrase, “personne morale”), endowed with one will, which strives to be 
embodied in a single state organism.
Evstafii Stankevich, discussing how Russia should treat the subjugated 
Poles and Swedes who had once threatened its existence (in the context of a 
discussion concerning the Finnish provinces won from Sweden) wrote, “We 
should put all our efforts into destroying not their cities and towns, but their 
dialects” (Stankevich II, 18). Rousseau, instructing the Poles how not to be 
“digested” by its powerful neighbor, advised them to put down roots into the 
soil of their native traditions. Stankevich recommended that his government 
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pull them out from that soil, precisely in order to digest them into the single 
body of the Russian Empire.
Rousseau had spoken of the necessity for national education primarily in 
relation to small and politically weak states—Poland, Corsica, and his native 
Republic of Geneva. Starobinski even saw in this a projection of the author’s 
own biographical problems: “By strange coincidence, the Poland of 1772 for 
which Rousseau was writing a law project offers a rather accurate image of Jean-
Jacques himself, surrounded, besieged, persecuted by real and imagined 
enemies and pursuers” (Starobinski 1962, 98–99). The interest in this problem 
on the part of Rousseau’s German admirers is also understandable: for divided 
Germany the consolidation of national traditions via education became the 
pledge of future political unification. 
Russia, it would seem, was in a completely different position, but the sense 
of the state organization’s precarity and the fragility of its very existence were 
also familiar. The reason for this sad state of affairs, in full agreement with Rous-
seau’s conceptions, had to do with ignoring national traditions and customs:
If they start entertaining us with alien customs, foreign games, foreign rites, 
foreign language, charming and seducing our imagination, then despite all 
rules, despite all good intentions and dispositions the prime basis of love of 
the fatherland—the spirit of national pride—will begin to decrease. … If 
one people attacks another with flame and sword in their hands, where does 
the latter find the strength to repel this horrible storm cloud, this lightning 
bolt, if it does not come from love for the fatherland and national pride?… 
From this it is clear that it is not only weapons and the power of one people 
that can be dangerous for another—a covert attempt to entice minds, to 
charm hearts and to shake their love for their land and pride in their name is 
a means more dependable than swords and cannons,—
wrote Shishkov in his “Treatise on Love for the Fatherland,” which he read at a 
ceremonial meeting of the “Colloquy of Lovers of the Russian Word” a few 
months before Napoleon’s army crossed the Neiman (Shishkov IV, 170–171). 
The logic of this construction is completely transparent. Foreign teachers 
inculcate Russian youth with fondness for foreign languages and the customs of 
foreign countries, due to which young Russians lose their national pride and 
become incapable of withstanding a military challenge. The effeminizing 
and weakening influence of French civilization turns out to be especially 
dangerous. Recall that later on in the passage from The Social Contract cited 
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earlier Rousseau says that Russia, in losing its national character, like those 
European countries that had once lost theirs, would fall prey to the Tatars.
This Rousseauian national-cultural isolationism provoked sharp criticism 
from D. I. Khvostov: “Speaking of education, the author rejects foreign 
teachers, but how can the country become enlightened?… What can enrich 
the language of the people if it shuns the productions of foreign countries? In 
places, [Shishkov’s treatise] is written well and effectively, but while it might 
be suitable for the age of Mikhail Romanov it is not for his descendants” 
(Khvostov 1938, 378). Khvostov’s mention of the times of Mikhail Romanov 
was not accidental. Shishov found examples of genuine love for the fatherland 
in classical times, selecting parallels to them from Russian history. He wanted 
to show his audience that Russians were no less capable of patriotic feelings 
than the heroes of Greece and Rome, and in far greater measure than modern 
Europeans. At the same time, of his four examples, three were from the Time 
of Troubles when Russia was threatened by Polish domination. 
Shishkov chose this era for his historical excursuses because he saw an 
analogy to his day. In his opinion, Russia was in danger of being conquered by 
Figure 13 Minin summons Prince Pozharskii to save the Fatherland (1800’s)  
by G. I. Ugriumov.
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Napoleon, and he believed that only a patriotic upsurge like the one led 
by Minin and Pozharskii would be able to save the country from certain destruc-
tion. In essence, the leader of the “Colloquy” reproduced a model that had been 
formulated several years earlier by his comrades and ideological allies. 
 4 
The history of Moscow’s liberation in 1612 could not have been a more appro-
priate ideological reference point for Russia in her current state. More than 
anything else, it gave Russia, badly defeated at Austerlitz, some necessary 
historical perspective. Once humiliated and almost subjugated by the Poles, 
Russia now ruled over that hostile people. Shikhmatov began a poem with this 
juxtaposition between her past misfortunes and her current greatness. More 
than that, Shikhmatov has Patriarch Germogen reveal the future, prophetically 
exclaiming:
Отверзлись очи мне душевны, 
Я вижу таинства времен… 
Забудь Россия дни плачевны; 
Царица ты земных племен. 
Врагов бесчестья полны лицы, 
Потухли бранныя зари, 
Почиют царства и цари 
Под сению твоей десницы 
Сармация твоя раба.  
   (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov 1971, 368)3
(My inner eyes have opened, / I see the secrets of the ages… / Russia, forget 
these tearful days; / You are tsaritsa of the tribes of earth. / Your enemies’ 
3  Cf. in Strudza: 
Но в будущем, я зрю, народ сей заблужденный, 
Каратель и тиран, к славянам приобщенный, 
Под скиптром русским мир и счастие вкусит.   
  (RO IRLI, f. 288, op. 1, № 13, l. 27)
(But in the future, I see, this prodigal people [the Poles], / Punisher and tyrant, 
attached to the Slavs, / Will enjoy peace and happiness under Russia’s scepter.)
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faces are full of dishonor, / The violent suns have set, / Kings and kingdoms 
repose / In the shade of your right hand / Sarmatia is your slave…)
Of course, the contrast between, say, the Tatar yoke and the conquest of Kazan 
could in principle have supplied the author with the same set of associations. 
However, these were “affairs of days long past” (Pushkin), whereas the final 
defeat of Poland could still be recalled by the majority of the reading and writing 
public, which made the historical allusions more alive and relevant. It is not by 
accident that a play about Pozharskii was put forward to counter Ozerov’s 
“Dimitrii Donskoi,” filled with the pathos of gentry honor and individual 
freedom (see Gordin 1910) and unacceptable to Shishkov’s group, (for 
Shishkov’s response to the play, see Sidorova 1952). Moreover the story of a 
people’s militia marching on Moscow could serve as an ideal analogy—both 
for a creating a militia and also for the role that the Orthodox Church played 
in the action. 
The entire first canto (out of three) of Shirinskii-Shikhmatov’s poem 
“Pozharskii, Minin, Germogen, or Russian Saved” describes a prayer by 
Patriarch Germogen, who is imprisoned in the Chudov Monastery; miracu-
lously, the prayer reaches Nizhnii Novgorod and spurs Minin to gather a 
militia. In the plays by Derzhavin and Kriukovskii, the outcome of the siege 
of Moscow and culminating moment is the patriarch’s summons to the 
troops. In both plays, especially Derzhavin’s, the “cellarer of the Trinity 
Lavra” Avraamii (Palitsyn) plays no small role (Derzhavin IV, 132). Glinka’s 
poem begins with Minin reading a letter from Avraamii. The words of the 
spiritual pastors move the people to rise up for the sake of their liberation, 
for the war must first of all be waged to protect the faith. Shikhmatov exclaims 
at the start of his poem:
Раскол латин душеотравный 
Уже — о, нестерпимо зло — 
На гибель веры православной
Возносит гордое чело, —   
   (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov 1807, 19)
(Тhe soul-destroying Latin schism / Is already—oh, unbearable evil— / 
Raising its proud brow / To destroy the Orthodox faith.)
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The very titles that Shikhmatov and Glinka gave their poems indicate the most 
important mythologems that the current political situation demanded. The 
formula “Pozharskii, Minin, Germogen, or Russian Saved” emblematized the 
unification of all classes in the name of a lofty goal, and the formula “Pozharskii and 
Minin, or Russians’ Sacrifices”—the enthusiastic character of that unification, the 
surge of sacrifice that the Supreme manifesto had demanded of all subjects.
“It seems that nature produced one closer to the throne and the other 
closer to huts on purpose so that, guided by the wisdom of all of the estates, it 
could act with greater strength for the general good,” wrote Severgin (1807, 16) 
of  the heroes in a sketch of  Martos’s monument. If Ozerov in “Dimitrii Donskoi” 
or Kheraskov in “Moscow Liberated” (which was also dedicated to the events of 
1612–1613, but written in the eighteenth century) depicted national unity as an 
alliance of princes, all of the above-named authors describe the history of the 
people’s rising. Of course, within the people estate divisions remain,4 but the 
general spiritual outpouring brings them together as one. Shikhmatov compares 
Pozharskii’s troops to a Siberian river that absorbs innumerable streams:
Текут в него со всех градов, 
Преславны жаждущи трудов 
Отечества нелестны чады.  
   (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov 1971, 366)
(Honest progeny of the fatherland / Flow into it from all cities, / Thirsting 
for labors, most glorious.)
Such an image of the birth of the people is directly connected with the basic 
metaphor of a sacrifice on the altar of the fatherland, which was perfectly 
expressed in Minin’s anthologized summons to the people of Nizhnii 
Novgorod to give their last for the salvation of Moscow. Sacrificing one’s most 
valuable and cherished property in the name of the general good not only 
had pragmatic material importance, but also symbolized the voluntary rejec-
tion of the private and personal, liberating oneself from everything that did 
not belong to the single national body.
4 Thus Glinka’s Minin refuses to be leader of the militia, triumphantly declaring: 
Я б изменил себе, Отечеству и вам, принявши сан военный. (Glinka 
1807, 9)
(I would betray myself, the Fatherland and you if I took on military rank.)
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Дадим себя, как Россам сродно 
Отечеству и вере в дань. 
Bсe силы, все стяжанье наше 
Слием для подвига сего, —  
   (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov 1807, 22)
(We will give ourselves, as is characteristic of Rosses / As tribute to the 
fatherland and our faith. / All our strength, all our earnings / We give for this 
deed—)
declares Minin in Shikhmatov’s poem. 
The Synod’s announcement, made known on November 30, 1806, admon-
ished the flock “to sacrifice with gratitude those goods to the Fatherland for 
which we are obliged to the Fatherland” (Shil’der II, 357). Orientation on the 
same historical model may also be divined in a diary description of the success 
of the first subscription lists, noted by Zhikharev on January 4: “Our grandees of 
old families and eminent clergy showed a praiseworthy example, and after them 
followed and continue to follow people of other conditions, all of them vying 
with one another to give as much as they can manage for the Fatherland; some 
lay their very last [penny] on the altar” (Zhikharev 1955, 311).
The censors gave permission to publish “Pozharskii and Minin, or Russians’ 
Sacrifices” on January 31, 1807, and Shishkov read “Pozharskii, Minin, 
Germogen, or Russian Saved” at a literary evening at Derzhavin’s on February 
10 (ibid., 358–359). Weeks earlier Zhikharev had spoken of the latter poem as 
“a recent work” (ibid., 351). Most likely, in producing Minin’s speech that 
occupied significant space in the poems, both authors were directly responding 
to the Synod’s announcement. In any case, there is no doubt of the similarity 
of the mobilization strategies that the poets and the church administration had 
created for the fight against the fearsome new enemy.
This type of national mobilization strategy is apparently unthinkable 
without the mythologems of conspiracy and treason. The image of the 
people as a single organism, a single will into which a multitude of indi-
vidual wills merge together, presupposes a preliminary purge of filth and 
infection without which neither the great act of self-renunciation nor 
victory in the eschatological battle with evil are possible. Preparing for war 
with Napoleon, in whom they saw a sinister fruit of revolutionary France, 
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the conservative Russian literary figures reproduced the logic of the Jaco-
bins with their incessant search for enemies who defied the “volonté 
générale,” embodied in the Convention. Or rather, both of these groups 
reproduced the logic of Rousseau’s Social Contract.
In Severgin’s words, “however strong an external enemy,… conflicts 
within the state are the worst antagonist” (Severgin 1807, 18). Derzhavin and 
Kriukovskii and Glinka in his “fatherland drama” “Minin” written two years 
later, as well as Strudza in “Rzhevskii,” all reserved a key role in the drama for 
the intrigues of Zarutskii the Cossack hetman and the last companion of 
Marina Mniszech, a power-hungry villain who was trying to clear his way to 
the Russian throne by treason and by a secret deal with the Poles. In contrast, 
in Kheraskov’s “Moscow Liberated” Zarutskii does not figure at all. The 
authors of these plays were hardly all spontaneously aiming at Czartoryski, 
but the system of ideological coordinates, in which they were setting up the 
figure of a foreigner who by the will of fate became the leader’s comrade and 
prepared to enter into secret relations with the enemy for selfish reasons and 
to destroy the fatherland, turns out to have been absolutely necessary.
Derzhavin and Kriukovskii perceive the Cossack Zarutskii as not fully 
Russian, which in part motivates his treason. “As if a Russian would betray,” 
Derzhavin’s Marina Mniszech tells the traitor Zarutskii apropos of the vacil-
lating Trubetskoi (Dezhavin IV, 155), and Kriukovskii calls Zarutskii “a 
Ukrainian hetman” (Kriukovskii 1964, 274). An additional circumstance 
leading to the hetman’s ruin is his connection to the Pole Marina Mniszech, 
who names him heir to the Polish puppet Otrep’ev. Apart from this, Derzhavin 
also has Pozharskii fall in love with Marina and heroically overcome his passion 
in the name of the fatherland.5 For many years to come the figure of a Polish 
woman became a symbol of danger and seduction in Russian literature. 
5 It is tempting to see this as a hint at Alexander’s mistress Maria Antonovna Naryshkina, 
born Princess Chetvertinskaia, who was Polish by birth. It was just in 1806 that their rela-
tionship became open, as the Bavarian emissary Ol’ri reported (see Bray 1902, 119). 
However, it is apparently necessary to reject this hypothesis. In the drafts of the poem 
“Pozharskii” which Ia. K. Grot dates to the 1780’s, Pozharskii is in love with a fictional Polish 
woman named Kleonisa (see Derzhavin III, 368–372). This is probably the case of a literary 
stereotype whose function was to increase the conflict between love and duty. On the other 
hand, not all of Grot’s datings are irreproachable, so this problem may require further study.
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However, Poland’s subversive activity is by no means limited to Marina 
Mniszech’s charms. Poles “try to introduce dangerous innovation to the Russian 
land,” and
Желая в воинстве раздоры поселить, 
… кабалу в России разрешают
И вольности мечтой сограждан обольщают. 
   (Derzhavin IV, 273)6
(Hoping to sow discord in the army, / … they [would] destroy slavery in 
Russia / And try to seduce their fellow citizens with the dream of freedom.)
This internal menace threatened the foundations of the state and the very exis-
tence of Russia, which was destined to endure by depending solely on national 
unity and traditions. At the same time the writers of the Shishkov camp were by 
no means deaf to the dangerous parallels between their own constructions and 
the rhetoric of their sworn enemies; they strove to prevent the sinister features 
of “les enfants de la patrie” from showing through their own idealized image of 
the “sons of the fatherland.” 
In the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Poles ended up in Moscow 
as a result of decisions by the Boyar Duma that had sworn allegiance to 
Władysław. However, this historical episode from the Time of Troubles was 
only mentioned vaguely in the works we have discussed. Those behind the 
oath of allegiance to the Polish heir had not been jettisoned from the national 
body even after the liberation of Moscow but, on the contrary, played a leading 
role in the state administration. None of the writers describing these events in 
the early nineteenth century wanted to undermine national unity by casting 
doubt on the loyalty of the best-born families in the state. The foreigner 
Zarutskii was a much better fit for the role of traitor. Even more indicative, 
however, was another quasi-historical episode.
6 We will not dwell in detail on this circle of allusions since they have been exhaustively 
analyzed by Mark Al’tshuller (1984, 157–166). It seems that the researcher somewhat exag-
gerates, however, seeing in the just cited lines a hint at the five-year-old attempt by Alexander’s 
advisors on the Secret Committee to abolish serfdom. Fears of the spread of revolutionary 
ideas among the lower classes which were discussed in the last section provided a fully 
adequate historical context for these lines. 
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 5 
In all of the works we have discussed, the election of Mikhail Fedorovich as 
tsar that established the Romanov dynasty serves as the conceptual culmina-
tion of the described events. It is almost always Pozharskii who poignantly 
and magnanimously refuses the crown offered to him and initiates the elec-
tion. In Derzhavin the people first express their preference for autocracy over 
the power of the Boyar Duma, exclaiming “No need for boyars, long live the 
tsar,” and then, together with the Duma, proclaim that “Pozharskii’s our man 
(Pozharskii nam liub)” (Derzhavin IV, 187–188). In Kruiukovskii the “leader 
of Smolensk” offers the crown to Pozharskii in the name of the army (Kriu-
kovskii 1964, 273). But Shakhmatov paints the most expressive picture:
Но что? Се возникает глас, 
Подобный шуму вод спокойных: 
Пожарский первый из достойных!
To будет царь, кто царство спас!… 
Духовный лик и сонм бояр, 
Несущи угвари державных, 
Величество богов земных, 
Грядут — и вся Россия в них — 
К свершителю деяний славных.
Взложи сияющий венец; 
Одеян красотою царской,
 На царский фон воссядь, Пожарской! 
Воссядь — и будь царем сердец!  
   (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov 1971, 378–380)
(But what is this? A voice is heard / Like the sound of calm waters: / 
Pozharskii is first among the worthy! / Let he be tsar who saved the kingdom 
(tsarstvo)! … // The clergy and the assembly of boyars / Carrying the 
symbols of state, / The majesty of earthly gods, / Will come—and all of 
Russia with them— / To the one who achieved glorious deeds. // Bestow 
the shining crown; / Arrayed in royal beauty, / Mount the royal throne, 
Pozharskii! / Mount it—and be tsar of our hearts!)
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In his poem Shikhmatov tried quite seriously to follow historical events faith-
fully. Derzhavin and Kriukovskii, in consonance with the laws of dramatic 
genres, introduced many fictional characters into their plays, although a 
certain historical verisimilitude was also important for them. Derzhavin 
endowed his “heroic presentation” with a foreword in which he indicated 
what was fiction and what was taken from historical sources. He definitely 
included the episode of offering the crown to Prince Pozharskii in his list of 
historically authentic events. However, neither the documents that had been 
published by the time nor the known manuscripts nor any historical works 
contained anything similar.7 Here, for example, is how I. I. Golikov described 
the country’s gratitude to Pozharskii:
After offering their most ardent prayers to the Lord, all eyes and thoughts 
were directed to those responsible for their happiness, Prince Dmitrii 
Mikhailovich Pozharskii and Koz’ma Minin. Recognizing them as the 
instrument of God’s grace, they so to speak poured out their hearts to them 
which were overflowing with the most lively gratitude, called them their 
benefactors and saviors, and as testimony of this all the government ranks 
unanimously resolved to grant the prince the honor of Boyar-hood and to 
present him with a patent signed by the hand of boyars from all over the state 
and by distinguished clergymen, which was then also affirmed by Mikhail 
Fedorovich. (Golikov II, 336; cf. Mankiev 1770; Novyi letopisets 1792). 
The discussion here concerns an award that was certainly a very high honor, but 
nevertheless far from the tsar’s crown. 
Clearly, Derzhavin felt a bit awkward about this episode. While referring 
in all other cases (and with full reason) to “the ‘Core of Russian History’ (Iadro 
Rossiiskoi istorii) and other chronicles,” here he limited himself to the vague 
suggestion “as some foreign writers and all circumstances confirm” (Derzhavin 
IV, 131). The reference to “all circumstances” indicates that the anonymous 
“foreign writers” are no more than a figure of speech. But whatever his sources, 
the source for all of the other writers, mostly likely, was Derzhavin himself. 
7 In Prince Obolenskii’s chronicle Pozharskii is actually named among the active participants 
in Mikhail’s election (see Platonov 1913, 411), but there is not a word about his candidacy 
for the throne. On the contrary, the only evidence of this kind is the assertion of the 
nobleman Sumin—which was most likely a slander and most likely not known to the literary 
men of the early nineteenth century—that Pozharskii attempted to be crowned in Moscow 
and that he had offered him 20,000 rubles for this (see Zabelin 1848, 85). 
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In Pavel L’vov’s historical narrative Pozharskii and Minin that came out in 
1810, he follows Golikov’s version, at times literally, but deviating from it, 
however, on the question of Pozharskii’s voluntary refusal of the throne. To this 
episode the author supplies the following commentary:
Our chronicles are silent about Prince Pozharskii’s praiseworthy refusal, 
perhaps because in those times virtue was no surprise and virtue’s frequent 
victories did not attract special attention but were considered the essential 
duty of an honest person and a God-fearing Christian, but word of this that 
was passed down from generation to generation, from mouth to mouth,… 
has reached us. … This legend was proclaimed in the song of one of our 
illustrious Skalds. With delight I accept this legend as a truth that should not 
be doubted, for I strongly believe that such an extraordinary event could 
take place in Russia since there was a Pozharskii and because such unparal-
leled greatness of soul was not foreign to him. (L’vov 1810, 175–176)
By “the song of a Skald,” L’vov had in mind not Derzhavin’s play that had been 
published two years earlier and that had had no success, but his celebrated ode 
Figure 14 Proposal for a monument to Minin and Pozharskii (1809)  
by I. P. Martos.
178 By Fables Alone
“On the Perfidy of the French Rebellion and In Honor of Prince Pozharskii.” In 
this ode, among other things Derzhavin wrote about his beloved historical hero:
He вняв к себе народа клику, 
Избрал достойного владыку
И над собою воцарил; 
Который быв покорен воле 
Избранного собой царя.
He возроптал и в низкой доле, 
Его веления творя. … 
Царя творец и раб послушный, 
He ты ль, герой великодушный, 
Пожарский, муж великий мой.   
   (Derzhavin I, 23–231)
(Not accepting the people’s adulation for himself, / He elected a worthy 
sovereign / And made him tsar over himself; / He submitted to the will / Of 
the tsar he chose. / He did not grumble over his humble role / Carrying out 
his commands. … / Obedient slave and maker of tsars, / Is this not you, 
magnanimous hero, / Pozharskii, my great man.)
In 1789, when Derzhavin wrote this ode, he did not worry much about the 
correlation of the legend he was presenting to the facts and documents. Now, in 
an era of growing interest in native history, when he himself had accused 
Ozerov’s “Dimitrii Donskoi” of violating “historical faithfulness” (vernost’) 
(see Zhikharev 1955, 331), the poet was obliged to support the legend he had 
once created by references to doubtful sources and incomprehensible 
“circumstances.”
However, there does exist a text that reflects this precise version of histor-
ical events. This is an historical folk song first published by P. V. Kireevskii in 
1868:
Как и взговорют бояре — воеводы московские: 
«Выбираем мы себе в цари 
Из бояр боярина славного — 
Князя Дмитрия Пожарского сына!»
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Как и взоворит к боярам Пожарский князь:
«Ох вы, гой еси, бояре — воеводы московские!
Не достоин я такой почести от вас, 
He могу принять я от вас царства Московского. 
Уж скажу же вам, бояре — воеводы московские: 
Уж мы выберем себе в православные цари 
Из славного, из богатого дому Романова 
Михаила сына Федоровича». (Putilov 1966, 95)
(So say the boyars, voevodas of Moscow: / “We are choosing a tsar for 
ourselves / A renowned boyar from the boyars / Prince Dmitrii, son of 
Pozharskii!” / So says Prince Pozharskii to the boyars: / “Hail to you, 
voevodas of Moscow! / I do not deserve such honor from you, / I cannot 
accept the kingdom of Moscow from you. / But I will say to you, voevodas of 
Moscow, / Let us choose an Orthodox tsar for ourselves / From the splendid, 
rich house of Romanov, / Mikhail Fedorovich.”)
It is possible that this song, recorded many years later from a seventy-year-old 
woman in the village of Slobod of the Borovskii region, Kaluga province (ibid., 
345)8 might have served as Derzhavin’s source. The poet had an interest in 
folklore (see, for example, Al’tshuller 1984, 285–291), and the song tradition 
may have influenced his depiction of Marina Miniszech in “Pozharskii” as a 
sorceress and magician (see Putilov 1966, 30, 36; Adrianova-Peretts I, 373). 
Still, another possibility is more likely. In the same ode, “On the Perfidy of the 
French Rebellion,” Derzhavin mentions Belisarius, who he describes else-
where as “the very greatest military commander … of the Greek Emperor 
Justinian; he conquered Carthage,… the Goths, Syracusans, Palermo, Naples 
and many other cities and peoples; he refused the crown the Goths offered 
him. …” Belisarius is also mentioned in this context in the ode “The Waterfall” 
(see Derzhavin I, 320; III, 520).
8 Cf. the characteristic note on this song by the author of an academy history of Russian folk-
lore: “Pozharskii is a national hero, and therefore the song, contradicting history, presents an 
episode relating that a council of boyars and voevodas decided to pick Pozharskii to be tsar, 
but he allegedly refused the throne for himself, proposing that they elect Mikhail Romanov. 
In this way the memory of the struggle among various candidacies for the Russian throne 
was reconstituted in folklore” (Adrianova-Peretts I, 376; cf. Busanov 1992, 112–113). 
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The historical Belisarius was well-known in Russia thanks to J.-F. 
Marmontel’s novel that Catherine, together with her travelling companions, 
had translated in 1767 during their trip down the Volga (ibid., III, 239). By 
the time “Pozharskii” was written, five editions of the Russian translation of 
Belisarius had already been published (SKRK II, 218–219). Most likely, 
Derzhavin made use of the very traditional scheme of likening Russian heroes 
to those of antiquity and modeled the legend of Pozharskii’s renunciation of 
the throne on Belisarius. Of course, both Marmontel and the folksong might 
simultaneously have served as sources for the relevant place in the ode; their 
combination could only have lightened the poet’s task. It also seems possible 
that the early nineteenth-century works about Pozharskii might themselves 
have led to this folksong. Such a pattern is not unusual.
In any case, the Pozharskii of the ode “On the Perfidy of the French 
Rebellion” is a model of Stoic virtue of a classical cast. In the drafts for the 
poem “Pozharskii,” when the hero makes his oath to Mikhail, “he declares 
that he is going into seclusion, but that if his arm or advice are ever needed for 
the fatherland, he is always ready to serve” (Derzhavin III, 373). In the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, this self-effacing act took on quite other 
features. In Kheraskov’s “Moscow Liberated,” Pozharskii’s speech summoning 
of Mikhail to the throne only serves as the compositional completion of an 
already essentially finished tragedy (see Kheraskov 1961, 371). In sharp 
contrast, for authors writing on this theme in 1806–1807, the corresponding 
monologue becomes the crux of the work’s message. In Derzhavin the hero 
refuses the “holy porphyry” of the tsars, saying: “Only one heir by blood / 
Can give them tranquility and return us to peace” (Derzhavin IV, 190). In 
Kriukovskii he exclaims: “Tsars are ordained for us by God” (Kriukovskii 
1964, 283). In Shikhmatov the corresponding episode reaches an emotional 
and conceptual peak:
… возник земный Эдем 
Для россов из земного ада; 
И я — o, из наград награда. 
Сподобился быть их вождем. 
Господь возводит на престолы, 
Владеть оправдывает он; 
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Вотще чрез пагубы, крамолы
Теснятся хищники на трон. 
Пусть высоты достигнут звездной. 
На землю наведут боязнь, - 
Приспеет медленная казнь, 
Восторгнет их рукой железной 
И свергнет в тартар от небес. 
И я — дерзнув ступить на царство, 
В себе вместил бы их коварство, 
Их студ достойно бы понес.  
   (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov 1971, 383)
(… an earthly Eden / Arose for Rosses out of an earthly hell; / And I—oh, 
reward of rewards, / Was honored to be their leader. // The Lord raises 
[kings] to the throne, / He justifies their rule; / While through destruction 
and treachery / Predators crowd up to the throne. / Let them reach the starry 
heavens / And make the whole world scared of them: / A slow punishment 
will ripen, / Rip them out with an iron hand / And send them down from the 
heavens into Tartarus. / And I, having dared to tread this path / Would 
embody their perfidy myself / And would have been worthy of their shame.) 
The poet places before his hero the choice between an absolute moral triumph 
and a just as absolute catastrophe, between heaven and hell. The leader, creating 
“an earthly Eden” for his people, turns out—if he takes the throne—to be like a 
“predator” who strives for power through destruction and treachery and who is 
destined to be thrown down to Tartarus. Ethical maximalism on this scale and 
the degree of anxiety becomes comprehensible if we take into consideration 
that Shikhmatov and the other writers of the time projected Pozharskii’s final 
apotheosis onto the fate of Napoleon. 
General Bonaparte had been able to put an end to the chaos of revolu-
tion, pacify civil tensions and raise France to an unprecedented pinnacle of 
power. In this context the imperial crown could be seen as a reward for 
obvious and extraordinary services to the fatherland. However, it is precisely 
here that an abyss of moral bankruptcy lurks. It was no accident that 
Napoleon’s coronation preceded the execution of the Duke of Enghien 
that shocked Russian society (see Dubrovin 1895, № 2, 204–208). In 
contrast, it is precisely Pozharskii’s decision to refuse supreme power, 
passing the throne on to its legitimate owner, that comprises his triumph:
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Велик, велик ты незабвенно
Кровавых множеством побед! 
Но сей победою бескровной 
Ты всех героев победил. … 
Вещайте, славные народы! 
Сыны всех лет, всех стран, всех вер:
Блеснул ли где в прошедши годы 
Подобной доблести пример? 
 Ему совместника в вас нет; 
Един Пожарский во вселенной!  
   (Shirinskii-Shikhmatov 1971, 383)
(Great [man], you are unforgettably great / For your many bloody victories! 
// But with this bloodless victory / You [Pozharskii] have conquered all 
other heroes. … // Be it known, glorious peoples! / Sons of all times, coun-
tries, faiths: / Has there shone anywhere in past years / Any such example of 
valor?… / You have no equal for him; / There is only one Pozharskii in the 
universe!)
Golikov’s story of Mikhail Romanov’s election speaks of the earlier “disagree-
ment and disturbance in thought that was like fierce ocean waves during storm 
winds” (Golikov II, 343). Only after the name of the future tsar is mentioned 
by “the voice of God” does the disquiet turn into general consensus. In 
contrast, Shikhmatov compares the voice of the people inviting Pozharskii to 
rule to “the sound of calm waters.” This is Rousseau’s general will (volonté 
générale) that was so dear to writers of national-conservative orientation. 
Only this time the general will, despite Rousseau’s assertions (Rousseau 1969, 
170–171), was in error, for it did not rely on divine blessing and national tradi-
tion. “The first among the worthy” may not inherit the throne. 
The election of Mikhail Romanov was also weighted with such providen-
tialist significance because it was precisely this inheritance that would— 
according to authors of Shishkov’s circle—ultimately guarantee Alexander’s 
victory over Napoleon, despite his human weaknesses and dangerous 
mistakes. “And the one who stole the throne will fall to dust before the tsar”—
with this line spoken by Pozharskii, Kriukovskii’s tragedy came to a close 
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(1964, 284). The play’s premiere was performed with thunderous success 
in Petersburg on May 22, 1807 (see Zhikharev 1955, 543–546). Ten days 
were left before the defeat at Friedland and a month until the Peace of Tilsit.
 6 
The second war with Napoleon of 1806–1807 strongly energized the national- 
conservative opposition. Its ideologues sensed that the national mobilization 
created favorable possibilities for going on the political attack. It was just at 
this time that regular literary readings began at Shishkov’s and Derzhavin’s; 
these meetings would a few years later develop into the “Colloquy of Lovers 
of the Russian Word” (Al’tshuller 1984, 48–9). The works written during 
these months by writers of the circle presented an entire range of ideological 
metaphors from which to build a new mythology of the origins of Russian 
statehood, to find historical analogies for current events, and to rearrange the 
figures in the national pantheon. By 1807 the contours of the new state 
ideology were basically defined. Evidently, even the emperor himself was 
thinking over the prospects for allying with his former intellectual foes. 
In Derzhavin’s memoirs it says that, “in 1806 and at the beginning of 1807, 
at the time when the French went into Prussia,” he wrote to the emperor
two notes about measures to subdue the impudence of the French and to 
defend Russia from an attack by Bonaparte,… about which he9 spoke to 
Him in person, asking permission to compose a project for which he had 
already collected his thoughts and sketched out a plan; it only needed some 
corrections from the War College and other places concerning the troops’ 
dress, the fortresses, weapons and similar things. The Sovereign accepted 
this proposal with favor, wanted to summon him to meet, but, having gone 
in March to the army near Friedland and then returning from there, he 
changed his former gracious behavior and no longer greeted him and didn’t 
speak to him. (Derzhavin VI, 828)
We should not doubt that it was not respect for the aging poet’s gifts as a 
commander that caused Alexander to demonstrate his previous favor to 
Derzhavin, whom three years earlier he had scandalously fired from service. 
9 In his memoirs, Derzhavin often referred to himself in the third person.
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However, the development of events brought Derzhavin, Shishkov and 
their adherents bitter disillusionment. As was stated in the Political Journal, “In 
the year 1807 from the Sarmatian land, irrigated with floods of blood, sprouted 
an olive tree of friendship which, quickly rising, embraced France and Russia 
with its branches” (Istoricheskaia kartina 1808, 83). Instead of the purging of 
foreign scum and a battle to the death, there followed the Tilsit peace, Sper-
anskii’s rise, and a new round of reformist activism. Nonetheless, the ideological 
elaborations that did not suit the state during these years were again called into 
action in 1812 when, on the threshold of the approaching war, Shishkov was 
appointed State Secretary and Rostopchin Moscow’s governor-general. 
 1 
Shishkov and his supporters’ new summons to power was preceded by the sensational dismissal of M. M. Speranskii. On March 17, 1812, 
Alexander I had sent for his state secretary and, after a highly emotional 
audience that lasted many hours, accompanied by dramatic effects and His 
Majesty’s tears, he relieved him of all of his duties. That evening Speranskii 
was sent under guard to Nizhnii Novgorod. Russian history is rich in 
instances of the sudden fall of yesterday’s all-powerful favorites; neverthe-
less the disgrace of the emperor’s closest advisor and “right hand” produced 
a deafening impression on contemporaries. F. F. Vigel’ wrote in his memoirs 
that “the news of his [Speranskii’s] exile still remains a puzzle for us and 
even posterity probably will not figure it out. In Russian legend it will 
remain like the history of the Iron Mask in France” (Vigel’ IV, 34). Sper-
anskii’s first biographer M. A. Korf, who knew him personally during the 
last years of his life, agreed with this assessment (Korf II, 27).
There are not many documents at our disposal that would allow us to 
judge what happened behind the closed doors of the emperor’s study. They 
consist of the following: Speranskii’s letters to Alexander justifying himself, the 
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story he told F. P. Lubianovskii, which the latter passed on in his Memoirs 
(Lubianovskii 1872, 227–229), and several fragmentary and contradictory 
statements by the emperor (for the most complete collection of the documen-
tary evidence, see Shil’der III, 31–52, 366–371, 487–532; see also Korf 1902; 
Bychkov 202–203; for an almost exhaustive bibliography of the question, see 
Raeff 1957, 202–203). The extremely detailed Memoirs of Ia. I. Sanglen 
(Sanglen 1883), the head of the secret department of the Ministry of Police and 
an active participant in the unfolding intrigue against Speranskii, are unreliable, 
and for all of their unique value must be used with caution. 
These memoirs were written more than thirty years after the fact, as well 
as after the death of Speranskii, who had ended his life a respected official. At 
first Sanglen refused to share his notes with Speranskii’s biographer Korf, 
pleading his obligations to Alexander, from which only the reigning emperor 
could free him. Korf, intrigued, attempted to procure the necessary permis-
sion from the emperor, but Nicholas I, who had an extreme antipathy toward 
Sanglen, wouldn’t hear of it. Nevertheless, Sanglen, apparently wanting to 
justify himself, flooded Korf with his papers. 
Figure 15 Portrait of 
Count M. M. Speranskii; 
gravure from the original 
by I. A. Ivanov.
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Understandably, Sanglen’s constant attempts to separate himself from 
those who took part in the intrigue and to demonstrate his extraordinary perspi-
cacity and present himself as a “knight without fear and beyond reproach” do 
not deserve the slightest trust. Such efforts boldly contradict both his imme-
diate superiors and eminent courtiers and even the emperor himself. However, 
his bare account of the charges that Speranskii’s enemies brought against him 
augments other known sources and does not contradict them in any way. The 
well-informed Nikolai Grech writes of secret conversations between Alexander 
and Sanglen (Grech 1930, 512), and in his diaries L. I. Golenishchev-Kutuzov 
asserted that after the state secretary’s exile Sanglen told him that “Speranskii’s 
crime is treason.” He further noted that Sanglen was “in some kind of ecstatic 
rage” (Bychkov 1902, 18).
This “ecstatic rage” on the part of a humble bureaucrat who had been 
admitted to the highest circle of power amply explains his unusual ability to 
recall all of the details of what turned out to be the acme of his career. For 
this reason he was so eager to explain everything for posterity, presenting 
his own role in as attractive a light as possible. Of course, Alexander, who to 
put it mildly was not apt to excessive candor, was least likely to reveal his 
cherished thoughts to Sanglen. Most probably, he repeated the main charges 
that came in the denunciations he had received, testing them against 
Sanglen’s responses and formulating a version of events that was most favor-
able to himself. 
Of all the above-mentioned sources, Speranskii’s letter sent to the 
emperor from Perm on February 4, 1813, is the most significant. Known to 
Korf only in a corrupt and incomplete copy, the genuine text was found and 
published by N. K. Shil’der (III, 515–527). The letter is credible in at least in 
one respect. Trying to justify himself, Speranskii lists all possible accusations 
against himself in maximum detail, both those he heard from the emperor 
as well as those about which he could only guess. “I do not know with preci-
sion what was imputed to me in the secret denunciations,” he wrote. “From 
the words which Your Highness was pleased to tell me at our parting I can 
only conclude that there were three main points of accusation: 1) that I tried 
to disrupt the state through financial dealings; 2) to make the government 
hated by means of taxation; 3) my opinions about the government” (ibid., 
521–522). On the first two counts Speranskii noted that, while he was 
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running the country’s financial system, state income had more than doubled, 
and that raising taxes—unavoidable for a state burdened with a huge budget 
deficit and preparing for war—can never be a popular measure. These conclu-
sions not only seem indisputable but obvious; it is impossible to imagine that 
Alexander would not have known of them earlier. Consequently, these 
charges were a rhetorical cover for Alexander’s true motives. The emperor 
evidently did not make much effort to hide this from Speranskii, insofar as on 
parting he said to him that “in any other, less urgent situation, he would have 
taken a year or two to closely review and verify” the information he had 
received (ibid., 515).
Therefore, besides refutation of the stated charges, Speranskii also had to 
respond to others that might have remained unexpressed. The most threatening 
was the suspicion, widespread in society, and allegedly confirmed by his 
disgrace, that he was acting in the interests of France. Speranskii later wrote in a 
letter to Alexander:
This cruel prejudice concerning my ties with France, confirmed by the fact of 
my banishment, now comprises the main accusation, and, I may say, the single 
stain on my reputation, among the people. You alone, Gracious Sir, and your 
sense of justice, have it in your power to remove this. I make bold to say affir-
matively: in eternal truth before God you are obliged, Sir, to do this. … The 
finances, taxes, new laws—all public affairs for which I had the happiness to 
be your executor—will all be justified with time; but how can I justify myself 
when everything is hidden and must be kept secret? (ibid., 523)
The issue in these dramatic lines concerns the fact that for several years 
Speranskii’s responsibilities included carrying on a secret correspondence with 
Talleyrand which his agent in Paris, K. V. Nessel’rode, had managed to estab-
lish. This correspondence went on outside usual diplomatic channels, and 
neither Chancellor Rumiantsev nor the Russian ambassador to France 
A. B. Kurakin knew of its existence (Nikolai Mikhailovich I, 83). Speranskii’s 
real misstep in the service that he describes in this letter was connected to this 
relationship with Talleyrand. To wit, his wrongdoing was: the unsanctioned 
reading of materials perlustrated from foreign diplomatic correspondence (see 
Shil’der III, 53–68). However, this trifling overextension of his almost unlim-
ited authority as state secretary could not have been the reason for his firing, for 
at the time of their fatal audience Alexander knew nothing about it. Speranskii 
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himself sent Alexander the relevant documents, together with an accom- 
panying letter on the night after his fall. The emperor subsequently showed this 
admission to the Minister of Justice I. I. Dmitriev as evidence of Speranskii’s 
guilt, as “his impudence swelled to the point that he wanted to share in state 
secrets” (Dmitriev 1986, 346). Paradoxically, Speranskii’s behavior that was 
aimed at modifying the pro-France direction of official diplomacy could be 
seen by poorly-informed parties as an indication of his special sympathy for 
France. Still, Alexander, who had placed this responsibility on his state secre-
tary, could not help knowing the true nature of events. “My enemies may 
question my political rules,” Speranskii wrote in his letter from Perm, “and 
could have imagined that I had sympathy for the French system, but Your High-
ness could not have harbored any doubts” (Shil’der III, 524). 
Nine months earlier Speranskii had sent the emperor his first letter of 
self-justification from Nizhnii Novgorod. It was much shorter than the letter 
from Perm and does not contain an analysis of the charges against him. None-
theless, one may find a suggestion of what the disgraced favorite considered the 
reason for his fall. “The first and single source of everything” (ibid., 44) is 
named here as the plan for state reforms that he was preparing. In the letter 
from Perm he recalled that he had put together his plans for legal reform at the 
emperor’s request and in close cooperation with him. He also noted that they 
were approved by other statesmen and were only aimed at perfecting the system 
of government administration; in no way did they limit the prerogatives of 
monarchial power (on Speranskii’s political ideas of this period, see Dovnar-
Zapol’skii 1905; Raeff 1957; Predtechenskii 1957; Kaliagin 1973; Morozov 
1999, etc.). 
According to Sanglen’s testimony, Alexander told him of his displeasure 
with Speranskii’s reformist ideas and on the very day of the final audience had 
even declared to him that Speranskii “was trying to undermine autocracy” 
(Sanglen 1883, № 2, 178; cf. Shil’der III, 8). However, even if we take this testi-
mony on faith, this kind of formulation was most likely an excuse for firing the 
state secretary, rather than the emperor’s sincere opinion. If in conversations 
with Sanglen, Dmitriev and the rector of Derpt University, G.-F. Parrot, 
Alexander mentioned treason, with people who were closer to him—A. N. 
Golitsyn, N. N. Novosil’tsev, and K. V. Nessel’rode—he made it known that he 
did not believe in Speranskii’s guilt. In his characteristic style he said completely 
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different things to different people. In particular, he mentioned to Novosil’tsev 
that Speranskii was not a traitor and was only guilty before him personally, 
“having paid for my trust with the blackest, most horrible ingratitude” (Shil’der 
III, 493; Nikolai Mikhailovich I, 105). In N. K. Shil’der’s opinion, it was 
precisely unguarded skeptical statements about the emperor that were the real 
reason for the state secretary’s downfall, and everything that happened on 
March 17, 1812, was “the settling of personal accounts by an insulted, vengeful 
heart” (ibid., 50).
M. P. Pogodin was of a similar opinion, noting that the disgraced favorite 
was never fully rehabilitated. The emperor did not show Speranskii the same 
good graces as before. For many years Alexander kept him far from Petersburg 
on various pretexts, and when they did meet, they avoided talk of the past 
(Pogodin 1871, 1146–1149). However, knowing Alexander’s vengefulness and 
his penchant for melodramatic effects, it is difficult to doubt that either he 
would never have forgiven Speranskii his disdainful words or that he would 
have arranged a ritual of forgiveness in a way he saw fit. On the other hand, it is 
always unpleasant to look someone in the eyes whom you have cruelly and 
unjustly harmed. One can say without irony that the fact that Speranskii was 
nevertheless returned to state service, and did not end his days in exile, is to the 
emperor’s great credit. 
Practically all references to Speranskii’s critical statements about the 
emperor ultimately lead back to the denunciations of him. These often contained 
very improbable information (see Shil’der III, 35). We will cite one example. 
Speranskii’s famous alleged evaluation of Alexander—“Everything that he does, 
he does half way. … He is too weak to rule and too strong to be ruled”—we 
know through three connecting links. Sanglen recorded in his memoirs that the 
statement came from the emperor, who had heard it from the Minister of Police 
Balashov, who had been assigned to watch over the state secretary. From the 
four people who might have made the statement, Speranskii seems the least 
likely. According to Sanglen, when he had heard the emperor’s account of the 
episode he quickly expressed his doubts: “Speranskii is a clever man, so how 
would he have said this, and on first acquaintance with whom—with the 
Minister of Police, and to be so frank with him? Moreover, this phrase was said 
before about Louis XV—it is a repetition” (Sanglen 1883, № 1, 23–24). Even if 
Alexander had really been so open with this middle-rank official, it seems 
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almost impossible to imagine that Sanglen would have allowed himself to 
contradict the emperor. More likely, he assigned himself this response that had 
just begged to be made only in retrospect. In any case his reaction is hard to 
gainsay. Speranskii’s career had begun at the very bottom and before serving at 
court he had had to spend time in close association with several important offi-
cials. The milieu in which he had to make his way did not dispose one to 
ingenuousness. Moreover, Speranskii knew that he was surrounded by a solid 
wall of malevolence and denunciations, and indeed because of this he had 
applied for retirement several months earlier, which Alexander did not accept. 
In such circumstances it would have been hard to imagine such suicidal and 
senseless openness from him.1
In the Perm letter Speranskii tried to explain to the emperor the source of 
the rumors about his “personal opinions.” “How, they will ask, did the same 
message come from various people? Because these various people were in fact 
one body, and the soul belonging to this body was the same that seemed to everyone 
and still seems an outsider” (Shil’der III, 523). As Shil’der notes, next to this 
passage “in the original on the side is written in pencil, apparently in Emperor 
Alexander’s hand, ‘NB’” (ibid.). In the opinion of M. A. Korf, the person 
referred to is the emperor’s sister, Grand Princess Ekaterina Pavlovna (Korf 
1902, 475). The validity of this guess is supported by the fact that Speranskii, as 
mentioned, considered the main reason for his fall the plan for state reforms, 
and a French translation of it, by the emperor’s order, had been given to 
Ekaterina Pavlovna’s husband, the prince of Oldenburg (Shil’der III, 44). Many 
contemporaries were also of this opinion. Rostopchin, who was closely 
connected to the grand princely couple, later recalled that people attributed 
Speranskii’s fall to “GPK i Pr.O” (Grand Princess Katerina and Prince 
Oldenburg) (Rostopchin 1992, 246).2
According to F. Gauenshil’d, who was close to Speranskii, the state secre-
tary attributed his fall primarily to Prince A. N. Golitsyn (Gauenshil’d 1902, 
261). However, he discussed this question with Speranskii ten years after the 
1 N. K. Shil’der cites a revolutionary statement also allegedly made by Speranskii (III, 35), 
taken from a denunciation made almost twenty years later to Nicholas I, that suggests total 
paranoia (see Shil’der 1898/1899). 
2 The initial “K” in the text instead of the more correct “E” is, of course, the result of a careless 
translation of the French “C” for “Catherine.” 
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fact, by which time the latter might have changed his opinion. Moreover, 
Speranskii would hardly have expressed his suspicions about a member of the 
royal family to anyone except the emperor himself. Furthermore, by that time 
the grand princess was no longer living.
Ekaterina Pavlovna may have played an instrumental role in the 
campaign to bring down the state secretary, but Speranskii did not know, or 
did not want to know, that directly behind the backs of the informers and 
provocateurs who surrounded him stood the emperor himself.3 It was 
Alexander who ordered the Minister of Police A. D. Balashov and Baron 
G. Armfel’dt to collect compromising information on Speranskii and simulta-
neously asked Balashov’s subordinate Sanglen to keep an eye on his boss. 
“We acted like telegraphs whose wires were in the emperor’s hands,” noted 
Sanglen. This statement can raise no doubts (Sanglen 1883, № 3, 394).
In light of the above we may make a careful suggestion concerning one of 
the murkiest details of the whole intrigue. As we know, Balashov and Armfel’dt 
made a proposal to Speranskii to form a triumvirate with them that would have 
taken the government administration into their hands. Speranskii unequivo-
cally refused, but did not report on this conversation to Alexander right away 
(Shil’der III, 529). Furthermore, he had some kind of meeting planned with 
Balashov which he missed; the note of apology that he sent the Minister of 
Police was later used against him. Traditionally, this unconsidered step has been 
explained by Speranskii’s fastidiousness (see, for example, Lubianovskii 1872, 
230; Shil’der III, 37–38 and passim). However, if we allow that Speranskii had 
understood the provocatory nature of this proposal, which would have been 
completely natural, but that he mistakenly assumed that the grand princess was 
behind it, then he might have thought that before entering into battle with such 
a powerful opponent he would need to prepare and collect more information 
first. For this reason he might not have wanted to break off all relations with 
Balashov immediately. 
3 V. A. Tomsinov describes the logic of this process somewhat differently: “The web of intrigue 
against Speranskii, huge in scope, took hold of Alexander and pulled him along to a denoue-
ment he had not planned. And he, instead of resisting, suddenly went along submissively, at 
first passively, trailing along the others, but then gradually found his legs and went off on his 
own, overtook the ones who had been dragging him along, and himself drew them forward 
to the place to which they had just recently been drawing him” (Tomsinov 1991, 196). 
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At times, in discussing the reasons for Speranskii’s disgrace, Alexander 
preferred to describe himself as a victim of circumstances. “Last night they took 
Speranskii from me,” he told Golitsyn on March 18, and then on the next day 
declared to Nessel’rode that “only current circumstances could have snatched 
this victim of public opinion away from me” (Shil’der III, 48). Of course, the 
emperor was not being completely sincere. The entire initiative for removing 
the state secretary belonged exclusively to him. Nevertheless, there was also a 
bit of truth in these complaints. 
Speranskii’s departure and Shishkov’s appointment in his place was one of 
those symbolic gestures for which Alexander had an extraordinary flair. These 
changes in personnel signaled the end of the Tilsit era, when the figure of the 
priest’s son Speranskii, brought to the foot of the throne after Alexander’s 
meeting with Napoleon in Erfurt, emblematized not only the pro-Bonapartist 
political course, but also Speranskii’s readiness to control the autocrat without 
reckoning with the public. Now, on the threshold of a mortal conflict, the 
emperor turned to face his subjects directly. According to one of Speranskii’s 
last accounts, Alexander said to him, “You have powerful enemies, public 
opinion demands your dismissal, and only on this basis do they agree to give us 
the money we need, and I have Napoleon and an inevitable war on my hands” 
(Bychkov 1902, 11). It isn’t clear if Speranskii was repeating words actually 
spoken at his audience with Alexander, or if this simply reflects his retrospec-
tive interpretation of the tsar’s motives. It is hard to say what money is being 
discussed, whether military subsidies were to come from England or future 
popular offerings. Nevertheless, the underlying political situation shows 
through almost transparently. “Was Alexander really convinced of the justice of 
the accusations and suspicions that he voiced to Speranskii or was this was only 
a mask to convince him, or perhaps, himself, only an excuse to rid himself at any 
cost, without evident due process, of a person to whom he himself had given 
too much influence?” asked Korf. “Most probably, the latter” (ibid., 10).
This explanation leaves one significant question unanswered. To demon-
strate a change in political policy the retirement and new appointment were 
sufficient; that is, such a decision did not require any additional explanations on 
Alexander’s part. Thus, the complex intrigue he set into motion and the wild 
accusations levelled against a close advisor seem excessive. Speranskii himself, 
without much success, tried to figure out why his enemies needed to annihilate 
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him and not merely remove him from office (Shil’der III, 529–532). At the 
same time several participants in the intrigue managed to penetrate the emper-
or’s motives, or, what is far less probable, to infect him with their own ideas. 
Sanglen cites a conversation that he allegedly had with Armfel’t on the eve of 
Speranskii’s dismissal. “‘You know,’ said Armfel’dt, ‘whether he is guilty or not, 
he has to be sacrificed; this is necessary to bind the people to the head of the 
state for the sake of the war which must be national.’” “This conversation,” 
comments Sanglen, “revealed the secret to me that Speranskii had been inexo-
rably marked for sacrifice, which under the pretext of betrayal and hatred would 
unite all estates and inspire everyone with patriotism in the current war” 
(Sanglen 1883, № 3, 377). 
This conversation so struck Sanglen that he considered it necessary to 
revisit it: “The Sovereign, forced by the pressure of political circumstances to 
fight a war against Napoleon on his own soil, wanted to find something which, 
awakening patriotism, would unite all estates around him. To achieve this it was 
necessary to fabricate a case of treason against the state and fatherland. The 
public, rightly or wrongly, had long ago proclaimed throughout Russia that 
[Speranskii] was a traitor anyway. Who would make a better choice [of victim] 
than he?” (ibid., 394). We repeat that the low reliability of Sanglen’s memoirs 
does not prove who precisely expressed this point of view. Still, the constella-
tion of ideas and images he describes so expressively—“sacrifice,” “treason,” 
“general hatred,” “unity of the people,” “patriotism,” “national war,” etc.—
unquestionably helped to color the entire course of events.
 2 
At the very end of the Perm letter, Speranskii names still another possible 
reason for his disgrace. He mentions it in passing, clearly feeling awkward that 
he had to touch on slander that was so obviously ridiculous to his addressee as 
well: “Is it really necessary, most gracious sir, for me to defend myself against 
those accusations that my enemies have spread about my morals and connec-
tions with Martinists, Illuminati, and so on? My papers clearly show that I never 
had any ties to them; in general I have tried to have my own opinions and to 
never believe anyone else blindly” (Shil’der III, 526). Speranskii had long 
known about such rumors but never took them seriously, and apparently did 
not believe that the emperor, well-informed about his activities, could have any 
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doubts on this score. Five years later, in a letter to his friend A. A. Stolypin, 
Speranskii, who by that time had become the governor of Penza, gave such 
rumors—involving completely different people this time—an unambiguous 
characterization: “How little enlightenment there is yet in Petersburg! From 
your letter I see that they still believe in Martinists and Illuminati there. Old 
wives’ tales with which one can only frighten children!” (Speranskii 1870, 
1152). 
However, the derisive tone of these responses hardly corresponded to the 
actual state of affairs. In reality the issue had to do with a well-developed 
complex of cultural and historical stereotypes that played a large role not only 
in the personal fate of the state secretary, but in the fates of Russia and Europe 
as well. The notion that a powerful secret conspiracy moves historical events 
has deep roots in human history. In the eighteenth century this explanatory 
practice acquired broad popularity (see Roberts 1972; Pipes 1997). Enlighten-
ment philosophers saw the cause of the victory of ignorance and prejudice as 
the age-old conspiracy of churchmen with the powers-that-be. Conservative 
thinkers, on the contrary, saw a similar conspiracy on the part of the Enlight-
eners themselves. Masonic lodges had spread widely in the first half of the 
eighteenth century, first in Britain and then across Europe, and they served as 
the material embodiment of evil behind-the-scenes intrigues (see, for example, 
Deforneau 1965; on the spread of Masonry, see Le Forestier 1970; Roberts 
1972, 17–145; Piatigorskii 1997, 37–232, etc.; on the origins of Masonry, see 
Stevenson 1988).
With its constantly advertised cult of secrecy, Masonry was an ideal object 
for the mythology of universal conspiracies.4 In comparably free and tolerant 
England, Masonic lodges recalled secret clubs and touted moral self-perfection 
and philanthropy as their programmatic goals, while in continental Europe 
they were more often seen as secret political societies or religious sects. On top 
of the three degrees adopted by English lodges, French and German Masonry 
constructed very elaborate systems of distinction that sharply complicated the 
ritual of initiation. They also enlarged the official Masonic genealogy by making 
connections with the medieval order of the Templars and with ancient esoteric 
4 On the constant and persistent propaganda of its own profound secrecy as one of the funda-
mental phenomenological paradoxes of Masonry, see Piatigorskii 1997, xiii-xiv, 76–77 and 
passim.
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cults. Occult and mystical movements asserted a strong influence on Masonry. 
The most important of these movements are Rosicrucianism, which focused 
on alchemical and para-medical research, and Martinism, a philosophical 
movement concerning “regeneration” or the reunion of the initiate’s soul with 
the spirit world to which it had earlier belonged (see Wyatt I-II; Le Forestier 
1970; Roberts 1972, 101–117; Macintosh 1992, etc.).5 On the other hand, the 
order of Illuminati, a secret society founded in 1776 in Bavaria by a professor 
at Ingolstadt University, Adam Weishaupt, also played a role in the develop-
ment of the lodges. The Illuminati promoted radical political reforms, partly of 
an egalitarian-socialist type (see Le Forestier 1974; for a representative collec-
tion of documents on the order’s history, see Dälmen 1977; cf. Roberts 1972, 
118–145). At first the order was not connected with Masonry, but at the start 
of the 1780s its leaders began to join Masonic lodges to make use of their popu-
larity to spread their ideas. The prohibition of the Illuminati by the Bavarian 
authorities in 1785 and the publication of the order’s secret documents that 
had fallen into the hands of the police created a real panic. This was true both 
among the Masons, who suddenly understood that they had been used as 
weapons in a dangerous game, and also among their traditional adversaries.
Weishaupt and the Illuminati came to serve as a symbolic marker of 
cosmic conspiracy in European public opinion. “The shadow of the disbanded 
order became a phantom that took on horrifying reality for weak minds,” wrote 
the historian of the order, René Le Forestier (1974, 613; cf. Pipes 1997, 
62–66). The diverse, conflicted and internally contradictory phenomenon that 
Masony represented in the late eighteenth century6 became for many outside 
observers a menacing monolith, in which political radicalism and occult inter-
ests seemed parts of a single plan. Moreover, elitism and hierarchy merged in 
5 The term “Martinism” apparently derived from the name of the originator of the doctrine of 
regeneration, Martinesa de Pasquale, but was often connected to the name of his follower, 
Louis-Claude de St. Martin, one of the most popular mystic authors of the eighteenth 
century (see, for example, Roberts 1972, 103–104). On the origins of Rosicrucianism and 
its relationship to early Masonry, see Yates 1999.
6 “On the one hand Masonry promoted the doctrine that all men are brothers, united by a 
common devotion to a ‘Great Architect of the Universe’ in defiance of religious dogmatism and 
sectarianism. On the other hand it taught that there is an ancient wisdom, handed down by 
initiates and embodied in secret rites and symbols and accessible only to those who have 
reached the appropriate grade,” wrote the British historian Christopher Macintosh (1992, 40). 
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their imagination into a deeply conspiratorial organization whose members 
acted via numerous and often uninitiated disciples. With the outbreak of the 
French Revolution, all of these mythologems acquired universal recognition. 
The lightning-fast destruction of this thousand-year-old monarchy and the 
quick spread of the revolutionary avalanche outside of France seemed to 
confirm the conspirators’ enormous power. Already by the start of the 1790s, a 
series of tracts and pamphlets appeared that tried to prove that everything that 
had happened was the handiwork of world-wide Masonry (see Roberts 1972, 
146–202). By the end of the century several studies appeared in which these 
ideas received full and systematic presentation: Memoirs Illustrating the History 
of Jacobinism by Abbé Barruel in French, John Robison’s Proofs of a Conspiracy 
Against All the Religions and Governments of Europe in English, and J. A. Starck’s 
The Triumph of Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century in German (see Barruel 
I-IV; Robison 1797; Stark 1803). Despite the somewhat later date of Stark’s 
book, it was mostly written at the same time as the two others, and a significant 
part of it had been printed in the journal Eudaimonia that was published in 
various German cities from 1795–1798 (see Droz 1961, 313–339).
For all of the common premises and goals of the authors, who to some 
extent worked together, in many ways they took different positions. Robison and 
Stark were themselves active Masons and strove to unmask the dangerous 
and menacing tendencies of some groups in order to defend others as 
well-intentioned and benign toward society. At the same time, the zealous Jesuit 
Barruel was a principled opponent of Masonry as such. He was ready to admit 
that many Masons did not pursue dangerous goals; but he explained this by 
arguing that many were ignorant of the criminal designs of the leaders of 
other, secret lodges. “I ask honest Masons once again not to think that they 
are being accused of wanting to carry out a similar revolution,” Barruel wrote. 
“When I will touch on that article of their laws, I will relate how many noble 
and virtuous souls did not suspect the true idea of Masonry—they saw in it 
only a philanthropic society and the kind of fraternity that all sensitive souls 
would want to make universal” (Barruel II, 263; cf. 257–259; on Barruel, see 
Roberts 1972, 193–202; Riquet 1973; Shaepper-Wimmer 1985). 
In Barruel’s opinion the French Revolution was the result of a triple 
conspiracy consisting of “sophists of atheism,” “sophists of rebellion,” and 
“sophists of anarchy.” The first wanted to overthrow the Church, the second, the 
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monarchy, while the third dreamed of destroying all social institutions. “The 
Jacobin conspiracy,” wrote Barruel, “was nothing other than an association, a 
coalition of the triple sect, a triple conspiracy which ripened long before the 
revolution, and to this day still ripens, to destroy the altar, throne, and all of 
society” (Barruel I, xvii). The conspiracy of “sophists of atheism” originated in 
the union of three figures: Voltaire, d’Alembert, and Frederick the Great; the 
conspiracy of “sophists of rebellion” was formulated in the lodges of Freema-
sons; and finally, the center of the “sophists of anarchy” was the order of 
Illuminati headed by Adam Weishaupt, who under Barruel’s pen took on the 
typical features of the devil’s representative on earth. The three conspiracies 
that Barruel defined may be correlated to the three parts of the triple formula 
“liberty, equality, fraternity.” A person who has been enlightened by the philo-
sophical teaching of the encyclopedists becomes free of religious dogmas with 
which church doctrines limited him; then adherents of the new philosophy join 
in unions whose goal is bringing down the monarchy and establishing equal 
rights; and the result of the destruction of the basis for any state system is the 
abolition of the state as such. A utopia of universal brotherhood then follows in 
its place. Barruel suggested that “the whole secret of Masonry consists in these 
phrases—equality and freedom; all people are equal; all people are brothers” 
(ibid., II, 261).
On the one hand, Barruel connected the category of brotherhood with the 
secret rituals of Masonic lodges, and on the other, with the Illuminati’s cosmo-
politanism, which did not recognize national boundaries. Here is how Barruel 
reconstituted the logic of the Illuminati: 
At the moment when people constituted nations they ceased recognizing each 
other as human beings. Nationalism or love of the folk took the place of general 
love. … And so it became a virtue to extend the borders of your empire at the 
cost of those who are not under your power. It became permissible to despise 
foreigners, to deceive and insult them. This virtue is called patriotism. … Lessen, 
eradicate this love for the fatherland and people will again learn to recognize 
and love one another as human beings. (Ibid., III, 172–173)
Exposing the Masons, Barruel latched on to both the Masons and Rosicru-
cians’ speculation regarding the ancient derivation of their rituals. In his 
opinion, “specialist initiates in Masonry itself have not erred when they 
named the Templars among their predecessors” (ibid., II, 387). He saw the 
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roots of Masonic symbols and organization in the order of Templars and in 
the heretical medieval sects of the Cathars and Albigensians; ultimately, he 
traced the Freemasons’ teaching to Mani, the founder of Manichaeism (see 
ibid., 387–412). Before the reader’s eyes arose a unified picture of the horrible 
activity of this anti-Christian, anti-state and anti-social sect that from 
prehistoric times had united all enemies of order, from adepts of the occult 
sciences to eighteenth-century enlighteners. In this construction, the 
French Revolution functioned as the culmination of this destruction and a 
step on the conspirators’ path to world domination.
Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism gained recognition all over 
Europe and was quickly translated into English and German, and subsequently 
into most other European languages. On the one hand, Barruel offered the 
most unified and detailed version of the theory of world-wide conspiracy, and 
on the other, one that was the simplest and most internally consistent. In the 
words of the French historian Daniel Mornet, “all of nineteenth-century 
anti-Masonic programs have Barruel’s book as their source” (Mornet 1967, 
362; cf. Roberts 1972). 
To the twenty-first century reader, Barruel’s picture of a world-wide 
conspiracy certainly seems familiar. But for it to be complete one important 
figure is still needed—the Jew. This addition was made almost immediately. In 
1806 Barruel received a letter from Florence from a certain Captain Simonini, 
whose identity neither the abbé nor later historians were able to establish. 
Expressing delight with Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism, Simonini 
complained that Barruel had not described the decisive role of the Jews in the 
entire conspiracy from Mani to the French Revolution (see Shaepper-Wimmer 
1985, 251–252, 402–406). The letter was published for the first time only in 
1878, but its contents nonetheless quickly became known to a wide public. 
Barruel himself found it easy to believe Simonini—in one of the notes to the 
German translation of his book he had already expressed similar views (see Pipes 
1997, 216). At first he even planned to publish a new work on this subject, but 
then rejected this idea. According to some accounts, he feared causing a mass 
extermination of Jews, and thus he limited himself to circulating suitable warn-
ings only among his correspondents, especially officials of law enforcement and 
the church. As the German historian Johannes Rogalla von Bieberstein indicated, 
this material made it to Alexander I through Joseph de Maistre, who believed it 
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(see Bieberstein 1976, 627). Indeed, Alexander referred to the Neapolitan 
Carbonari as “one of Satan’s synagogues” (Nikolai Mikhailovich I, 546). In the 
archive of N. K. Shil’der, who had access to the emperor’s papers, there is a copy 
of Simonini’s letter to Barruel, probably made by the historian himself (Pièce 
trouvée parmis les papiers de feu de P. Barruel jésuite, auteur d’une Mémoire 
pour server à l’histoire de jacobinisme, OR RNB, Kart. 20, № 10).
A conspiracy of such strength and menace demanded ample means with 
which to combat it. The immediate and obvious solution was to liquidate all 
secret societies that not only posed an implicit threat to traditional absolutist 
regimes but also challenged the basis of the fledgling national consciousness. 
The newly-forming national body was seen as an organic whole that did not 
permit ancillary developments that were hidden from public sight. In The Social 
Contract Rousseau had emphasized that in popular sovereignty private associa-
tions were inadmissible because they contradict “the general will” (Rousseau 
1969, 171).7 However, such a prohibition was insufficiently reliable, insofar as, 
on the one hand, it could not guarantee that conspiracies would not arise, and, 
on the other, it deprived defenders of the existing order of a powerful and effec-
tive weapon that the conspirators themselves could make use of. In Barruel’s 
opinion, the Illuminati “were delighted with the laws and practices of the 
Jesuits, who under a united leadership were able to rouse so many people scat-
tered around the world to act in the name of a single goal, and they tried to 
imitate their methods, furthering diametrically opposite views” (Barruel III, 11).8 
Both Barruel himself and Joseph de Maistre, who seconded him on this ques-
tion, were convinced that the expulsion of the Jesuit order from European 
countries had been orchestrated by the Masons as a way to free their hands. 
“One celebrated French revolutionary said that the revolution would have been 
impossible if that order had existed, and indeed, nothing could be more just,” 
de Maistre wrote to Victor Emmanuel in 1811 (Maistre XII, 73). 
Therefore, in the milieu that had created and supported the mythology of 
a satanic world-wide conspiracy, the idea constantly arose of a secret associa-
tion of the powers for good. If for some people the Jesuits could serve as an 
example of such a “righteous conspiracy,” others put forward the notion of “a 
7 On the basis of completely different material, Jean Starobinski demonstrated that the struggle 
for “transparency” was Rousseau’s fundamental life-long obsession (see Starobinski 1971).
8 According to Barruel, the words in italics are taken from Mirabeau’s The Prussian Monarchy.
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brotherhood of philosophers,” who armed themselves “in the name of the 
truth,” opposing the “anti-Christian fraternity,” as Barruel wrote to Starck (see 
Droz 1961; Shaepper-Wimmer 1985, 387). In the Masonic and Rosicrucian 
milieu they tried to oppose the Illuminati threat with a unification of true 
Christians, inspired by the desire for genuine heavenly enlightenment (Epstein 
1966, 84–111). Here dangerous aspects of Masonry were often connected with 
the Jesuit’s penetration into their lodges and orders (see Roberts 1972, 
138–141, 180, etc.).
Such an adoption of the enemy’s weapons, of course, was a two-edged 
sword. In the political battles of the nineteenth century, Barruel’s book served 
as not only a warning against conspiratorial groups but also as a textbook for 
conspiracy. The colossal destructive power with which Barruel credited the 
Illuminati was extraordinarily attractive for many revolutionary organizations 
of the new era and, in particular, increased the attractiveness of Masonic 
symbols and attributes. The mythology of world-wide conspiracy, conclusively 
formulated by the end of the eighteenth century, substantially contributed to 
the growth of a multitude of local conspiracies that marked the start of the nine-
teenth century (see Roberts 1972, 203–246; Pipes 1997, 76–80; on the 
Decembrists’ interest in Barruel, see Landa 1975, 251–306, 366; Rogov 1997, 
115–117). Prerevolutionary Europe entered the age of secret political societies 
head first. 
 3 
The history of the image of Masons in Russia, as Douglas Smith has shown, 
mostly followed the European model (Smith 1999, 136–175). However, in the 
Russian interpretation anti-Masonic mythology almost immediately merged 
with traditional ideas about secret conspiracies against Russia that were spun 
beyond its borders. Almost from the advent of Masonic lodges, a significant 
number of texts appeared in which the Mason was depicted, on the one hand, 
as Satan’s servant, and on the other, as an incorrigible Francophile who followed 
the prescriptions of hostile France. One of the poems that reflected these 
notions, the anonymous “Psalm Exposing the Freemasons,” was even included 
in Kurganov’s Pis’movnik (Letter-Writing Manual), thus testifying to the popu-
larity of this text and guaranteeing its broad dissemination (Kurganov 1769, 
325; cf. Martynov 1988, 439; Smith 1999, 140–142). 
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In the 1780s the most significant anti-Masonic polemics were the 
comedies and publicistic works by Catherine II. These depicted Masons as 
charlatans and deceivers who ensnared unsuspecting citizens in their intrigues 
(see Semeka 1902). But the ironic and scornful tone of the empress’s printed 
comments on the secret societies only functioned to mask her profound 
anxiety over them. According to the stories of Metropolitan Platon as recorded 
by F. P. Lubianskii, after her return to Moscow from Crimea in 1787, 
Catherine was apt to see “omens” of her funeral “at the instigation of the 
Martinists” everywhere: in the sand that was sprinkled on the streets, in the 
dark grey paint of the street light poles, and even in the body type of certain 
Muscovite clergymen. “They will bury me here,” she said to Platon, “your 
preacher must be a dark Martinist: look at him, skin and bones, all dried out” 
(Liubianovskii 1872, 187–188). At that moment Catherine was worried 
about connections between the Moscow Masons and Prussia, as well as their 
attempts to make contact with the heir to the throne, Pavel Petrovich (see 
Vernadskii 1999; Zapadov 1976, 46–48, etc.). The Masons, whom the empress 
did not distinguish from the Martinists, which she hated, again appeared 
simultaneously as sorcerers devoted to black magic and agents of foreign 
powers. In these years Catherine was moving from polemics and restrictions 
to unqualified repression. At approximately the same time there were wide-
spread rumors in Russian society that the Jacobins and Masons planned to 
poison the empress (Turgenev 1887, 88). Much later in Rostopchin’s “Notes 
on the Martinists” he wrote that the Martinists “drew lots for who should stab 
the empress and the lot fell to Lopukhin” (Rostopchin 1875, 77; cf. Smith 
1999, 166–167). For their part, the Masons did not dispute the reality of this 
conspiracy but instead tried to emphasize their own innocence, referring to 
some unknown Illuminati as the perpetrators (Barskov 1915, 200–203). 
The rebirth of Russian Masonry in the first years of Alexander’s reign inev-
itably stimulated the revival of traditional phobias. Characteristically, fear of the 
Masonic menace grew especially strong in 1806–1807, during the conflict with 
France. It was just at this time that Russian versions of the two most well-known 
books on the world-wide conspiracy came out: two simultaneous editions of 
Barruel and a paraphrase of Robison (see Barruel 1805 / 1809 I-XII; Barruel 
1806 / 1808 I-IV; Robison 1806). At that time the popular lodge “People of 
God” or “The New Israel” was closed and its founder, Tadeusz Grabianka, a 
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Polish count and follower of the radical Avignon system “of Masonry in a 
Catholic spirit” (Lubianovskii 1872, 214), was arrested and locked away in the 
fortress (see Longinov 1860; Pypin 1997, 323–332; Serkov 2000, 59–62). 
Several members of this lodge also suffered: A. F. Labzin’s journal “Messenger 
of Zion” was banned and F. P. Lubianovskii was almost exiled to Yakutsk for his 
translation of J. H. Jung-Stilling’s mystical book Longing for the Homeland (see 
Lubianovskii 1872, 214–216; cf. Bakunina 1967, 280, 311). 
Stilling himself, who corresponded with Russian Masons during these 
years, also cautioned them against “the great society … of the enemy of Our 
Lord and his kingdom … in which Voltaire was the first member.” The main 
role in this evil society was played by Weishaupt and the Illuminati, who had as 
their goal “a universal republic, the extermination of earthly rulers or enslaving 
them by the Illuminati, and the complete destruction of the Christian faith” 
(letter to I. V. Lopukhin of September 16/27, 1804, in Vinitskii 1998, 297–298; 
on the letter’s circulation in Masonic lodges, see ibid., 28). Of course, in distinc-
tion from Barruel, the Protestant Stilling did not see the Jesuits as the bulwark 
against the satanic criminal plotters but the activities of the Hernhutter sect. He 
believed that in apocalyptic times the Hernhutters were destined to acquire 
their promised land in “Asiatic Solima,” located in “Crimea, the Volga steppes 
and Astrakhan” and under the wing of the “Eagle,” that is, Alexander I. “Let us 
all pray together,” Stilling wrote, “ and may the Lord preserve this great and 
good Sovereign and those around him from Illuminism which is especially 
strong today” (ibid.). 
On the threshold of the coming war, the Committee for Preserving the 
General Safety was created on January 13, 1807. The first point of the secret 
“Regulations of the Committee” contained a very clear indication of the 
empire’s main threat: 
The perfidious government of France, trying to achieve its ruinous goal of 
world-wide destruction and disorganization, among other things, as is well 
known, patronizes the remnants of secret societies spread through all lands 
under the names Illuminati, Martinists, and other similar ones, and through 
this has secret collaborators in all European countries—not including 
those noxious people whom they openly send and support for this end—
who in a collateral way so to speak assist the French government, and by 
means of whom it succeeds brilliantly in its evil plans. (Shil’der II, 365; 
Ivanov 1997, 83–87). 
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The author of the “Regulations” and, probably, the initiator of the committee, 
was one of the “young friends” of the emperor, N. N. Novosil’tsev. On March 5 
of the same year, 1807, he wrote to Alexander, “Our chancelleries are full of 
‘Martinists,’ ‘Israelites’ [a reference to “The New Israel”], ‘Illuminati’ and scoun-
drels of all shades, and at home it teems with French and Jacobins of all nations” 
(Nikolai Mikhailovich 1999, 280).9 However, the attack on the Masons did not 
go very far at this time, and only those who were connected with Grabianka’s 
lodge were subject to persecution. The anti-French direction of Russian foreign 
policy did not last long, either. In June 1807, the Tilsit peace was signed. In the 
autumn of 1808 there followed the Erfurt meeting between Alexander and 
Napoleon, which firmly placed the Russian-French alliance at the center of the 
new political alignment in Europe. It was after his return from Erfurt that 
Speranskii became the emperor’s confidante and right-hand man. 
 4 
The circumstances of Speranskii’s rise turned him into a kind of symbol of the 
unpopular pro-French policy. Rumors of the unprecedented praise that 
Napoleon had bestowed on the new favorite, as well as his constant meetings 
with the French ambassador, Armand de Caulaincourt (see Tomsinov 1991, 
126, 188–189), did not work in his favor. When it became clear that it was 
Speranskii who was to be the soul and prime mover of the far-reaching and 
poorly-understood reforms, his image took on clear-cut and familiar contours 
in contemporaries’ eyes. In December 1809 Joseph de Maistre, referring to 
“well-informed people,” reported to his king that “in the emperor’s cabinet 
[Speranskii] fulfills … the orders of that widespread sect that is trying to 
destroy monarchies [expédter les Souverainetés]” (Maistre 1995, 132; 
Maistre XI, 385). De Maistre did not name the leaders of this “sect,” but there 
was no need for this. In all of the courts of Europe everyone would have 
understood perfectly well whom he had in mind. 
In 1812 Speranskii’s subordinate in the Commission to Compile a New 
Law Code G. A. Rozenkampf accused him of “treason to the state and Illumi-
nism” (Korf II, 31). At the same time a denunciation sent to Alexander and 
9 It is not impossible that Novosil’tsev was himself a Mason. In T. A. Bakunina’s dictionary of 
Russian Masons his name is listed with a question mark (Bakunina 1967, 373). 
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signed “Count Rostopchin and Muscovites”—but possibly coming from the 
old freethinker Fedor Karzhavin (ibid., 10)10—said that Speranskii, “under the 
guise of patriotism wanted to act against the person” of the emperor, “ to 
provoke all estates to anger and incite the people to pronounce a great and 
terrible demand.” The author of the letter also claimed to know “the place where 
Napoleon’s correspondence with the exposed participants in the conspiracy is 
kept” (Rostopchin 1905, 413). In ascribing his own fantasies to Rostopchin, 
whose views were well-known to the public, the author of the denunciation 
only partly sinned against the truth. By this time Rostopchin had already sent 
Alexander his “Note on Martinists” through Grand Princess Ekaterina 
Pavlovna, in which he listed those who, in his opinion, were active in secret 
societies. Furthermore, this number “are all more or less devoted to Speranskii, 
who while not belonging to any sect in his heart (and perhaps not even to any 
religion), makes use of their services for conducting business and keeps them 
10 People from whom copies of the denunciation had been confiscated told the commission 
about the authorship of Karzhavin, who had died in March of 1812. Of course, evidence 
obtained this way must be treated with extreme caution.
Figure 16  Portrait of  
F. V. Rostopchin. Gravure of 
T. Meyer after the original 
by Ernst Gebauer
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dependent on himself.” Behind the back of Speranskii, who was manipulating 
the Martinists, loomed an even more menacing figure. At the end of the memo-
randum, Rostopchin wrote:
I am sure that Napoleon, who is directing everything toward the achieve-
ment of his goals, patronizes him, and at some time he will find strong 
support in that society which is just as much worthy of scorn as it is 
dangerous. Then people will see, but too late, that their ideas are not 
chimeras, but reality; that they do not mean to be the butt of ridicule but to 
go down in history, and that this sect is nothing other than the hidden enemy 
of governments and states. (Rostopchin 1875, 80–81)
Rostopchin substantiated the connection between contemporary Martinists 
and Napoleon with the fact that the Martinists of Catherine’s era had acted “on 
the instructions of Bavarian Illuminati, whose letter to Novikov was appre-
hended in the post” (ibid., 76–77). This confiscated letter from the Illuminati to 
Novikov, it seemed, was echoed in Alexander’s words as recorded by Sanglen: “I 
think that it would not be difficult to take possession of the Illuminati’s corre-
spondence with their leader Weishaupt; Balashov says that Speranskii is the 
Illuminati’s regent (regent).” According to Sanglen, “the sovereign began 
laughing” when voicing this tirade; he then told the memoirist that Speranskii 
had his own lodge, and that “in Arnfel’dt’s opinion, it’s a lodge of Illuminati” 
(Sanglen 1883, № 1, 33). The specific rank in the order of Illuminati that the 
Minister of Police Balashov and the emperor attributed to Speranskii is worthy 
of attention. According to Barruel a regent is the highest, eighth degree for an 
Illuminant who is not yet initiated into the great mysteries. Above regents stand 
the Magi or People-kings, and above them the Areopagites, the supreme council 
of the order headed by Weishaupt (Barruel III, 213–288), who after the dispersal 
of the movement lived uninterruptedly in the city of Gotha on a modest pension 
and spent his time writing verbose treatises defending his earlier activities.11
11 It is worth citing the description of Weishaupt’s personality by the historian of Illuminism, 
René de Forestier: “Weishaupt was neither an evil genius nor a benefactor of mankind, but a 
common university dean. … He was a typical pedagogue of his time in his bookish knowl-
edge, his proud self-satisfaction, his doctrinaire and pedantic tone, authoritarian spirit, and 
his complete ignorance of real life. He saw people and society only through books and was 
convinced that a person who had read the most well-known works that had been written 
since antiquity would possess holistic understanding and be able to resolve all of the prob-
lems that confront the human race” (Le Forestier 1974, 555). 
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The traditional Polish component was also not forgotten. After Tilsit, 
Adam Czartoryski, the main agent of Polish influence at Alexander’s court, no 
longer played a substantive role in Russian politics and his mythological func-
tion was transferred to Speranskii. In the above-cited denunciation that was 
attributed to Karzhavin, it said that Speranskii got the emperor to agree to 
introduce taxes to support the Polish army (Rostopchin 1905, 413). The same 
rumors circulated even in circles closest to the main players in this historical 
drama. According to A. A. Loginov’s story, “A. S. Shishkov brought news to 
Count Pavel Aleksandrovich Stroganov’s house in the presence of Speranskii’s 
underlings A. N. Olenin and A. I. Turgenev. ‘He was tempted by a trifle,’ said 
Shishkov, stating as reliable fact that Speranskii had been bought off by 
Napoleon to betray Russia in return for the promise of the Polish crown” 
(Bychkov 1902, 32).
As noted in the last chapter, Shishkov was a main figure in the struggle 
against Czartoryski (see Al’tshuller 1984, 28), who belonged to one of the 
oldest Polish families and who might have received the crown in a restored 
Poland. On the other hand, Speranskii, the son of a provincial Orthodox 
clergyman, could in no way have been considered a possible candidate 
for the Polish throne. This did not deter Shishkov, who was totally caught up 
in the logic of the myth, nor, apparently, did it bother his interlocutors. 
Moreover, by his character Shishkov was least of all given to cynical slander. 
Unquestionably, he seriously believed these accusations. 
According to the testimony of a contemporary, these rumors eventually 
reached Speranskii himself. “In Perm they let it slip out that he had betrayed the 
fatherland not for money, but for the Polish crown. ‘Thank God,’ he said, 
crossing himself. They are starting to think better of me—after all, it is more 
excusable to be seduced by a crown!’” (Bychkov, “Prebyvanie” 1902, 239). 
Eighty years after these events, the historian P. I. Bartenev published a 
story he had heard from Count Stroganov, a story from the Polish Marshal 
(regional marshal of the nobility) Liubetskii about how Balashov had asked 
him for information on the state of public opinion in the Polish provinces. 
Liubetskii showed him a note that had already been prepared for Napoleon that 
was “allegedly signed ‘your faithful Speranskii.’ Having seen this note, Balashov 
did not conceal his satisfaction,” and several days later Speranskii was exiled to 
Nizhnii Novgorod. “Of course,” added Bartenev, “the note that Liubetskii 
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procured was counterfeit” (Bartenev 1892, 79). Needless to say, this whole 
narrative was completely absurd, starting with the fact that a note with this kind 
of content could not have existed. Still, one can recognize a living echo of the 
rumors that surrounded Speranskii’s disgrace.
Actually, money did figure in Speranskii’s crisis. In the denunciation 
attributed to Karzhavin, it said that Speranskii had been “drawn away from 
loyalty to the fatherland” by means of “gold and diamonds given him through 
the French ambassador” (Rostopchin 1905, 414). In the first weeks of exile 
when Speranskii was especially suffering from his lack of money, waiting in vain 
for the salary that was owed him, his close friend P. G. Masal’skii, who was 
acting in his name, wrote to him with vexation about the fantastic rumors of his 
unprecedented riches—“several millions held in an English bank,” “700,000 in 
silver, sent to Kiev for contracts,” dozens of homes, and so on (Speranskii 1862, 
17; cf. Tomsinov 1991, 187–188). The idea of “Kievan contracts” most likely 
derived from Balashov, and the emperor spoke with Sanglen about them (there 
the sum mentioned was 80,000; Sanglen 1883, № 1, 39–41). Massal’skii was 
especially disturbed by the participation in these conversations of people 
whom he had considered Speranskii’s well-wishers, in particular Count 
Kochubei, who knew the disgraced favorite well and had helped advance his 
career (Speranskii 1862, 14). 
In Derzhavin’s Memoirs (Zapiski) is an episode relating to an earlier 
period, but written down during the war years. The poet recalled his struggle 
at the start of Alexander’s reign to defend Russia’s interests against Polish and 
Jewish influence at court. The leader of the former was Czartoryski, of the 
latter—Speranskii, “who was completely devoted to the Jews (zhidy) through 
the well-known tax-farmer Perets” and who “was publicly suspected of avarice 
… in his connection to Perets” (Derzhavin VI, 801, 805). Czartoryski and 
Speranskii turned out to be parallel, and consequently interchangeable, repre-
sentatives of two dangerous nations that were hostile to Russia. 
Even such a seemingly irrelevant element of the myth as black magic came 
into play. Balashov told Sanglen that
having arrived at Speranskii’s the previous evening at seven o’clock he was 
gripped with horror. In the vestibule a tallow candle was burning dimly, and 
in the second large room as well, and from here he was led into his study 
where two wax candles were burning out and the fire in the fireplace was 
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going out. Upon entering the study he felt the floor under his feet shaking as 
if it were on springs, and on the shelves instead of books stood phials. 
Seeing Balashov, Speranskii “quickly closed” an ancient book that he had been 
reading (Sanglen 1883, № 1, 23–24).
The image of a traitor at the foot of the throne plotting unheard-of misfor-
tunes for the fatherland, the agent of dark forces, a sorcerer, a French spy in the 
pay of the Jews and counting on the Polish throne, took its final form. “Near 
him it seemed to me that all of the time I smelled sulfur and could see bluish 
flames of the underworld in his pale blue eyes,” wrote F. F. Vigel’ (II, 10). Of all 
the traditional components of the image of Masons and Illuminati, the state 
secretary, it seems, only lacked sex and alcohol addictions. In Rostopchin’s 
“Note on Martinists,” for example, I. V. Lopukhin is labeled “a drunkard given 
to debauchery and unnatural vices” (Rostopchin 1875, 80), but Speranskii 
escaped this kind of accusation. Vigel’, who hated him, wrote of the “immorality 
of his rules (although not of his behavior)” (Vigel’ II, 9). This was hardly due to 
the state secretary’s ascetic lifestyle. More likely, early nineteenth-century 
Russian society was insufficiently puritanical to consider these kinds of moral 
lapses significant attributes of so menacing a personage. 
 5 
The set of ideologems that clustered around Speranskii had been formed before 
his rise. The new favorite simply filled a functional niche that had developed 
after the members of the Secret Committee—especially Czartoryski—had 
departed the political scene. However, Speranskii came to play this role in a 
much more powerful and credible way than any of his predecessors. A signifi-
cant factor in the crystallization of these notions was the fact that the emperor 
who had raised the unknown son of a priest to the heights of power, as well as 
Speranskii himself, were both in thrall to the very same mythology. 
The striking lack of correspondence between Speranskii’s power and influ-
ence, on the one hand, and his official duties, on the other, was nothing new. 
Favorites always found themselves at the center of public attention, yet acted 
more or less off-stage. But in the Alexandrine epoch this familiar phenomenon 
of political culture took on rather unusual forms. Alexander’s “young friends” 
had formed a closed circle that was called upon to play the role of a kind of 
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shadow cabinet and to make fundamental decisions behind the backs of official 
office-holders. It was not without reason that the members of the Secret 
Committee jokingly called it the Committee of Public Salvation, thereby 
likening it to a Jacobin club (see Lotman and Uspenskii 1996, 502). In 1808–
1811 Speranskii fulfilled the function of the entire Secret Committee as far as 
internal affairs were concerned. In foreign policy he became one of the leading 
participants of an analogous, unofficial coterie that likewise substituted for 
state institutions. 
The advisor to the Russian ambassador in Paris Nessel’rode writes to the 
state secretary, bypassing Prince Kurakin [i.e., the official emissary]. R. A. 
Koshelev conducts a direct correspondence with the Russian ambassador in 
Vienna, Count Shtakel’berg and the Austrian chargé d’affairs [poverennyi] 
St. Julien, again, bypassing the chancellor [N. P. Rumiantsev], and Koshelev 
reports on it all directly to the emperor. A special procedure, but it is Emperor 
Alexander’s approach,
wrote Grand Prince Nikolai Mikhailovich, the publisher of many Russian 
diplomatic documents (Nikolai Mikhailovich I, 83; cf. Shil’der III, 53–54; 
Sirotkin 1966, 178). We know from Speranskii’s Perm letter that it was he who 
initiated this secret correspondence (Shil’der III, 524). It closely recalled—
down to using code names for governmental figures (see Nikolai Mikhailovich 
I, 101)—Louis XV’s “King’s Secret,” which as we have seen had a reputation in 
Russia as the center of an anti-Russian Masonic conspiracy. It is not clear to 
what extent Speranskii and Alexander consciously oriented themselves toward 
this very familiar model. It is of course impossible to exclude a simple coinci-
dence, but it is fully credible that they would have set up their anti-French 
conspiracy using means that had been tried and tested in Paris. It is worth 
noting that apart from Speranskii, the soul of Alexander’s “Imperial Secret” was 
the well-known Mason R. A. Koshelev.
Despite Rostopchin’s and Vigel’’s assertions on Speranskii’s atheism (see 
Rostopchin 1875, 80; Vigel’ II, 9), for his entire life he remained a profoundly 
religious person and a thinker of a clearly articulated mystical tendency (see 
Kadetov 1889; El’chaninov 1906, etc.). Already in 1804 he counted the experi-
enced mystic I. V. Lopukhin as a mentor, and in his turn he had familiarized his 
friend Archbishop Feofilakt (Rusanov) with mystical works by Eckartshausen, 
Fénelon, and Madame Guyon (see Lopukhin 1870; Speranskii, “Pis’mo” 1870; 
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Bychkov 1872; cf. Korf 1867, 444–454; Speranskii, “Pis’ma” 1870). Later, 
Speranskii willingly shared his exceptional knowledge in this area with the 
emperor. He wrote in the Perm letter,
When Your Highness desired to have information about this kind of subject 
and in particular about their mystical side, I was ready to dedicate all of the 
fruits of my own searchings and meditations to you with pleasure. These 
talks were the more pleasant for me, the more I could see that your feelings 
were commensurate with their subject. (Shil’der III, 526)
However, the strong interest in mysticism by no means meant necessary partic-
ipation in Masonic societies. We have no information concerning Speranskii’s 
affiliation with any lodges before 1811.12 In 1822, after the closing of all Masonic 
lodges in Russia, Speranskii wrote in a statement that he had taken no part in 
secret societies but that in 1810, as a member of a state committee for investi-
gating Masonic affairs, he was “taken into Fessler’s lodge with the government’s 
knowledge and visited it two times” (Bakunina 1967, 503; cf. Serkov 2000, 90). 
At the time of this testimony Speranskii had just returned to Petersburg after a 
year and a half of exile and prolonged service in the provinces. His position was 
very uncertain, and he understood that his every word, especially on such a 
sensitive question, could attract very close scrutiny. All aspects of his biography 
were well-known to the emperor and could easily be verified, so it is hard to 
imagine that in this situation he would have given any false testimony. It is a 
different matter that in many respects he changed the emphasis. 
In the memoirs of Baron F. Gauenshil’d, Speranskii’s close colleague of 
those years, it tells of the “plans to reform the clergy” that inspired the state 
secretary and of the “extremely strange” means by which he wanted to imple-
ment them: 
The proposal was to found a Masonic lodge with branches throughout the 
Russian Empire which the most capable religious figures of all conditions 
would be required to join. Religious brothers would have to write articles on 
well-known humanitarian questions, write sermons, etc., and these papers 
12 The evidence that Speranskii visited Grabianka’s lodge (see, e.g., Sokolovskaia 1915, 176, 
etc.) is only documented by Magnitskii’s denunciation (see Bakunina 1967, 509). In general, 
both pro- and anti-Masonic historians have striven, albeit for opposing reasons, to increase 
the number of celebrated and influential people who took part in lodges, often borrowing 
unreliable information from one another.
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would be taken to the main lodge so that the first master of the great lodge 
would review them (this honor was offered to me), according to whose 
recommendations the most worthy would receive promotions in the union 
of Masonic lodges and in the state. But since the many already existing 
lodges will by no means agree with this project and pursue completely 
different goals (actually they did not have any goals), Speranskii offered two 
ukases for the emperor’s signature. With one of them the emperor ordered 
the Minister of Popular Enlightenment Count Aleksei Razumovskii to 
temporarily close all lodges in the empire and to demand of the masters of 
the chair [copies of the texts of] their various rituals. This ukase was signed 
by the emperor and was quickly carried out; the second ordered heads of 
lodges to either accept new rituals for Masonic lodges compiled by Speranskii 
(at that time not completely worked out) or to close them. The emperor 
promised to sign this ukase, but this was not done. 
Although I was only twenty-five years old at that time, I felt that this project 
was totally impractical and that it would create an even more unfavorable 
impression because it too closely recalled that of Weishaupt. (Gauenshil’d 
1902, 253–254)
In these memoirs written many years after the fact, there are minor inac-
curacies. Thus the order of the Minister of Police given to the leaders of the 
lodges did not involve temporary closure but only a temporary halt in accepting 
new members (Pypin 1997, 335–336). However, on the whole Gauenshil’d 
correctly described the course of events. The well-known Masonic reformer I. 
Fessler was invited to Russia to work out the new unified ritual, and Speranskii 
obtained a position for him as professor of Hebrew and philosophy at the 
Alexander Nevskii Academy. This appointment was likely part of his plan to 
orient the future lodge towards clergymen. 
According to the testimony of Mason K. P. Rennenkampf, he translated 
the ritual from German to French for Speranskii’s initiation (Pypin 1900, 310). 
This circumstance, by the way, serves as indirect confirmation of the fact that 
until this time Speranskii had not taken part in Masonry. According to Masonic 
rules, a brother once accepted into any lodge did not require a second initiation. 
As A. I. Serkov indicates, “in June 1810 M. M. Speranskii first opened the 
session of his Great Lodge, and at the start of September the emperor ordered 
that the acts of all Masonic systems be collected and a committee be created to 
review the M. M. Speranskii-I. A. Fessler plan” (Serkov 2000, 74; cf. Pypin 
1900, 303–310; Sokolovskaia 1915, 174–179). 
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Later, however, the project came to a standstill. Alexander refused to give 
the lodge official status, and then he simply had it closed. Fessler was forced to 
retire and leave Petersburg (Gauenshil’d 1902, 255).
In trying to reform Masonry, Fessler “demanded that the brothers accept 
the ancient English system with some changes” (Pypin 1997, 243; on Fessler 
see Barton 1969; Gordin 1999, 173–180). He proposed simplifying the ritual 
and rejecting occult research and the higher ranks, which he thought should be 
transformed from practical gradations into an object of historical study. In the 
words of G. Florovskii, “he thought that the task of a true Mason was creating a 
new type of citizenship, reeducating citizens for the impending Age of Astraea” 
(Florovskii 1937, 140). Undoubtedly, it was these very ideas that attracted 
Speranskii. 
The strategic goals that Speranskii pursued in planning such a simultane-
ously secret and official lodge and their relation to his attempts to “transform 
the clergy” become comprehensible if we set them in the general context of his 
reform activities. It was just at this time that Speranskii began a reform of the 
government administration on a colossal scale (see Raeff 1957; Chibiriaev 
1989, etc.). Naturally, he could not fail to consider the people who would be 
destined to take up responsibilities in the reformed system. The aim of forming 
a cohort of educated government servitors of all ranks also dictated the ukase 
on exams that were to accompany elevation to the first noble rank. It also 
created the Lycée at Tsarskoe Selo, an elite educational institution where chil-
dren of the high nobility were to be prepared for state service. But Speranskii 
naturally saw the estate he came from himself as the main reserve for staffing 
the bureaucracy (on Speranskii’s activity in organizing religious education 
itself, see Chistovich 1894; on his educational projects as a whole, see Raeff 
1957, 57–63; Tomsinov 1991, 133–135). The issue concerned a consistent 
system for selecting the most talented representatives of the clergy, first of all, 
students from religious educational institutions. The selected persons were to 
be connected to one another by the bonds of mystical brotherhood, united by 
a single center and under government supervision. In the words of the cele-
brated German statesman G.-F. Stein, Speranskii “believed in the revival of the 
world by means of secret societies” (Pertz III, 57). Stein arrived in Petersburg 
later and knew this whole story second hand, but his discussion basically coin-
cides with what we know from other sources.
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To Gauenshil’d Speranskii’s project “too closely recalled that of Weishaupt.” 
However, both Speranskii and the memoirist himself took their understanding 
of the Iluminati’s activities primarily from Barruel and similar works of this kind. 
Moreover, as has been noted, Barruel asserted that the Illuminati “were delighted 
with the laws and practices of the Jesuits … and they tried to imitate their 
methods, furthering diametrically opposite views” (Barruel III, 11). The organiza-
tion that Speranskii conceived, with its official character and orientation towards 
the clergy, appeared as something midway between a traditional Masonic lodge 
and the order of Jesuits. Joseph de Maistre, who suspected Speranskii of fulfilling 
the commands of “the vast sect,” wrote that he had publicly “lauded the Jesuits 
and their system of education” (Maistre 1995, 132; Maistre XI, 385). In spite of 
his presumptions, Speranskii was probably completely sincere. He most likely 
valued the organizational practice and pedagogical system of the Jesuits and 
wanted to use elements of their experience for his own ends. Analogously, 
organizing a centralized Masonic lodge in Russia could, in his view, have averted 
the spread of Illuminist tendencies. It seems that Speranskii was not alone in this 
idea—later the diary of the painter B. L. Borovikovskii echoed rumors circu-
lating in Petersburg that “Prince Golitsyn and Filaret would like to create a new 
Christian social order (soslovie) in opposition to the Masons” (Nikolai 
Mikhailovich I, 202). 
Be that as it may, this project, like others of Speranskii’s reformist plans, 
reflected the position of Alexander, who saw a definite danger in Masonic 
lodges and wanted either to place them under unconditional state control or to 
counter their influence via other secret societies that would realize his own 
purposes. In 1810–1811 he corresponded with Koshelev on these issues and 
sent him the intercepted creed of the Italian Illuminati (ibid., II, 55). At that 
time the panicky emperor asked his sister Grand Princess Ekaterina Pavlovna 
not to write anything to him about the Martinists by regular post but to send 
her letters only via courier (Nikolai Mikhailovich 1910, 60). He told Sanglen 
that it was essential “that there be no secret lodges from the government” and 
ordered that all of the protocols of Masonic meetings be presented to him 
(Sanglen 1883, № 1, 33, 42). 
This was connected to the creation in 1810 of a committee to review 
Masonic documents, one of whose members was Speranskii (see Sokolovskaia 
1915, 178–179; Serkov 2000, 74–75). It seems that A. N. Pypin was the first to 
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draw attention to the fact that this initiative that had earlier been considered 
“the private affair of Speranskii, Rozenkampf and Fessler [actually] had official 
underpinning” (Pypin 1997, 341). He also published a letter to the emperor 
from an unknown party proposing “to establish Masonry in its original purity.” 
The total coincidence of the proposals contained in this letter with what 
Gauenshil’d wrote causes us to conclude that if it was not directly written by 
Speranskii, then it at least developed his ideas:
I considered it my duty to present to Y[our] H[ighness] several thoughts 
regarding those wise measures which Y[our] H[ighness] proposes to use for 
establishing Masonry. They seem to me to guarantee the success of Your 
intentions.
1. It should eliminate the increase of rotten habits, establishing healthy morals 
founded on the solid basis of religion.
2. It should prevent the introduction of any other society founded on 
harmful principles, and thus develop a kind of constant but unnoticeable 
surveillance . … 
After the organization of this order will be established and purified in this 
way, it will be necessary to form a center of unification in some place or other 
to which all of the institutions of this type that could be formed within the 
empire will come together. … Any other lodge in the empire not established 
by this mother-lodge must not be tolerated. (Ibid., 333–335)
However much Speranskii’s projects corresponded to the monarch’s own 
profound aspirations, they were doomed to fail. Gauenshil’d was correct when 
he called them “totally impractical” and also “strange and suspicious” 
(Gauenshil’d 1902, 254). Apart from the fact that a mystical fraternity of this 
type was the fruit of Abbé Barruel and his allies’ poetic fancy and could hardly 
have been put into practice, the attempt to organize it would have inevitably 
come up against opposition from diverse and very influential circles.
Perhaps the first to sound the alarm was Joseph de Maistre. All of Speranskii’s 
reform activity prompted a strong negative reaction from him. Already in 1809 
he had responded to rumors of the new favorite’s constitutional projects with 
his “Essay on the Principles that Produce Political Constitutions,” in which he 
sharply criticized the very idea of a written constitution as the basis for national 
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jurisprudence. However, it was precisely the state secretary’s educational 
projects that most deeply affected the Jesuits’ direct interests in Russia, insofar 
as in the first decade of the nineteenth century schools for the high Russian 
aristocracy were to a significant degree under their control (see Flinn 1970; 
Edwards 1977). Practically all of de Maistre’s publicistic activity in 1810–1811 
was directly leveled against Speranskii. In June and July of 1810 he wrote “Five 
Letters on National Education,” addressed to the newly appointed Minister of 
National Public Enlightenment Count A. G. Razumovskii; in March 1811, 
“Observations on the Curricular Plan Proposed for the Nevskii Seminary by 
Professor Fessler”; in September 1811, “Note on the Freedom of National 
Education” to the ober-prokuror of the Synod and intimate friend of Alexander, 
Prince Golitsyn. In December 1811, this cycle was finalized with “Four Frag-
ments on Russia” which were directly intended for the emperor. The fourth 
fragment, “On Illuminism,” was dedicated to various secret societies and 
mystical movements and the degree of danger each represented (Maistre VIII, 
157–360; cf. Triomphe 1968; Fateev 1940). 
No less harsh was the reaction of Orthodox hierarchs on whom had been 
foisted a Mason and defrocked Catholic monk who had become Lutheran in 
the capacity of overseer of future pastors. Even Speranskii’s friend Archbishop 
Feofilakt (Rusanov), who owed him his church career, came into conflict with 
him (Chistovich 1894, 29–62). And to top it all the Masons were indignant 
over the proposal that they conduct their lodges according to Fessler’s reformist 
plans or have to close them (see, e.g., Pypin 1997, 339–348). Furthermore, the 
state officials who were to put these plans into effect—in particular, Minister of 
Popular Enlightenment Razumovskii and Minister of Police Balaskov—were 
themselves Masons (see Bakunina 1967, 42, 435–436; Serkov 2000, 74). 
Even without leading to any practical results, this unusual initiative could 
not help but provoke dissatisfaction. In 1811, requesting that Alexander limit 
his expanding circle of activities, Speranskii enumerated the rumors that were 
going around about him in society: “In the course of one year I was in turn a 
Martinist, an advocate of the Masons, a defender of freedom, foe of slavery, 
and, finally, a confirmed Illuminatus. … I know that most of them [his 
accusers] do not themselves believe this nonsense, but, concealing their own 
obsessions under the guise of public utility, they try to adorn their personal 
animosity with the label of state animosity” (SbRIO XXI, 460). There was no 
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need for alternating criticisms—the accusations Speranskii lists formed a 
single and fully integral image. But it is hard to doubt that the unsuccessful 
initiative to create a centralized Masonic lodge greatly fostered notions of a 
“confirmed Illuminatus” in public opinion. Against the background of the 
growing anti-Illuminati hysteria and spy mania on the threshold of war, the 
myth of a conspirator near the throne took on a necessary wholeness. The state 
secretary’s first major defeat became the prelude to his coming downfall. 
 6 
Speranskii considered his fall the result of intrigues on the part of some “secret 
committee” whose mainspring was Grand Princess Ekaterina Pavlovna (Shil’der 
III, 259). This understanding was predicated on the very same fundamental 
ideologems of conspiracies and secret societies that guided his political oppo-
nents. At the same time the grand princess did not hide her enmity toward the 
state secretary (see Lubianovskii 1872, 261; Semevskii 1911/1912, 224–225). 
It was she who instigated the creation of the two main publicistic works that 
were directed against Speranskii—Rostopchin’s “Notes on the Martinists” and 
N. M. Karamzin’s “Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia”—and she who 
passed them on to Alexander (see Rostopchin 1876; cf. Semevskii 1911/1912, 
231; Pipes 1959, 69–75; Martin 1997, 93–103).13 Russian society of the time 
might possibly not know about one or another of the grand princess’s state-
ments, or, indeed, about the documents that the emperor received through her 
intermediacy (on the pre-publication history of Karamzin’s work see 
Tartakovskii 1997, 181–189). But it is incontrovertible that Ekaterina Pavlov-
na’s opposition to both the Tilsit agenda and to the reformist plans connected 
with Speranskii’s name was rather widely known and made her unusually 
popular (see Vries de Gunsburg 1941, 26–29). In their reports foreign diplo-
mats even recorded discussions about the possibility of her replacing Alexander 
on the throne with some frequency (see Martin 1997, 200).
13 Karamzin clearly went far beyond criticism of Speranskii’s proposed reforms, offering what 
was in essence one of the first holistic conceptions of Russian history. Nonetheless, the 
initial polemical direction of the “Memoir” that was revealed by its first investigators (see 
Korf I, 132–144, 161–165; Pypin 1900, 214–260) seems rather obvious. In our opinion, Iu. 
M. Lotman’s attempted revision of this perspective (1997) does not have sufficient basis. 
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Ekaterina Pavlovna’s betrothal to the prince of Oldenburg announced at 
the start of 1809 gave rise to great patriotic enthusiasm. During 1807–1808 
Napoleon had unofficially raised the question of seeking the grand princess’s 
hand in marriage. Her quickly organized betrothal to the prince was not only an 
expression of Ekaterina Pavlovna’s deep antipathy and that of her mother, the 
widowed Empress Maria Fedorovna, toward the ruler of France who was not 
born of the purple, but also in essence a first affront to the new ally (see Vries de 
Gunsburg 1941, 34–41). Already in late November 1808 de Maistre had 
reported on Ekaterina Pavlovna’s coming wedding to the prince of Oldenburg 
and expressed his satisfaction over it:
This marriage, unequal in some respects, is nevertheless sagacious and 
worthy of the grand princess who is just as sagacious as she is charming. 
Most of all, any princess in a family that enjoys Bonaparte’s horrible friend-
ship should hurry to marry even somewhat below her level, because who 
knows what kind of ideas will enter that singular head. … Nothing can 
compare with the goodness and grace of my lady the grand princess. If I were 
Figure 17 Portrait of 
Grand Princess Ekaterina 
Pavlovna (1810’s). 
Gravure by Andre Joseph 
Mecou after the original 
by Jean-Henri Benner.
219Chapter 6: Enemy of the People
an artist I would send you a depiction of her gaze and you would see how 
much virtue and intelligence nature bestowed on her. (Maistre XI, 163–164; 
Maistre 1995, 111)
In 1807 Derzhavin began to write an “Epistle to Grand Princess Ekaterina 
Pavlovna on the Patronage of the Native Word”14 that remained unfinished. The 
epistle was probably meant as an official greeting from the literary circle formed 
that year, which had begun to meet in the poet’s home and thereafter grew into 
the “Colloquy of Lovers of the Russian Word.” The poet called the young grand 
princess a “connoisseur (iskusnitsa) of the language of her people.” This exag-
gerated praise nevertheless reflected the young grand princess’s real interest in 
her native tongue, so rare in the court milieu and so important for Shishkov’s 
literary coterie. As Ekaterina Pavlovna’s letters to Karamzin demonstrate, she 
wrote in Russian only with great difficulty, but displayed a strong desire to 
master that skill (see Ekaterina Pavlovna 1888, 43–56). In the capacity of 
“colleague” and “interlocutor” of the great empress, who had borne the same 
name (soimennoi) as the addressee of the epistle, Derzhavin summoned 
Ekaterina Pavlovna to heed “the voice of your homeland’s lyre” and serve as 
“champion (predstatel’nitsa) … of the Russian word before the throne” 
(Derzhavin III, 527–528).
As Mark Al’tshuller has shown, Napoleon’s courtship of Ekaterina 
Pavlovna became the background for the allusions in Derzhavin’s tragedy 
“Eupraxia” (Evpraksiia), written in 1808–1809 (Al’tshuller 1984, 160–164). 
This tragedy, based on the “Tale of the Destruction of Riazan by Batu,” relates 
how the Tatar khan demands that Eupraxia, wife of Fedor, prince of Riazan, 
come to him in his camp. The battle that follows Fedor’s refusal ends with his 
death and Eupraxia’s suicide. In order to arouse the audience’s patriotic feelings, 
Derzhavin ended the tragedy with still one more battle in which Batu is defeated 
by troops from Moscow. The reason for this deviation from the source is 
revealed in the tragedy’s “Foreword”:
14 The dating was made by Ia. K. Grot, first publisher of the “Epistle,” who based it on a mention 
in a letter from Evgenii Bolkhovitinov to Derzhavin in that year (Derzhavin III, 527). 
However, insofar as the poet calls her “Grand Princess” (velikaia kniaginia and not kniazhna) 
in the title it is obvious that he also returned to the work after her wedding. 
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Insofar as they [our Russian forebears] did not betray either their faith or 
their fatherland, their misfortune gives us an image worthy of emulation, 
sowing in the souls of later generations the courage with which in subse-
quent years they destroyed Batu’s kingdom. … But if our forebears had 
betrayed the faith and if their love for the fatherland and loyalty to their 
sovereigns had grown cold, then Russia would long ago have ceased to be 
Russia. We conclude with Solomon’s saying: There is nothing new under the 
sun. (Derzhavin IV, 298)
The final phrase unequivocally ties the historical episode depicted by the poet 
to contemporary events. The marriage of Ekaterina Pavlovna to the prince of 
Oldenburg prompted a burst of jubilation from Derzhavin, and he sang of their 
wedding in the ecstatic poem “Hebe” in which he wrote:
О изящна добродетель, 
О Великий образ жен, 
Кто, быть могши сам владетель,
Ho став волей унижен, 
Явил выше царской власти
Дух отечеству служить. … 
Сим одним Екатерина, 
Именем своим одним 
Ты повергла исполина 
Росса ко стопам твоим. (Ibid., III, 2–3)
(Oh refined virtue, / Oh Great image of women, / Which, able to be sover-
eign itself, / Was voluntarily humbled / And showed that the spirit of serving 
the fatherland / Was higher than tsarist power. … / By this alone, Ekaterina, 
/ By your name alone / You brought the giant, / Russia, to your feet.)
The issue in these deliberately vague lines concerns the grand princess’s oppor-
tunity to become the spouse of the mightiest of earthly monarchs, whom the 
new bride, in Derzhavin’s view, had rejected in favor of patriotic duty. The next 
year the poet dedicated the poem “Procession of the Russian Amphitrite Along 
the Volkhov” to the same couple, and in it he again connected his hopes for 
Russian letters to the grand princess.
Derzhavin was not alone in setting his hopes on Ekaterina Pavlovna. In 
the public consciousness of those years, the personality of the grand prin-
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cess was subjected to the very same process of intensive mythologi- 
zation as the figure of the state secretary, albeit in reverse. The beautiful and 
decisive sister of the sovereign who symbolically bore the name of her 
great-grandmother and who was selflessly fighting for Russia’s interests was 
set against that of the dangerous intriguer and conspirator who, in his posi-
tion near the throne, was trying to carry out the orders of the country’s most 
malicious enemy.
Many tragedies written in 1808–1809 reproduce the very same collision. 
The state is faced with an immeasurably stronger enemy whose arrogant lord 
proposes a shameful peace. In such a situation and in view of the obvious 
inequality of forces, the negative characters propose to accept humiliation, 
while the noble heroes demand to take the field and, against all odds, finally 
triumph. Besides the already mentioned “Eupraxia,” this scheme repeats in 
“Mikhail, Prince of Chernigov” by S. N. Glinka (1808); L. N. Nevakhovich’s 
“The Souliotes, or Spartans of the Eighteenth Century” (1809); A. A. 
Shakhovskoi’s “Deborah” (1809); and a series of other plays. In earlier plays by 
Derzhavin and Glinka the main villain was Batu, and the Russian princes who 
at first are ready to shamefully capitulate finally see the way to repentance and 
redemption. In contrast, in Nevakhovich’s and Shakhovskoi’s plays, written 
after Speranskii’s elevation, the enemy leader is moved off stage and first place 
is taken by the figure of a traitor who craves destroying the motherland out of 
vengeful ambition. 
Both Heber (Khaber) in “Deborah” and Palaska in “The Souliotes” turn 
out not only to be fainthearted tools of the enemy’s will but also central movers 
in ominous intrigues undertaken out of hatred for their native land and its tsars, 
and who have personal power as their goal. When Heber exclaims:
Что можем сделать мы? 
Врагов несметна сила 
Подавит смертью нас и истребит вконец, - 
(What can we do? / The enemies’ endless power / Will crush and finally 
exterminate us,)
- he is moved not by error and not even by cowardice but by a secret pact with 
the enemy. Even without knowledge of his treason, Deborah answers him:
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Что можем сделать мы, великий мой отец
To миру доказал. Иль силою единой 
Сисар мог завладеть обширной Палестиной? 
Иль воины его храбрей израильтян? 
Нет, не оружие, а лесть, раздор, обман, 
Служащие его намереньям жестоким, 
Израиль, поразя унынием глубоким, 
Сисару предали… 
(What can we do? My great father / Showed the world what. Or was it by 
force alone / [That] Sisera [Sisar] was able to take charge of vast Palestine? / 
Or are his [the enemy’s] troops braver than the Israelites? / No, it is not 
weapons but flattery, discord, deception / Serving his cruel intentions, / 
That betrayed Israel, struck by profound dejection, / to Sisera. … )
By twist of fate both traitors turn out to be royal advisers. “Your friendship will 
help me bear the heavy burden of rule,” the young tsar of Israel Lavidon tells 
Heber (ibid., 464). Both traitors also enter into secret negotiations with agents 
of the monstrous enemy. Naturally, both Heber and Palaska abhor the people 
and traditions of their native land in equal measure. “The Souliotes are used to 
go into some kind of incomprehensible ecstasy from the word fatherland. Let 
me call this but the fruit of prejudices”—Palaska thus paraphrases Barruel’s 
description of the Illuminati’s views. “… In the enlightened countries of Europe 
even people who triumphantly declare that they find no sense in the word 
fatherland and call themselves citizens of the whole world are tolerated. Tell me, 
what will the Souliotes lose if Ali Pasha will rule them?” (Nevakhovich 1809, 
56). It is precisely the converted Jew Nevakhovich who is disposed to explain 
Palaska’s treason by his alien ethnicity. “Souliote blood did not flow in this 
monster—his father was a foreigner,” Amaseka, the wife of the Souliote leader, 
tells the people (ibid., 93). 
In both plays the decisive role in the victory over the terrible enemy is 
played by a woman who not only inspires courage in her brave but doubting 
spouse, but also appears herself on the field of battle at the critical moment. It 
is hard not to see in the elevation of Deborah and Amaseka into the limelight 
a reflection of the providential role that the writers of this circle assigned to 
Ekaterina Pavlovna. Similarly, the prototypical basis for both villains is rather 
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obvious. But it would still be premature to assert that the authors of these 
plays are directly trying to charge the new favorite with treason. The time for 
such accusations was still ahead. The heart of the matter lies elsewhere. 
The tragedies of 1808–1809 became one of the main manifestations of the 
ideologem of conspiracy as applied to the concrete political circumstances and 
statesmen of the day. At the same time, the metaphorical correlations in social 
consciousness not only reflected historical collisions in their own peculiar ways 
but also foreshadowed, and, to some extent, even created them. Thus the image 
of women-warriors, heirs to Catherine the Great, most likely stimulated the 
feverish activity that the grand princess displayed in 1812 when forming a 
people’s militia. “The sovereign still knows nothing, but … the idea of creating 
special regiments belongs to the count [Rostopchin] and to me,” Ekaterina 
Pavlovna wrote to V. P. Obolenskii at the start of the war, “and it came into being 
because Count Rostopchin was in Moscow” (Ekaterina Pavlovna 1888, 22). As 
events demonstrated, Rostopchin was not such a wholehearted supporter of 
this idea. “The great project is being created despite the count’s resistance,” we 
read in a letter of June 7 to the same addressee. “… Not two weeks will pass 
before Moscow shows its city head that he does not know her. Let this all be 
between us. I am happy that a good enterprise is being carried out, and it doesn’t 
matter by whom” (ibid., 24). 
Speranskii also felt the pressure of his mythological role. In his letter of 
self-justification, declaring that he had no relationship to secret societies or 
menacing intrigues, Speranskii exclaimed, “Most Merciful Sovereign! In the 
unseen presence of God the Seer of Hearts, I make so bold as to ask: is this how 
a gloomy power seeker who hates his sovereign and desires that be become 
hateful to others behaves, gives advice, acts and speaks?” (Shil’der III, 526). 
In the tragedies, the villains are preordained for suicide by the canons of 
the genre. “I accept the damnation of the people from all sides,” declares Heber 
and stabs himself (Shakhovskoi 1964, 511); then an abyss opens up under him 
and he tumbles into hell. In Nevakhovich Palaska throws himself down a prec-
ipice. The land will not accept a traitor, and he must literally disappear from the 
face of the earth before the triumphant people can unite to celebrate victory. In 
was in this key that the majority of contemporaries perceived Speranskii’s 
expulsion.
V. I. Bakunina described the event in eschatological terms: 
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God showed his mercy to us, again turned to us, and our enemies fell. Crime 
unheard of in Russia, treachery and betrayal, is unmasked. … One must only 
conclude that Speranskii meant to betray the fatherland and sovereign to our 
enemy. They say that at the same time he wanted to inflame rebellion in all 
regions of Russia, to give freedom to the peasants and to give them weapons 
to wipe out the gentry. A monster who did not rise due to his valor wanted 
to use the sovereign’s trust to destroy him. … On the 19th this became 
completely public and the news was met with delight; people visited each 
other to offer congratulations, gave thanks and glory to the Lord Savior and 
praise to the still unnamed son of the fatherland who uncovered the treason. 
… No one, however, was surprised by the treachery; they had long assumed 
it from all of the new regulations. (Bakunina 1885, 393)
There is much that is indicative in this statement. There was general agreement 
about the character of Speranskii’s crime, despite the fact that no official 
announcement had been made about it; conviction of his unprecedented secret 
power and ability “to inflame rebellion in all regions of Russia”; prayers of 
thanks; the sense that no such betrayal had ever occurred in Rus’; as well as the 
use of the word “monster” (izverg), which in Russian suggests something 
expelled from the national body. A. Ia. Bulgakov also called Speranskii a 
monster, recording in his diary that “a conspiracy has been uncovered in Peters-
burg whose goal was to turn Russia over to the French” (Bulgakov 1867, 
1367–1368). As Vigel’ later recalled, Speranskii’s disgrace “was celebrated as 
the first victory over the French” (Vigel’ IV, 33). The calculations of those who 
had instigated his downfall were fully validated. The expulsion of the hated 
“monster” gave rise to a remarkable wave of patriotic exaltation.
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Alexander’s complaints that his “right hand” had been taken away and was a 
“sacrifice” he had to make to public opinion should probably be understood in 
as literal a way as possible. It was not for nothing that Minin and Pozharskii’s 
militia, one of whose initiators had called for risking wives and children in the 
name of the country’s liberation, became the prototype for the war Russia was 
expecting. Thus Speranskii’s exile could be interpreted simultaneously as a 
sacrifice from two perspectives. On the one hand, the sovereign as the first son 
of the fatherland put what was most valuable to him—his plans for reform—
on the sacrificial altar, and on the other, the ritual slaughter of a traitor became 
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a symbolic pledge of national unity.15 It is not surprising that while the emperor 
himself considered the sacrifice that he had made almost excessive, the 
majority of his subjects thought it insufficient. 
According to Vigel’s memoirs, everyone “was surprised … and dissatis-
fied. How could they not execute this criminal, traitor to the state, betrayer, and 
be satisfied with sending him away from the capital and removing him from 
office?” (Vigel’ IV, 33). Varvara Bakunina noted in her diary that “in society all 
right-thinking people … were not happy with this leniency, calling it indul-
gence” (Bakunina 1885, 395). Even such a far from bloodthirsty person as 
Karamzin, according to a contemporary witness, said that “he thinks this should 
end with the scaffold” (Bychkov 1902, 34). Whatever the precise meaning of 
the words “should end” (doit finir)—the historian’s moral opinion or his 
prediction of the future—his judgment was extremely indicative. 
However, the scaffold seemed appropriate and the inevitable conclusion 
only for the small and very Europeanized elite. A bit lower on the social 
ladder, quite different measures were discussed. In his pamphlet on Speranskii, 
G. P. Ermolov, a distant relative of the famous general, wrote as if he were 
addressing the exile: “Scorned everywhere and by all estates who are ready to 
tear you to pieces and to rid the earth of even your dust—here is the reward for 
the lawlessness and evildoing you prepared for Russia, and an even greater 
punishment awaits you ahead as a monster who wanted to destroy everything 
pleasing to Him” (Ermolov 1895, 24). Formulas like “tear to pieces” and “rid 
the earth of your dust” were not mere rhetorical clichés. Speranskii was taken 
into his exile in Nizhnii Novgorod without going through Moscow, where 
rumors circulated that as soon as he and Magnitskii (who was being exiled with 
him) “will be brought into Moscow they will be torn apart by the people” 
(Bestuzhev-Riumin 1859, 72). Word came to Vigel’ that in Nizhnii Novgorod 
Speranskii “was almost murdered by an enraged rabble” (Vigel’ IV, 34). It is 
hard to say to what degree such aggressive intentions toward the fallen favorite 
were really widespread among the lower levels of society. We know that in exile 
Speranskii spent much time taking walks and in the company of the simple 
folk and apparently did not find this particularly dangerous (see Bychkov, 
15 We are not considering the archaic roots of such ritual sacrifice, although it is possible that 
such an approach to the given material might yield interesting results (see Girard 2000). 
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“Prebyvanie” 1902). All of the testimony that we have concerning the universal 
hatred for Speranskii comes from the noble milieu, which was in this way artic-
ulating its notions about the people and the forms in which national unity was 
(or should be) manifested. 
Later, in his “Memoir on 1812,” Rostopchin—with a bit of ingenuous 
cynicism—referred to the campaign against Speranskii as a “dark intrigue” and 
asserted that he “was one of the most astonished when … [he] learned of his 
exile” (Rostopchin 1992, 245–246). “Unfortunately,” he wrote, “… Speranskii 
was reputed a criminal, a betrayer of his tsar and fatherland, and people of a 
humble estate substituted his name for that of Mazepa, which is their epithet 
for a traitor” (ibid., 246). The very notions that Rostopchin had actively helped 
formulate and propagate he now attributed to the ignorance of “people of a 
humble estate.”
This maneuver was quite characteristic of Rostopchin. In the second half 
of August 1812, not long before the Battle of Borodino, he arrested more than 
forty French residents of Moscow (see Popov 1875, № 10, 132–133), put them 
on a wooden barge and in the presence of a huge crowd sent them downstream, 
which he accompanied with the following highly expressive farewell speech: 
French people! Russia gave you shelter but you did not cease thinking up 
evil against her. To avoid bloodshed, not to besmirch the pages of our 
history, and not to imitate the satanic frenzy of your revolutionaries, the 
government is forced to send you away. You will live on the banks of the 
Volga among peaceful people who are true to their oaths, who scorn you 
too much to do you harm. For some time you will quit Europe and go off 
into Asia. Cease being scoundrels [mauvais sujets] and become good 
people, and, whatever you were up to until now, turn from Frenchmen into 
good Russian citizens; be calm and humble or await even greater punish-
ment. (Ibid., 130–131)
In his memoirs, Rostopchin wrote that he did this “having received proof of 
the degree to which the people were agitated,… in order to calm them and 
to diminish their fury” (Rostopchin 1992, 290). However, even such a like-
minded admirer as Sergei Glinka asserted that there was no danger of mob 
law: “I lived with the people in the streets, on the squares, at the markets, 
everywhere in Moscow and in the environs, and I declare by the living God 
that no kind of furious hatred disturbed Russia’s sons” (Glinka 1836, 42; cf. 
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Popov 1875, № 10, 130–133). No matter which memoirist gauged the 
temper of the Muscovites more accurately, it is incontrovertible that 
Rostopchin was carrying out his own longstanding plan. We will recall 
that already in 1806 during recruitment for the people’s militia, he had 
demanded that Alexander exile all of the French from Moscow without 
exception (Rostopchin 1892, 419).
In the same way, for his entire tenure as Moscow governor-general Rostop-
chin persecuted the Martinists with unflagging energy. He wrote to the emperor 
about the intrigues of the Martinists and Illuminati on the second day after his 
appointment and the closer that Napoleon’s army came to Moscow, the more 
time and effort he spent on the internal enemy (see Popov 1875, № 8, 277; 
Kizivetter 1915, 158, 160–170). After having sent the director of the post office 
F. P. Kliucharev out of Moscow to Voronezh, Rostopchin wrote to Alexander 
that this was on his part “the single means to prevent the Martinists’ plans, 
which have been already brought to the point of threatening Russia with misfor-
tune, and you—the fate of Louis XVI. In time you will see, Sovereign, that this 
horrible sect gained your favor with the help of those who themselves belonged 
Figure 18 Throwing French actresses out of Moscow (1812). Caricature  
by A. G. Venetsianov.
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to it” (Kizivetter 1915, 166).16 In the context of the “Notes on Martinists” that 
he had earlier given to the emperor, the last phrase of this tirade plainly took 
aim at Speranskii. 
Even in exile the disgraced favorite did not give Rostopchin peace, and 
he wrote to Alexander that “from the first to the last in all of Russia he is 
considered a traitor,” and warned the emperor of the deadly menace emanating 
from the outcast (Rostopchin 1892, 428–435). In August 1812, he again and 
without the emperor’s sanction wrote an order to the governor-general of 
Nizhnii Novgorod to send Speranskii to Moscow (Bychkov, “Prebyvanie” 
1902). The demand to bring a state criminal to a city to which enemy forces 
were approaching seems puzzling, to say the least. The single possible expla-
nation of Rostopchin’s strange behavior comes from Korf: “But here the 
question arises, and it is here that we see its importance, with what goal did 
Rostopchin dare to take such a step so far exceeding his prerogatives? Doubt-
less, with only one [purpose] … to sacrifice the man the people hated to their 
aroused passions, as he did with the unfortunate Vereshchagin” (ibid., 234; 
cf. Kizivetter 1915, 184). 
The Vereshchagin episode, described repeatedly from first, second, and 
third-hand accounts by shocked contemporaries and analyzed in detail in the 
historical literature (for a collection of documents, see Dmitriev 1998, 546, 
556–559; cf. Popov 1875, № 8, 287–291; Kizivetter 1915, 115–121), is very 
familiar from Tolstoy’s War and Peace. For the issues discussed in the current 
book, Rostopchin’s own explanations for this horrible act present the main 
interest. In a report preserved by M. A. Dmitriev from Rostopchin to his uncle, 
the Minister of Justice I. I. Dmitriev, on October 13, 1812, it says, “As concerns 
Vereshchagin, just before the entry of our enemies into Moscow I handed this 
traitor and state criminal over to the people crowding around him who saw in 
him the voice of Napoleon and prophet of their misfortunes and made him a 
16 A . N. Popov and S. P. Mel’gunov are inclined to explain Rostopchin’s hysterical hatred for 
Martinists in part by his connection to the Jesuits, whom he supported through his wife who 
had converted to Catholicism (see Popov 1875, № 8, 275–278; Mel’gunov 1923, 134). It 
seems as if such an approach accords with the interpretive practices described in this book. 
At the same time it is probable that his wife’s conversion to Catholicism that made Ros- 
topchin’s position rather vulnerable might have stimulated his interest in the widespread 
mythology of conspiracies and secret societies, and also to some extent may have fostered his 
swift transformation from a proponent of pro-French policies to a militant Francophobe. 
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sacrifice to their righteous wrath” (Dmitirev 1998, 99). Ten years later Ros- 
topchin related another version of these events in his memoirs:
I ordered that the merchant’s son Vereshchagin, author of Napoleonic 
proclamations, be taken from prison and brought to me, as well as a 
certain French fencing teacher by name of Mouton. … Addressing the 
former, I began to reproach him for a crime so much more vile because 
he alone out of the entire population of Moscow wanted to betray his 
fatherland; I told him that he had been sentenced to death by the Senate 
and that he had to suffer for it—and I ordered two subordinate officers 
of my convoy to kill him with their sabers. He fell without saying a single 
word.
Then, turning to Mouton, who, expecting the same fate, was saying 
prayers, I said to him: “I grant you life; return to your own and tell them that 
the scoundrel whom I just punished was the only Russian to betray his 
fatherland.” (Rostopchin 1992, 313)
Let us consider the contradiction between these two accounts. On the heels 
of recent events and before the end of the war, Rostopchin presents himself as 
instrument of popular anger, and ten years later—as the executor of a legal 
sentence. (Actually the Senate sentenced Vereshchagin not to death but to 
hard labor.) However, the symbolic dimension of the event is clear in both 
descriptions. From the huge mass of the people Rostopchin isolates a single 
traitor on whom guilt for the national tragedy is placed. The especially meta-
phorical and theatricalized character of this fixation on one criminal becomes 
particularly visible if we take into consideration that, during the investigation 
of the Vereshchagin affair, Rostopchin tried to expose an extensive Masonic 
conspiracy behind the back of the unfortunate merchant’s son (see Shchukin 
VIII, 44–77). 
The expulsion of the traitor from the national body becomes fearsome 
news for the enemy about the solidarity the people have acquired; the need to 
inform them of this news saves the life of the fencing master Mouton. Let us 
recall that in front of Rostopchin’s home had gathered a crowd of people who 
had been summoned in his posters to form a fearsome people’s militia to repulse 
the enemy. In his accounts Rostopchin splits the story of the punishment he 
carried out into two parts. In one the people play the role of executioner, in the 
other it is the subordinate officers from his convoy. In the words of M. A. 
Dmitriev, Rostopchin pointed Vereshchagin out
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to the people, of whom many had gathered, and, calling him a traitor, he 
ordered a police dragoon to stab him; the dragoon did not obey immedi-
ately, but when ordered a second time took out his saber and struck him a 
blow. The surname of this dragoon was Burdaev. Then they threw Versh-
chagin off of the steps to the people who tore him to pieces and dragged him 
through the streets. (Dmitriev 1998, 98–99)
All of the memoirists sketch a roughly similar picture; only the ballet master 
A. P. Glushkovskii asserted that “Rostopchin’s orderly Pozharskii delivered 
the first blow to Vereshchagin’s head with a broadsword, and not Burdaev” 
(Glushkovskii 1940, 96). This difference indirectly supports Rostopchin’s 
later account that he gave the order to hew the man to two subordinates. If 
Glushkovskii’s information is true,17 then the inevitable historical analogy 
that arises is most probably no accident. The governor-general, occupied 
with forming the Moscow militia, which he and his cohort constantly and 
persistently projected onto the Nizhnii Novgorod militia of 1611–1612, 
could not have helped but notice the famous surname of his orderly. 
Shoving him onto the stage of history at this dramatic moment Rostopchin, 
consciously or not, elevated his self-motivated action to the level of 
emulating the heroic national past. 
Leo Tolstoy depicted Vereshchagin’s killing as a desperately cowardly step 
that Rostopchin committed in order to distract the enraged crowd and slip 
away unnoticed. This version provoked P. A. Viazemskii’s determined protest. 
Seconding the opinion of Varnhagen von Ense, who knew Rostopchin, he 
wrote that “Rostopchin made Vereshchagin a sacrifice in order to increase the 
people’s indignation, and at the same time gave Napoleon and the French as it 
were a foretaste of the bitterness with which they would be greeted in hospitable 
Moscow” (Viazemskii VII, 212; cf. Varnhagen von Ense 1859). D. N. Sverbeev 
(1871, 520) also wrote about the fact that Rostopchin “might have been … the 
criminal murderer of Vereshchagin, but he could not be and was not a killer out 
of cowardice.”
However, Tolstoy’s critic Viazemskii also presumed that the commander 
of Moscow “handed Vereshchagin over to the people as a sacrifice” “at a moment 
of great sorrow, great frustration,” and that there was “nothing premeditated, 
17 I. F. Zhukov writes that the second man who carried out the punishment was A. G. Gavrilov 
(Zhukov 1866, 255). 
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nothing planned” in his action (Viazemskii VII, 212). Still, the entire scenario 
of the tragedy was invented by Rostopchin beforehand. Of course, there was 
nothing accidental about the fact that Vereshchagin and Mouton had been left 
in jail while all of the other prisoners had been taken away three days before the 
fatal event; according to Rostopchin’s later testimony, “they forgot to send them 
off with the 730 [other] criminals” (Rostopchin 1992, 312). 
To a certain degree the only chance factor was the person of Vereshchagin, 
who by the will of fate ended up at the center of events and who substituted for 
a much larger-scale figure who had already been singled out long before by 
public opinion for the role of the main traitor and conspirator. But it was 
precisely the basic interchangeability of the sacrifice that serves as the clearest 
proof that on the streets of Moscow, a monumental ideological ritual was 
played out: an incarnation of the myth of the people’s body.
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The Vereshchagin incident aroused His Majesty’s dissatisfaction. “His execu-
tion was not needed, and especially should not have been carried out this way,” 
Alexander wrote to Rostopchin on November 6, 1812. “It would have been 
better to hang or shoot him,” the emperor added with his characteristic 
humanism (Shil’der 1893, 184). In the opinion of many contemporaries, this 
act of vengeance was the reason for the sovereign’s negative disposition toward 
Rostopchin. 
We are not fated to know whether Alexander felt that the bloody farce that 
played out in front of the governor-general’s house was a parody of the sophis-
ticated sacrifice he himself had offered almost six months before in the name of 
uniting the nation around the throne. In any case, having returned to Russia 
from vanquished Paris, he hastened to send Rostopchin into retirement. The 
ukase on removing him from office was signed on August 30, 1814. On the next 
day, August 31, the emperor permitted Speranskii to leave his place of exile. The 
people’s war was over. 
 1 
By sending Speranskii away in this manner, Alexander attracted enormous public attention to the office of state secretary. The next important 
symbolic step was the appointment of a successor to the disgraced favorite. On 
March 22, 1812, the emperor summoned A. S. Shishkov to an audience. Fright-
ened “by the removal of Speranskii and the retirement of Mordvinov,… and, 
finally, by the sovereign emperor’s clear disfavor” toward him, Shishkov 
prepared for the worst, but things did not turn out that way (Shishkov 1870, 
120). “I have read your treatise on love for the fatherland,” said Alexander. 
“With such feelings, you can be useful to it. It seems as if we cannot avoid war 
with the French; we need to carry out a levy of troops; I would like you to write 
the manifesto about it” (ibid., 121). 
In the apocryphal version in which these words were recorded in Varvara 
Bakunina’s diary, the emperor said to Shishkov, “I have not read many things 
Russian, but rather a lot that is foreign, but I have never read anything so beau-
tiful as your speech on love for the fatherland” (Bakunina 1885, 404). The 
emperor’s words probably reached the diary’s author via several mediating 
links, and the nature of the transformation clearly shows both the image of the 
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sovereign in social consciousness as well as the reaction of the Petersburg public 
to the changes taking place. We will never know if the emperor really read 
Shishkov’s “Treatise,” which the author had decided to read aloud at a meeting 
of the “Colloquy of Lovers of the Russian Word” several months earlier, after 
worrying that his performance would be taken “as a bold attempt to rouse 
national pride without permission of the government” (Shishkov 1870, 
117–118). Be that as it may, Alexander did not apprehend Shishkov’s idea 
expressed in the “Treatise” that love for the fatherland was based on using the 
native tongue.
When N. S. Kiselev and Iu. F. Samarin published Shishkov’s memoirs, they 
drew attention to a difference between the manuscript and the version that the 
admiral had published in 1831. According to them, “in the printed text 
the emperor speaks to Shishkov ‘on ty,’” that is, using the intimate and not the 
polite form of the pronoun “you” (ibid., 121; cf. Shishkov 1831, 1–2). It was 
usual for the autocrat to address a subject in this way, and other places in the 
memoir preserve this form (Shishkov 1870, 249, 259, 262, etc.). At the same 
time, it is hard to suspect Shishkov of forgetting such a significant detail of their 
conversation which he himself called “the most important event in my life” 
(ibid., 118), the more so since the manuscript version was created long before 
the printed one (Tartakovskii 1980, 49–50). Apparently the audience had 
taken place in French, in which the etiquette for using second person pronouns 
significantly differed from the Russian. 
It is all the more improbable that the emperor chose Shishkov instead of 
Karamzin, who was also a candidate (Grot 1867, 118), out of considerations 
of language and style, as Kiselev and Samarin suggested, referring to the intel-
lectual leader of the “Colloquy”’s “simple, true, sincere, as well as powerful 
word that inspired heroic exploits” (Shishkov 1870, 124; cf. Lotman i 
Uspenskii 1996, 420–424, etc.). More likely, on the eve of inevitable war, 
Alexander wanted to demonstrate to the Russian people that the ideological 
orientation had changed and that he was now prepared to find support in the 
social groups and circle of ideas that Shishkov had represented over for an 
entire decade. S. T. Aksakov, who was an extraordinarily ardent supporter of 
the new state secretary, claimed that “in Moscow and in the inner provinces of 
Russia … everyone was very pleased by Shishkov’s appointment” (Aksakov II, 
305; cf. Zharinov 1912).
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Shishkov wrote the first, trial manifesto in one evening (see Shishkov 
1870, 121). “His style is serious, eloquent and strong,” wrote V. Bakunina in her 
diary, “but harsh to many: they are unused to sayings and phrases that are 
completely Russian” (Bakunina 1885, 394). Despite his lack of experience writing 
such documents, which made him nervous, Shishkov was able to cope with the 
new task with the help of those rhetorical and ideological models that he and 
his associates had been working out since 1806. “The present condition of 
affairs in Europe,” began the manifesto, “demands firm and decisive measures, 
constant vigilance and a strong home guard which could protect Our Great 
Empire in a certain and reliable way from all enemy assaults” (Shishkov 1870, 
423). Note the use of the word “home guard” (opolchenie); in fact, Shishkov 
was referring to a special levy of recruits for the army. Less than four months 
later, when it was necessary to summon an actual militia, Shishkov described 
the difference clearly: “The internal force created today is not a militia or levy of 
recruits but a temporary force of true sons of Russia that is being set up as a 
precaution to support the regular troops and for the most reliable safeguarding 
of the Fatherland” (ibid., 428). Shishkov distinguishes the home guard not only 
from the regular recruits but also from a militia, while the manifesto of 
November 30, 1806, to which he was obviously referring, had been called “On 
Figure 19 Variants for a medallion commemorating the home guard  
by A. N. Olenin.
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the Summoning and Formation of Universal Temporary Militias or Police” 
(PSZ № 22374). Shishkov was apparently either troubled by the unsuccessful 
attempt to form a militia in 1806–1807 or he simply did not like the foreign 
word “militia.”
In the first manifesto Shishkov chose the perhaps not fully accurate but 
emotionally powerful term “opolchenie” because this rhetorical move allowed 
him to emphasize the universal character of the mobilization and to have 
Russian society make the necessary historical connection. In the manifesto on 
the home guard, the associative mechanism was employed in full force:
Let him [the enemy] meet in every Nobleman a Pozharskii, in every cler-
gyman a Palitsyn, in every citizen a Minin. Most Noble estate! In all ages you 
have been the savior of the Fatherland; Most Holy Synod and clergy! You 
have always summoned grace onto Russia’s head with your heartfelt prayers; 
Russian people! Brave descendants of the brave Slavs! You have repeatedly 
broken the teeth of the lions and tigers who have assailed you; be united, all, 
and with a cross in your heart and weapon in your hands no human force can 
overcome you. (Shishkov 1870, 427)
In this patriotic rhetoric, the parallel between the anti-Napoleonic home guard 
of Moscow and the troops of Minin and Pozharskii that had been worked out 
five years earlier naturally came to the fore. 
The emperor signed the manifestoes “To the First Capital City, Our 
Moscow” and “On the Summoning of a Home Guard” (zemskoe opol-
chenie) on one day—July 6. In their texts Shishkov clearly defined the 
continuity between them: “We have already called out to our First Capital 
City, Our Moscow, and now we summon all of our subjects, of all condi-
tions, secular and religious” (ibid., 427). Such an order of address, in which 
“the ancient Capital of Our Ancestors” was preferred not only over Peters-
burg, but the entire country, was motivated by the fact that Moscow “was 
always the head of the other Russian cities; … according to its example, sons 
of the Fatherland from all other regions have flowed to it, like blood to the 
heart, in its defense” (ibid., 425). The excess of organicist metaphors that 
followed from Shishkov’s ideas about the state having to form “one body and 
soul” (Shishkov IV, 184) indicated by lack of mention that this was also a 
rejection of the Petrine model of statehood. In one of his conversations with 
the emperor, Shishkov allowed himself to note that the evil undermining 
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Russian’s strength had begun with “the otherwise great Peter I, but in this 
case who did not foresee the consequences. Together with useful arts and 
sciences he allowed trivial imitations to enter that disturbed native customs 
and habits” (Shishkov 1870, 160). Petersburg did not have the right to be 
either the “heart” or the “head” of Russia. The disease that was threatening 
the national body demanded consolidation around historical holy places. 
“We Ourselves do not hesitate to stand among our people in this Capital and 
in other places of our Realm to summon and guide all of our home guards,” 
it said in the manifesto addressed to Moscow (ibid., 425). 
Alexander mastered the art of subordinating his actions to the “general 
will,” as he understood it, but only gradually. The first symptoms of this new 
attitude were manifested in the appointment of Shishkov and Rostopchin—
whom he found profoundly unappealing—to important positions. Then, 
pressured by Shishkov and Minister of Police Balashov, he agreed to leave the 
army and go to Moscow despite his own desire to remain. This decision, as 
Richard Wortman has demonstrated, testified to the fact that the autocrat, 
despite “his most personal inclinations,” took upon himself “the role of 
national leader who mobilized all the estates of the realm in the cause of 
defending the empire” (Wortman 1994, 217). The culmination of this auto-
cratic self-abnegation was the appointment of M. I. Kutuzov, whom the 
emperor hated, as commanding general. “When Rostopchin reported to me 
in his letter of September 5 that all Moscow wants Kutuzov to command the 
army,… my choice had to fall on the one whom general opinion designated,” 
the emperor wrote to his sister Ekaterina Pavlovna (Nikolai Mikhailovich 
1910, 87–88). The choices of “all Moscow” and “general opinion” were essen-
tially identical, and the “first capital city” became a symbol of national unity. 
It was not by accident that Sergei Glinka compared the emperor’s arrival in 
Moscow to the election of Mikhail Romanov as ruler of the nation (Glinka 
1814; cf. Wortman 1994, 219). 
In the official announcements on the surrender of Moscow and the 
enemy’s departure from it, no analogies with the events of 1612 were drawn 
(Shishkov 1870, 157–159, 438–442), even though the parallel was strongly 
present in the minds of contemporaries. It sounded in Ivan Kovan’ko’s “Soldier’s 
Song,” which had been published in the first issue of the journal Son of the 
Fatherland and had attained extraordinary popularity: 
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Хоть Москва в руках французов, 
Это, право, не беда— 
Наш фельдмаршал князь Кутузов 
Их на смерть привел туда. 
Вспомним, братцы, что поляки
Встарь бывали тоже в ней, 
Но не жирны кулебяки—
Ели кошек да мышей. 
Напоследок мертвечину 
Земляков пришлось им жрать, 
А потом пред русским спину
В крюк по-польски изгибать. 
Побывать в столице слава, 
Но умеем мы отмщать. 
Знает крепко то Варшава, 
И Париж то будет знать.   
   (Kovan’ko 1812; cf. Grech 1930, 304–305)
(Although Moscow’s in French hands / This, truly, is no misfortune—/ Our 
field-marshal Kutuzov / Led them there to die. // Remember, brothers, that 
the Poles / Also visited Moscow / But it wasn’t rich pastries that they ate / 
But cats and mice. // At last they were forced / To scarf down dead coun-
trymen, / And then bend their backs in Polish fashion / Before the Russians. 
… // It may be glorious to visit the capital / But we know how to take 
revenge, / Warsaw knows that very well / And Paris will know it too.) 
At the end of 1812 D. P. Troshchinskii consoled Kutuzov about the fact that he 
had been forced to abandon the capital: “Of course you regret that you were not 
able to stand up for the first capital city of ours. But who can fight against fate? 
… Pozharskii was [also] unable to defend the mother of Russian cities; he threw 
out an enemy that was a hundred times weaker than the one that now flees from 
your sight. Destiny has compared you to that great man; both of you will remain 
in the memory of posterity as benefactors of the fatherland. Moscow fell, but, 
supporting itself on her, Russia came through” (SbRIO III, 14–15). Thanking 
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his correspondent, Kutuzov answered: “It was comforting to me to read in your 
friendly letter that Pozharskii drove the enemy out of Moscow and didn’t let it 
get established there” (ibid., 16). Kutuzov wrote this phrase in his own hand at 
the end of the copyist’s version of the letter.
Together with this, the manifestoes’ descriptions of the French army’s 
brutality in the occupied city markedly duplicated formulas that had been 
created earlier to depict the horrors of the Polish occupation. In the 
celebrated “News from Moscow of October 17,” which contemporaries 
considered Shishkov’s best publicistic work,1 he emphasized that “surveying 
all of the horrors [of the French presence] as a whole, we cannot say that we 
are conducting war with a [normal] enemy” (Shishkov 1870, 438). The 
behavior of the French army was juxtaposed to “the image of war between 
powers that maintain the honor of their names” (ibid., 439), and as exam-
ples of these he cited England, Sweden, and, naturally, Russia. In just the 
same way in 1807, V. M. Severgin, in listing the violence that the Swedes 
had committed in Russia, noted: “But these evils I would call virtues in 
comparison to the unspeakable horrors of the Polish troops” (Severgin 
1807, 9). It is not impossible that this historical parallel led Shishkov to 
insist that the Moscow fire had been perpetrated by the enemy, like that of 
two hundred years before (on contemporaries’ views of the reasons for the 
Moscow fire, see Tartakovskii 1973; cf. Zharinov 1912a). The monstrous 
immorality of the Polish and French interventionists predetermined their 
blasphemous hatred toward the capital of ancient Russian piety. 
 2 
Battle with this kind of enemy required the full concentration of all national 
forces. In the first manifesto about the levy of recruits, Shishkov wrote about 
the necessity “to protect Our Great Empire from all powerful enemy assaults on 
it” (Shishkon 1870, 423). Then in the manifesto about the home guard, he 
proclaimed that these “new forces,… bringing new horror to the enemy, consti-
tutes the second line of defense of the homes, wives and children of each and 
everyone” (ibid., 426–427). This rather elementary metaphor would probably 
not be worth mentioning if the motif of separating the opposing sides by an 
1  In the words of D. N. Bludov, who had no liking for Shishkov, “to arouse his eloquence it was 
necessary for Moscow to burn down” (Grech 1930, 351). 
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impermeable barrier had not taken on such special significance in Shishkov’s 
writing. In the “News from Moscow,” the issue comes up with the choice that 
will face Russia after the occupiers’ excesses in the first capital city: “… [W]e 
must necessarily choose between two things: either continue to feel a partiality 
for this dishonorable people, and be its dishonorable slaves; or, cutting all moral 
connections with it, return to the purity and virtue of our [traditional] ways, 
and be in name and soul brave and Orthodox Russians. We must decide once 
and for all between good and evil, and erect a wall so that evil will not touch us” 
(ibid., 442). 
In one of the notes to his translation of A Short and Just Tale of Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s Ruinous Works by the German publicist E. M. Arndt, Shishkov 
wrote that Napoleon had gotten hope for success from “the French language, 
books, theater, teachers, educators, merchants and all sorts of dear (milye) 
seducers and traitors who had so long ago settled in it [Russia] and who 
tried to eradicate almost all Russian habits and customs,” as well as from 
“the perverted Sarmatians who thought that it would be better to be slaves 
of that hellish monster than brothers to their countrymen, and from the 
Russians in lands adjacent [to Poland] who could not help being partially 
infected by this plague.” However, “as soon as the revolutionary monster 
(chudovishche) approached” “the heart of Russia” and “stirred up its blood, 
and then such a fiery lava streamed from it that no one could withstand it: 
… forces and weapons and schemes and temptations all burned up. That is 
how blessed Russia revealed itself ! Be always thus, my most precious 
Fatherland! Erect an insuperable wall between French depravity and your 
virtue” (Arndt 1814, 46n).
For Shishkov the issue here was not about rhetorical effects. The image of 
a wall that was necessary to erect between good and evil also defined his polit-
ical views. In his Memoirs he expressed doubts about the necessity of the 
European campaign. “Why continue it [the war] when it is done?” he asked 
Kutuzov in December 1812 (Shishkov 1870, 167). In the manifesto about the 
French invasion of June 13, he had put the following words into Alexander’s 
mouth: “I will not lay down arms while a single enemy remains in my realm” 
(ibid., 425). Now that mission had been fulfilled, and any other war goals were 
deeply foreign to Shishkov. However, if at first Shishkov only made up his 
mind to voice his doubts about a European campaign to Kutuzov, who may 
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have had some sympathy for him,2 the idea of taking the war directly onto the 
enemy’s territory so distressed him that he decided to speak directly to the 
emperor. On November 6, 1813, he wrote an almost hysterical letter to 
Alexander imploring him not to cross the Rhine and not to continue the war 
in France. In his words, “the safest and most necessary protection” for Russia 
was “curing internal wounds and restoring our disturbed forces” (Shishkov 
1870, 239). At the same time, a war to liberate Germany could still be benefi-
cial insofar as “first, the powers of the untamable and impudent enemy have 
been weakened; second, the barrier between him and us has been restored; 
third, it is noble and worthy of honor and glory to snatch an innocent victim 
out of the clutches of a fierce predator” (ibid., 239–240). But to send the army 
into France was senseless and risky. A month earlier Shishkov had concluded 
his Leipzig manifesto with the words: “We are on the shore of the Rhine and 
Europe has been liberated” (ibid., 234). France, cursed by God, was not 
included as part of Europe and did not need liberation, and it was quite 
acceptable to leave it under Napoleon’s sway.
Upon receiving Shishkov’s memorandum, at first Alexander decided to 
somewhat soothe his state secretary, who was quite sick at the time. “I am very 
pleased with your paper and read it through more than once; there is much 
truth in it, and although I will not follow your advice, in many things I agree 
with you,” he told Shishkov (ibid., 245). However, a month later during one of 
his “gracious” conversations he conjectured that Shishkov “was not so much 
sick in body as in his thoughts” (ibid., 249). This declaration was a clear indica-
tion that his state secretary was not long for the job. 
The fierce intensity of anti-Napoleonic rhetoric has long been noted as a 
special feature of the publicism and literature produced during the war. In the 
words of A. V. Predtechenskii,
It seems that there was no single poem, no single ode, no single work of 
prose in which Napoleon was forgotten, and of course, it was not to put in a 
good word about him. Such epithets as “the Attila of the nineteenth century,” 
“predator,” “outcast,” “monster,” “most vile hypocrite and deceiver,” “bloody 
2  According to a persistent tradition, Kutuzov allegedly told the Emperor: “Your promise is 
fulfilled; not one armed enemy remains on Russian soil; now only the second part of your 
vow remains—to lay down your arms” (Shil’der III, 137). However, Soviet historians consis-
tently denied the truth of this account (see, e.g., Okun’ 1947, 282–286). 
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and vengeful,” “immortal Kashchei” and “Zmei Gorynich” [villains of 
Russian folklore], “the greatest murderer,” “universal scourge,” “horror 
personified,” “hell in the flesh,” “cannibal,” and a multitude of others of this 
kind abundantly adorned the works of poets and prose writers who 
commented on the events of 1812–1814. (Predtechenskii 1950, 224; cf. 
Kazakov 1970)
On this background the restraint with which Shishkov speaks about the 
French emperor is noteworthy. In the manifestoes of 1812, Shishkov mentions 
Napoleon extremely rarely, preferring the collective forms “enemy” and “foe” 
that signify France just as much as its leader, as well as the country in general. 
There is not the slightest doubt that Shishkov related to Napoleon with not 
even the slightest bit more sympathy than any of his countrymen. However, he 
was not so much interested in Napoleon as in the French as a whole. As he 
exclaimed in the “News from Moscow”: 
Could he [Napoleon] have been able to inspire millions of hearts with the 
spirit of frenzy and lawlessness if they themselves were not corrupt and did 
not breathe depravity? Although, of course, in any, even a pious people, 
there may be deviants; however, when almost every single person in the 
entire army acts as deviants, robbers, arsonists, rapists, offenders of 
humanity, desecrators of what is sacred—then it is impossible that among 
such people there were good morals and manners (nravy). (Shishkov 
1870, 441)
In 1814, when the Russian troops were already located in France, Shishkov, 
extremely annoyed by the indulgent tone the commander of allied forces K.-F. 
Schwarzenberg assumed toward the French, wrote a project for an address to 
them that was not meant for publication or to be shown to the emperor, but for 
that reason expressed the author’s thoughts with special clarity:
Wiping you from the face of the earth would not sufficiently satisfy justice. 
In vain will you try to accuse Napoleon alone of all these cruelties. No! Even 
before him you demonstrated to what degree of depravity and ferociousness 
atheism (bezverie) had brought your way of living (nravy); sown among you 
long ago it has grown, spread and matured; having taken control of you it 
vomited your teachers and heroes out of the depths of hell—your Marats 
and Robespierres, and finally it sent you Napoleon. You chose them to rule 
over you because you saw in them the most vicious possible minds, the 
cruelest hearts. (Ibid., 271)
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The idea formulated here that the French had chosen their revolutionary leaders, 
and especially Napoleon, is extremely important. Shishkov repeats it several 
times, including in a published manifesto: “A people,… having trampled faith, the 
throne, laws and humanity, falls into discord, anarchy, ferociousness, steals, 
punishes, torments its very self and … chooses as its leader, then tsar, a commoner, 
a foreigner” (ibid., 472). From this perspective the favorite idea of a significant 
number of Russian and European publicists that Napoleon was a usurper of the 
French throne played no role. The French emperor emerges as having been just as 
purposefully chosen by his people as once the Russians had called the blessed 
dynasty of the Romanovs to the throne. A nation that observes divine order 
elects an anointed one to the throne with a single will, creating the basis for a 
great dynasty, while a nation that lives according to the dictates of the devil 
places “above itself a tsar, or, more justly, ataman, born as a commoner on Corsica, 
who surpasses everyone … in dishonor, cunning and malice” (ibid., 270).
Therefore, according to Shishkov, the Russian army should in no case 
enter France. It may have been possible to end the war with Napoleon, but the 
metaphysical “struggle between godlessness and piety, between vice and virtue” 
should not and could not be halted (ibid., 441–442). But it was necessary to 
continue this struggle within Russia, eradicating the French infection that had 
penetrated deeply.
In 1813 Shishkov had a violent quarrel with Kutuzov (“Out of respect I 
will not call him by name,” he wrote in his memoirs; ibid., 177), who believed 
that in order to improve the mores of Russian society it was necessary to 
preserve the French theater in Petersburg and the traditions of secular educa-
tion for children of the nobility. “Why not then [build the theater] on the ashes 
of Moscow,” wrote the furious Shishkov. “My soul turned from such thoughts 
with disgust, and it seemed that if she3 too were infected with them I would rip 
her out of my very self ” (ibid., 177–178). The linguistic structure of this utter-
ance is itself highly symptomatic. The penetration of alien influence into the 
people’s body, “the secret attempt to beguile minds, to charm hearts” was for 
Shishkov “a surer means than swords and cannon” to defeat another people 
(Shishkov IV, 171). He cites with great approval a fragment from F. N. Glinka’s 
3 In Russian, the soul (dusha) is a feminine noun. (Translator’s note)
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Letters of a Russian Officer where he speaks about the dangers that French pris-
oners pose for Russian ways (see ibid., 177). 
Moreover, Shishkov’s extremely militarist rhetoric contrasted with his 
natural geniality as a person. He was not at all inclined to persecute anybody. 
This task fell to Rostopchin, who in 1806 had demanded that Alexander “cure 
Russia of infection” by kicking all French people out of the country without 
exception, and when he became commander of Moscow in 1812, he immedi-
ately began to draw up lists of foreigners to be deported (Shchukin II, 67–68; cf. 
Ogloblin 1901; Mel’gunov 1923, 140–146). After Moscow’s liberation his 
main concern was that insignificant part of the population that had remained in 
the city and that could have been exposed to foreign infection. As A. G. Tarta-
kovskii writes, “all those inhabitants who had remained in Moscow during the 
period of occupation … fell under police surveillance; each of them was consid-
ered politically unreliable and subjected to nonstop police surveillance” 
(Tartakovskii 1973, 261). 
In a letter to Alexander in December, Rostopchin shared his characteristic 
concerns with the emperor concerning the mood in Moscow: “Every 
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fainthearted nobleman, every merchant who escaped the capital and every 
transient priest considers himself—this is no joke—a Pozharskii, Minin or 
Palitsyn, because one contributed several peasants, and another several pennies, 
to save all of their property. In a mass the Russians are awesome and uncon-
querable, but as individuals extremely negligible” (Shil’der 1893, 187). 
Polemically turning Shishkov’s lines from the manifesto on the home guard 
inside out, Rostopchin characteristically juxtaposes the united, mobilized 
people to their individual representatives. At the same time Rostopchin wrote 
to the sovereign asking that insofar as “Bonaparte has evidently slipped away 
from us, would it not be wise to think about measures to fight against your 
enemies within the state?” (ibid.). He gave a description of these enemies in 
letters of September 24, 1813, and January 19, 1814:
It is necessary to take measures right now to extirpate the new evil that the 
presence of captured Frenchmen—generals and officers—represents for 
our inner provinces. They have penetrated into private homes and spread 
very dangerous views. … The mania for the French has not passed in Russia, 
and their current situation evokes more and more sympathy for them on the 
part of fools and nobles. … Since 1812 could not cure them of this stupid 
partiality for this accursed breed, we must seriously begin the destruction of 
these ecstatic devotees, and there are many of them in all social classes, espe-
cially among school-age youth. (Ibid., 200, 204)
The measures Rostopchin proposed would have extended the regime of 
national mobilization that had been worked out for the war for an unlimited 
period. It was necessary for the national body to finally be purged of the 
inner contagion and be securely isolated from the incursion of alien 
elements.
 3 
Understandably, such an isolationist policy was hardly acceptable to all of 
Russian society. For Alexander himself, the liberation of Russia from the 
invaders was, in essence, only a necessary step in the realization of a far more 
broad-scale plan. On December 12, 1812, when celebrating his birthday in 
Vilnius, he told the gathered generals and officers, “Gentlemen, we have not 
only saved Russia, we have saved Europe” (Shil’der III, 134). He was not willing 
by far to be content with a national war within the borders of the state. He was 
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talking about a universal historical and even eschatological confrontation that 
would completely alter the way the world was set up. 
N. K. Shil’der noted that Shishkov’s and Rostopchin’s appointments “had 
resulted from the extraordinary conditions of 1812 and certainly did not corre-
spond to the emperor’s personal plans, and seemed to constitute a concession 
to public opinion; it is unsurprising that once peace was concluded they simul-
taneously received new assignments” (ibid., 259–260). In Shishkov’s memoirs 
it says that, when one of his friends had suggested the admiral as a member of 
the State Council in 1810, Alexander had answered, “it would be better if I 
agreed not to rule” (Shishkov 1870, 115). The dismissal of the two ideologues 
occurred on August 30, 1814, but attempts to take the monopoly on the official 
view of the causes, course, and goals of the war out of their hands had begun 
much earlier, in the final months of 1812. At first these attempts were connected 
with the transfer of the war outside of Russia and the necessity of organizing 
anti-Napoleonic propaganda that was aimed at European—first of all German—
readers (see Sirotkin 198a; Shtein 1905, 886). Simultaneously the ideological 
product designed for internal consumption was gradually changing. 
A substantive watershed in these changes was the parallel publication in 
the Son of the Fatherland (1813, ch. VII, № 32) and Readings in the Colloquy of 
Lovers of the Russian Word (1813, vyp. 13) of Archimandrite Filaret’s “Essay 
(rassuzhdenie) on the Moral Reasons for Our Unprecedented Successes in the 
War with the French of 1812.” The publication of the “Essay” in both outlets 
had been preceded by A. N. Olenin’s “Letter to Archimandrite Filaret,” which 
encouraged the addressee to write this work. Olenin wrote:
Forgive me that I am bothering you and writing about the same subject 
about which I troubled you orally. But what can I do? I dream about this day 
and night and I continually hear in my ears the echoes of the beautiful 
expressions in the speeches or discussions you have composed on the moral 
reasons for our unprecedented success in the current war … that was waged 
against us by almost all of Europe under the leadership of the eternally impu-
dent, cruel and godless French.
In my opinion, there has not been a more fitting opportunity for the 
eloquent pen of a religious figure to boldly assume the role of a secular 
writer. And indeed for whom then, if not a servant of the Holy Altar, is it fit 
to prove that the events of the current war and the unprecedented achieve-
ments of the Russian people has its start and finish in their limitless faith in 
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God, in natural, simple morality, not spoiled by false reasonings, and in 
loyalty to the Tsar, not due to philosophizing but according to God’s law and 
love for the Fatherland. (Olenin 1813, 219–220)
This letter was written on January 5, 1813, five days after the Russian troops 
crossed the Niemen, initiating the European campaign. At this time Olenin, in 
his capacity of senior state-secretary, took Shishkov’s place in Petersburg while 
Shishkov was accompanying the emperor. During the short period between 
Speranskii’s removal and Shishkov’s appointment, it had also been Olenin who 
had carried out the responsibilities of state secretary. When Alexander 
appointed Shishkov to the post, Varvara Bakunina had written in her diary, 
“Olenin, who had worked in all kinds of ways to replace the State Secretary, and 
who let everyone know that he himself would receive the post, wrote to 
Shishkov that he would have been insulted by any other choice, and that he 
recognized him as more worthy than himself, and added: ‘Do not take this for a 
Judas’s kiss’” (Bakunina 1885, 405). 
Thus the campaign to undercut Shishkov’s position was instigated by his 
own deputy, which was a time-honored bureaucratic tradition. However, in 
this case there were profound intellectual differences involved. Olenin was 
not at all a run-of-the-mill bureaucrat. For almost a decade he had been the 
ideologue and inspiration of a literary and artistic salon whose program 
consisted to a large degree in developing the cultural dimension of Catherine 
II’s “Greek Project.” An admirer of Winckelmann and Herder and former 
member of the Derzhavin-L’vov circle, Olenin shared a common interest with 
the Shishkovites in the problem of nationality and the desire to contrast 
national originality to an ideal of universalist culture, which in his case was 
oriented on French models. He saw the roots of Russian nationality not in the 
Church Slavonic linguistic domain or in folklore, national traditions and 
rituals (see Al’tshuller 1984), but in the historical ties between Russia and 
ancient Greece, and he perceived a direct succession from classical Greek to 
modern Russian culture. 
The idea of constructing Russian national culture on the basis of the 
Greek inheritance had been advanced with great energy in Catherine II’s 
“Beginning of Oleg’s Reign” and in N. A. L’vov’s preface to I. I. Prach’s Collec-
tion of Russian Folk Songs. It also inspired Derzhavin’s Anacreontic poems and 
especially the illustrations for them that were done under Olenin’s direction, 
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and it defined the work of writers in the Alexandrine epoch who were close to 
Olenin.4 Within this sphere of ideas were: V. A. Ozerov’s dramaturgy; the 
translation of the Iliad in hexameter that N. I. Gnedich was working on; and I. 
M. Murav’ev- Apostol’s Letters from Moscow to Nizhnii Novgorod that was 
published in the Son of the Fatherland in the years during and right after the war.
In the second half of the 1800s, the Olenin and Shishkov circles lived 
through several rather sharp literary clashes. In 1807 Shishkov and Derzhavin, 
who were close at that time, initiated attacks on “Dimitrii Donskoi” by Ozerov, 
a playwright sponsored by the Olenin circle, and rumor placed responsibility 
for the failure of Ozerov’s “Poliksena” in 1809 on A. A. Shakhovskoi, who had 
left the Olenin circle and allied with the Shishkovites (see Medvedeva 1960; 
Al’tshuller 1984, 147–157; Gordin 1991). Then the members of the Russian 
Academy rejected Krylov’s candidacy; Krylov was an undisputed authority in 
the Olenin circle, but, as Mark Al’tshuller writes, the Academy members 
“demonstratively gave preference and juxtaposed the rejected fable writer” to S. 
A. Shirinskii-Shikhmatov, who was elected a member (Al’tshuller 1975, 163).5 
Later, in 1815, V. A. Zhukovskii, who often visited Olenin, wrote that “His 
home is a place where authors gather, over whom he wants to be dictator. … 
Here they disparage Shishkov, and if they don’t disparage Karamzin then they 
at least dispute those who praise him” (Zhukovskii 1904, 13). 
The intense rivalry between Olenin and Shishkov by no means contra-
dicted Olenin’s, Krylov’s, and to some degree Gnedich’s membership in the 
“Colloquy.” In forming the “Colloquy,” Shishkov’s goal had been to attract all of 
the even somewhat noticeable literary and government figures, so that the list 
of its honored members included Karamzin, Ozerov, Uvarov and even 
Speranskii. On the other hand, Olenin’s position in the “Colloquy” was rather 
4 On the political and cultural orientation of the Olenin circle, see Maiofis 1998; on the circle’s 
aesthetic program, see Tomashevskii 1948, viii, xxiv-xxvii; Gillel’son 1974, 4–37; and Kuku-
levich 1939, who writes that “The conception of classical style (classical topoi) formed in A. 
N. Olenin’s circle for works with national content … arose as a result of the interaction of 
Winckelmann’s neoclassicism and nationality in the spirit of Herder” (312).
5 Al’tshuller’s insistence that the positions of Olenin and Shishkov were identical (Ibid, 
173–183; cf. Al’tshuller 1987, 98–103, etc.) cannot be accepted in our opinion, and contra-
dicts the facts that he himself relates. O. A. Proskurin, in our view, analyzes the history of 
these literary relations more accurately, although he rejects the existence of an “Olenin 
circle” as a special “literary grouping that worked out its aesthetic program [and] that occu-
pied its own special position” without sufficient basis (Proskurin 1987, 72–76, 65).
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ambiguous. We have no information at all on his participation in its work in the 
first years of the organization’s existence, until the spring of 1813, when he 
addressed himself to Shishkov, who was still attached to the emperor, with a 
letter, fragments of which were first published by Al’tshuller:
Fate has again pleased to assign me a place in which I am called on to repre-
sent your person. Gracious sir, guess what place—the Colloquy of Lovers of 
the Russian Word! In your absence the first group [of which Shishkov was its 
chair and Olenin a member] is orphaned. Its turn is coming, and they 
appointed me caretaker. So this is what moves me to trouble you with a 
request … Would you not be able to present something in the “Colloquy” 
for the first group—are not there any of your works that could be read in 
public? (Al’tshuller 1975, 173–174)
The meeting Olenin was writing about took place on May 20.6 Shishkov’s 
works were not read at it, but on the other hand the public that attended 
heard Olenin’s letter to Filaret and the latter’s “Answer to a Letter in Which it 
was Proposed that an Essay be Written [or: That I Write a Letter] on the 
Moral Reasons for Our Unprecedented Successes In the Current War.” 
Besides this, S. S. Uvarov’s “Letter to N. I. Gnedich on the Greek Hexameter,” 
a programmatic work of the Olenin circle, was also read, as well as Gnedich’s 
response and his hexameter translation of Book 4 of the Iliad that illustrated 
the basic ideas of Uvarov’s letter. If we add to this several fables by Krylov and 
a passage from a translation of Racine’s “Iphegenia” by M. E. Lobanov, “one of 
the habitués of Olenin’s house” (see Timofeev 1983, 99), we may say that the 
meeting led by the first group of the “Colloquy” that took place in the absence 
of its chair turned into a special benefit for Olenin and his allies.
 4 
In expressing the desire that “the eloquent pen of a religious figure boldly 
assume the role of a secular writer,” Olenin was making a particularly subtle 
move. Providentialist interpretations of the recent events were at that time a 
commonplace and reflected the emperor’s own position. “And so in this great 
matter we recognize God’s wisdom (promysl),” wrote Shishkov in the 
6 Al’tshuller assigns the general date of 1813 to this letter, but considering the date of the 
meeting we may date it more precisely. 
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Figure 21 Portrait of Archimandrite Filaret (Drozdov). Gravure by J. Brian.
manifesto of December 25, 1812 (Shishkov 1870, 172). During the entire 
European campaign, Shishkov occupied himself looking in holy books for 
“various descriptions and expressions that correspond to our present war” 
(ibid., 252; for what he found, see ibid., 252–257). However, it was far more 
natural for an authoritative figure from the church to interpret God’s purposes 
and manifestations. With his request Olenin addressed the most striking and 
popular of such figures.
In the memoirs of a contemporary seminary student, Filaret, “an all-pow-
erful archimandrite, a renowned marvel of intellect and learning,” at that time 
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stood “on a height that was the more unattainable the less his rank in the hierarchy 
corresponded to his actual influence” (Giliarov-Platonov II, 74). The young 
rector of the St. Petersburg Spiritual Academy was the rising star of the Russian 
church. At the dawn of his career he had been patronized by the celebrated 
Russian preacher, Moscow Metropolitan Platon, who said of the developing 
pastor, “I write like a human being, but he writes like an angel,” and who predicted 
that in time Filaret would occupy his pulpit (Ponomarev 1867/1868, № 12, 
518). Called to Petersburg, Filaret attracted general attention with his sermons 
in the Alexander Nevskii Lavra, and among his regular audience members were 
Olenin, A. N. Golitsyn, A. S. Sturdza (Stourdza), and A. I. Turgenev (Chistovich 
1897, 54). In 1811 by personal order of Alexander, Filaret was asked to serve at 
the dedication of the Kazan Cathedral. At the end of that year his father, the 
priest Mikhail Drozdov of Kolomenskoe, was on recommendation of the 
Ober-procuror of the Synod Prince A. N. Golitsyn awarded with a kamelaukion 
and pectoral cross “as a mark of the Monarch’s special favor toward his son, who 
had commended himself so well in the capacity of preacher of God’s word” 
(Sukhomlinov 1868, 17). In the same year, 1811, Filaret became close with 
Golitsyn, whom he called “a true zealot of the faith and the church,” and who 
presented him with “Fénelon’s religious works” (Steletskii 1901, 55). In 
September 1812, when the French army was in Moscow, Filaret wrote to his 
family that “Amid the general upset one person amazed me with his generosity 
of spirit. While many people were abandoning their homes, Prince Aleksandr 
Nikolaevich set up a church in his” (Filaret 1882, 166–167). 
Golitsyn’s church, built during the most difficult months of the war, was 
meant to as it were resurrect the spirit of original Christianity. Derzhavin 
compared the services in Golitsyn’s church with “the shade of Tabor” and a 
secret temple “of the first Christians” (Derzhavin III, 170). One of the constant 
attendees of the church that had been created for an extremely narrow circle of 
people was Alexander I, for whom Golitsyn was one of the main spiritual 
pastors in those years. In the autumn of 1812 in this select company, Filaret 
began to present his sermons that aroused huge interest in the highest Peters-
burg society (see Korsunskii 1885; cf. Florovskii 1937, 166–184). In the service 
on the consecration of the cathedral, he connected current events with the 
inner consecration of those who were praying, something that—in the words 
of Filaret’s biographer I. N. Korsunskii—“was one of the central questions of 
251Chapter 7: War and Quasi Peace
mysticism” (Korsunskii 1885, 398; for a comparison of Filaret’s sermons of this 
period with those of the French mystic Jean Philippe Dutoit, see Galakhov 
1875, 165–175).
“Christians! You are the living church of God!,” Filaret preached. “… Curi-
osity to see the consecration of the visible temple would be in vain if at the same 
moment we did not think about the consecration of our inner invisible temple. … 
The image of inner consecration is represented in the image of external conse-
cration” (Filaret 1812, 2–3). Among the congregants of Golitsyn’s home church 
Filaret’s sermon had such success that, in violation of church traditions, they 
asked him to repeat it (see Korsunskii 1885, 398). Later he did not include this 
sermon in his collected works, explaining that “I clarified the significance of 
diverse objects and rituals incorporated into the order of consecration of 
temples,… according to my own considerations, arbitrarily, if you please—
hypothetically” (see Ponomarev 1867/1868, № 4, 135). 
The view of the ideal church that Filaret’s sermon expressed contradicted 
the entire structure of Shishkov’s thought. Shishkov considered ancestral faith 
the most important component of love for the fatherland, thus putting the 
historical, ritual side of Orthodoxy in first place. This was all the more natural 
for Shishkov and his followers because love for the fatherland itself took on the 
character of a ritual cult for them. 
Ограда царств необорима, 
О ты, к Отечеству любовь, 
Достойна быть боготворима, 
(Invincible defense of kingdoms, / Oh, you, love for Fatherland, / Worthy to 
be deified).
Thus began Shirinskii-Shikhmatov’s poem “Pozharskii, Minin, Germogen, or 
Russia Saved.” As Stefano Garzonio discovered, when he prepared his poetry 
for (an unpublished) re-issuing in 1834, Shikhmatov, who had already taken 
monastic vows, changed the problematical word “bogotvorima” (deified or 
worshipped) to the more cautious “sacredly honored” (sviashchenno-chtima) 
(Garzonio 1994, 73). 
Shishkov’s “Treatise on Love for the Fatherland,” in which this cult reached 
its culmination, was recited with resounding success in the “Colloquy” on 
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December 15, 1811. Ten days later in his “Sermon on Christ’s Birth,” Filaret 
developed the idea that Christ’s Kingdom was not of this world, and thus, 
intentionally or not, he unambiguously refuted Shishkov: “Only defenseless 
wanderers find Bethel and Bethlehem—the house of God and the house of the 
Bread of Life. Only voluntary exiles of the earth are accepted as citizens of 
heaven. One who desires to be a receptacle for the Son of God must have one’s 
fatherland in God alone, and, for all one’s regard for the earthly fatherland, 
which by the way is perfectly natural and just, one should consider it only an 
antechamber to heaven (predgradie nebesnogo)” (Filaret 1994, 43). D. I. 
Khvostov, who was present at the session when Shishkov read his “Treatise,” 
subjected it to criticism that partly anticipated Filatet’s: “On December 16 there 
was a reading by Shishkov of his ‘Speech on Love for the Fatherland,’” he wrote in 
his diary. “The public was satisfied with it, the members of the Colloquy were 
wild about it, but really the speech is poor. The examples are puerile, the proofs 
weak, somehow [having to do with] faith, upbringing, and language. Faith is 
love for the Celestial Power, and whether it instills patriotism in us, I don’t 
know. History often demonstrates the opposite.” Later Khvostov added a 
sarcastic postscript to this entry: “Be that as it may, this love for the fatherland 
got the author promoted to state secretary” (Khvostov 1938, 378). Shishkov 
even had to face criticism that his patriotic feelings were un-Christian. “Many 
protest against this dictum [“Great is the Russian God”], seeing something 
pagan in it, saying that God is one for all peoples, so how can one say the Russian 
God?” he wrote in the notes to Arndt’s Short and Just Tale. “But these protests 
are unjust. Here the Russian God does not signify a special divinity that the 
Russians have, but one and the same God [who confers] great grace on the 
Russians” (Arndt 1814, 51n). 
In the “Essay on the Moral Reasons for Our Unprecedented Successes in 
the War with the French of 1812” that he read in the Colloquy, Filaret repeated 
many of the rhetorical moves that had been employed in Shishkov’s manifes-
toes. Thus he fully reproduced the metaphors characteristic of the Shishkov 
circle relative to the moral infection that the French brought with themselves to 
Russia: “Did he [Napoleon] not strive to organize within our very own borders 
an unseen advance guard, sending crowds of revolutionary scum who carried 
infection in the wake of orphaned sons of the French kingdom who were 
running to us to escape that very infection which was consuming their 
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homeland? And the sons of the North, just as alien to base suspicion as suscep-
tible to deviousness, sometimes accepted them into their unsuspecting homes, 
like a snake into their bosoms” (Filaret 1822, 172). Just as familiar to those who 
heard the “Essay” was Filaret’s providentialist interpretation of recent events 
and the conviction that the European catastrophe had only been the fulfillment 
of God’s unfathomable plan that had at first been hidden from mortal eyes 
(ibid., 183–185). 
At the same time, a whole series of thoughts that Filaret expressed sharply 
distinguish his position from the Shishskovite one. The most profound differ-
ences emerge when Filaret speaks of the place that Russia occupies in the world 
and in Europe, as well as his ideas concerning Russia’s divine predestination. 
“What is the state?” he asked. His first definition was: “A certain district in the 
general domain of the Almighty, externally separate but linked to the unity of 
the whole by an unseen power” (ibid., 177). Here the notion that was arguably 
central to Shishkov’s world view as expressed in his manifestoes—that the 
national body had to be walled off in isolation from alien peoples—was rejected. 
For Filaret the separate existence (“otdelennost’”) of any state was an external 
attribute of political reality that only thinly covered over the inner unity of 
God’s world order. Filaret underscored this inner unity with his second defini-
tion, when he noted the functional nature of the separation of mankind into 
state formations: “What is the state? A great family of people which because of 
its increasing numbers and the differentiation of clans could not be controlled 
as it was at the beginning by a single and natural father, and so it recognizes a 
Sovereign to rule over it in this capacity who is chosen by God and the law” 
(ibid., 178). Translating this argument from the metaphysical into the histor-
ical sphere, Filaret again postulates the original unity of humanity in which 
various peoples are likened to different families within the bounds of one state. 
While the metaphor of the state-family may differ from that of the 
state-organism, it does not essentially contradict it; a family may also be 
understood as an organic whole. Thus Shishkov, who constantly resorted to 
personalizing formulas (e.g., “The Sovereign and fatherland are the head and 
body,” “The troops, grandees, nobles, clergy, merchants, peasants … made up 
a single soul”; Shishkov 1870, 142, 171), at times used the family metaphor 
himself (e.g., “On the one hand, landowners, out of paternal concern for them 
[their peasants] as for their own offspring, and [the peasants] on the other 
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hand, like ardent householders, filled with [a sense of ] filial responsibility 
and duty, bring themselves to that happy condition in which well-behaved 
and successful families thrive.” Ibid., 307). In this light it is important that the 
third and last definition that Filaret gives for a state emphasizes the conscious 
moral choice made by citizens who take upon themselves the corresponding 
civic obligations: “What is the state? A union of free moral beings who join 
together and sacrifice part of their freedom for the preservation and support 
of morality through the general powers of the law, which is a necessary condi-
tion of their being” (Filaret 1822, 179). Here too the view of the state is 
universalist. The moral law is one for all peoples and monarchs, only some of 
them “enter the universal order of His rule … through devotion and virtue,” 
while others, on the contrary, “get together only out of fear and are motivated 
only by personal interest,” “bring society closer to failure,” and are ultimately 
“struck down by justice as an unacceptable part of God’s domain” (ibid., 
177–179). It was precisely this moral participation of Alexander’s subjects in 
a “union of love” with their sovereign, their adherence to a single moral law, 
that enabled them to preserve national unity even “when the voice of the laws 
was almost inaudible amid the noise of battle” (ibid., 182). This unity was 
guaranteed not so much by the organic strength of the national body as by the 
free moral choice of Russia’s inhabitants, including the enserfed peasants: “… 
A multitude of free hands abandoned their scales, pens, and other peaceful 
tools and reached for swords; free sacrifices for the needs of warfare were not 
only made generously by free people, but also by those who themselves could 
be sacrificed by others” (ibid., 181). In Filaret’s “Essay,” the words “free” and 
“freedom” occur nine times, while, for comparison, in the entire corpus of 
Shishkov’s manifestoes, about seven times larger in size, they occur only 
eleven times, and of these, eight refer to European peoples that Napoleon 
conquered. “We have already saved [them], glorified our fatherland, and 
returned Europe its freedom and independence” (Shishkov 1870, 258)—this 
usage is typical of the rhetoric of Shishkov’s manifestoes. 
As state secretary, Shishkov was obliged to extol the Russian army’s 
European campaign and not raise doubts about his own sincere pride in its 
successes. But, as noted, for him the campaign of liberating Europe only supple-
mented and highlighted the war’s main task—to save Russia from the enemy 
and to guarantee its safety. In Filaret’s conception these two tasks were reversed. 
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The expulsion of the French from Russia only served as the first step in realizing 
its universal historical mission—to confirm the Christian order throughout 
Europe. He concluded his essay:
Today, errant peoples, know the path to the wellbeing you desire that you 
lost in vain fantasies! The divine scourge has struck Europe so that its blows 
would be heard at all ends of the universe. Heed the voice of the One Who 
Punishes and turn to Him, so that He be your Savior.
Today, Russia, blessed by God, know your greatness and do not 
slumber—preserve the basis on which that greatness was achieved! 
And You,… Who, firm in the truth, saved Your realm and with goodness 
in might is saving other realms. Rejoice in His strength and be joyful for His 
salvation! (Filaret 1822, 184–185)
Figure 22 Medallion commemorating the expulsion of the enemy from  
Russia in 1812 by A. N. Olenin.
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In the first half of 1813, the doctrine of national messianism was only briefly 
sketched out. After a year, however, in his “Sermon on the Day of the Trium-
phant Coronation (venchanie na tsarstvo) and Holy Anointing of the Pious 
Sovereign Emperor Aleksander Pavlovich,” Filaret could formulate it with 
exhaustive fullness and specificity:
There is only one true—because natural—route to national power, the route 
to social good and to the salvation of suffering humanity. If the Tsar and 
people have the blessing of Providence such that their strength revealed in 
saving themselves from danger, extends to the salvation of other peoples that 
suffer under a heavy and unjust yoke, then their happiness is not deceptive 
and their joy is fulfilled. If God not only manifests His salvation for us, but 
through us, then we are not only an object but an active instrument of His 
plan. … The Russian Tsar delights in Your strength and for Your [sending] 
saving [grace], first onto us, then through us and now for the entire Christian 
race, he rejoices. (Filaret 1873, 195, 197)
This Christian universalism, based on the sense of a special providential 
mission for Russia and its emperor, came to replace Shishkov’s isolationism 
as imperial state ideology. This kind of rhetoric attained special intensity in 
the framework of the popular apocalyptic interpretation of recent events. In 
one of his most celebrated sermons, the “Sermon on the Voice Crying in the 
Wilderness,” delivered in Prince Golitsyn’s home church, Filaret said:
Do we not already hear the end of the great universal sermon—this Gospel 
will be brought to all creation and then the end will come. In this gloomy 
midnight You alone see if it is already time for the cry: Behold, the bridegroom 
cometh; go ye out to meet him!… 
But if someone does not yet hear, or does not recognize the voice of God 
in the exploits of his own life; yet at least he will not shut his ears and heart 
to the destinies of those universal voices which suddenly stun tribes and 
peoples, astonish the eyes, unsettle heaven and earth. … We will not speak 
about the blows with which He shakes the entire great desert of Western 
Christianity. Do you not hear that voice that thundered not long ago and that 
has still not abated within the borders of our land, in the ruins, in the barren 
desert of the great city? (Filaret 1814, 14–17)
On June 16, 1813, Filaret returned the proofs of the journal Readings in the 
Colloquy of Lovers of the Russian Word, along with the text of his “Essay,” to S. P. 
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Potemkin. “Having read the notebook and having found it correct, I return it to 
Your Highness,” he wrote in the accompanying letter. “I only have doubts about 
the two last words, that is, the name of the writer, but if the Colloquy wants them 
to be there, I cannot keep water in a sieve” (Filaret 1883, 45). “To keep water in 
a sieve” was completely impossible. Filaret’s influence and fame continued to 
grow. On June 29, 1813, after the sermon he delivered over M. I. Kutuzov’s coffin 
in the Kazan Cathedral, he was awarded the Order of Equiapostolic Prince 
Vladimir in the second degree. “This decoration is unparalleled in our time, all 
the more so in those years,” wrote S. Ponomarev in 1867 (Ponomarev 1867/1868, 
№ 12, 528). Yet D. I. Khvostov, who had been so critical of Shishkov’s “Speech 
on Love for the Fatherland,” also remained dissatisfied with this sermon:
They say that Filaret, the well-known preacher, was sent the Order of 
Vladimir second degree. A great distinction. [Was it] really for his sermon at 
Pr[ince] Kutuzov-Smolenskii’s grave? A work of oratory is a very secondary 
type of creation, and hundreds of priests in Russia could write something 
similar. It does not live up to its content and is unworthy of the leader about 
whom it preaches. Why the comparison with [ Judah] Maccabee? It is inde-
cent if only for the reason that after Maccabee’s death, the kingdom of Judea 
fell. (Khvostov 1938, 392)
Khvostov’s grumbling, however, could not halt the ideological changes either 
in 1811 or in 1813. It was Filaret and no other who was entrusted with 
composing a commemorative service for the holiday “of saving the Church and 
Russian State from the Invasion of the Gauls and with them the twelve nations” 
which, by the ukase of December 25, 1812, was ordered to be celebrated on 
Christmas day (PSZ № 25669). The order of service included: verses from the 
fourth book of Kings (2 Kings in the Western Bible) about the sign given to 
Hezekiah (2 Kings 19: 20–22, 27–28); the famous passage from Revelations 
about the horseman on a white horse (Rev 19: 11–16); the visions of the Baby-
lonian king from the Book of Isaiah; and the hymns “Glory to God in the 
Highest,” “We Praise You God,” and “In the Bethlehem Manger” (Izhe vo 
iasliakh Vifleemskikh) (see Dobronravov 1913). As Georgii Florovskii noted, 
“this was a service for the salvation of the whole world” (Florovskii 1937, 583). 
Alexander I’s new political course had received eloquent ideological and ritual 
formulation. Now he needed new bards. 
 1 
The period of the war with Napoleon and the first postwar years saw the appearance of a new state poet, arguably the last one in the history of 
the empire, but undoubtedly the last to be equally accepted both by state 
and society. With the publication of “The Singer in the Camp of Russian 
Warriors,” in the December 1812, issue of Herald of Europe, V. A. Zhukovskii’s 
name outgrew literary circles to reach a national audience, after which 
followed the poet’s recognition at court. The success of “The Singer” is all 
the more striking against the background of Derzhavin’s unsuccessful 
attempt to treat the great events of 1812—his “Lyric-Epic Hymn on the 
Expulsion of the French from the Fatherland” (see Derzhavin III, 137). We 
do not know the exact date of the rough draft in which Derzhavin expressed 
the intention to pass on his “decaying lyre” (vetkhaia lira) “as a legacy to 
Zhukovskii” (ibid., 449), but some time on the threshold between 1812 and 
1813, this intention was accomplished. In February 1813 “The Singer” 
earned approval through the court of the Dowager Empress Maria Fedorovna, 
who—in the absence of Alexander, who was away with the army, and 
who in any case had little interest in literary affairs—provided ideological 
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leadership for the literary process. On May 8 the empress presented the poet 
with a ring and ordered that a separate edition of the poem be published at 
her cost (Dmitriev 1871, 417–421). 
Zhukovskii himself, despite the persistence of the humility topos in his 
works (“my weak gift,” “unknown singer,” “timid strings,” etc.), rather quickly 
acquired a sense of his providential mission. “Send me a copy, and everything 
good [that has been written] on the occasion of current victories,” he wrote to 
A. I. Turgenev on April 9, 1813, after the separate edition of “The Singer” had 
come out. “I also want to write something, the more so since I have the right to 
do so, because I foretold them: many places from my song were simply 
prophetic and happened à la lettre” (Zhukovskii 1895, 98–99). However, the 
victories of Russian arms remained unsung by him. In May 1814 after receiving 
news of the taking of Paris, he was in distress over his lack of creative produc-
tion that had been caused by grievous personal circumstances:
You order me to write. Priceless friend, my soul takes fire at the great things 
that are happening before our eyes. My heart contracts when recalling our 
Sovereign and that divine role that he is now playing in the sight of the entire 
world. Russia has never been so exalted. What a wonderful greatness! But as 
if on purpose my imagination is having a dry spell. Thoughts awaken in my 
head, but when I take up the pen I feel paralysis and I can only pity myself. I 
cannot describe this condition to you. It is not grief—no! Grief is also life, 
but this is some kind of dead aridity. Everything seems empty, and life—
even more empty. Such a state is worse than death, and perhaps only 
Napoleon’s could be even worse. (Ibid., 119)
Zhukovskii’s writer’s block was all the harder for him because he felt both 
prepared and obligated to give poetic expression to Russia’s greatest victory. 
Moreover he almost immediately knew what literary form this would take. 
“However, despite my paralysis, I sometimes have thoughts about writing an 
epistle to our Mark Aurelius. What an enchanting character. And what pages for 
history does 1814 have in store! Brother, brother! It would be happiness what-
ever I could write!” he complained in the same letter (ibid., 120). In the fall of 
1814 work on an epistle to Alexander was his main creative occupation. 
“Between us: I would like to write an Epistle to the Sovereign. Will it be accepted, 
and is it not too late?” the poet asked the same Turgenev in October (ibid., 
125). Also at that time, in listing his future projects in a letter to Masha 
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Protasova, he included a single original poetic undertaking—the “Epistle to the 
Sovereign” (Zhukovskii 1907, 46). 
In October Zhukovskii finally experienced the long-desired creative surge. 
On the twentieth he reported to Turgenev that he had finished the plan for the 
epistle: “The plan is done, it seems, well, and this is the most important thing 
for me. It is written, so I need not fear that ideas written down in a moment of 
heat will depart my brain in a moment of coldness” (Zhukovskii 1895, 126; 
various fragments of the plan are published and analyzed by: Poplavskaia 1983, 
105–115; Iankushevich 1985, 104–108; Iezuitova 1989, 153–154). On 
November 8 the poet reported to his correspondent that “not one line [of the 
epistle] is written yet,” because he wanted “to finish many trivial tasks to take on 
one important one without any distraction.” Now when the preliminary plan 
was done, Zhukovskii prepared “to add his name to a monument to Alexander.” 
Work on the epistle now went quickly. As I. A. Poplavskaia has shown, the main 
part of the text was written between November 13 and 23 (Zhukovskii I, 722). 
“You are waiting for the plan of my Epistle to the Sovereign,” the poet wrote 
Turgenev on December 1, “but I am sending you the completed work” 
(Zhukovskii 1895, 130). 
Zhukovskii asked Turgenev that, before presenting the epistle to the 
empress, he should read it to K. N. Batiushkov, D. N. Bludiov, S. S. Uvarov and D. 
V. Dashkov. This request was fulfilled, and the poet’s friends responded to his 
new creation with delight. “Your work is enchanting, everything in it is noble, 
both its thoughts and feelings. It is full of life and poetry—in a word, you are 
equal to your subject, and what a subject,” Batiushkov enthused. He, together 
with N. I. Gnedich and A. F. Voeikov, made a series of minor criticisms, most of 
which Zhukovskii took into account when editing the poem (Batiushkov II, 
1989, 317–318). “Wonderful! Wonderful! Lofty feelings, profound and 
powerful thoughts, bold and noble praise, the language of a poet. … Turgenev 
and I are thinking of the best way to present your beautiful work to the Sovereign 
Empress,” Uvarov wrote to Zhukovskii on December 20 (Uvarov 1871, 0163). 
This presentation took place on the thirtieth before the grand princes and 
princesses and Maria Fedorovna’s secretary, the poet Iu. A. Neledinskii-Meletskii. 
Turgenev read the epistle while the empress followed the text in a copy she held 
in her hands. As Turgenev reported to Zhukovskii, the grand princes interrupted 
the reading with cries of “Beautiful! Excellent! C’est sublime” and expressed the 
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desire that the epistle be translated into English and German, the languages of 
Russia’s allies. The tongue of defeated France apparently seemed unworthy for 
singing the praises of their lawfully-crowned brother. However, Turgenev 
expressed doubts about the prospects for such translations: “For that you would 
need another Zhukovskii, and he belongs to Russia alone; only Russia has an 
Alexander and a Zhukovskii. … I am sure that Alexander with his soul that is 
insensible to honors will feel the force of his genius and will render justice to 
himself and to the age that produced this genius” (Zhukovskii 1864, 885–887). 
The dowager empress expressed the desire to familiarize herself with 
everything that came from Zhukovskii’s pen, and also to receive a copy of the 
epistle to send to Alexander at the Congress of Vienna. On September 4, 1815, 
Zhukovskii arrived in Petersburg from Derpt and was received by the empress 
and grand princes at court, where he himself read “The Singer in the Camp of 
Russian Warriors.” At the conclusion of the meeting, Neledinskii-Meletskii 
recited the epistle “To Emperor Alexander,” which had become Zhukovskii’s 
calling-card. Zhukovskii was branded as a state poet, and he himself was quite 
eager to accept this status. A year later, in October 1816, when Prince Golitsyn 
presented the emperor with a copy of Zhukovskii’s newly published Poems, the 
poet wrote to Turgenev, “The Sovereign’s attention is a sacred matter—I can 
also have a right to it if I will be a Russian poet in the noble sense of the name. 
And I will! Poetry … must have influence on the soul of the entire people, and 
it will have this positive influence if the poet turns his gift to this end. Poetry 
belongs to national education” (Zhukovskii 1895, 163). The emperor fully 
appreciated Zhukovskii’s writing and his intentions. The poet was awarded a 
pension of 4000 rubles in 1816 and, a short time later, the position of teacher of 
Russian to the Grand Princess Aleksandra Fedorovna, wife of the future 
Emperor Nicholas I. Zhukovskii could not have become more “official.”
 2 
Recognition came to Zhukovskii against the background of the complete 
destruction of his hopes for personal happiness. His joining Moscow’s home 
guard on August 12, 1812, occurred a few days after E. A. Protasova refused 
him entry to her house because of what she felt were improper hints at his feel-
ings for her daughter. The ukase awarding Zhukovskii a mention in December 
1816 came only a little before Masha Protasova’s wedding to Dr. Moyer on 
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January 14, 1817. Over the course of four and a half years, Zhukovskii first 
gained and then lost his hopes for the happy arrangement of his fate. In these 
years the political storms and personal drama merged in his poetry, mutually 
embellishing each other. Evidently, the personal tone that was unthinkable 
for traditional official battle poetry was what guaranteed “The Singer” its 
resounding success. 
A мы?.. Доверенность к Творцу! 
   Что б ни было — Незримой 
Ведет нас к лучшему концу 
   Стезей непостижимой. 
(And us?.. [Have] confidence in the Creator! / Whatever comes—the 
Unseen One / Will lead us to the best end [could also mean: “a better end”] 
/ By an inscrutable path.)
These providential formulas easily fit into the official position on the ongoing 
military actions: misfortunes and military setbacks, including the surrender of 
Moscow, were only part of God’s unknowable design, hidden for a time from 
mortal eyes, but ultimately directed toward the greater glory of the Russian 
Empire. “The Singer” had been written when these were still only poetic hopes 
and it was published when they had begun to come true. In 1815, when they 
were fated to be totally fulfilled, Batiushkov repeated Zhukovskii’s formulas 
once again: 
Мой дух! доверенность к Творцу! 
Мужайся; будь в терпеньи камень.
Не он ль к лучшему концу
Меня провел сквозь браный пламень?   
   (Batiushkov I, 165)
(My spirit! [Have] confidence in the Creator! / Have courage; be patient 
like a stone. / Was it not for the best end /He led me through the flame of 
war?)
The word combination “confidence in the Creator” (or more precisely, its prose 
equivalent, “confidence in Providence”) had a long history from Zhukovskii’s 
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lips. Back in 1803 after the death of his friend and spiritual mentor Andrei 
Turgenev, he had tried to console Turgenev’s father: “However it may be, as 
Karamzin says, and every good person should say: [have] confidence in the 
Creator! “ (Zhukovskii 1895, 10). Zhukovskii clearly indicates the source of his 
frame of mind, but in borrowing Karamzin’s words he—perhaps not fully 
consciously—subtly shifts the meaning in ways that are extremely suggestive. 
Zhukovskii was citing Karamzin’s fictional correspondence published in 1795 
between Melodor and Filaret, names that in Greek mean “giver of songs” and 
“truth-lover,” i.e., a poet and a philosopher. The philosopher Filaret, consoling 
his friend who has become disillusioned with humanity and the meaning of life 
after the bloody disturbances of the French Revolution, wrote:
Why not have that same confidence in Providence that two people may have 
in one another?… I have confidence in the All-High and I am tranquil. No! 
The lamp of learning will not die out on the earthly sphere. … Enlighten-
ment is always beneficial; enlightenment leads to virtue, proving to us the 
close union of the personal and the general good, revealing a never-ending 
source of happiness in our own breasts; … in enlightenment alone we find 
the salvific antidote for all human misfortunes. (Karamzin II, 186, 188)
To Karamzin, confidence in Providence is—despite all possible reservations—
the conviction that the supreme power arranges the world for the best, both for 
an individual and for humanity. For Zhukovskii, it is hope for the immortality 
of the soul. For both Zhukovskii and Batiushkov, the Creator leads those who 
have trust in Him “to a better [or: the best] end”—victory and miraculous deliv-
erance on the field of battle. But in the broader context of both poems, the 
“better end” is synonymous with “a better world,” to which, in Zhukovskii “the 
son of combat” flies “on wings of lightning,” while in Batiushkov, a “better life” 
comes when, having shed “earthly raiments,” the poet “quenches the desire for 
love” “with a stream of heavenly rewards.” 
Zhukovskii’s correspondence with Masha Protasova in 1814–1815 liter-
ally abounds with similar phrases. The poet describes a vision of future 
happiness that came to him: “I seem to see through some sort of fog: calmness, 
spiritual tranquility, confidence in Providence” (Zhukovskii 1883, 207). 
“Confidence in Providence has awakened in me,” he notes in his diary for his 
beloved his impression from reading “Our Father.” “You and Providence—in 
both of you is my true happiness. I give you over to its protection, and I myself 
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give my word to give myself over to it with perfect tranquility,” he writes to 
Masha, and in answer she nevertheless reproaches him for “little confidence in 
Providence” and wishes him “more confidence in God and the carefree [feeling] 
of a child” (Zhukovskii 1907, 32–37). This list could be continued. 
Placing oneself unconditionally into the hands of Providence demands 
the inevitable relinquishing of one’s individual will and desires. The single 
action worthy of a person is to reject the notion that one is capable of influ-
encing one’s life and the course of events and obligated to do so; one must 
instead meet any manifestation of higher will with the necessary acceptance. 
Another constant refrain in the letters of Zhukovskii and Masha is the line from 
Zhukovskii’s recently written poem “Teon and Eshkin”—“everything in life is 
the means for [something] great”—which they occasionally cite, replacing the 
epithet “great” with “beautiful” (ibid., 59, 65, 70; cf. Zhukovskii 1895, 156). 
“You will not get far with Stoicism! Woe to him who depends on himself in 
anything,… and here only virtue ne pas avoir d’excés: resignation parfait à la 
volonté de Dieu (may not be excessive: perfect resignation to God’s will),” wrote 
Masha to A. P. Elagina on April 25, 1815 (Zhukovskii 1904, 144). 
It was just this “perfect resignation of oneself to God’s will” that becomes 
the central feature ascribed to the addressee of the epistle “To Emperor 
Alexander.” All of the appearances of the sovereign in the poem are marked by 
descriptions of prayers and by the corresponding rhetorical formulas that 
express the hero’s supreme degree of humility before Providence, which 
deserves particular reverence in someone with such unlimited power: 
Смиренно приступив к сосуду примиренья,
В себе весь свой народ Ты в руку Провиденья,
С спокойной на Него надеждой положил — 
[коронация Александра] 
И в грозный между тем полки слиянии строй,
На все готовые, с покорной тишиной
На твой смотрели взор и ждали мановенья.
А Ты?.. Ты от небес молил благословенья…
И ангел их, гремя, на щит Твой низлетел,… 
И Ты средь плесков сих — не гордый победитель,
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Но воли Промысла смиренный совершитель. …
[начало европейского похода]
На страшном месте том смиренный вождь царей
Пред миротворною святыней алтарей
Велит своим полкам склонить знамена мщенья…
[молебен в Париже на месте казни Людовика XVI]
И се!.. приникнувший к престола ступеням
Во прах пред божеством свою бросает славу!..
О Вечный! осени смиренного державу;
[возбращение Александра в Петербург]
Склоняю, Царь земли, колена пред тобой,
Бесстрашный под твоей незримою рукой,
Твоих намерений над ними [поданными]  
   совершитель…
[молитва Александра]
(Zhukovskii I, 367–376; on the same prayers in the “Prayer of the Russian 
People” of 1815, the prototype of the future hymn, see Kiseleva 1998)
(Humbly approaching the vessel of reconciliation, / You have placed 
yourself with all Your people / Within you in the hand of Providence, with 
tranquil hope in Him - 
[Alexander’s coronation]
And meanwhile the regiments merged together into awesome ranks, / 
Ready for anything and in humble silence, / Looked at your expression and 
awaited a signal. / And You?.. You were praying for heaven’s blessing / And 
their angel, roaring, flew down to your shield … / And you among these 
bursts of applause are no proud conqueror / But the humble executor of the 
will of Providence…
[the beginning of the European campaign]
On that terrible place the humble leader of tsars, / Before the sacred altar of 
reconciliation, / Orders his regiments to lower the banners of vengeance…
[prayers in Paris in the place of Louis XVI’s execution]
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And that one! .. Bending down to the steps of the altar / Casts his glory into 
the dust before the deity! / Oh, Eternal One! Protect the dominion of the 
humble;
[Alexander’s return to Petersburg]
I bend my knee before you, Tsar over the earth; / Under your unseen hand I 
am fearless, / Executor of your intentions for them [my subjects]. )
[Alexander’s prayer]
One should note that the accent on humility and submission to Providence, 
which reached an apogee in this epistle, fully corresponded to official propa-
ganda. Thus Archimandrite Filaret, whose spiritual eloquence had a huge 
influence on Zhukovskii, delivered his “Sermon on the Day of the Triumphant 
Coronation to the Kingdom and Holy Anointment of the Most Pious Sover-
eign Emperor Aleksandr Pavlovich” at the same time Zhukovskii was beginning 
to contemplate his epistle to the emperor. Here it said in part:
At that very time when our Most Pious Autocrat wants to give worthy praise 
to his victorious troops he sings David’s hymn: not to us, Lord, but to Your 
name give glory. … [He] does not only profess what is, but also senses and 
predicts the future influence of Providence on his actions. God alone, he 
says, rules everyone, it is He that accomplishes this matter, so that the great 
matter of saving shattered kingdoms and groaning peoples and of pacifying 
the world is accomplished. (Filaret 1873, 195–196)
In this sermon Filaret refers to Alexander’s well-known manifestoes and ukases 
that themselves contain abundant formulas of ritual self-abnegation. On June 
30, 1814, the emperor declined a petition from the Synod, Senate and State 
Council that they be allowed to erect a monument to him and that he be granted 
the appellation “Blessed.” Alexander explained that all of his soul’s “thoughts 
and efforts” consisted in seeking divine and human blessing, but nevertheless 
he emphasized that “I do not permit Myself, as person, the presumption to 
think that I have already achieved that and can accept and bear that title. All the 
more so … since I have always and everywhere encouraged My subjects to 
modesty and a humble spirit…” (PSZ № 25629). 
Richard Wortman has collected a broad range of materials which testify 
that this whole rhetorical arsenal was not formal, but that it reflected the emper-
or’s deep psychological mindset (Wortman 1994, 221–231). Alexander not 
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Figure 23 Prayer of Thanksgiving in Paris, 1814. Gravure by I. V. Cheskii.
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only “took every opportunity to display self-effacement in his work to effect the 
designs of God” (ibid., 224), but he also incessantly tried to assimilate the 
“technology” of this self-effacement. According to Golitsyn’s testimony, at one of 
the meetings of the war council in 1814 in France, Alexander, as he said himself, 
felt “an overpowering desire to turn the matter over to God’s will.” 
“I strongly desired to pray,” continued the emperor, “and to pour out the 
heavy doubts and vacillations of my soul before the Lord. The council 
continued to work, but I left it for a while and hurried into my own room; 
there my legs bent at the knee by themselves and I poured out my whole 
heart before God.” After long and energetic prayers, Alexander finally heard 
God’s word. “A sweet world in my thoughts, penetrated with calm, a firm 
decisiveness of will and a kind of radiant clarity of purpose—all this was 
given me then in this joyful and certain injunction.” (Bartenev 1886, 95)
In this way, and despite the opinion of the majority of his generals, the decision 
was made to march on Paris. In these memoirs it is also related how, after the 
French were driven from Russia, Alexander cut off his generals who had 
ascribed the victory “to the unmatched courage of the glorious Russian army 
and the just as immoveable will of their powerful ruler and commander.” The 
emperor objected that, in his words, “the Lord Jesus is the only Conqueror and 
Liberator of the motherland from the fierce enemy invasion” (ibid., 91). 
The heavy labor of deciphering the preordained will of Providence 
demanded helpers. Over the course of his entire life Alexander sought spiritual 
advisers and surrounded himself with mystics and visionaries who helped him 
determine the necessary condition of the spirit.1 Soon after taking Paris, on July 
10, 1814, his meeting with the most celebrated European mystic Johann Hein-
rich Jung (Stilling) occurred. Alexander was more or less familiar with Stilling’s 
works, about which he had written to Ekaterina Pavlovna in the note “On 
Mystical Literature” (Nikolai Mikhailovich 1910, 288). In the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Stilling’s autobiography, which told of the endless and 
beneficent interventions of Providence in the author’s fate, was known all over 
Europe. One section of the book concluded with the assertion that it describes 
not “Stilling’s whole life in general [the autobiography was written in the third 
1 The legend originating from Alexander himself that his religious awakening was connected 
with the events of 1812 was decisively disputed by G. Florovskii (1937, 130).
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person], but only the history of how he was guided by Providence” ( Jung-
Stilling II, 175). 
With Jung-Stilling Alexander discussed the religious situation in Russia, 
the position of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and also the question of 
which confession best corresponds to the spirit of true Christianity. However, 
Alexander wanted most of all to find out from his conversation partner what 
this true Christianity consists of. In Jung-Stilling’s words, he told Alexander the 
main things were “perfect abnegation (abandon parfait), constant concentra-
tion (receuillement continuel), and heartfelt prayer (oraison de coeur).” “‘Yes,’ 
answered the emperor, ‘that’s exactly what I practice.’ ‘But how does Your Excel-
lency manage to maintain this state amid so many activities?’ ‘I am sometimes 
able to reach it,’ said the emperor, ‘but I must admit that it is becoming harder 
and harder’” (Ley 1975, 88). Stilling’s list of Christian virtues was probably 
already familiar to Alexander. On December 22, 1814, about the time 
Zhukovskii’s epistle was being read by his friends in Petersburg, in a letter to 
F. M. Tseier Speranskii named “prayer, humility and renunciation” as the feel-
ings that are “most significant for piety” (Speranskii 1870b, 175). Living in the 
country far from court news, Speranskii could hardly have known about 
Alexander’s latest mystical conversations; however, he himself had had many 
such talks with him three or four years earlier. Similarly, while working on the 
epistle, Zhukovskii almost certainly did not know about the lessons that the 
emperor had received from the famed mystic.2 Even so, he was still able to 
represent Alexander’s Christian ideal accurately. Under his pen the emperor 
appeared just the way Jung-Stilling had described the ideal Christian: someone 
who completely casts off worldly strivings, continually concentrates on under-
standing divine predestination, and who turns to the creator with words of 
heartfelt prayer.
 3 
In Zhukovskii’s epistle Alexander is shown conversing alone with God, without 
the clergy. Even in his frequent descriptions of church rituals, the poet does not 
2 Theoretically, information about such an important conversation could have reached the 
poet, if we take into account his close relationship with A. I. Turgenev, Turgenev’s with 
Golitsyn, and Golitsyn’s with Alexander. However, in the second half of 1814 Zhukovskii 
was far from Petersburg, and hardly anyone would have dared trust such stories to writing. 
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mention any religious figures even once, each time choosing—perhaps not 
fully consciously—grammatical constructions that create the feeling that the 
holy rite is taking place by itself:
Когда ж священный храм при громах растворился —
О, сколь пленителен Ты нам тогда явился,… 
И погрузился крест при громах в древни воды!
И се!.. подъемлется спасения сосуд…
И звучно грянуло: воскреснул Искупитель!
Россия, Он грядет; уже алтарь горит,
Уже Его принять отверзлись двери храма,
Уж благодарное куренье фимиама,
С сердцами за него взлетело к небесам! 
    (Zhukovskii I, 367; 373–375)
(When the holy temple opened to the sound of thunder—/ Oh, how 
enthralling You appeared to us,… // And to the sound of thunder the cross 
was plunged in the ancient waters! // And so!… the vessel of salvation will 
rise up… / And it resounded loudly: the Redeemer has been resurrected! // 
Russia, He will come; the altar already burns, / The doors of the temple have 
already opened to receive Him, / Already the grateful smoke of incense / 
Has flown up to the heavens with our hearts after it!)
This consistent way of describing church services came from the epistle’s 
basic artistic conception; in Zhukovskii the tsar communes directly with 
God, so there is no room for mediators. However, this scenario is also 
founded on a whole series of biographical, ideological and historical 
presuppositions.
“Why should a person dressed in a cassock and called a protopope have 
more influence on you than our common good, than the sight of your chil-
dren, than your own reason?,” wrote Zhukovskii with poorly-motivated 
irritation to A. P. Kireevskaia in the summer of 1813; Kireevskaia had 
intended to invite a clergyman to console her after the death of her husband. 
Zhukovskii’s none-too-tender attitude toward the church hierarchy was 
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Figure 24 Portrait of V. A. Zhukovskii. Gravure by A. A. Florov from the  
original by P. F. Sokolov. 
additionally complicated in these years by the fact that, in his opinion, wrong-
ly-interpreted church rules stood in his path to happiness. Ekaterina Afanas’eva 
Protasova—Zhukovskii’s half-sister—had refused to permit Zhukovskii’s 
marriage with his niece, her daughter, on the basis of her religious convic-
tions. Zhukovskii’s letters to Turgenev of the period were full of sarcastic 
comments on cassocks and those who wear them. In one of them Zhukovskii 
wrote that “Nature and God” did not oppose his marriage to Masha and that 
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Ekaterina Afanas’eva was “acting out of some sort of cruel and fanatical 
motives” (Zhukovskii 1895, 139). Zhukovskii hoped to overcome these 
motives and prejudices by attracting authority figures to his side; he also 
insisted that technically, according to the official register of births, he was not 
considered the Protasovs’ relative: “The written law opposes marriages 
between relatives, but in nature relatives do not exist. … The law does not call 
me her brother, consequently I recognize a single law of nature, and it is not 
against me. The Lutheran and Roman Catholic religions also allow marriages 
between relatives” (ibid.).3
Zhukovskii juxtaposed ecclesiastical formalism to living, personally expe-
rienced faith that told him that the feelings he shared with Masha were 
preordained by Providence. After leaving the home guard in February 1813 or 
1814, he went to I. V. Lopukhin in the country to make his emotions and hopes 
known to him. The poet counted on the fact that the support of Lopukhin, who 
enjoyed great moral authority, would help him overcome Ekaterina Afanas’eva’s 
opposition: 
I didn’t pray, but felt that God, hidden beyond that clear sky, saw me, and this 
feeling was stronger than any prayer. … How sweet and invigorating is the 
idea of God, when one imagines oneself in His presence together with her. 
… To this moment I have often noticed in myself some kind of detachment 
from religion—I never rejected it, but it seemed to be the cause of all of the 
losses in my life and I did not separate it from the prejudice which deprived 
me of everything! But superstition is not religion. And now in this light I see 
that it is essential for true happiness! And this will be a gift from my Masha. 
… How can I not consider her the means, chosen by Providence, to grant 
me the way to be worthy of citizenship in the City of God!
3 Protasova herself argued that for Zhukovskii “everything in the Christian law that did not 
profit him he considered a prejudice” (Zhukovskii 1904, 289). On his part, Zhukovskii 
denied that his sister had true Christian feelings: “Christianity (in her words) forces her to 
refuse us our happiness, but she doesn’t have [the features] that constitute the character of a 
Christian woman” (Zhukovskii 1895, 137). Most later biographers have agreed with his 
assessment. K. K. Zeidlits (1883, 60) called Protasova’s views “outward formalism,” and in P. 
A. Viskovatov’s opinion, “she believed in various prejudices and saw religiosity in external 
ritualism” (Viskovatov 1883, 187). However, A. E. Gruzinskii’s point of view also seems 
quite reasonable—that “it is hard to consider E. A. Protasova a formalist on this question. 
The proponents of the marriage posed the question in far more formal terms … when they 
based their argument on the fact that there was no kinship between Zhukovskii and Masha 
according to the books” (Zhukovskii 1904, III).
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Zhukovskii returned to this feeling that he had experienced on the road to 
Lopukhin again on the return trip: “This living feeling did not deceive me; I 
am sure that this is God’s voice, [and] Ivan Vladimirovich approved of my 
intentions” (Zhukovskii 1883, 209).
The impossibility of marrying Masha Protasova in no way made the 
existence of their heavenly union less real. At the start of 1814 Zhukovskii 
exchanged rings with Masha and wrote in his diary which was meant for 
her: “We will become betrothed in the name of God for the sake of virtue, 
of a good life, which will pass if not together, then at least in the identical way 
and for one [goal]. We cannot be together,… but one roof or one sky—is it 
not all the same?” (Zhukovskii 1907, 6). At the end of 1815, when the 
impossibility of being with Masha had become clear, he wrote to her in the 
same diary: “Let us forget about the distance that separates us from that 
boundary beyond which our motherland begins, from that future, in which 
we will be together and inseparable. … And our identical life here is a 
preparation for eternity” (ibid., 70). The similarity of the lives of the lovers, 
betrothed by Providence, was to be assured by reading the very same 
passages from Holy Writ and from religious writers and moralists, above all 
their favorite Fénelon (“You have your Fénelon, whom you can under-
stand,” writes Zhukovskii to Masha in the spring of 1815—Zhukovskii 
1883a, 671; cf. 668). It was also ensured by attempts to keep parallel diaries 
that were meant for each other. This spiritual union was not to be destroyed 
by Masha’s marriage, which Zhukovskii ultimately accepted. The poet 
planned to establish with Masha and her husband “a close triumvirate 
whose goal was general happiness” (Veselovskii 1904, 206). Even Masha’s 
death hardly seemed to change anything in this special psychological condi-
tion that enriched Zhukovskii by means of “comradeship with a heavenly 
being”; the very thought of his lost beloved became “a religion” for the poet 
(ibid., 237; Vinitskii 1998, 55–91). 
In the words of the author of one of the best books on the mystical roots of 
the Holy Alliance, E. Мühlenbeck, “in the milieu of German sectarians there 
existed the practice … of entering into mystical marriages that was invented by 
Swedenborg and popularized by Jung-Stilling’s novel. Two people came 
together spiritually for common prayers. … Sometimes people could enter into 
such marriages even if they were already married, or persons of one sex. Some 
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people had several spiritual husbands or wives. Others gave special significance 
to earthly betrothals, seeing them as the antechamber to marriage in the other 
world” (Мühlenbeck 1887, 157). 
The similarity of the poet’s spiritual drama to this kind of psychological 
and mystical experience is obvious; Florovskii wrote long ago about the 
German Pietist roots of Zhukovskii’s religiosity (Florovskii 1937, 129). It is 
indicative that spiritual illumination came to the poet while on the road to 
Lopukhin, the most important Russian mystic and author of the popular tract 
Some Features of the Inner Church (1789–1791). According to Lopukhin, the 
“inner church” was a union of the select who had been enlightened by the light 
of divine wisdom. The varying degree of communion with this light determined 
each member’s position within the fellowship. As for traditional church rituals, 
they were assigned a purely supplementary, although important role—they 
were “to prepare [people for] the most correct and efficacious organization of 
spiritual exercises for the inner service of God” (Lopukhin 1997, 89). According 
to Lopukhin, the “inner church” was a kind of ideal Masonic order. Zhukovskii’s 
membership in Masonry remains a rather debated question (see Lotman 
1960), but the ideal of a close union of souls that understand one another was 
always important for him. Even in “The Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors” 
the very choice of metaphors for toasts in honor of military camaraderie refers 
to this kind of human relations:
Святому братству сей фиал 
   От верных братий круга!
Блажен, кому Создатель дал 
   Усладу жизни, друга; 
С ним счастье вдвое; в скорбный час
   Он сердцу утешенье, 
Он наша совесть; он для нас 
Второе Провиденье. 
(Zhukovskii I, 237)
([Raise] this flask to sacred brotherhood / From the circle of loyal brothers! 
/ Blessed [be] the one to whom the Creator gave / The joy of life, a friend; / 
With him happiness is doubled; in an hour of grief / He is consolation for 
the heart, / He is our conscience; for us he is / A second Providence.)
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At times Zhukovskii saw the prototype of such fraternal association in idyllic 
provincial existence in the circle of friends and family, at times in the court at 
Pavlovsk, to which he addressed his collections Für Wenige (For the Few), and 
at other times in the union of poets. Zhukovskii instilled the same ideal in 
Masha, whose motto was “Activité dans un petit cercle” (Activity in a small 
circle) (see Petukhov 1903, 98).
“You, me, and Batiushkov should make an alliance for life and death. 
Poetry—the goal and means; to glory—honor; to hell with the praise of 
babblers; to friendship—everything!,” he wrote to Viazemskii on November 
10, 1814, the day he began working on the epistle “To Emperor Alexander” 
(Arzamas I, 228). According to Oleg Proskurin, who published this letter, 
under the text “a picture of a torch with three tongues of flame” was drawn 
(ibid., 527). And in February of that year, possibly under the fresh impression 
of the visit to Lopukhin, he wrote to Voeikov:
Without creating parties, we should be crowded into a little circle: 
Viazemskii, Batiushkov, me, you, Uvarov, Pleshcheev, and Turgenev should 
be under one banner—of simplicity and good taste. I forgot a very, very 
important person: Dashkov. Embrace him like a brother for me. Let 
Karamzin and Dmitriev be the ministers of enlightenment in our republic, 
and our pope—Filaret. … Brother, brother! Imagine our Surinam life, 
imagine our tight union, our tranquility, based on spiritual calm and illu-
mined by spiritual joys. … (Ibid., 220)
The reference in this context to the Orthodox hierarch as the “pope” of a literary 
republic or perhaps of a Masonic order might seem unexpected, unless we take 
into consideration the special place Filaret occupied in Zhukovskii’s life and 
that of his close associates. It was Filaret who, in answer to A. I. Turgenev’s 
question, declared that he did not see any obstacles to Zhukovskii marrying 
Masha (see Zeidlits 1883, 60). But it was even more important that Filaret, 
rising star of the Orthodox Church, was at this time not only sympathetic to 
reigning mystical moods but in many ways helped define them.
As I. N. Korsunskii writes, by 1814 “Filaret had reached the acme of his 
fame as a preacher in Petersburg” (Korsunskii 1885, 460). On May 18, 1814, 
the day the manifesto on peace with France was proclaimed, he delivered his 
“Sermon on the Day of the Holy Spirit’s Descent” in Golitsyn’s house church. 
He declared that “God gives the Holy Spirit to anyone who is disposed to 
276 By Fables Alone
accept Him,” and he also subjected the acting hierarchy—to which he 
belonged—to criticism of a kind that was almost unthinkable on the lips of a 
man of the church:
And so, believe not us, whom, of course, as punishment for our unworthy 
service to the word God no longer places as your guides to faith and as nour-
ishers of love, but puts us before you for only disgrace and condemnation, so 
that in this sacred place there is not so much the Word of God, living and 
real, which judges the heartfelt thoughts and designs of those listening, as 
much as the cold consideration of those listening that judges and condemns 
dead human words; [but] believe the chosen instruments, the envoys and 
heralds of the Holy Spirit. (Filaret 1814a)
Filaret excluded this whole fragment from his sermon in its following 
republications, up to and including the phrase “dead human words.” Prob-
ably the juxtaposition of chosen instruments of the Holy Spirit to preachers 
who are unworthy to serve the word seemed inadmissible to him. Alek-
sandr Sturdza, who was his close associate, even thought that the future 
metropolitan was then being “shaken by the suggestions of many various 
spirits that were transgressing ancient Orthodoxy” (Nevodchikov 1868, 6). 
However, such ideas were completely in accord with the religious ideals of 
Alexander and Golitsyn.
As Florovskii wrote, “the second decade of the new century in Russia 
proceeded under the sign of the Bible Society,” which had been founded 
on the emperor’s initiative in December 1812 simultaneously with the 
final expulsion of the French from Russia (Florovskii 1937, 147). In the 
Report of the Bible Society for 1815, its president, Golitsyn, wrote that 
the emperor “enlivens the Society’s activity with the promptings of his own 
heart. He himself is removing the stamp of incomprehensible speech that to 
this day has barred the way to Jesus’s Gospel for many Russians, and he is 
revealing this book to the most undeveloped of the people (ot samykh 
mladentsev naroda) from whom not its goal but solely the gloom of time 
has hidden it” (Pypin 2000, 56). By “the stamp of incomprehensible speech” 
and “the gloom of time,” both Golitsyn and Alexander meant the Church 
Slavonic language in which the Bible was traditionally published, and 
which in their opinion was not understood by the majority of people in the 
empire. 
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One of the several directors of the Bible Society was S. S. Uvarov, and 
one of its two secretaries was A. I. Turgenev. Filaret took part in the society’s 
work from the moment it was created, and in 1814 became one of its direc-
tors. Having become one of its vice-presidents, he headed the work of 
translating the Bible into Russian and for many years remained one of the 
main supporters of this idea. This led to numerous conflicts with the more 
conservatively-oriented members of the hierarchy, as well as with A. S. 
Shishkov and his followers (see Chistovich 1899; Pypin 2000, 20–303; on 
the linguistic and cultural significance of the polemics around the Bible trans-
lation, see Proskurin 1996).
Possibly, two years before work began on the Society’s Russian transla-
tion of the Bible, a similar idea had occurred to Zhukovskii. Listing the main 
projects he planned to complete for Masha in 1814, together with the “Epistle 
to the Emperor,” he included in one point his intention “to translate the Bible” 
(Zhukovskii 1907, 46). Perhaps he meant the poem “La Bible” by the French 
poet L. de Fontanes that he had translated that very year (Zhukovskii I, 
331–333). However, in the context of the main goal of the Bible Society, his 
precise phrase indicates a far more ambitions idea that Zhukovskii partially 
realized in the 1840s and 50s when he translated the entire New Testament 
(Ianushkevich 1992, 287). 
Among the poet’s exalted outpourings of those years, the fervent 
confessions that he made to Aleksandr Turgenev especially stand out. “Be 
my genius-leader,” Zhukovskii addresses him in the poem “On a day of 
happiness to remember you” (V den’ schast’ia vspomnit’ o tebe) (Zhukovskii 
1895, 110; in the printed version this line sounded a bit more moderate: 
“Be my companion-leader”). In another letter to him he calls him “guardian 
angel” (ibid., 111). Such ardent feelings were inspired by various things, 
including Turgenev’s attempts to help Zhukovskii in his love drama and the 
memory of Aleksandr’s prematurely deceased brother Andrei, who had 
been the poet’s elder friend and mentor. But the fact that in this small circle, 
Turgenev served as representative of the Bible Society, of Prince Golitsyn, 
and in some sense of the emperor himself, also could have played a signifi-
cant role.4 
4 On the very same paper as Zhukovskii, Voeikov wrote to Turgenev, pathetically exclaiming, 
“Is it possible that in the nineteenth century and during Alexander’s reign, and while the 
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 4 
Alexander’s spiritual experience of those years was first of all a search for 
mystical partners and the formation of a complex system of spiritual alliances. 
According to Princess S. S. Meshcherskaia, who was close to the emperor, she 
and Alexander “gave each other their word to begin reading the Bible on the 
same day and to read a page from the Old Testament every morning, so as to 
always be reading the very same chapters, whatever distances may have sepa-
rated them.” The emperor frequently wrote to the princess about “what 
impressions the reading of this or that place in Holy Writ has made on him” 
(Grellet de Mobillier 1874, 3–4). Possibly, the princess didn’t realize that he 
had taken a similar vow together with Golitsyn and also with the well-known 
Mason R. A. Koshelev. In 1821, Koshelev reminded the emperor “about the 
union all three of them had entered into before the face of the living God” and 
how Alexander himself had placed Koshelev “at the top of this triangle” (Nikolai 
Mikhailovich I, 553). Still another triangle of the same type arose in 1814, 
when, as in the first instance, Alexander inserted himself into an already existing 
mystical pair. 
During the emperor’s conversation with Jung-Stilling, they had begun 
speaking about Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna’s maid of honor Roksandra 
Strudza, with whom both men had established unusually confidential rela-
tions. Shtilling admitted to Alexander that “he had entered into an eternal 
union (alliance éternelle) with her to live for the Lord. ‘We will also create 
such a union,’ the emperor said, and embraced Jung” (Ley 1975, 88). On 
the same day Alexander spoke about this with Strudza, who left her recol-
lections of this conversation: “‘This morning I saw Jung-Stilling,’ said the 
emperor. ‘We had an explanation with him, as we could, in German and in 
French, however, I understood that you have entered into an indissoluble 
union with him in the name of love and mercy. I asked him to accept me as 
a third, and we shook each other’s hands. Do you also agree?’ ‘But this 
union already exists, Sovereign!’ ‘Is it true?’—and at this he took me gently 
by the hand, and I could feel that tears were pouring out of my eyes” (Edling 
benevolent Prince Golitsyn as well as you keep the holy swords sheathed and do not allow 
fanatics to shed their brothers’ blood, tears of innocent sufferers must flow and two angels 
[Zhukovskii and Masha] must be sacrificed to the devil of superstition?” (Ibid).
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199, 198). The Swiss researcher Francis Ley, author of the monograph 
Alexander and His Holy Alliance, called the association of the philosopher, 
maid of honor, and emperor “a mystical trinitarian pact” (Ley 1975, 89). 
Without a doubt, this definition also fully applies to the Holy Alliance 
itself. The rulers who signed this pact bound themselves to be guided in 
their politics by the Christian commandments, “which was by no means 
limited to applying them to their private lives alone, but on the contrary, 
they had to govern the will of the tsars and to guide them in all of their 
actions.” They declared themselves and their subjects “members of a single 
Christian people (nation chrétienne),” whose autocrat “is no other than … 
Jesus Christ,” “insofar as in him are attained the treasures of love, conduct, 
and wisdom” (VPR VIII, 518). Both the lexicon and argumentation of this 
international agreement fully coincide with those which were used when 
the mystical ménage à trois was created between Alexander, R. Strudza, and 
Jung-Stilling. 5 
A year earlier Jung-Stilling had already foretold the basic parameters of the 
Holy Alliance, having written about the symbolic significance of the allies’ 
victory over Napoleon:
You will search in vain in history for three monarchs who were filled with 
the fear of God to such an extent, all three true Christians, united among 
themselves by fraternal love. … What strikes me most of all is that our liber-
ators represent the three basic confessions into which the Christian world is 
divided. The emperor of France is the greatest of the Roman Catholics, 
Emperor Alexander is first among the Christians of the Greek confession, 
and King Friedrich-Wilhelm is the most outstanding of the Protestants. As if 
the Lord desired that the entire Christian world and its most respected 
leaders would conquer the constitutional idol. (Ley 1975, 90)
This type of ecumenical program was also the basis of the Bible Society. In his 
reports Golitsyn expressed both pride that “all Christian confessions are 
united together in it” (Pypin 2000, 79) and the hope that its “activity opens 
up the beautiful dawn of a betrothal day for Christians and [the possibility] 
5 It is extremely tempting to imagine that—in keeping with Golitsyn’s language—the three 
mystical unions described above were connected among themselves by the presence of the 
Russian Emperor in each, like three triangles coming together at the top. The resulting 
geometrical figure—a pyramid—was one of the main Masonic symbols.
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of a time when there will be one pastor and one united congregation, that is, 
when there will be one divine Christian religion for all confessions of a 
diverse Christian configuration” (Strelletskii 1901, 163).6 
6 In this connection the hypotheses that Alexander and Golitsyn planned “the evangelization” 
of Russia (see, for example, Etkind 1996) or that Alexander intended to convert his empire 
to Catholicism before his death (Dmitrieva 1996, 94–95), which is based on a Jesuit legend 
long proved wrong by S. P. Mel’gunov (1923, 105–109), do not seem convincing. The 
“conversions” about which Etkind and Dmitrieva write would have been very modest 
compared to the messianic-eschatological synthesis which Alexander was contemplating.
Figure 25 Medallion commemorating the Triple Alliance by A. N. Olenin.
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It is known that Alexander did not like to recall the Fatherland War (the 
Russian name for Napoleon’s invasion), did not visit its memorable places, and 
did not commemorate its great events, although as his biographer Nikolai 
Mikhailovich notes, “he did travel to Wagram and to Waterloo” (Nikolai 
Mikhailovich I, 212; cf. Shil’der IV, 50; Wortman 1994, 231). Of course, 
biographical considerations played a part here: the emperor’s role in the events 
of 1812 was mostly passive, while the European campaign was in many ways his 
personal triumph. Nevertheless, ideological considerations determined these 
preferences to a great extent. A war for liberating the fatherland from an inva-
sion corresponded to the emperor’s ideas about his predestination and the 
destiny of his country far less than a war for saving humanity and establishing 
the universal Kingdom of Christ. When the Russian monarch wrote to his 
Austrian colleague that the agreement that they were about to sign “crowns the 
salvific mission of our union” (VPR VIII, 516), the word “salvific” was to 
be taken literally. The union under the leadership of Alexander was to assume 
the function of Christ.
Zhukovskii’s epistle was written more than nine months before the 
Holy Alliance was concluded. Still ahead were the fruitless negotiations at 
the Congress of Vienna, Napoleon’s escape from Elba, the Hundred Days, 
Waterloo, the imprisonment of the emperor on the island of St. Helena, the 
signing of the peace and the allied courts’ sojourn in Paris. Nevertheless, the 
general conceptual and metaphorical schemes realized in this act and in Alex-
ander’s later politics are fully present here. First and foremost the inner 
proportions of the text attract one’s attention. Of the 486 lines of the epistle less 
than ten percent, or 40 odd lines, are devoted to 1812 and only one to the Battle 
of Borodino. At the same time, the burning of Moscow is interpreted providen-
tially—it is a “fire of freedom” in which the chains that Napoleon imposed on 
Europe are consumed: 
Пылает!., цепи в прах! Воскресните народы! 
Ваш стыд и плен Москва, обрушась, погребла,
И в пепле мщения свобода ожила! 
(It blazes!., chains into dust! Revive (lit., resurrect), peoples! /Moscow, 
collapsing, you have buried your shame and imprisonment / And from the 
ashes freedom awakened revenge!)
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The political providentialism of Zhukovskii’s interpretation corresponded to 
Alexander’s own personal providential view of the Moscow fire as told to Pastor 
Eilert: “The fire of Moscow illuminated my soul and filled my heart with such 
warm faith as I have not felt since then. Then I knew God” (Shil’der III, 117). 
In the epistle the culminating point in the description of the military 
campaign is the Russian army’s crossing of the Niemen River; Zhukovskii dedi-
cates about thirty lines to Alexander’s decision to continue the war in Europe. It 
is precisely at this moment that the Russian emperor acquires the right to the 
title “Blessed” and assumes a divine nature:
И руку Ты простер, и двинулися рати! 
Как к возвестителю небесной благодати, 
Bo сретенье Тебе народы потекли, 
И вайями Твой путь смиренный облекли. 
    (Zhukovskii I, 371)
(And you stretched out your arm, and the armies set off! / As to the one who 
announces heavenly grace, / The peoples flowed to You in greeting / And 
strew Your humble path with palms.)
These “palms” (vaia) are the palm branches with which people greeted Christ 
upon his entry into Jerusalem. The Russian emperor entering Europe is thus 
directly likened to the Savior.
Just as once during the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 King Leonid 
arrived from the north to the Spartans, making Greeks into Greeks once again, 
now the Russian Hermann returns the defeated Teutons to life:
Как всколебалися тевтонов племена!
К ним Герман с норда нес свободы знамена —
И всё помчалось в строй под знамена свободы;
В одну слиялись грудь воскресшие народы, 
И всех царей рука, наш царь, в руке твоей.  
   (Ibid., 372) 
(How the Teutonic tribes began to move! / Hermann brought the banners 
of freedom to them from the north / And everything rushed into formation 
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under the banners of freedom; / The resurrected peoples merged into one 
breast / And the might of all tsars is in your hand, our tsar.)
This all-European—and, given the political map of the time, world-wide—
character of Russia’s predestination and its emperor becomes the leitmotif of 
the epistle. Depicting the emperor’s touching farewell to the dying “lead-
er-starets” Kutuzov, Zhukovskii supplements this picture with a just as touching 
description of the death of J. V. M. Morreau, the French general who fell fighting 
in the allied army. The significant space dedicated to Morreau in the text of the 
epistle symbolizes the expiation of the sins of France, which, forgiven by the 
magnanimous victor, offers its repentance on the site of Louis XVI’s 
execution: 
И чуждый вождь — увы! — судьба его щадила,
Чтоб первой жертвой он на битве правды пал —
Наш царь, узнав тебя, на смерть он не роптал;
Ты руку падшему, как брат, простер средь боя;
И сердцу верному венчанного героя,
Смягчившего слезой его с концом борьбу,
Он смело завещал отечества судьбу. … (Ibid.)
(And the foreign leader, alas, was preserved by fate / Only so he would fall as 
first victim in the struggle for truth—/ Our Tsar, recognizing You, did not 
grumble at death; / Amid the battle you stretched out your hand to the fallen 
man like a brother; / And to the faithful heart of the crowned hero / Who 
eased his last minutes with a tear / He [Morreau] boldly bequeathed the fate 
of his fatherland.) 
The high honors that the allied monarchs rendered to Morreau aroused 
Shishkov’s profound dissatisfaction, as he wrote in his memoirs:
Of course, Morreau was a skilled and brave warrior. With Napoleon he 
shared his people’s admiration and fame, and was probably also seeking 
supreme power; and, perhaps, if he had attained it, being a person of better 
morals, he would not have been such a bloodthirsty monster trying to get 
power; however, together with him he led the revolutionary troops, and if he 
had now turned against him, that was not because he wanted to see his 
fatherland ruled as before by the heirs of legitimate sovereigns (since he had 
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no such desire earlier), but only because he had been insulted and held a 
personal grudge. Thus it seems to me it was not proper for the two autocratic 
heads of state to immediately gallop up to him, as to some creature who was 
better than anyone else or heaven-sent. Our leaders who were immeasurably 
more glorious than he—Rumiantsev, Suvorov, Kutuzov—were never shown 
this kind of honor. If not yours, then the people’s pride should not have 
permitted this. (Shishkov 1870, 210)
Neither Shishkov nor Zhukovskii could have known, of course, that for 
Alexander himself both Morreau’s celebratory meeting and farewell were 
strictly formal gestures. As far as Jung-Stilling’s recommended “complete abne-
gation” is concerned, the emperor outdid anything either the skeptical 
memoirist or the ecstatic poet could have imagined. “They wrongly thought 
that if Morreau was with us, everything was decided,” Alexander wrote to 
Golitsyn from Teplitz after the general’s death. “Only God and not Morreau or 
anyone else can bring this matter to a good end. … I believe in Him more 
strongly than all the Morreaus on earth” (Nikolai Mikhailovich, 144).
More than twenty lines in the epistle are dedicated to the “battle of the 
peoples”—the Battle of Leipzig. In the original plan of the epistle Zhukovskii 
wrote, “Here the argument for freedom should be decided, [with] all of the 
peoples on earth present. The forefathers of all peoples watch—Hermes 
[Zhukovskii apparently meant Germann], Peter, Gustav” (Ianushkevich 1985, 
105). In the final text, however, the forefathers who inspire their nations are 
replaced by “the shades of all ages … above the luminous head of the tsars’ 
leader.” Alexander, “the young Agamemnon of the union of avengers,” represents 
all of humanity before God:
Я зрю Тебя, племен несметных повелитель. 
Сей окруженного всемирной тишиной, 
Над полвселснною парящего душой, 
Где все Твое, где Ты над всех судьбою властен, 
Где Ты один всех благ, один всех бед причастен.  
   (Zhukovskii I, 376)
(I see You, commander of numberless tribes, / The one who is surrounded 
by universal calm, / Soaring in spirit above the universe, / Where everything 
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is Yours, where You have power over everyone’s fate, / Where You alone are 
privy to all good things and alone to all misfortunes.)
As is clear from the published fragments of the plan, Zhukovskii was going to 
include the “Council of Tsars,” the Congress of Vienna, in the epistle (see 
Iezuitova 1989, 153–154).7 However, by the time he completed work on the 
epistle, the congress had still not finished and its results remained unclear. 
Therefore the chronological and thematic culmination for the poet became 
the emperor’s arrival in Petersburg in 1814, before his departure for Vienna. 
The epistle is crowned by a huge description—taking up more than a quarter 
of the text—of the mystical betrothal of tsar and people before the face of the 
Almighty. The ruler of the world, Alexander, swears to make “his throne” “an 
altar of love” for his people. In its turn, the people “raises its hand” to “the 
sacred hand” of the monarch: 
Как пред ужасною святыней алтаря, 
Oбет наш перед ней: все в жертву за Царя!  
   (Ibid., 378)
(Before the terrifying sacred altar, / [We make] our promise: Everything in 
sacrifice for the Tsar!)
Only divine rule can be a holy “mirror” of Alexander’s rule which is wholly 
directed toward the other world and eternal bliss. “Everything here be for 
good, /As all is for the good there,” the Russian tsar prays in the epistle “To 
Emperor Alexander” (ibid.). The poem written at the same time, “Prayer of 





7 It is difficult to agree with the researcher when she proposes that the original plan was 
changed because Zhukovskii was dissatisfied with “advancing the person of the tsar to the 
first place … [since] he had not played the first role by far in destroying Napoleon” (Ibid). It 
would hardly be possible to advance the tsar to first place more strongly than in the final text. 
286 By Fables Alone
(Heavenly life, / Known to the heart, / Shine to the heart!)8
The marriage of the ideal tsar with the ideal people can be realized in the same 
place where the marriage of Zhukovskii and Masha Protasova occurred—in 
heaven. 
 5 
Zhukovskii’s success was universal and unconditional only for a short time. On 
September 23, 1815, came the premiere of A. A. Shakhovskoi’s “Lipetsk Spa” 
(Lipetskie vody), in which the author of the epistle “To Emperor Alexander” 
became the butt of cruel mockery.9 And in the next year Zhukovskii was subject 
to attack from another social flank—by P. A. Katenin and A. S. Griboedov. This 
historical and literary collision was first comprehensively analyzed in Iu. N. 
Tynianov’s classic work, “The Archaists and Pushkin.” As Tynianov wrote, “in 
1815/1816 a ferocious war was waged against Zhukovskii, and the first shot 
was fired by the elder archaist Shakhovskoi,… but it was the young archaists 
Katenin and Griboedov who clarify the true meaning of the battle, its deep 
basis” (Tynianov 1968, 36). Together with these open “anti-Zhukovskian” 
attacks, Tynianov examines the hidden criticism of the poet in the correspon-
dence of the members of Arzamas themselves. “It seems at times,” he notes, 
“that he dissatisfied ‘his own’ even more than their enemies” (ibid., 38). In A. S. 
Nemzer’s observation, by the end of the 1810s, Zhukovskii “was alone in litera-
ture and he understood this” (Nemzer 1987, 191).
In Tynianov’s interpretation, the agreement between literary folk who 
were far apart in their political views is connected with the autonomous nature 
of literary and linguistic development in relation to ideological and social 
factors. The mechanisms of literary similarities and ideological differences lie 
on different planes and their zones of action do not impede each another. Still, 
at least in the given case there is no need to resort to the theory of “the imma-
nence of the literary series.” Alexander’s popularity, that in the second half of 
8 On the meaning of these lines, see Kisileva 1998.
9 In his work A. S. Nemzer shows that Zhukovskii first stung his opponent in his epistles to P. 
A. Viazemskii and V. L. Pushkin (see Nemzer 1987, 168–176). Nonetheless, the experi-
enced polemicist Shakhovskoi was by no means only moved by the personal offense. He did 
not recognize the right of an author of sentimental ballads to hold the position of state poet. 
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1814 had reached beyond the clouds, plummeted. Dissatisfaction came not 
only from Shishkov’s circle that he had summoned in Russia’s moment of need 
and then excluded from the country’s ideological leadership, but also from 
among young freethinkers who brought from Germany not visions of a future 
Christian kingdom but fashionable ideas about national revival. For both 
groups, cosmopolitan mysticism and mawkish visionary fancies—on the part 
of both Alexander and the most famous singer of his reign—looked more and 
more like an affront to Russia’s national interests and dignity.
 1 
The Petersburg audience that applauded and booed the premiere of “Lipetsk Spa” on September 23, 1815, did not yet know that nine days earlier a 
document had been signed in Paris that for almost a decade was destined to 
define the fate of Russia, and in many ways, that of all Europe. The document 
creating the Holy Alliance, described by the French publicist Abbé Dominique 
de Pradt as “the apocalypse of diplomacy” (Edling 1999, 223), is one of the 
most enigmatic treaties in the history of international relations. No wonder that 
time and again researchers have scrutinized both the preparations for and the 
conclusion of the treaty (See Mühlenbeck 1887; Nadler I-V; Presniakov 1923; 
Shebunin 1925; Bühler 1929; Dorland 1939; Geiger 1954; Ley 1975; Martin 
1997; for a concise selection of documents, see Bertier de Sauvigny 1972).1 
We can assume that the basic factual picture of the events has been clear 
for a long time. The memoirs of participants and witnesses (see Empaytaz 1828,
1 * First published in Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Euroasian History 4 (2) (2013): 
279–312.
1  Also quite valuable is A. N. Shebunin’s unpublished monograph, Vokrug Sviashchennogo 
soiuza (OR RNB, f. 849, № 110–11), based on a wide range of archival documents (cf. 
Sirotkin 1975, 118). 
“Star of the East”: 
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36–38; SbRIO III, 201; Edling 1999, 221–224; Metternich 1880, 209–212) 
paint a sufficiently complete and consistent picture. The finishing touch was 
added in 1928, when Werner Näf published and analyzed the text of the 
initial draft of the treaty, composed by Alexander I with remarks by the 
Austrian Emperor Franz (Näf 1928, 34–39; cf. Ley 1975, 149–155; for a 
Russian translation, see VPR VIII, 504–5, 518). The Russian emperor person-
ally wrote the first draft of the treaty, which was edited by State Secretary 
Ioannes Kapodistrias and his assistant, A. S. Sturdza (see Sturdza 1864, 69; 
SbRIO III, 201; Liamina 1999). It was reviewed in Baroness Juliette von 
Krüdener’s mystical circle, which Alexander frequented in the summer and 
fall of 1815; and then transmitted to his allies, the Austrian emperor and the 
Prussian king. Both sovereigns found the treaty’s apocalyptic-messianic rhet-
oric quite disconcerting, and they were totally unreceptive to Alexander’s 
vision of a foreordained union of their peoples and armies in a single Chris-
tian power. Prince Klemens von Metternich, the real director of Austrian 
foreign policy, was even more skeptical toward the project. In light of Russia’s 
preeminent military and diplomatic authority after the victory over Napo-
leon, however, the monarchs of Austria and Prussia decided not to deny their 
august ally the fulfillment of his cherished aspirations. After Alexander agreed 
to remove the more radical formulas from the text, the treaty was signed on 
September 14 (26), the feast of the Exaltation of the Cross and the day before 
the anniversary of the coronation of the Russian emperor. Both of Alexan-
der’s allies presumed that they had signed some kind of confidential 
declaration of intentions. Nevertheless, three months later the Treaty of the 
Holy Alliance was promulgated by Alexander in St. Petersburg, together with 
the corresponding manifesto. 
Even if the course and sequence of the key events in the history of the 
treaty are sufficiently well-known and do not require special discussion, issues 
concerning the meaning and purpose of this peculiar diplomatic relic and its 
political, philosophical, and ideological sources are much less clear. What goals 
was the Russian emperor pursuing? He literally forced his allies to sign an act 
quite contrary to all of their preconceptions about the structure of relations 
between states and then, breaking all existing promises, publicized it. This ques-
tion disturbed diplomats of the 1810s and continues to trouble historians until 
the present day. 
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Almost all those who have tried to reconstruct the history of these 
dramatic months touch upon the relations between Alexander and Baroness 
Krüdener in some way. They met on June 4 (16), 1815, in the German city of 
Heilbrunn. Afterwards the baroness followed the sovereign by imperial invita-
tion to Paris, where the almost daily meetings between the emperor and the 
prophetess continued right up to the signing of the treaty and Alexander’s 
departure for the homeland. As a rule, this dramatic and well-documented 
episode is used either to support or to refute the theory that the baroness had a 
profound influence on the plan for the Holy Alliance. Many at the time believed 
this theory, which undoubtedly had its origins in Krüdener’s own assertions. 
The Leipzig pastor Wilhelm Traugott Krug, who visited Krüdener in 1818, 
wrote that he asked her “about the Holy Alliance, for which you, Frau von 
Krüdener, have been identified as the real inspiration. She only half agreed with 
this and said ‘the Holy Alliance was the direct work of the Lord. He chose me as 
His instrument. Thanks to Him I accomplished this great work’” (Krug 1818, 
6–7). On the contrary, Sophie de Tisenhaus, Comtesse de Choiseul-Gouffier, 
who knew Alexander well, wrote: “I do not know on what basis the authors of 
Figure 26 Portrait of 
Baroness von Krüdener. 
Gravure by J. Pfenninger. 
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two histories of the Emperor Alexander ascribed the idea of the Holy Alliance 
and universal peace to the excited imagination of Frau Krüdener. This noble 
project could have sprung only from the heart of Emperor Alexander” 
(Choiseul-Gouffier 1999, 302). Historians also hold quite opposite views. We 
can say that among the authors we have noted, Eugène Mühlenbeck and Francis 
Ley consider Krüdener’s role very significant while V. K. Nadler and Arthur 
Dorland categorically reject it. 
There probably is no answer to the question as posed in this form. It is 
almost impossible to draw a clear distinction in the full spectrum of Alexander’s 
mystical notions between impulses from meetings with the baroness and 
impressions he derived from other sources. However, some aspects of the cele-
brated encounters between the emperor and the prophetess, which have not 
yet been elucidated completely, can offer us important insight into a whole 
complex of ideologies reflected in the text of the Holy Alliance treaty and in 
many of the emperor’s political decisions. 
 2 
One of the first accounts of the June 4, 1815, meeting came from Empress 
Elizaveta Alekseevna’s maid of honor, Roksandra Sturdza, who at that period 
was close to both participants. For some time she had been in regular corre-
spondence with Baroness Krüdener and as described in the preceding chapter 
was bonded to the sovereign in a special mystical union. It was Sturdza who 
showed Alexander Krüdener’s letter, which could have been interpreted as an 
obscure prediction of Napoleon’s flight from the island of St. Helena (Elding 
1999, 217). This letter impelled the emperor to seek the baroness’s acquain-
tance, even more eagerly after the prophecy was fulfilled. 
As Sturdza wrote in her memoirs, on that day Alexander 
was weighed down by boredom, fatigue, and grief. His soul was given over to 
self-introspection. “Finally I breathed more freely,” he said … “and my first 
act was to open the book I always have with me. But my perception was 
clouded, and I could not comprehend the meaning of what I had read. My 
thoughts were disconnected and my heart constricted. I put the book aside 
and thought how comforted I would be in such a moment to converse with 
a sympathetic being. I remembered you, what you told me about Madame 
Krüdener, and the wish I expressed to make her acquaintance. Where could 
she be now, I asked myself, and where could I meet with her? Just as I was 
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thinking about this, I heard a knock at my door. It was Prince [P. M.] 
Volkonskii. His face expressed impatience. He told me that he had no inten-
tion of disturbing me at this hour, but that he could not get rid of a woman 
who insisted on seeing me. Then he named Madame Krüdener. Can you 
imagine my surprise? I wondered if I were delirious. Such an unexpected 
answer to my musings could not be accidental. I caught sight of her, and she, 
literally looking into my soul, turned to me with powerful words of consola-
tion, calming my troubled thoughts, which had tortured me for so long. Her 
appearance was a blessing to me, and I promised myself I would continue a 
relationship so dear to me.” (Ibid., 221) 
Certainly, for a real mystic like Emperor Alexander there are no accidental 
coincidences. Besides, Frau Krüdener’s appearance with her daughter in his 
study at that hour was not completely accidental. She knew from Roksandra 
Sturdza of Alexander’s growing interest in her, persistently tried to run into 
him in those weeks, and arrived in Heilbronn hoping to find him there (Ley 
1994, 281–299; on Krüdener, see Knapton 1939; Pypin 2000, 304–397). The 
episode just described, more than almost any other, confirms the extraordi-
nary powers of persuasion that all memoirists noted in Krüdener. Convincing 
the adjutant general to report to the emperor in the middle of the night that 
two unknown women wanted to see him was a rhetorical triumph, in many 
respects much more striking than those that her many readers and followers 
have described. 
According to the mystical practices of the time, just as Providence guided 
its chosen ones in life, it did more than send them the necessary companions 
and spiritual teachers at the proper moment. More often and more infallibly it 
opened sacred books before them to the proper pages, as if Providence were 
pointing to the necessary prophecies. According to Prince Golitsyn, sometime 
in September 1812, in the most critical period of the war, a Bible he gave to the 
emperor accidentally fell open to Psalm 90 [Psalm 91 in Protestant 
translations]: 
A thousand shall fall at thy side and ten thousand at thy right hand, but it 
shall not come nigh thee. Only with thine eyes shalt thou behold and see the 
reward of the wicked. Because thou hast made the LORD, which is my 
refuge, even the most High, thy habitation. There shall no evil befall thee, 
neither shall any plague come nigh thy dwelling. For he shall give his angels 
charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. They shall bear thee up in their 
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hands, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone. Thou shalt tread upon the lion 
and adder: the young lion and the dragon shalt thou trample under feet. [Ps. 
91: 7–13 King James Version] 
Alexander read this, shaken to the core by how closely the words of the psalm 
corresponded to his thoughts and his situation. A few days later, the emperor 
attended a solemn prayer service and unexpectedly heard the priest read that 
very psalm. After this, his confusion gave way to a firm belief in the providential 
nature of what had occurred (Grellet de Mobilier 1874, 22–24). 
It is impossible to say how closely the above account corresponds to the 
actual course of events. More importantly, it echoes a specific type of mystical 
reflection on the ways of Providence and the means by which it reveals itself to 
mortal eyes. Baroness Krüdener’s companion and follower Pastor Empaytaz 
recorded in his memoirs how Alexander applied verses he read from Psalms 35 
and 37 to current events (Empaytaz 1828, 22–24). Alexander’s letters to 
Golitsyn are filled with similar interpretations and applications (see Nikolai 
Mikhailovich I: 548–559 and passim). In J. H. Jung-Stilling’s memoirs, this 
technique for discerning divine plans is mentioned so frequently that the 
author felt compelled to raise a special caution, lest readers be led into tempta-
tion: “Opening up the Bible [at random] to gain knowledge of the Divine will 
or of the future is an abuse of Sacred Scripture. This is a kind of divination 
forbidden to a Christian. If it is done to comfort oneself with the word of God, 
then it should be done with complete composure and submission of self to the 
will of God” ( Jung-Stilling II, 238).2 The meaning of this not completely trans-
parent passage is that such knowledge is totally accessible to the author, who is 
endowed with direct mystic intuition and who is able “to correlate events of the 
present time with biblical prophecies” ( Jung-Stilling II, 232), but is not granted 
to ordinary man. 
It is precisely in the account of the emperor’s encounter with Baroness 
Krüdener that mention of a book which he opened but was unable to under-
stand precedes her appearance in his house. The phrase that Roksandra Sturdza 
attributed to the emperor, “the book which I always have with me,” suggests the 
Bible, which he read daily according to a prearranged schedule. Eugène 
2 The practice of opening the Bible to a “random page” to seek the intentions of Providence 
was taught in particular by the famous mystic Abbé Fournier to the founder of Martinism, 
Robert Martinez de Pascually (see Viatte I, 45). 
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Mühlenbeck claims that on that day the emperor read Psalm 20 and quotes a 
lengthy extract from it (Mühlenbeck 1887, 223). N. A. Troitskii writes in a 
recently published book, however, that the baroness entered when Alexander 
read the apocalyptic prophecy about “a woman clothed in the sun” (Rev 12: 1; 
Troitskii 1994, 284). But the book Alexander was concerned with that night 
was not the Bible. 
I. N. Bartenev quotes Golitsyn, the closest confidant of the emperor, in his 
memoirs: 
Undoubtedly, Krüdener, who was living in the faith, strengthened the Sov- 
ereign’s awakening faith by her impartial and mature advice. She resolutely 
directed Alexander’s will towards ever greater self-surrender and prayer and 
probably at the same time revealed to him the secret of that prayer of the 
spirit which God has decreed that all who dwell here below might attain, but 
unfortunately is destined only for a few of the elect. 
The following episode demonstrates that Krüdener had spiritual conver-
sations with Alexander. At the time R. A. Koshelev gave the Sovereign a 
book popular then, The Cloud over the Sanctuary, or That Which Prideful 
Philosophy Cannot Imagine, which the late Aleksandr Fedorovich Labzin had 
translated from German. Although Alexander read the book, he was 
completely unable to understand its content. According to Alexander’s 
precise testimony, when Krüdener was summoned, she was able to interpret 
and explain the hitherto difficult and incomprehensible passages of the work 
to him. (Bartnev 1886, 93–94) 
It is impossible to determine from Golitsyn’s statement whether he is referring 
specifically to the encounter between the emperor and the Baroness that inter-
ests us or to one of their later conversations. However, an entry in Krüdener’s 
daughter Juliette’s diary resolves the issue. The first person to publish the diary 
was the Swiss historian Francis Ley, a distant descendant of the Krüdener 
family and keeper of the family archive. Juliette Krüdener’s testimony basically 
confirms evidence from other sources, except for a few details. She writes, for 
example, that when the baroness gave Prince P. M. Volkonskii a letter for the 
emperor, Alexander ordered his overnight guests summoned as soon as he 
received it. She recalled: 
We found Alexander alone. He was somewhat embarrassed when he saw us. 
I was completely composed. I want to relate the whole discussion. We were 
struck by what dear Alexander told us, that when he arrived at Heilbronn, he 
295Chapter 9: “Star of the East”
remembered his conversation with Mademoiselle Sturdza and thought that 
Madame Krüdener should be somewhere nearby. He also wanted to write to 
the margravine. When he received maman’s letter, which apparently had a 
great impact on him, he had just finished reading a passage from Eckart-
shausen which spoke of the economy of grace for that Church of which he 
hitherto had had no idea (l’économie de la grâce pour cette Église dont il n’a 
encore aucune idée). He accepted everything that maman disclosed to him 
“with true humility,” convinced that the Lord helps him whom He calls, but 
was not convinced that he in particular had been chosen to accomplish this 
great work (pas convaincu de son élection particulière pour opérer cette 
grande oeuvre). (Ley 1994, 289–290; Krüdener 1998, 129)3
Thus it is clear not only which book the emperor was reading before the 
baroness appeared, but also what constituted the source of his bewilderment 
and anxiety. That makes it all the more important to understand this forgotten 
yet historically extremely important mystical work. 
 3 
The Cloud over the Sanctuary (Die Wolke über dem Heiligtum) was one of Karl 
von Eckartshausen’s last works (see Faivre 1969; cf. Viatte II, 41–51). It 
appeared in 1802, one year before his death, and was translated into Russian 
only two years later by Labzin in 1804. The Cloud was something of a culmina-
tion of Eckartshausen’s philosophical legacy. It is almost totally devoted to the 
problem of the interior church, which was the mystic’s constant preoccupation 
and central to European mysticism as a whole at the end of the eighteenth and 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries. As he began to read, Alexander must 
have realized that true faith was hidden by external senses from ordinary 
mortals. To know God, man had “to uncover inner feeling in himself ” 
(Eckartshausen 1804, 21), something fully accessible only to members of the 
“Lightbearing Divine society, which is diffused throughout the whole world, 
but which is guided by a single truth and linked by a single spirit” (ibid., 25). 
This society “has existed since the first day of the world’s existence” and appears 
as an “inner assembly” and “great Temple for the rebirth of mankind,” with 
“Christ Himself ” as its head (ibid., 25–26). If God has ruled the society directly 
3 There is no indication of the source of the italics in the quotations, which were published in 
Ley’s monographs from material from the personal archive. It is possible the historian was 
responsible for them. 
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throughout its entire history, then “its first Deputy” has been “the best man of 
that time. … He does not know all his members, but if, by Divine intention, it 
becomes necessary for him to recognize them, at that very minute he will find 
them in the world, ready to assist in achieving the preordained goal” (ibid., 47). 
The “lightbearing” society is divided into three levels. At the first level, “inspira-
tion,” allegiance is manifested in “moral goodness,” and at the second, 
“enlightenment,” with the achievement of “enlightened understanding,” that is, 
immersion in the world of mystical composition. At the third level, “vision,” 
“faith progresses to contemplation”; that is, man attains the facility of sensible 
communion with higher powers (ibid., 41; cf. Faivre 1969, 336). 
An essential feature of the lightbearing society is that its members have no 
“distinguishing external characteristics. … If those who really are fellow 
members need to assemble, they unerringly will find and recognize each other, 
and there will be no deception. No member will be able to choose another, for 
this election will be revealed to the spirit of all” (ibid., 48). This revelation 
distinguishes the membership of the lightbearing society from, for example, 
Masonic lodges, where it is precisely the ritual of initiation and reception of 
new brethren that plays an organizational role. According to Eckartshausen, 
election, separating the devotees from other mortals, was achieved at inception 
and it needed only to be discerned. “God and nature,” he wrote, “hold no 
mysteries for their progeny. The mystery lies only in our infirmity, our inability 
to bear the light. … Our infirmity is the cloud which covers the sanctuary. … 
Sons of the truth! There is but one order, one brotherhood, one likeminded 
union of the followers of the light, through which the light can be attained” 
(ibid., 51, 59). Hence people endowed with the gift of penetrating the cloud 
covering the sanctuary truly are destined for a providential role. In the author’s 
words, “all the original knowledge of the human race is preserved in this society. 
… It is the society whose fellow members constitute the Theocratic (ruled by 
God) government, which some day will be the center of the whole world’s 
governments” (ibid., 50). Here the author presents an eschatological perspec-
tive, in which the members of the lightbearing society dispersed across the 
globe unite to establish a mystical theocracy to direct the world order. 
The notion that a special fellowship of dedicated souls existed in the world 
was not invented by Eckartshausen but was common to all mystical savants of 
the time. It was developed, in particular, in the book by I. V. Lopukhin Some 
297Chapter 9: “Star of the East”
Features of the Inner Church, probably the only eighteenth-century book by a 
Russian author that acquired international prominence. Eckartshausen heartily 
endorsed this work, a few days before his death writing a letter to the author 
where he called Some Features “a precious book, replete with true wisdom” 
(Lopukhin 1990, 39; cf. Faivre 1969,178–179, 222–225 and passim). At the end 
of the first decade of the nineteenth century, the public had access to this testi-
monial, both in the widely circulated manuscript text of Lopukhin’s Notes and in 
the foreword to the 1810 French edition of the book (see Lopukhin 1810). 
Alexander was quite familiar with these ideas. His note “On Mystical Liter-
ature,” meant for Grand Princess Ekaterina Pavlovna, probably written in the 
first half of 1812, presents a fairly detailed account of the basic doctrine of the 
interior church. The emperor wrote that “the origin of the so-called mystical 
societies is hidden in the distant past” and dates from the mysteries of ancient 
religions. One of their essential elements was that not everyone was able “to see 
the light” of truth, to experience divine love, and to recognize the “outpouring 
or revelation of the deity” in his works in nature. In Alexander’s words: 
The Christian religion established the bond between ancient and contempo-
rary societies. At its inception it was nothing but a secret society. No one was 
admitted to the church of Jerusalem without trial and purification. The 
policy of rulers converted this secret knowledge into a public religion. But 
while policy revealed the rites, it was unable to divulge the secrets. Hence, 
today as always, there is an external Church and an interior Church. (Nikolai 
Mikhailovich 1910, 286–287)
Unlike ordinary theological works intended for the external church, books 
addressed to the inner church constitute a body of “Secret or Mystical Theology,” 
which in turn is divided into three levels. The first consists of works “whose 
principal subject is the theory of this doctrine or of its first abstract principles.” 
Since these authors were “enlightened people, but not Angels … among their 
truths one encounters a multitude of different systems, more or less bold and 
sometimes completely strange.” Authors of the second level of works treat “not 
so much … theory as practical moral learning.” According to the emperor’s 
classification, Eckartshausen belonged in this group. Finally, the third, “most 
trustworthy and most reliable category” was made up “of those … who are 
concerned solely with moral education, pointing out the practical path vali-
dated by experience, but not going into any kind of theories” (ibid., 286–287). 
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It does not follow from the extensive list of mystical authors the emperor 
inserted in the memorandum that he personally was acquainted with their 
works. Thus, A. E. Presniakov convincingly proposes that Speranskii’s lessons 
were reflected here, while George Florovskii points to R. A. Koshelev (see 
Presniakov 1923, 76; Florovskii 1937, 130). Still, it is quite plausible that in 
1815 Alexander could have been sufficiently familiar with Eckartshausen’s 
work, which appeared in Russian as early as 1804 and which dealt with themes 
that so concerned him. Besides, mystical reading of this type envisioned 
returning again and again to the same texts, seeking new and even more hidden 
profundities. Alexander’s words set down by Roksandra Sturdza about “the 
book I always have with me” probably were not a chance remark by the memoirist; 
instead, they indicate that when Baroness Krüdener arrived, Alexander was 
rereading a work with which he already was familiar and turned to the prophetess 
asking her to interpret a passage that long had been a source of anxiety. 
The passage that disturbed the emperor spoke “of the end times and of 
grace preserved in that Church of which he hitherto has no concept” (Ley 
1994, 289–290). Like many other mystical works, The Cloud over the Sanctuary 
is full of repetitions, so it is impossible to be absolutely certain to which passage 
Juliette Krüdener referred. Even so, it can be suggested with a certain measure 
of caution that she had the following episode in mind: 
Since the Disciples of the Lord could not understand the great mystery of 
the new and ultimate Covenant, Christ deferred it to the future last days, 
now drawing nigh, saying “on that day (on which I will announce my mystery 
to you), you shall know that I am in the Father, and you in me, and I in all of 
you” ( Jn 17: 22–23). This Covenant is called the Covenant (union) of peace. 
Then the Divine law shall be imparted to the innermost recess of our heart, 
and all of us shall recognize the Lord and shall become His people and He 
our God. (Eckartshausen 1804, 102)
It is easy to see that the issue is how the apostles will acquire an understanding 
of divine Providence and divine grace (l’économie de la grâce). Eckartshausen 
refers to the chapter from the Gospel according to John, which gives Jesus’s 
prayer for his chosen disciples. (“I pray not for the world, but for them which 
thou hast given me,” John 17: 9). This is preceded by a description of the bewil-
derment of the apostles, unable to understand the prophecy about the time 
when the spirit of truth will descend ( John 16: 17–18).
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Just as the “disciples of the Lord” initially did not understand the essence of 
what was preached to them, the emperor, according to the unanimous testimony 
of Roksandra Sturdza, Aleksandr Golitsyn, and Juliette Krüdener, was unable to 
understand the sense of Eckartshausen’s prophecies immediately. In the German 
mystic’s opinion, eschatological events were imminent: “Everything already has 
been prepared for God’s essential assembly and for union with Him, which even 
here is possible” (Eckartshausen 1804, 102). The last days, in the opinion of 
Eckartshausen and other celebrated mystics of that epoch, were supposed to 
begin as early as the first decades of the nineteenth century (see Faivre 1969, 
514–20; for Jung-Stilling’s calculations, see Jung-Stilling 1815, xiii–xv). 
We recall that the lightbearing society was divided into three levels, 
depending on the degree to which its members had achieved higher perfection. 
In exactly the same way mystical science was supposed to enlighten the world 
in three stages, “first, to regenerate man individually, or precursors from the 
Elect; then, regenerate many men; and finally, all mankind” (Eckartshausen 
1804, 102). Apparently, the historic moment which Europe was experiencing 
corresponded to the second stage in this eschatological plan; it fell to the scat-
tered members of the interior church to recognize each other and begin the task 
of regenerating “many men.” Here if the “precursors of the Elect” were monarchs, 
their duty was to accomplish the genuine enlightenment of their own peoples. 
Thus the emperor’s bewilderment at Eckartshausen’s pages becomes more 
understandable. It seemed that too much of his extraordinary and awful fate 
pointed unambiguously to his providential election, but at the same time an 
explicit awareness of such a destiny and the inner conviction that he belonged 
to the society of lightbearers constantly eluded him. As Juliette Krüdener 
wrote, Alexander was not convinced that “precisely he was chosen to accomplish 
this great task,” or, to translate the French literally, “in his special election” (Ley 
1994, 290; Krüdener 1998, 129). 
A translation problem emerging in the above citation from The Cloud over 
the Sanctuary is extremely revealing. Speaking of the mystery of the new and 
ultimate Covenant which the apostles could not understand, Eckartshausen, in 
Labzin’s rendering, indicates that “this Covenant is called the Covenant (union) 
of peace.”4 The translator needed the parentheses to convey the full sense of the 
4 Labzin uses the words “zavet” and “soiuz,” translated here as “covenant” and “union.”(Trans-
lator’s note).
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German “Bund,” almost inevitably lost in choosing any Russian term. The 
general consensus among German mystics was that the first union (“alter 
Bund”) concluded by God with Abraham and the second (“neuer Bund”) with 
the disciples of Jesus now was replaced by the “holy union” (“heiliger Bund”) 
(Mühlenbeck 1887, 251). The same connection between the concepts of “cove-
nant” and “union” exists in French, which was the primary medium by which 
the emperor became acquainted with the sacred books. There the corre-
sponding biblical term is rendered as “alliance.” The semantic structure both of 
the French “alliance” and the German “Bund” convey fully the biblical concept 
of covenant, which, strictly speaking, represents the union between God and 
his people. In a letter written in 1815, Baroness Krüdener cited the book of 
Ezekiel (37: 26), saying that God concludes a covenant with Israel, “a Covenant 
[Alliance] of peace, and it shall be an everlasting covenant with them” (Ley 
1994, 282). Thus, the new covenant instituted by Jesus signified a change in the 
terms of this union: 
If the first covenant had been faultless, there should have been no need to 
seek a place for another one. But the prophet reproached them, saying, 
“Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I shall make a new cove-
nant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah, not that covenant 
I made with their fathers at that time when I took them by the hand in order 
to lead them out of the land of Egypt.” … In saying “new” he showed the 
obsolescence of the former one, but what is decaying and growing old is near 
its end [Heb. 8: 7–9, 13]. 
The advent of apocalyptic times required yet another renewal of the covenant, 
or, in other words, conclusion of a new union of peace. 
 4 
Two aspects of the draft treaty proposed by Alexander provoked dissatisfaction 
among the sovereign’s allies. First, they were able to remove from the text 
extreme expressions of the coming unity whereby subjects of the three powers 
were to “see each other as fellow-countrymen,” and their armies as “part of one 
army.” In place of the reference to “a single people designated a Christian 
nation,” the Austrian emperor and the Prussian king preferred the somewhat 
less binding expression, “a single Christian people,” and instead of “three sectors 
of this one people,” characterized their powers as “three branches of a single 
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family” (VPR VIII, 504–505). A second feature of the Russian emperor’s draft, 
perhaps even less acceptable to the allies, was its zeal for totally altering the 
entire system of international relations. A directive in the draft stated that “the 
form of mutual relations previously established by the powers must change 
completely and it is absolutely necessary to strive to replace it with an order 
based on the supreme truths inspired by the eternal law of the Divine Savior” 
(ibid., 504). In the final text, after radical reworking, this passage was shortened 
considerably and recast as a much more neutral aspiration that “the form of 
mutual relations as presented be subject to the supreme truths inspired by the 
eternal law of the Divine Savior” (ibid., 518). 
Franz and Friedrich Wilhelm also were troubled by the assertion in the 
preamble of the draft that the sovereigns adhering to the treaty intended “in the 
future to be guided by no other principles whatsoever except the precepts of 
this holy faith … which are by no means restricted to applications just in private 
life, as they hitherto have been, but on the contrary, are to rule the will of the 
monarchs directly and govern all their actions.” Next to the words “in the future” 
and “as they hitherto have been,” the Austrian emperor noted emphatically 
“bleibt aus” – “omit” (ibid., 503–504; for more detail, see Näf 1928, 39–52; Ley 
1975, 149–156). Thus criticism of the existing system was suppressed, and the 
passage as a whole acquired a descriptive character. 
Meanwhile, Alexander considered the prospect of general and total 
renewal particularly important. After the universal historical combat between 
good and evil and on the threshold of the advent of the end times, everything 
had to change, both for tsars and for peoples. On August 29 (September 10), 
two weeks before the text of the Holy Alliance was signed, there was a massive 
parade of the Russian army in the town of Vertus, near Paris, determined, as 
Alexander later told Golitsyn, “according to a special secret revelation,” which 
also dictated the scenario of the celebrations (Bartenev 1886, 100). The following 
day, all who took part in the parade, more than 150,000 men, again were led onto 
the field for a thanksgiving service on the occasion of the Russian emperor’s 
name-day. “The revelation … judged it necessary that the Russian army be 
divided into seven squares,” Golitsyn related. “The prayer service was conducted 
in the central, that is, the fourth square with the tsar’s entire staff and all our 
Russian generals. Divine services also were held in the other squares” (ibid.). 
Baroness Krüdener alluded to these “seven altars” on which “the blood of the 
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covenant (l’alliance) called for divine mercy” in one of her last letters to Alex-
ander (Ley 1994, 407; on the parade, see Shil’der III, 340–344). 
Undoubtedly these seven altars were ordered to symbolize the seven 
churches whom Jesus addresses in the first three chapters of the Apocalypse, 
promising “grace … and peace from him which is, and which was, and which is 
to come, and from the seven spirits which are before his throne” (Rev 1: 4). 
Golitsyn recalled that Alexander was so taken with the Apocalypse “that, in the 
Sovereign’s own words, he could not read it enough” (Bartenev 1886, 88). 
Jung-Stilling, in his enormously popular interpretation of the Apocalypse, 
called it “the manifesto of the King of Kings to his subjects from those times 
until the last day.” In Jung-Stilling’s words, the seven spirits mentioned in the 
verse cited earlier “stood before the throne of Jehovah” and are transfigured “in 
the Old Covenant by the seven-branched lampstand standing in the tabernacle, 
and later in the Temple before the Holy of Holies” ( Jung-Stilling 1815, 4–5). It 
was with just such a “seven-branched lampstand” that the seven squares of the 
Russian army offered praise to the Lord for the victory they had won. The 
Christian Russian forces were equated with the new Israel. 
According to Jung-Stilling, the seven churches alluded to the diversity 
of historical Christianity (ibid., 11). The emperor himself and “the tsar’s 
entire staff ” prayed in the fourth square, which was located not just in the 
geometric center, but which also, according to the Apocalypse, corresponded 
to the Church of Thyatira. In the Apocalypse, denunciation of many of its 
members who are condemned to terrible punishments is followed with the 
promise of blessings to “the rest in Thyatira, as many as have not this doctrine 
and which have not known the depths of Satan, as they speak; I will put 
upon you none other burden. … And he that overcometh and keepeth my 
works unto the end, to him will I give power over the nations. And he shall 
rule them with a rod of iron; as the vessels of a potter shall they be broken to 
shivers: even as I received of my Father. And I will give him the morning 
star” (Rev. 2: 24, 26–28). 
Alexander could not fail to see an obvious prophecy of his own destiny in 
the reference to the “victor” to whom “power over the nations” (“pouvoir sur 
les nations” in the French translation) was given. Note that Jung-Stilling 
perceived the Church of Thyatira as the Moravian Brethren ( Jung-Stilling 
1815, 34–40), whom the emperor visited during his European journey and 
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about whom he questioned the German mystic in detail when they met in 
person (see Geiger 1954, 283–297, 333–334; Ley 1975, 63–76). 
Baroness Krüdener, who accompanied Alexander to Paris, was with the 
Russian emperor throughout the entire ceremony and so was in the group that 
reviewed the parade and offered prayers in the central square. Undoubtedly she 
became the official interpreter of the symbolism of the celebration. Her 
brochure, The Camp at Vertus, written literally during the very days Alexander 
was considering the text of the Holy Alliance treaty with his allies, was 
published in an enormous number of copies, and, by imperial order, was imme-
diately translated into Russian. In a note to the Russian edition, the translator 
explained that “the word ‘vertus’ means virtue [dobrodetel’], which is why 
when the sovereign emperor came to review the army in Vertus, the French said 
‘Alexander set out for his own domains’” (Krüdener 1815, 3). The French title 
of Krüdener’s brochure, Le Camp de Vertus, theoretically also could have been 
translated as The Field of Virtue (Pole dobrodeteli) (Krüdener 1815a). In the 
baroness’s account, the military parade assumed features of a cosmic drama, 
signifying the advent of the eschatological age. “We were witnesses to one of 
those grandiose spectacles where Heaven and earth converge. … Who dares 
depict the history of our times? What Tacitus ventures to concern himself with 
events which like the legendary Sphinx devour those who fail to guess the 
meaning of the riddle?” (Krüdener 1815, 4). The parade not only indicated 
symbolically the hidden meaning of the upheavals that had totally altered 
Europe and the world, but also was itself transformed into a kind of mystery, 
which only the elect could interpret. 
As Eckartshausen wrote, “[M]ysteries … hold the promise of secrets 
which were and always will be the heritage of just a few men, secrets which 
neither are sold nor proclaimed openly from the pulpit, secrets accessible only 
to the heart striving for Wisdom and Love, and in which wisdom and love 
already have been awakened” (Eckartshausen 1804, 54). “In the last times 
everything hidden shall be revealed,” however, and mankind already is 
approaching “that time when the great Veil concealing the Holy of Holies shall 
be drawn back” (ibid., 73, 57). Baroness Krüdener would not go beyond vague 
hints about the hidden meaning of the drama that was being played out: “Thus 
all who either delight in penetrating this great secret, which still is veiled, like 
Isis, or fear lest its cover be rent, experience either hope or fear from this epoch. 
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This solemn spectacle, where so many great Sovereigns have bowed before the 
Tsar of Tsars, already appears as if it were leading the universe into different 
times and as if it were a living prelude to that sacred history, which should 
regenerate all” (Krüdener 1815, 10). 
The essence of Krüdener’s interpretation was that present occurrences 
were absolutely unprecedented: “Who could doubt that there were great inspi-
rations here, and who did not say with the Apostle that the old has passed away 
and all things are made new! And who would not wish for something new amidst 
such destruction” (Krüdener 1815, 9). The verse cited from Paul’s Second 
Letter to the Corinthians [2 Cor 5: 17] in French translation sounds even more 
precise: “Le monde ancien s’en est allé, un monde nouveau est déjà né” (The 
old world has passed, and a new world has already been born). Thus the defini-
tive victory over Napoleon that renewed the entire world profoundly and 
completely was symbolically equated with the birth of Christ. The grandiose 
prayer service on the field near Vertus became the first testimony to the signifi-
cance of what had occurred. Signing the treaty creating the Holy Alliance two 
weeks later was interpreted by its authors and ideologues as an act of worship 
to the infant Jesus. 
According to the memoirs of Baroness Krüdener’s companion, Pastor 
Henri-Louis Empaytaz: 
A few days before his departure from Paris, [Alexander] said to us, “I am 
leaving France, but before my departure I want to render in a public act the 
homage which we owe to God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit for the 
protection He has granted us and invite the peoples to obey the Gospel 
(inviter les peuples à se ranger sous l’obéissance de l’Évangile). I have 
brought the draft of this treaty to you and I urge you to read it carefully. If 
there are any expressions in it of which you disapprove, inform me about 
this. I want the emperor of Austria and the king of Prussia to join me in this 
act of worship so that we, like the Magi of the East, recognize the higher 
power of God the Savior (afin qu’on nous voie, comme les mages d’Orient, 
reconnâitre la suprême autorité du Dieu Saveur).” (Empaytaz 1828, 40–41; 
Ley 1975,146–47)
The comparison of the monarchs entering into the alliance with the Magi 
worshipping the infant Jesus was reinforced further by the fact that, according 
to early Christian tradition, there were three magi who were Eastern kings 
(see Averintsev 1980). In the same way, the text of the treaty is associated 
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with the gifts brought by the magi to the cradle of Jesus and with the act of 
worship itself. 
On Christmas Eve Catholics and Protestants mark the feast of the three 
magi. In the nineteenth century, Alexander’s birthday fell precisely on this date, 
according to the Western calendar (December 12 according to the Russian). 
Three years in a row, from 1812 to 1814, the emperor celebrated his birthday in 
the company of Western Christians—in Vilnius, Karlsruhe, and Vienna—
when most of the population of these cities recalled the magi and prepared for 
Christmas. Such a coincidence, of course, could not but be noticed by 
Alexander, who sought hidden omens everywhere and who anxiously followed 
the mysticism of the calendar. 
The thematic complex linked to the Nativity played an extraordinary role 
in European mysticism. In the words of A. D. Galakhov, the Nativity became 
the favorite subject of mystical literature, because “the incarnation of God in 
the soul” provided it with material for secret comparisons and a secret parallel 
Figure 27 Mother of God (1814-1815). 
Icon based on a passage from Revelations 
by V. L. Borovikovskii.
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with what the French preacher Du Toit called “the transformation of fallen man 
into a new creation” (Galakhov 1875, 104). The doctrine of inner rebirth or 
regeneration (régénération) was a central element of mystical study of the 
person. The Cloud over the Sanctuary presented this parallel very forcefully: 
In us, everything is unclean, everything is covered by a web of vanity, every-
thing sullied by the filth of sensuality. Our will is an ox harnessed in a yoke 
of passions. Our intellect is a donkey, obstinate in its opinions, prejudices, 
and stupidities. In this transitory and disintegrating hovel, the abode of 
brute passions, Christ is born in us through faith. The simplicity of our soul 
creates a pastoral situation, for it brings Him the first sacrifices, then the 
three main powers of our royal dignity: Intellect, Will, and Action prostrate 
themselves before Him and bring Him the gifts of truth, wisdom, and love. 
(Eckartshausen 1804, 140) 
God’s awakening in the soul of man corresponds to the birth of Christ in the 
cradle of Bethlehem, and man’s inner acknowledgment of the dominion of 
Jesus to the gifts of the magi, the three kings of the East, who once had been 
given the morning star as a sign of the Nativity. Juliette Krüdener’s diary entry 
for September 23, 1815, describes the emperor’s first appearance in the prophet-
ess’s home after he learned his allies were prepared to sign the treaty, “Alexander 
remarked that if he had not been prepared by this act, he could not have under-
stood ‘the adoration of the magi.’ … Alexander was unusually candid, talked 
about the king [Louis XVIII], the need for inner regeneration, reading Sacred 
Scripture, his own life, making use of time, and trust in God” (Ley 1994, 318). 
Long before, Alexander had compared the victory over Napoleon with the 
new birth of Christ. As early as the Christmas of 1812, he issued a manifesto in 
which he ordered the day commemorated as the feast “of the deliverance of the 
Church and the Russian realm from the invasion of the French and the twelve 
tribes with them” (PSZ № 25669). At the same time, he signed a decree to 
begin construction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow (PSZ № 
25296), as if summoning all the emperor’s subjects to worship Jesus. The actual 
consecration of the new cathedral to Christ testified to the supraconfessional 
character of the future temple (see Florovskii 1937, 134; for the text of the 
ukase, see PSZ, № 25296; on the plan, see Witberg 1954; Medvedkova 1993). 
Now, relying on the spiritual and intellectual support of West European mystics, 
he urged his august allies and their peoples to the same kind of worship. 
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Figure 28 The manifesto of December 25, 1815.
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Insofar as the Russian emperor felt himself to be God’s chosen one, called 
to bring Christian enlightenment to the world, he could not be satisfied with 
the compromises reached with his allies, above all with their demand that the 
treaty of the Holy Alliance be kept confidential. His goal was that the magi’s act 
of worship, performed by the three monarchs, at the same time be revealed to 
all as testimony to the advent of new times and as an example for general emula-
tion. On Christmas, December 25, 1815, also the date commemorating Russia’s 
liberation from the French, Alexander published the text of the treaty. More-
over, he accompanied this publication with a manifesto that included the 
provisions he had been forced to exclude from the draft. First and foremost 
among these was the concept that, after the conclusion of the treaty, the basis 
of international policy would be subject to complete change: 
We have understood from the consequences of trials and tribulations for 
the entire World that the conduct of previous political relations between the 
Powers in Europe was not founded on those true principles on which 
Divine wisdom in its revelation secured the tranquility and prosperity of 
peoples. Hence We, united with Their Majesties the Austrian Emperor 
Franz the First and the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm, undertook to 
establish an alliance between Us (inviting the other Christian powers to 
join us). In this We mutually pledge ourselves, both between us and in rela-
tion to Our subjects, to take as the only means leading to this the rule drawn 
from the teaching of Our Savior Jesus Christ, proclaiming to people that 
they should live as brothers, not in enmity and malice, but in peace and love. 
We hope and pray to The Most High to send down his grace and that this 
Holy alliance be securely established between all Powers for their general 
welfare. Also, let no one, obstructing the unanimity of all the others, dare 
stand aside from it. To this end, enclosing herewith a copy of this alliance, 
We order it promulgated and read in the Churches. 
St. Petersburg. On the day of the Nativity of Our Savior. 
December 25, 1815. (PSZ № 26045) 
In concluding the Holy Alliance treaty, Alexander hardly could have expected 
to find fellow brethren of the interior church in his allies and the other 
monarchs invited to subscribe to the text. The knowledgeable Roksandra 
Sturdza asserted that the crowned heads of Europe signed the document 
either “not understanding it and not taking the time to familiarize themselves 
with its significance,” or wholly in a spirit of “resentful indignation.” In her 
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opinion, Alexander “knew people too well to delude himself in this respect, 
but he thought that it ought to be proclaimed in Europe from the mouths of its 
sovereigns for all to hear that Europe was turning away from the impiety which 
had characterized the recent past in order openly to confess its faith in Christ” 
(Edling 1999, 223–224).
News that the documents had been made public in St. Petersburg caused 
consternation in the capitals of Europe. An epoch in which policy was supposed 
to be based directly upon the teachings of the Gospel started with an unprece-
dented breach of agreements that had been concluded and promises that had 
been made. The allies, as Metternich’s closest associate, Friedrich Gentz, wrote 
in a dispatch from Vienna to St. Petersburg, “were shocked and confused” (Ley 
1975, 165). Alexander achieved his purpose, however, by demonstrating his 
dissatisfaction with traditional secret diplomacy and revealing the coming of 
the new times to the whole world. 
 5 
“True religion, like the ark of the covenant (l’arche d’alliance) between God and 
his creation, embraces the horizon of the inhabited world with new love,” 
asserted A. S. Sturdza in his “Meditation on the Act of Fraternal and Christian 
Union,” in preparation for publicizing the ideas of the finalized agreement 
(Stourdza 1815, 4). “Our dear Sovereign, subjected to ordeals and turning 
toward faith, felt the need to loudly proclaim through the Holy Alliance the 
inception of the Kingdom of Christ, whose only authorized representatives the 
first three kings of Europe had declared themselves to be. It is impossible to 
look at the act of Holy Alliance otherwise than as a manifesto preparing the way 
for the kingdom of the Savior,” Golitsyn wrote in 1820 to Baron Berkheim, 
Krüdener’s son-in-law (Shebunin, manuscript, № 110, 196). Of course, both 
Golistyn and Sturdza belonged to those closest to Alexander and were familiar 
with his most intimate thoughts first-hand. However, other sensitive and 
sympathetic contemporaries also caught the gist of the emperor’s designs. 
Even before New Year’s the news made it to Speranskii’s Penza estate. By 
this time his exile had ended, but he had still not returned to government 
service and retained the status of a statesman in partial disgrace. The published 
agreement aroused his warmest approval. He wrote to his friend F. I. Tseier on 
December 31, 1815:
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At last a ray of light has illuminated my spirit and dispersed all my doubts. I 
mean the manifesto of December 25. I may finally give myself up fully to the 
direction of my thoughts; I may dare to state my excitement, and to converse 
with the Sovereign about a subject worthy of his attention. … Do you 
remember our discussion last summer in the Velikopol’skii garden, when, 
speaking of the spirit that should guide monarchs in their actions at the 
Congress of Vienna, I had the faintheartedness to despair? But is this a 
phantom? Do I correctly understand the true meaning given to this act? Woe 
to them who would be so brazen as to play with the very most holy names 
and objects. No; the spirit of darkness could again extinguish this manifesta-
tion of grace, as has often happened, but now this light is still pure and acts 
in all fullness. (Korf 1867, 445–446)
And indeed on September 6, Speranskii addressed a letter directly to the 
emperor: 
The truths described in the manifesto of December 25 in the act of alliance 
places on all of Your subjects a new obligation of unlimited trust and open-
ness. More than many others I must feel and fulfill this obligation. … Can I, 
should I now be silent when I see indubitable marks of true, heartfelt and not 
cerebral, grace that illuminates your heart. Let not Your modesty be offended 
by this statement! Christ’s grace is given without merit and may be admitted 
without flattery. (Ibid., 447)
In full agreement with Alexander’s own view of his role, Speranskii empha-
sized that the act of Holy Alliance was not a “personal action” by the rulers 
who signed it but “a pure outpouring of the most abundant Christian grace for 
which they were favored to be the vehicles.” The direct intervention of grace 
into the course of the historical process also established “a new political right” 
based on two fundamental principles. In the first place, “the goal of human 
societies is to guide people into union with Christ,” and secondly, “Jesus Christ 
is and should be the head of all Christian societies. The true rules for their 
governance cannot be taken from anywhere but from His rules and teaching” 
(ibid., 448–449). Thus the single task of an earthly state turned out to be 
preparing nations either for a universal Christian republic or straightaway for 
the start of a chiliastic Divine Kingdom on earth. Speranskii explained the 
nature and character of the future theocracy to the same F. I. Tseier in a letter 
of January 22:
311Chapter 9: “Star of the East”
People err when they assert that the spirit of God’s kingdom is incompatible 
with the principles of political societies. Is not rulership (derzhavstvo) a 
kind of priesthood (sviashchenstvo)?… What is the anointment of Sover-
eigns?… Can one doubt the reality of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit onto 
the anointed person, if only that person is capable of receiving it?… I do not 
know even one question of state that could not be reduced to the spirit of the 
Gospels. Everything down to taxation can be worked out in this spirit and 
under its guidance. Did not the Jiménezes, St. Bernards, St. Louises, Alfreds 
all draw abundantly from this source? (Speranskii 1870b, 188–189)
Inspired by the Holy Alliance, Speranskii was ready to see the monarchs who 
headed it as the direct recipients of grace, summoned to embody the utopia of 
the kingdom of the gospels and to implement it in practical measures and state 
structures.
Still, in a letter to a close friend who considered Speranskii his “spiritual 
father” (ibid., 192), the former state secretary made so bold as to also express 
some criticisms of the new document. Speranskii probably did not exclude the 
possibility that his correspondence was being monitored, and may have even 
thought that his ideas would make it all the way to the royal addressee. “It is true 
that the expressions of the act of alliance are insufficiently clear,” he wrote. “Thus, 
for example, one cannot call Jesus Christ the head of everyone, even infected 
members; because He is the head of a single body which is His Church; a kingdom 
is not the Church of the truly faithful; but why nitpick at the form, ignoring the 
spirit and general direction of this act?” (ibid., 189). Despite all polite provisos, the 
differences between Speranskii and Alexander were quite serious. Speranskii fully 
shared Alexander’s conviction, reflected in his note “On Mystical Literature,” 
concerning the existence of the “Church of the truly faithful” that was under the 
direct authority of Christ. His deputies on earth might be anointed monarchs if 
they comprehend their divine mission and prove worthy. At the same time the 
former state secretary was not ready to indiscriminately consider all powers as 
part of the “Church of the faithful,” even if they were in care of the most devout 
monarchs. Speranskii’s references to historical analogies show that while he 
considered the idea of Christian politics proclaimed in the manifesto a new thing 
for the contemporary world, he nevertheless did not find it completely unprece-
dented. Having been separated from the sovereign during several extremely 
eventful years, he joyfully recognized echoes of old conversations in the new public 
312 By Fables Alone
documents but remained deaf to ideas from different sources that had influenced 
Alexander after his removal from office. He accepted the mystical spirit of the act 
of union with sincere enthusiasm, but did not see, or did not want to see, its escha-
tological dimension. Yet the eschatological pathos of the agreement he had written 
was especially important for the emperor. The end days were imminent, and the 
truth would cease being the possession of a narrow circle of the select and bring 
many people—and then everybody—along. As Eckartshausen prophesied, the 
epoch when the society of lightbearers were to proclaim their existence in every-
one’s hearing and its members would recognize one another were rapidly 
approaching. It was for this very reason that on the day of Orthodox Christmas 
Alexander spoke to his people, and, as he could not have helped realize, to all of the 
peoples of Europe, over the heads and despite the wishes of his allied monarchs. 
The new ideological conception’s nodes of meaning, which the state secre-
tary who knew the emperor so well ascribed to “insufficient precision,” were, 
however, fully clear to the poet. Apparently, Zhukovskii had thought of a contin-
uation of “The Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors” even before the start of 
active work on the epistle “To Emperor Alexander.” In the words of the author, it 
was supposed “to present the singer of Russian warriors returning to the Moth-
erland and singing a song of liberation in the Kremlin … on the very day that 
Russia, triumphant, is bending her knee with gratitude before Providence, which 
through her had saved all the peoples of Europe and [brought] all the benefits of 
freedom and enlightenment” (Zhukovskii 1902 II, 143). This explanation was 
given in the separate edition of the poem “The Singer in the Kremlin” that came 
out in 1816 with a note that “these verses were written at the end of 1814.” They 
were probably composed for the second anniversary gala celebration of the liber-
ation of Russia from the French, in which the emperor might have participated 
had the Congress of Vienna successfully finished its work. However, the 
Congress’s deliberations dragged on and then were completely interrupted by 
the news of Napoleon’s escape from Elba. On March 4, 1815, Zhukovskii reported 
to A. I. Turgenev that he intended to publish a booklet “under the title ‘The Singer 
in the Kremlin’ (it is almost finished and only requires corrections), with the addi-
tion of other lyric poems” (Zhukovskii 1895, 142). Making corrections continued 
for almost a year. The publication of the Christmas manifesto of 1815 and the 
Holy Alliance pact probably served as the culminating stroke that helped 
Zhukovskii finalize the poem’s definitive configuration. 
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Like “The Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors,” “The Singer in the 
Kremlin” is composed of a series of poetic panegyrics that the singer recites 
and which an attentive chorus echoes. In the poem’s last fragment, the sing-
er’s words sound like a direct response to the text of the manifesto and 
treaty:
О совершись, святой завет! 
   В одну семью, народы! 
Цари! в един отцов совет!
   Будь сила щит свободы! 
Дух благодати, пронесись 
   Над мирною вселенной 
И вся земля совокупись 
   В единый град нетленной! 
(Oh come to pass, holy behest [sviatoi zavet]! / Into one family, peoples! / 
Tsars! Into one council of fathers! / Strength, be shield of freedom! // Spirit 
of grace, be carried / Over the peaceful universe / And [let] the whole earth 
come together / Into a single imperishable city!)
Zhukovskii accurately feels the eschatological overtones of the ratified agree-
ment. Hence the interpretation of coming days as the realization of the “holy 
behest” (i.e., alliance). Like Speranskii, Zhukovskii sees in the union that had 
been concluded the action of the spirit of grace, but, unlike him, he understands 
that the issue does not so much concern a new political organization of earthly 
states as it does “a single imperishable city,” whose outlines one may discern 
beyond the curtain of the ages:
Ты, мудрость смертных, усмирись
   Пред мудростию Бога 
И в мраке жизни озарись  
   К небесному дорога.
Будь вера твердый якорь нам 
   Средь волн безвестных рока
И ты в нерукотворный храм 
   Свети, звезда востока. 
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(You, mortals’ wisdom, be humbled / Before God’s wisdom / And in the 
murk of life illumine / The path to heaven. / Faith, be a steady anchor for us 
/ Amid the unknown waves of fate / And you, star of the East, / Shine into 
the temple not made by mortal hands.)
Zhukovskii could hardly have been informed of the emperor’s statements in 
which he compared the concluded act with Christ’s Nativity, and he and his 
allies with the magi. Nevertheless he accurately grasped the symbolic signifi-
cance of the date the imperial manifesto was published. “The star of the East” 
by which the three magi—or to translate the French formula more literally, the 
three king-sorcerers—found the infant Jesus again lit up the sky above the 
earth, and the three allied monarchs bowed to the “temple not made by mortal 
hands,” the new manger of Bethlehem. 
In the final lines of the poem the singer and the people merge in one surge 
of rapture, one act of reverence to this sign that has now become visible:
Свети, свети, звезда небес, 
   К ней взоры, к ней желанья, 
К ней, к ней за тайну их завес 
   Земные упованья.
Там все, что здесь пленяло нас
   Явлением мгновенным, 
Что взял у жизни смертный час, 
   Воскреснет обновленным! 
Рука с рукой! вождю вослед! 
   В одну, друзья, дорогу
 И с нами в братском хоре, свет, 
   Пой: слава в вьшних Богу! 
(Shine, shine, star in the heavens, / To it our gazes, to it our desires, / To it, to 
it, behind the mystery of their veils, / Our earthly hopes [are directed]. / There 
everything that captivated us here / [Seems but] a momentary occurrence, / 
What the hour of death takes from life / Is resurrected, renewed! / Hand in 
hand! Follow the leader! / To one road, friends / And together with us in our 
fraternal chorus, world [or: light], / Sing glory to God in the highest!)
The celebration of the great national victory on the ruins of the ancient capital 
is crowned by a nationwide apotheosis of the future resurrection of the dead, 
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promised by the new Nativity. The voices of all peoples of the world merge in 
this “fraternal chorus.”
 6 
In the brochure The Camp at Vertus, Baroness Krüdener wrote that the meaning 
of contemporary events “eludes the understanding of those who do not have 
the living God to interpret them and who remain forever orphaned and envel-
oped in the darkness of perplexity. … But among those in exile, also in this land 
of captivity, there always remained a holy race, there always was a people 
pleasing to God. These, those people of all ages, were the only ones who carried 
out that great work of the Creator” (Krüdener 1815, 5). In using the words 
“race” (race) and “people” (peuple), the baroness did not have in mind the 
subjects of one or another monarch, and even less an ethnic group. This “chosen 
people, children of promise” consisted of “men of great enlightenment, placed 
at the top of the ladder.” They alone are able “to view this epoch in the light with 
which the majesty of the Sacred Scriptures has illumined them” (ibid., 5, 10).
In essence, this is the same society of lightbearers that Eckartshausen had 
described, a mystical union of the initiated, comprising a single nation. In 
another place, the baroness uses the word “people” in the more traditional 
sense when speaking of the subjects of the Russian empire as “simple-hearted 
peoples (peuples), who have not yet drunk from the cup of all the abomina-
tions, and who have not yet fallen away from the God who saves them” (ibid., 
6). “Simple-hearted peoples” could be the instrument of providence as long as 
they are not ruled by the false enlightenment that had ruined debauched 
peoples, above all, the French. These are identical with the inhabitants of 
Thyatira who “did not know the satanic depths.” Their historical role is deter-
mined by having at their head a monarch associated with true enlightenment, 
whose attributes are “rule over the nations,” “iron rod,” and “morning star,” or, 
as Krüdener expressed this concept, “a man of great judgments, predestined to 
this before all ages” (ibid.). Thus Alexander stood simultaneously at the head of 
two peoples entrusted to him by God: the people of his own empire and “the 
chosen people of the reborn.” 
The baroness called Alexander “the Lord’s chosen one” (l’élu du Seigneur) 
in a letter of May 17, 1815, to Roksandra Sturdza (Ley 1994, 288). At the time 
of her first conversation with the emperor on June 4, she was prepared to dispel 
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Alexander’s doubts about his “special election.” On June 23 Krüdener wrote to 
the emperor about “those who should comprise the small number of members 
of that Church which Christ chose for himself in order to renew the world and rule 
by means of it for the next thousand years.” “You are one of these Chosen Ones,” 
she addressed Alexander, “and Your heart already has been prepared by great 
sacrifices. If You, Sire, had not been able to respond to these great plans, the 
Lord would not have called you to his service and would not have made you the 
victor over the dragon (Antichrist) and the leader of peoples” (Nikolai Mikhai-
lovich II, 216). For Krüdener, the church of the reborn (régénérés) existed as a 
concrete historical institution, at the given moment more or less corresponding 
to the circle of her devotees and persons aroused by her preaching. Thus she 
actively sought to enlist Alexander’s closest associates as members of this 
church. On June 22 she “spoke fervently” to Karl Freiherr vom Stein and 
Kapodistrias of “the need to be reborn” (Ley 1994, 296). As early as March 
1815, before the meeting with the emperor, the baroness’s daughter noted her 
mother’s prophecy about the Russian sovereign’s coming mission in her diary: 
“Maman thinks that Alexander will leave his country, that he will be lifted up 
by the Lord into a lofty school of trials, and then the people of God will join 
him, after which he will return to Russia” (ibid., 286). Like the new Moses, 
Alexander was supposed to lead the “chosen people” into the Promised Land, 
which, according to Baroness Krüdener, was located in the southern provinces 
of the Russian Empire. 
In his memoirs on Alexander, Pastor Empaytaz included a letter which the 
emperor wrote to him from Baden on October 6, 1815. Thanking his corre-
spondent for his spiritual counsels, the emperor wrote that his soul “rejoices in 
that which belongs to the nation (nation) unknown to the world, but whose 
triumph is approaching swiftly” (Empaytaz 1840, 47). Apparently, in publishing 
the letter, the memoirist simply did not notice the polite but inflexible refusal 
under the veil of genteel deference so characteristic of the emperor. Alexander 
sincerely wished to believe in his divine predestination, and so received the 
fervent addresses of his confidante gratefully and trustingly. He envisioned the 
structure of the interior church completely differently, however. He regarded it 
as a secret fellowship of the elect. Its members could belong to different Chris-
tian confessions, live in various countries, and have no idea of each other’s 
existence, but they should be able to discern that they were alike by a special 
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mystical sense. On this issue, Alexander clearly was much more akin to 
Eckartshausen, who wrote that the elect “belong to no sect and no society other 
than the grand and authentic society of all the lightbearers” (Eckartshausen 
1804, 65). This was the hitherto unknown people which the whole world was 
soon destined to recognize. 
Even at the time of the first encounter between the emperor and the 
baroness, her daughter thought to remark that Alexander was “less interested” 
in what “maman” said about the “Church of our times” than what “pertained to 
the way of the Christian, to prayer, and to holiness” (Ley 1994,290; Krüdener 
1998, 130). Distinct disagreements became apparent exactly two months later, 
on September 4, a week before the prayer service at Vertus. “Alexander came,” 
Juliette Krüdener wrote in her diary. “We had a conversation about the Church. I 
spoke with him without any fear and told him that I felt that he had not yet 
committed himself to this work. He told us that he thought that it was not true, for 
example, that the church consisted of a few individuals, and that it should be estab-
lished in a specific country; he thought that it would exist everywhere” (Ley 1994, 
307; Krüdener 1998, 133). This is why the baroness’s missionary activity put 
Alexander on his guard. According to Juliette Krüdener, when Stein discussed 
her mother’s ideas with Alexander “concerning the church,” he was afraid that 
the baroness was too “open with others on this issue” (ibid.). 
As Eckartshausen wrote, man “henceforth should know and be instructed 
in everything that pertains to regeneration: … [F]irst, a Teacher and Mentor is 
necessary, but to know him, one must believe in Him, for what is the use of a 
Teacher if the pupil does not believe in him” (Eckartshausen 1804, 135). The 
general regeneration was approaching, but meanwhile Alexander, as A. N. 
Pypin noted long ago, very quickly lost faith in Madame Krüdener. The scholar 
refers to the testimony of Princess Meshcherskaia, who cited the sovereign’s 
“own words”: “The emperor spoke of his unexpected encounter with Frau 
Krüdener at the very minute when in his mind he hoped God would send him 
a person who would help him understand God’s sacred will correctly. Then he 
continued: ‘For some time I have thought that it was precisely she whom God 
had chosen to this end, but I very quickly saw that this light was nothing but an 
ignis fatuus [will-o’-the-wisp]’” (Pypin 2000, 365). In 1818, Alexander spoke to 
Countess S. I. Sollogub about the “simplicity” of Christianity and about “unset-
tled souls who lose themselves in subtleties they themselves do not understand. 
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For example, Madame Krüdener,” he added, “might have had good intentions, 
but caused irreparable harm” (Posnikova 1867, 1038–1039). 
For a time Krüdener was able to help Alexander overcome his doubts 
and become convinced of his election and his membership in the society of 
lightbearers. As his belief in his special predestination increased, however, it 
enabled the emperor to reject the baroness’s claim to spiritual leadership. In 
the words of Eckartshausen himself, “in the end times, everything hidden 
shall become manifest, but it also is prophesied that in these times many false 
prophets shall arise, and the precept is given to the faithful not to believe in 
every spirit, but to test the spirits to see whether they are of God”( 1 John 4: 
1; Eckartshausen 1804, 73). Krüdener’s teaching envisioned Alexander’s role 
as leading the exodus of the baroness’s followers out of Europe and bestowing 
upon them a place for the coming chiliastic kingdom in the confines of his 
own empire (see Ley 1994, 347–385). This could only clash with the senti-
ments of the sovereign, whose eschatological expectations, in large part with 
the assistance of Krüdener herself, had been raised to the highest level. 
 7 
Roksandra Sturdza wrote in her memoirs that the Holy Alliance was “the reali-
zation of the grandiose concept of Henry IV and Charles Irénée Castel, the 
Abbé de Saint-Pierre” (Edling 1999, 223). Undoubtedly the emperor himself 
had a similar view, for as the Austrian diplomat Friedrich von Gentz put it, he 
saw “himself as the founder of a European federation and wanted to be regarded 
as its leader.” As Gentz noted in 1818, “over a period of two years he did not 
write a single memoir or a single diplomatic note in which this system was not 
presented as the glory of the age and the salvation of the world” (Nikolai 
Mikhailovich I, 219–220). 
Creating this kind of European federation, or Christian republic, with 
Russia playing an active role, was a goal of Catherine II’s policy as early as the 
1770s and constituted one of the significant bases of the “Greek Project.” It is 
not surprising that the treaty of the Holy Alliance, suffused with religious 
rhetoric, was perceived by European public opinion as an anti-Turkish decla-
ration. Gentz, troubled by the publication of the treaty, wrote in one of his 
dispatches: 
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The first instinct of almost everyone who learned of the treaty’s existence 
was to regard as it as the portent of a project directed against Turkey. They 
said that since Christianity was the principal subject and sacramental word 
(le mot sacramental) of this document, then clearly it did not prohibit mili-
tary action against unbelievers, and that Emperor Alexander’s secret 
intention was to bind the leading Christian powers by a solemn oath and 
then to propose a new crusade to them. (Ley 1975, 180)
Similar interpretations of the emperor’s Christian sentiments were shared not 
only by such staunch opponents of the liberation of Greece as Metternich and 
Gentz, but also by passionate advocates of the Greek cause. Roksandra Sturdza 
recalled how as early as 1814, despite the opposition of the Austrian court, she 
had induced Alexander to visit a church of the Turkish Greeks in Vienna. The 
Russian sovereign’s visit was, in her words, “a minute of happiness for the unfor-
tunate Greeks, and in their imagination they envisioned their august protector 
in the Church of Saint Sophia” (Edling 1999, 203). 
Grecophile sentiments also were common in Baroness Krüdener’s inner 
circle. Her son-in-law F. Berckheim recalled that on one occasion he read 
“ancient prophecies” to Alexander, “contained in collections of works of 
alchemy, where the ruler of a certain northern monarchy was proclaimed, who 
would gather the people around him who were the most like him in piety.” As 
Berckheim reported later, this prophecy came from Madame Jeanne Marie 
Bouvier de la Motte Guyon, who supposedly predicted that “this chosen 
monarch would be a Russian, that he would become the head of a universal 
church, and that his capital would be either Constantinople or Jerusalem” 
(Shebunin, manuscript, № 110, 120). Apparently, from the very beginning 
Alexander regarded these prophecies warily, since he did not share his grand-
mother’s expansionist plans (Arsh 1976, 236–38 and passim). By March 1816, 
he instructed his envoy in London, Count Kh. A. Lieven, to explain to the 
English cabinet that the treaty as approved “contains no hostile intentions 
towards peoples who are not fortunate enough to be Christians,” and that his 
intention was to provide the same explanations to the Ottoman Porte 
(Shil’der III, 553). In his view, there was no special place assigned to a Christian 
republic of Greece. The emperor put his hopes in the universal Church, hence 
Russia’s historical ties to Byzantine Orthodoxy, so essential to any design for a 
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“Greek Project,” became less important to him. What is more, the classical 
connotations of Catherine’s plans, which a significant number of those who 
shared the emperor’s apocalyptic sentiments still found attractive, held no 
fascination whatever for him. 
Alexandros Ypsilantis’s uprising in 1821 posed a choice for Alexander 
(Fadeev 1958; Dostian 1972, 196–331; Arsh 1976; Prousis 1994, 6–54, which 
also contains a short bibliography, 185–186). It seems that he made a decision 
without particular difficulty. On February 24, 1821, he wrote from the Congress 
of Laibach to Golitsyn, who on the whole was sympathetic to the Greek 
liberation: 
There is no doubt that the summons for this revolt was given by the same 
central governing committee (comité central directeur) from Paris in order 
to create a diversion on behalf of Naples5 and to prevent us from destroying 
one of these synagogues of Satan, established with its only goal to preach 
and disseminate its anti-Christian teaching. Ypsilantis himself writes in a 
letter addressed to me that he belongs to a secret society founded for the 
liberation and rebirth of Greece. But all these secret societies are affiliated 
with the central committee in Paris. The revolution in Piedmont has the 
same goal—to establish one more center to preach the same doctrine and 
paralyze the influence of the Christian authorities who profess the Holy Alli-
ance. (Nikolai Mikhailovich I, 219–220)
Ten days earlier, Alexander, referring to “reliable evidence” at his disposal, tried 
to convince the same correspondent of the existence of a general conspiracy of 
“revolutionary liberals, radical levelers, and Carbonari” who “communicate and 
agree with each other,” and that this conspiracy was based “on the so-called 
philosophy of Voltaire and those like him” (ibid., 546). About this time the 
emperor sent a letter to Princess Meshcherskaia in which he informed his 
correspondent that the sovereigns assembled in Laibach were seeking means 
for battle with “the Empire of Evil, which is expanding … with the help of all the 
occult means which its directing satanic spirit employs” (ibid., 251). 
Like V. P. Petrov ten years earlier, Alexander regarded an international 
conspiracy with its center in Paris as the principal threat to the coming Chris-
tian republic. In the opinion of V. G. Sirotkin, “the basic premise set forth in the 
treaty creating the Holy Alliance about the reasons for the emergence of the 
5 A revolution was taking place there at this time.
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‘revolutionary spirit’ was the same as before; it is the conspiracy of Masons and 
Jacobins, who were not destroyed and continue to sow intrigues.” As the histo-
rian puts it, “these old ideas of the Abbé Augustin Barruel were modernized by 
the Paris jurist Nicholas Bergasse,” who wrote to Alexander about the existence 
of the “principal center” of revolutionary propaganda in France. He also wrote 
about “the Bavarian philosopher and mystic, Franz von Baader,” who in a 
brochure published in 1815, On the Necessity Prompted by the French Revolution 
of Establishing a New and Closer Bond between Religion and Politics, proposed 
measures for the struggle with the worldwide conspiracy quite similar to the 
sentiments of the Russian emperor at the time (Sirotkin 1981, 45; cf. Baader 
1987). In 1814, that is, a year before publication, Baader sent the text of his 
work to the Russian and Austrian monarchs in Vienna (Sirotkin 1981, 46; Ley 
1975, 125–126). 
The various appropriations of Barruel’s framework were by no means 
solely the work of two publicists, however; rather, they were common to all 
mystical thought of the epoch. In his autobiography Jung-Stilling wrote that 
Abbé Barruel “in the main is correct, erring only in details” ( Jung-Stilling II, 
218). Six years before the appearance of Memoirs of the History of Jacobinism, 
Eckartshausen published a multivolume work on magic in which he pointed to 
secret societies in particular as the principal danger to the political and social 
order. “Everything that assumes the mask of secrecy is in the highest degree 
suspect,” he wrote, and declared that societies spawning “vain enthusiasts,” 
“nurturing imposters,” or even worse, adopting political goals, were to be 
avoided (Eckartshausen I, 387; II, 215–223). 
By analogy with the inner church, or “society of lightbearers,” thinkers 
with a mystical orientation developed their concept of a conspiracy of the 
powers of darkness, nefariously opposing the accomplishment of the divine 
plan and willingly or unwillingly carrying out the designs of the devil. With 
the advent of the end times, the struggle between good and evil inevitably 
assumed an eschatological character. “To submit to the spirit of evil,” Alexander 
wrote in 1815 to Frédéric-César La Harpe, who had advised him to make peace 
with Napoleon, “means to strengthen his power, to give him the means to estab-
lish a tyranny in an even more terrible form than the first time. One must have 
courage to do battle with him, and, with the help of Divine Providence, unity, 
and perseverance, we will achieve a favorable outcome” (Shil’der III, 327). 
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For those with such views, the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
empire were a kind of open revelation of the Antichrist to mankind. Over-
thrown and on the brink of final defeat, the agents of darkness had to operate 
especially craftily and cunningly. Naturally, the blacker and more malevolent 
the true goals of the conspirators, the more they had to camouflage their actions 
with noble and virtuous slogans. To withstand them required insight and reso-
lution, which the Lord alone could provide to his chosen ones. Such a 
perception of the world, which Alexander had formulated even before the war 
and which took definite shape during the campaigns of 1812–15, provided a set 
standard for interpreting the revolutionary wave between the end of the 1810s 
and the beginning of the 1820s, from the upheavals in Naples and Piedmont to 
the mutiny in the Semenovskii Regiment, in which the emperor persistently 
tried to discern signs of a widespread conspiracy (see Shil’der IV, 179 and 
passim). For him the Greek uprising was one more testimony to the diabolical 
cunning of the spirit of evil. Neither the execution of the Greek patriarch, nor 
the massacres of Greeks in Constantinople in April 1821, nor the pressure of 
public opinion in his own land, where demands to support the Greeks as fellow 
Orthodox Christians had a major impact (see, for example, Fadeev 1964, 
41–52), persuaded the emperor to alter his point of view. At the end of 1821, he 
ordered Baroness Krüdener exiled from St. Petersburg, where she had come to 
preach the coming mystical triumph of the Russian tsar in the walls of the 
Church of Saint Sophia (see Ley 1994, 404–409). 
The two basic ideological models of Russian policy created in the 1770s, 
the “Greek Project” and the theory of a worldwide conspiracy, came into irrec-
oncilable conflict, and the conspiracy theory was the total and unquestioned 
victor. Much later, Aleksandr Sturdza, an ardent Greek patriot and partisan of 
Russian intervention in Greek affairs, wrote that the July 1830 Revolution in 
France “vindicated the emperor’s foresight” (Sturdza 1864, 104; cf. 98–99). In 
1822, at the time of the Congress of Verona, Alexander discussed these ques-
tions with François René de Chateaubriand, who in February 1823 quoted 
Alexander’s words in his speech in the French Chamber of Deputies and later 
included them in his memoirs:
“Suppose,” Alexander asked, “that as our enemies maintain, alliance is only a 
word advanced to cloak ambition? That might have been valid in the old 
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order of things, but is it possible to speak of private interests today when the 
whole civilized world is in mortal danger? 
“An English, French, Russian, Prussian, or Austrian policy can no longer 
exist, for there is only a common policy that must be shared by peoples and 
sovereigns for the benefit of all. I ought to have been the first to demonstrate 
my devotion to the principles upon which I based the alliance, and a case 
presented itself: the Greek uprising. Nothing, it would seem, would be 
more in my interests, the interests of my people, and in accord with the 
opinion of my country than a religious war against Turkey, but I perceived 
the sign of revolution in the upheavals occurring in the Peloponnese. And 
so I stayed on the sidelines. … No, I never will break with the monarchs to 
whom I am bound. Sovereigns should be permitted to conclude open alli-
ances in order to oppose secret societies.” (Chateaubriand 1840, 96–98; cf. 
Nikolai Mikhailovich I, 295–296)6
In the letter to Meshcherskaia cited above, Alexander stressed that effective 
methods to combat satanic intrigues are, “alas, beyond meager human strength.” 
“Only the Savior, with the power of his Divine word,” the emperor explained, 
“can give us the necessary means” (Nikolai Mikhailovich I, 251). And if a 
member of the “society of lightbearers” needed mystical intuition and spiritual 
support to be aware of his election and recognize his comrades, then the same 
degree of perceptive intervention was necessary for him to discover the enemy 
and expose his schemes. By 1818–19, the emperor had concluded that mystical 
associations of a pious tendency might be an effective means to combat subver-
sive forces. In these years he openly protected E. F. Tatarinova’s “spiritual 
union,” hoping with its help, as he himself said, “to root out heresies, both the 
Skoptsy and the Masons” (Tolstoi 1872, 224; cf. Dubrovin 1895/1896; Etkind 
1997) and to defeat the “Carbonari,” who now are “spreading in the West” and 
“already have penetrated” to its “seat of power” (Kossovich 1872, 1233). 
In 1822, however, Alexander decided that all secret societies, without 
exception, ought to be banned categorically, above all, it seems, Masonic lodges 
(see Lebedev 1912; Serkov 2000, 242–244). A signed statement was obtained 
from Tatarinova that her meetings would be discontinued, and in 1825, after 
the collapse of the Russian Bible Society and the dismissal of Aleksandr 
6 Here we are not considering the influence of Austrian diplomacy and Metternich on the 
development of the Greek crisis, which is extremely important for the political history of the 
conflict but not directly relevant to our topic (see Bertier de Sauvigny 1960; Bertier de 
Sauvigny 1972, etc.)
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Golitsyn, she, in effect, was exiled from St. Petersburg. In the last year of his life, 
Alexander also apparently began to be disillusioned with the ideas of the Holy 
Alliance. The light of the “star of the East,” sent from above to guide the chosen 
one on the path of spiritual revelation, turned out to be just the next 
“will-o’-the-wisp.” 
 8 
Faith in the existence of a universal conspiracy run by a secret committee in 
Paris was one of the extremely few mythologems that united the partisans of 
mystical universalism that, for many years, surrounded Alexander with the 
national isolationists of Shishkov’s orientation. “From both sides the arguments 
and even the entire phraseology were absolutely identical,” noted Pypin, 
concerning the accusations of participating in a Masonic conspiracy and aiding 
the Antichrist which were traded by the leader of the mystical sect, Esaul 
Kotel’nikov from the Don, and his persecutors from the conservatively-oriented 
Orthodox hierarchs, first of all Archimandrite Fotii (Pypin 2000, 448). This 
kind of similarity in many ways facilitated Alexander’s falling under Fotii’s influ-
ence toward the end of his life (see ibid., 190–287; Chistovich 1899; Kondakov 
1998; Gordin 1999, etc.). Sensing the growing dissatisfaction and again 
becoming disillusioned with his former spiritual guides, the emperor tried to 
step in the water in the same place for a second time, to repeat the move that he 
had made with such success in 1812. In the place of Golitsyn as minister of 
popular enlightenment he again appointed Shishkov. However, this time the 
superannuated admiral was not to get a chance to influence the empire’s ideo-
logical course. The new reign that began with the tragic events of  December 14, 
1825, demanded other people and other programs. 
 1 
A new phase of ideological production began in the early 1830s, which was a turning point in the Russian Empire’s foreign and domestic policies. 
The Peace of Adrianople with Turkey in 1829 had put an end, at least for a time, 
to Russian striving for dominance over the Orthodox East and the unification 
of the peoples of this faith under its aegis. The new Emperor Nikolai Pavlovich 
(henceforth referred to as Nicholas I) fully shared his elder brother’s skepti-
cism toward the grandiose notions of their grandmother (see, e.g., Lincoln 
1989, 118). However, educated Russian society still cherished the dream of 
Russia’s historical destiny of restoring Greece and therefore had been disillu-
sioned by the lack of mention of Greece and the Orthodox faith in the imperial 
manifesto that had declared war (see, e.g., Benkendorf 1929, 157–158; cf. 
Fadeev 1958; Prousis 1994). Now, if the Slavic question remained on the 
agenda, it had been shifted from the realm of real politics into that of hypothet-
ical schemes, while the Greek question was taken off of the table completely. 
This was even more the case after the assassination in 1831 of Ioannis 
Capodistria, the first president of Greece and former Russian state secretary for 
foreign affairs (see Woodhouse 1973).
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Having rejected expansionist plans in the East, the Russian autocracy also 
adopted a more cautious policy in the West. This path was more likely intended 
to curtail the influx of foreign influences into Russia than to aggressively pursue 
its own agenda beyond Russia’s borders. When he received word of the revolu-
tions in France and Belgium in 1830, Nicholas I considered the possibility of 
military intervention in Europe, but the Polish uprising forced him to 
completely reject such an idea and to preserve the status quo (Shil’der 1903 II, 
284–320).
Thus the section of the Holy Alliance’s legacy that was based on collective 
armed defense of existing monarchial regimes was ideologically repudiated, at 
least until 1848. The moderate isolationism that came to the fore in Nicholas I’s 
foreign policy, however, was by no means connected to a focus on long-awaited 
internal reforms. On the contrary, under the impact of the same complex of 
historical events—the July Revolution in France, the Polish revolt, the cholera 
riots of the summer of 1831—the emperor discarded the reformist plans of the 
first five years of his reign, in which he had “revived” Russia “with war, hopes, 
and labors.” Even the highly modest recommendations of the “December 6 
Commission,” which were the culmination of these efforts, were as it turned 
out essentially shelved (see Kizivetter 1912, 410–502; Lincoln 1989, 92–98).
The rejection of reforms did not mean that the emperor no longer believed 
in their necessity. In the early 1830s Nicholaevan politics took on its classical 
form, whose essence the autocrat expressed aphoristically in 1842; while 
putting the brakes on yet another project for gradual reform, he declared, 
“There is no doubt that serfdom in its present situation is an evil, the most 
palpable and obvious to everyone, but to touch on it now would be an even 
more ruinous matter” (Mironenko 1990, 187). This formula is endlessly fruitful 
and may be applied to many sides of Russian state life: an obvious political evil 
may not be corrected out of the fear of shaking the very foundations of the 
existing power. Nicholas I preferred to trust the recommendations of his elder 
brother the Tsesarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, who wrote to him that “old age 
(drevnost’) is the most reliable protection for government regulations,” advising 
him to leave reform “to the judgment of time” (SbRIO XC, 77). 
In implementing this strategic turn in politics, the emperor undoubtedly 
felt the need for a system of gradual and organic development that, at the same 
time, occurs under government control. Necessary changes were postponed to 
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some vague future, but their reliability and solidity would be guaranteed by the 
very course of events. Thus the responsibility for them was transferred from the 
authorities to the movement of history; the purely conservative functions of 
maintaining the state’s stability and preserving the fundamental bases of the 
political order were left to the government. 
S. S. Uvarov, who was appointed deputy minister of popular education in 
early 1832, was able to present the emperor with an outline for this kind of 
system. His triad of “Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality,” which A. N. Pypin 
aptly labeled the “theory of official nationalism” (Pypin I, 380), was fated to be 
Figure 29 Portrait of S. S. Uvarov. Lithograph by M. Mukhin.
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empire’s state ideology for many decades (on Uvarov and his political phil- 
osophy, see Davydov 1856; Schmid 1888; Pypin I; Shpet 1989; Koyré 1929; 
Durylin 1932; Riazanovskii 1967; Whittaker 1999; Gordin 1989; Kazakov 
1989; Tsimbaev 1989; Isambaeva 1990; Shevchenko 1991; Kachalov 1992; 
Egorov 1996; Shevchenko 1997). The unusually large historical significance of 
this ideological system lies in characteristic contradiction to the extremely 
limited circle of sources on whose basis one may try to reconstruct its initial 
form. Uvarov did not leave any kind of developed exposition of his own polit-
ical philosophy. The preamble to the first issue of the Journal of the Ministry of 
Popular Education; a circular published on his appointment to the post of mini-
ster; several paragraphs from reports on his inspection of Moscow University 
and documents concerning the activities of the Ministry of Popular Education 
during his decade-long work there; and two or three oral comments recorded 
in the diaries of M. P. Pogodin and A. V. Nikoitenko—until very recently this 
has exhausted the entire corpus of sources (Uvarov 1875; Uvarov, “Ot reda-
ktsii” 1834; Uvarov, “Tsirkuliarnoe” 1834; Uvarov 1864, 2–4; Nikitenko I, 174; 
Barsukov IX, 235–237).1 
This kind of practice is quite usual. Having armed itself with an ideological 
doctrine, the state authorities do not usually put much energy into clarifying its 
content, preferring a multitude of tautological restatements over interpretation. 
Thus the institutions of power leave themselves sufficient room for maneu-
vering when it comes to deciding whether or not any particular manifestation 
of social life fits its parameters. Furthermore, and in contrast to their oppo-
nents, the authorities often make it seem that they do not require particular 
theoretical explication of their principles insofar as they have the possibility of 
realizing them in practice, at least ideally. Consequently, and in reference to 
“Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality,” the document that would offer the 
best explanation would be one that had preceded its imperial approbation; that 
1 In the single existing monograph on the theory of official nationalism there is little on 
Uvarov in distinction from the more prolific Pogodin and Shevyrev (see Riazanovskii 1967), 
and the single biography of Uvarov says relatively little about his intellectual legacy, but 
much about his practical activities as minister and his contribution to Russia’s educational 
system (see Whittaker 1999). Even in an article especially dedicated to Uvarov’s ideology 
(Whittaker 1978) the analysis is based primarily on his “liberal” period, most fully expressed 
in his 1818 speech at Petersburg Pedagogical University (on this see also Pugachev 1964; 
Isambaeva 1990).
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is, in which its author would have been compelled to defend and explain his 
views. Hence a valuable addition to the known corpus of sources is the report 
Uvarov gave to Nicholas I, “On Some General Principles that Can Serve as 
Guide in Administering the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment” that was 
published by M. M. Shevchenko (see Uvarov 1995). Together with the familiar 
formulations that were later repeated in the corresponding reports and circu-
lars, it contains a whole series of propositions that let us connect the triad to 
the time and conditions of their creation. However, this document—as is 
revealed by Uvarov’s note on the copyist’s text discovered by Shevchenko—
was presented to the emperor on November 19, 1833 (ibid., 70). This was eight 
months after the start of Uvarov’s term as minister, and almost eleven months 
before the earliest known references to the triad, to be found in a report on his 
inspection of Moscow University written in December 1832 (Uvarov 1875, 
511). Here Uvarov was undoubtedly presenting ideas to the emperor that he 
had already approved. Shevchenko reported that he was not able to find a 
signature on this report, and one might have concluded that such a document 
did not exist. Uvarov wrote most of his works in French, and they were later 
translated and edited by his assistants; indeed we found a rough draft of Uvarov’s 
letter, in French, in the same archival fond as the document that Shevchenko 
located (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 98, 16–22 ob.). It is a little more protracted 
and significantly less official than the final version, and differs from it in various 
important details. Moreover, the draft was written in March 1832, more than a 
year and a half before the final report was presented to the emperor. We 
published this document in 1997 (see Uvarov 1997; it will be cited from here 
on without further references). On its basis we will attempt to reconstruct 
Uvarov’s project for Russia. 
This is the earliest known mention of the triad. Uvarov had just received 
the position of assistant minister and the assignment to inspect Moscow 
University. Considering the advanced age and weak health of the minister, 
Count K. A. Liven, this assignment indicated the emperor’s intention to give 
the ministerial chair to Uvarov if he successfully carried out his mission (see 
Rozhdestvenskii 1902, 170–223). The newly-appointed assistant minister sent 
the emperor a memorandum in which he described his “most vital need to 
open [his] heart” to the monarch, “to throw [himself] to His feet [with] a 
confession faith” and to lay out his guiding principles. These words were not 
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merely dutiful formulas or ritual flattery, to which Uvarov was more than 
inclined. A professional careerist and experienced administrator, he was none-
theless inspired by an exceptionally ambitious project to gradually change the 
citizens of the empire via the institutions of the Ministry of Popular Enlighten-
ment and thus to mold Russia’s future. “Either the Ministry of Popular 
Enlightenment represents nothing or it represents the soul of the administra-
tive corps,” he wrote to Nicholas I, clearly unconcerned that his explicit claim to 
be ideological leader for the entire government apparatus might upset his 
addressee.2 Uvarov achieved his goal: the emperor handed him a mandate to 
carry out his designs. 
The fate of the triad was not the only thing that testified to this approval. 
After a year and a half in the report “On Some General Principles,” and ten years 
later in the report “A Decade of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment,” Uvarov 
repeated almost word for word several fragments from the letter, including its 
most important ones. The sentiments expressed in the letter became official 
doctrine. Uvarov had correctly understood the emperor’s cherished aspirations 
and subtly grasped the current needs of government politics. In Uvarov’s 
opinion, Russia could count on recovery since the religious, political and moral 
ideals that the supreme power wanted to spread still retained palpable force. 
Nevertheless, decisive and well-considered actions by the government were 
required because these ideals had been “dissipated by premature and superficial 
civilization, fantasy systems, and reckless undertakings; they are disconnected, 
not unified into a whole, without a center, and, moreover, over the course of 
thirty years have had to withstand the assault of people and events.” 
Uvarov’s chronology is remarkable. The reference to thirty years unambig-
uously described the first years of Alexander’s reign, which was thus being 
rejected from start to finish, with all of its hopes, disillusionments, victories, 
failures, and efforts at change, and in which Uvarov himself had actively partic-
ipated. To characterize the political style of Alexander and his close associates, 
Uvarov conceived the formula “administrative Saint-Simonism,” which is 
worthy of adoption by history textbooks. Uvarov’s definition does not so much 
indicate the visionary scope of the innovations of the Alexandrine era as it does 
2 N. I. Kazakov’s assertions that Uvarov’s triad was exclusively intended for departmental use 
in the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment (Kazakov 1989), challenged by V. A. Mil’china 
and A. L. Ospovat (1995, 21), thus seem baseless. 
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their utopian fervor, as well as their armchair activism, based on the conviction 
that any problem may be solved with the help of abstract schemes, paper proj-
ects, and bureaucratic measures.3 In this sense Arakcheev’s military colonies 
truly differed little from Saint-Simon’s phalansteries. By connecting the discred-
ited administrative style with the name of the celebrated utopian thinker, 
among the last heirs to eighteenth-century theoretical rationalism, Uvarov 
signaled that he himself intended to follow a totally different intellectual path.
 2 
In the memorandum only one name is mentioned, and its choice and the very 
way it is cited deserve thoughtful consideration. Discussing the worldwide 
consequences of the July Revolution in Paris, Uvarov exclaimed, “Did not one 
of the authors of the July Revolution, Mr. Guizot, a man of conscience and 
talent, not recently proclaim from the tribune: ‘Society no longer has any polit-
ical, moral or religious convictions’? This wail of despair, involuntarily bursting 
from all well-intentioned people of Europe, whatever views they may hold, 
serves as the single creed (simvol very) that still unites them in today’s 
conditions.”
Uvarov wrote his letter in March, and thus was responding to the latest 
events in Paris. On February 18, 1832, the French Chamber of Deputies was 
discussing the question of state subsidies for Catholic seminaries. The radical 
deputy Odilon Barrot, who demanded that such subsidies be sharply curtailed, 
accused the parliamentary majority—which was by no means disposed in favor 
of the Catholics, but which had opposed the demand for cuts for political 
considerations—of having no firm principles. François Guizpot’s speech in 
response, according to the Parisian newspaper “Journal des debats,” had 
imparted “greatness and sublimity” to parliamentary discussions “which it so 
often lacks” ( Journal des debats, 1832, February 17). Guizot declared:
Recall, gentlemen, what our worthy colleague Odilon Barrot recently said—
he complained bitterly about our lack of firm principles, and said, as far as I 
remember, that for many minds there is already no longer any good or evil, 
3 Oleg Proskurin has observed in conversation with the author that the combination of utopi-
anism and castles in the air, together with a high degree of bureaucratic efficiency, was the 
characteristic feature of the bureaucrat of the Alexandrine era. The model here is Speranskii. 
Uvarov himself also belonged to this type of government functionary. 
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neither truth or falsehood, that people move about without knowing  
themselves what feeling is guiding them. 
Mr. Odilon Barrot is correct, and I consider this evil as serious as he, but 
I think that he did not explain this in full. The issue is not merely that our 
political and moral convictions are unstable and impermanent but also that 
they contradict convictions that are far more definite,… be they shut off in a 
narrow circle and belonging to a small number of people, but on the other 
hand more passionate, and, I do not fear to say, more fanatical, than those 
which we profess. … We are forced to deal both with revolutionary ideas 
that are still trying to devour society as well as with old counter-revolu-
tionary beliefs that are by no means as weak as we might think at times, but 
still full of energy and danger. What can we with our moderate views, I ask 
you, oppose to these two hostile parties whose convictions are filled with 
fanaticism and therefore unworthy of our trust? 
Love for order, which in our day in France truly makes up a universal 
desire, and the well-known moral instinct for decency and justice. These are 
our two single strengths, two single beliefs: with love for order and the 
instinct of a decent person we enter into battle with the dual fanaticisms, 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary. (Guizot I, 386–387)
Uvarov interpreted Guizot’s speech quite freely, as it by no means represents “a 
wail of despair.” The French orator’s partial agreement with the accusations of a 
lack of firm principles was merely a rhetorical move to contrast the instinctively 
correct moral feeling of the majority with the infatuated adherence of both left 
and right doctrinaires to their wild theories. Uvarov, however, was attracted by 
Guizot’s apologia for the golden mean and used his polemical concession to 
construct his own political model. “There is a huge distance between the old pre- 
judices which do not recognize anything that did not exist at least a half a century 
ago and the new ones, who ruthlessly destroy everything that they come to 
replace, furiously attacking the remnants of the past. [But] there is also firm soil, a 
reliable support, a basis which cannot let you down,” he wrote to the emperor in 
the memorandum. In Europe, according to Uvarov, “well-intentioned” people 
occupy a similarly reasonable position, but shocked by the dramatic course of 
historical events and having lost their orientation, their “creed” inevitably became 
“a wail of despair.” 
We have no information about what the imperial addressee of Uvarov’s 
letter thought of Guizot’s speech. On the one hand, the emperor, enraged and 
frightened by the July Revolution, would not have sympathized with one of its 
leaders, but on the other, Guizot had done much to keep popular discontent 
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within legal limits. Especially important for Russia, he categorically opposed 
French interference in the Polish crisis, which the Parisian radicals insisted on 
(ibid., 330–336). Furthermore, we don’t know if the mention of Guizot was 
preserved in the final text, which might have diverged from the draft. In any 
case, in ascribing despair over the events taking place in his country to one of 
the French political leaders, Uvarov made Guizot and his ideas politically palat-
able for his correspondent. This kind of rhetorical device strongly recalls the 
condescending intonation of Soviet propaganda in relation to progressive 
figures of the West. As the narrative goes, these were people of “conscience and 
talent,” who while incapable of true understanding of historical dialectics were 
nevertheless able to attack the evils of the capitalist system sincerely and 
profoundly. To use a later expression, it was important for Uvarov “to push 
Guizot through” (that is, through the censorship) in order to endorse his 
conception of French civilization. 
Uvarov, who always followed the cultural and political life of Paris with 
great interest, must have already been long familiar with Guizot’s career, which 
revealed unexpected parallels with his own. In 1811, when Uvarov had begun 
his service in the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment, Guizot had founded the 
journal “Annals of Education,” in which he laid out his views on creating a 
national educational system. In 1816 he had published a treatise, co-authored 
with P.-P. Royer-Collard, who later became an important figure in post-July 
France, in which they spoke of the duty of the state to take charge of education 
and to realize national principles through educational institutions (see 
Johnson 1963, 110–113). This idea Uvarov promoted strongly. By strange 
coincidence, in one year, 1821, both Guizot and Uvarov had been removed 
from educational activity due to their excessive liberalism. Guizot’s return to a 
university professorship in 1828 had been a personal and political triumph. At 
about that time he delivered his lectures on the history of European civiliza-
tion and especially in France, to great success. These two courses were 
published in 1828 and 1829 as separate volumes and, together with much else, 
contained a general theory of civilization that at the time represented the last 
word in European historical science. 
Following Guizot’s example, Uvarov founded the Journal of the Ministry 
of Popular Enlightenment, in 1834. This publication became the transmitter of 
the new official policy. Its very first issue featured the introductory lecture 
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from The History of Civilization in Europe in which the basic theoretical ideas 
for both courses were laid out. According to Guizot, it was the development 
and perfection of civilization that was the key to mankind’s progress, because 
civilization was handed down from generation to generation and thus consti-
tuted “the destiny of the human race” (Guizot 1834, 432). Civilization of this 
or that people combines in itself “the development of social activity and the 
development of private activity” (ibid., 441); on the one hand, “its establish-
ments, trade, industry, wars, all of the particulars of government,” and on the 
other, “religion … the sciences, literature, the arts” (ibid., 432–433). Its pres-
ence is revealed “everywhere where the external position of a person is 
extended, enlivened, improved, everywhere that the inner nature of a person 
reveals its splendor and greatness” (ibid., 41). At the same time, while 
belonging to one people, civilization is also the property of all humanity. For 
Guizot the existence of one single European civilization is obvious, and he 
tried to embrace it in one general conception; it goes without saying that, 
from his perspective, France had the uncontested leading role in this 
civilization. 
In the Russian translation that appeared in the Journal of the Ministry of 
Popular Enlightenment, Guizot’s key concept of “civilization” is translated as 
“civic education” (grazhdanskoe obrazovanie). The publication itself bore the 
title “The First Lecture of Mr. Guizot from the Course of Lectures He Read On 
the History of European Civic Education.” The issue here was not finding a 
Russian equivalent. The word “tsivilizatsiia” (civilization) was fairly common at 
the time and even frequently occurs in the text. At times the translator resorted 
to using both terms, e.g., “From ancient times and in many countries they use 
the word civilization, civil education” (ibid., 434; the original has only “civilisa-
tion”). In one place, an incorrectly chosen pronoun, it seems, indicates 
incomplete editing: “the existence of European civilization is obvious; a kind of 
unity is clearly revealed in the civil education of various states of Europe; it 
[sic]4 follows from almost identical facts” (ibid., 428). 
The journal’s editors evidently divided the main category of Guizot’s 
historiosophy into two parts, relatively speaking, into “bad” civilization and 
4 The feminine pronoun that would grammatically refer back to “tsivilizatsiia” is evidently in 
error, as the expected referent, “unity,” is neuter.
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“good” civil education.5 In his memorandum Uvarov sharply delineated what 
he understood by the word “civilization.” He emphasized that the events of 
1830 “had done away with” the idea of social progress that inspired the French 
historian and had taken unaware “those who believed in the future of peoples 
most strongly of all” and caused them to doubt “if that which they call civiliza-
tion is really the path to social good.” The rhetoric suggested that even the 
author of the concept of European civilization should at least to some extent 
reassess his former views. 
The terminological operation performed on Guizot’s first lecture turned 
out to be uncommonly productive. The word “civilization” took on the meaning 
of social experience that was unacceptable for Russia. “We are forced to use the 
name Europe for something that should never have had any other name than 
its own: Civilization,” is the way F. I. Tituchev (II, 57) later formulated this 
position. The authorities used this to their advantage, categorizing this term as 
falling in the sphere of “civil education.” 
It is very likely that Uvarov personally edited the translation. Publication 
of the Journal of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment was the most important 
element of the new minister’s plan for spreading his doctrine. As Uvarov 
instructed his readers in the forward to the first issue, “The Ministry considers 
its primary and holy duty to give … a useful direction for readers of our Journal 
and to satisfy the just desire of true sons of the Fatherland to know how they 
can better facilitate the lofty objectives of the Father of Russia” (Uvarov 1834, 
VII). The coincidence of mentioning Guizot in the letter to the emperor and 
the appearance of his lecture in the first issue of his journal was hardly acci-
dental. Two notes to the lecture demonstrate that Uvarov took part in preparing 
5 In a letter to the author of January 6, 1998, Z. Bauman wrote: “[I have] one note concerning 
the dual Russian translation of “civilization.” It follows from your research that Uvarov 
drank his fill of German milk and even looked at the Germans through French eyes. Before 
he happened to read Guizot, the image of the process Guizot was writing about had already 
formed in his mind as Bildung, and this concept is best translated into Russian as obrazo-
vanie (education). By the way, in Guizot’s time ‘civilization’ was similar in spirit to 
‘education.’ This concept (like the concept of culture) was born in the late eighteenth 
century to describe not a condition but an activity, task, creation, reworking, formation. It 
was only after many years that civilization, like culture, was considered something finished 
(something like ‘developed socialism’) and they forgot the initial idea of the concept. 
Hence in explaining what the matter was about, Uvarov (or the translator), it seems, was 
correct.” Cf. Fevr 1991, 270–281.
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this publication. In both cases the commentator’s dissatisfaction is caused by 
similar passages. Guizot’s statement that traces of French civilization “are visible 
in all of the monuments of European literature” was accompanied by the 
important proviso: “Everywhere the action of this influence is decreasing. Now 
every people is creating its own literature just as the civil education of every 
people must be achieved to meet its own requirements” (Guizot 1834, 440). 
An even more irritated response was provoked by Guizot’s assertion that “there 
is practically no great idea and no great principle of civil education that France 
has not spread everywhere.” In the editors’ opinion, most likely directly 
Uvarov’s,
the author has been carried away by the one-sidedness characteristic of 
French writers. This will continue until that time when France ceases to 
regard itself as the focus of global enlightenment. But was it so long ago that 
France itself became familiar with the country nearest to it, Germany, and 
was she in a condition to make use of the fruits of its all-encompassing 
learning? After this it is unforgivable for us Russians to take the opinions of 
French writers as the single standard. We have before our eyes all of the 
countries of Europe, including our very own Fatherland that is so little 
known by foreigners, but nevertheless acquiring more and more influence 
on their fate. The civil education of the Slavic peoples was not part of Mr. 
Guizot’s plan at all. … For a true, complete picture, of course, we will have to 
wait for a long time for a skilled artist who must necessarily know all of 
Europe. (Ibid., 430)
The reference to France’s acquaintance with Germany’s “all-encompassing 
learning” refers to Madame de Stäel’s On Germany that came out in 1811. 
The goal of this book had been to acquaint what, in the author’s opinion, 
was egocentric French culture with the treasures of the German soul. 
Uvarov had known Madame de Stäel in Vienna in 1807–1809 at the time 
she was beginning to work on her book (see Durylin 1939). But the most 
important aspect of these two notes lies elsewhere. Guizot’s Francocentric 
view of European civilization is contrasted here to the notion of Europe as 
the amalgamation of national cultural worlds. Russia and the Slavic peoples 
as a whole only appear in this argument after Germany. Putting his main 
emphasis on Russian nationality, Uvarov unavoidably had to turn to those 
thinkers who were first to consciously challenge France’s cultural 
hegemony. 
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 36 
The connection of Uvarov’s triad with the political theory of German Roman-
ticism was first explored more than seventy years ago by Gustav Shpet who, 
very generally and in many ways by guesswork, indicated the dependence of 
Uvarov’s ideas on the Romantics, and in particular on the “state doctrine” of the 
German historian Heinrich Luden (Shpet 1989, 245–246; cf. Luden 1811). 
And indeed, in the very broad circle of sources for Uvarov’s doctrine, which 
encompasses a wide spectrum of European anti-revolutionary philosophy from 
Joseph de Maistre to Burke and Karamzin, the political doctrine of German 
Romantics plays a leading role. 
Uvarov’s main source was evidently the books and lectures of Friedrich 
Schlegel. Uvarov lived in Vienna from 1807 to mid-1809, at the same time as 
Schlegel. He became acquainted with his brother, August Schlegel, who accom-
panied Madame de Stäel and was her consultant in writing On Germany. Fifteen 
years later, in 1823, August wrote to Uvarov, who had by that time become pres-
ident of the Imperial Academy of Sciences: “Your Excellency once deigned to 
encourage my scholarly efforts with the attention with which you favored me 
with in Vienna, when I had the honor of being acquainted with you” (OPI 
GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 86, 293). In his Vienna diary, large portions of which were 
published by S. N. Durylin, Uvarov wrote, “I have heard that Madame de Stäel 
has earnestly extolled Mr. F. Schlegel’s intellect, but I do not know him well 
enough to be convinced of the justice of this praise. The exterior of a German 
writer is so hard to penetrate that one must be very convinced of the benefits to 
try and pierce it” (Durylin 1939, 236). 
The guarded nature of this comment does not contradict the intense 
interest with which Uvarov followed the work of the German thinker. It was 
precisely in 1808 that Schlegel’s book On the Language and Wisdom of the 
Indians came out; in it the author demonstrated that Indian history, mythology, 
language, and literature not only lay at the basis of all European culture, but also 
infinitely surpassed all of Europe’s achievements in its inner perfection (see 
Schlegel 1808; cf. Schwab 1950; Wilson 1964). Uvarov sent a copy of this book 
to Karamzin in Petersburg and recommended it to Zhukovskii (see Gillel’son 
6 For a more detailed discussion of the ideas in this section, see Zorin 1996.
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1969, 51). More importantly, he himself was deeply taken by the idea of deve-
loping Eastern studies, which from the start took on a distinct political 
coloration. One year after returning to Petersburg, he proposed “A Project for 
an Asian Academy,” which served as the basis of his career in scholarship. 
Extensively citing Schlegel’s work, Uvarov planned to turn the Russian capital 
into an international center of Oriental studies. In the project he not only based 
his ideas on the geographical position and political interests of Russia, but also 
on the necessity of returning modern civilization to its genuine roots (see, e.g., 
Riazanovskii 1960; Whittaker 1978). 
Nine years later Uvarov wrote to Speranskii, “The establishment and 
spread of Eastern languages should also help spread healthy ideas about Asia in 
its relationship to Russia. Here … is a new source of national politics that 
should save us from premature decrepitude and from European contagion” 
(Uvarov 1896, 158). Friedrich Schlegel was among the European luminaries 
who received the projects’ plans, and he responded sympathetically. He 
answered Uvarov in April 1811, “The plan fully accords to the greatness of the 
capital of the Russian Empire as well as to the many supplementary means that 
you have at your disposal. If such an undertaking actually comes into being, it 
would allow us to hope for the embodiment of everything that for the time 
being is impossible to realize in any of the remaining capitals on the European 
continent” (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 86, 298–299 verso). He clearly fully 
approved of the project’s political direction. 
Schlegel promised Uvarov to help propagate his idea in Austria and 
Germany.  Soon Schlegel sent Uvarov his “Course of Lectures on Most Recent 
History,” delivered in Vienna in 1810 and published a year later. “Of course, 
in these lectures I mostly oriented myself towards my German audience. But 
I hope that this work will not be totally devoid of general interest for all 
enlightened peoples. I would be very happy if this attempt attracted the 
attention of such an enlightened expert of the sciences and history [as you 
are],” he wrote in an accompanying letter (ibid., 300). Here the German 
philosopher’s political philosophy was developed on the basis of extremely 
wide-ranging historical material. Uvarov also sent this book to Karamzin, 
presuming that the work of his German colleague would be useful for the 
historiographer, who was laboring at the time on his History of the Russian 
State. Karamzin was skeptical towards Schlegel’s work, however, seeing in his 
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nationalistic imaginings a pursuit “of the phantom of new ideas” and 
“historical mysticism” (Gillel’son 1969, 52). 
Uvarov, like Karamzin, was an educated conservative and at this time 
belonged to the same wing of Russian social thought. The enthusiasm that 
Schlegel’s “historical mysticism” inspired in him reflected an important genera-
tional break in the development of Russian conservatism. This break had 
incalculable influence on the formation of national consciousness, and, in the 
future, on the entire spirit of official Russian imperial ideology. As often 
happens, chance biographical factors here turned out to be inseparable from 
deep historical processes. The time in which Uvarov and Schlegel came together 
was a very unique period in Austrian history. The atmosphere of these months 
was greatly determined by the expectation of a military clash with Napoleon. 
The anti-Napoleonic coalition that had come together in Vienna at that time 
bizarrely united almost totally opposing forces: remnants of the French ancient 
régime, the aristocratic emigration, and young German nationalists. Uvarov 
himself later wrote about the fact that “this crusade united all of the indepen-
dent salons and all of the peoples that were not drawn into the orbit of the great 
captain,” and that these allies were not welded together “by any common creed 
apart from [the desire of] bringing down the imperial tyranny [of Napoleon]” 
(Uvarov 1848, 96–97). 
Due to his philosophical system, Schlegel was the natural leader of this 
strange alliance. He had been invited to Vienna by I.-F. Stadion, the head of the 
hawks at the Austrian court, to give a course of public lectures on history that 
was meant to help cultivate national self-consciousness on the part of the 
German public. These public lectures, which were the basis for the book he sent 
to Uvarov, did not take place in Vienna in 1809 due to the war; instead, they 
were delivered the year after the defeat. With the start of military action Schlegel 
received the position of court secretary and was attached to army headquarters. 
There, he published the newspaper “Ősterreichische Zeitung” and published 
proclamations in which he tried to convince the Germans that Austria was 
waging war on their behalf and that only thanks to Austria would Germany 
obtain independence and freedom (Langsam 1936, 40–64). 
At the heart of Schlegel’s political views of these years lay the conception 
of the nation as an integral personality, a unity based on blood relations and 
secured by common customs and language. In his Philosophical Lectures of 
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1804–1806, which presented the fullest and most detailed exposition of his 
system, he says:
The notion of the nation presumes that all of its members compose a single 
personality. For this to be possible, they must all have the same origin. The 
older, purer and less mixed with other races, the more a nation will have 
common customs. And the more of these common customs and the more 
attachment to them it manifests, the greater the degree to which a nation will 
be formed from this race. In this connection language has supreme impor-
tance because it serves as unconditional proof of common origins and binds 
the nation with the most vital and natural links. Together with the common-
ality of customs, language is the strongest and most reliable guarantee that 
the nation will live for many centuries in indissoluble unity. (Schlegel II, 
357–358)
Schlegel divided the ethnos (“race”) into a natural community and a “nation” 
that arises on the basis of an ethnos as a political formation. This collective 
personality should also develop into a state. Schlegel’s ideal of a national state 
was the medieval limited monarchy in which the unity of the national 
organism was guaranteed by its division into corporations. In the philoso-
pher’s opinion, the national rebirth and unification of Germany should occur 
around Austria, which had best preserved medieval state institutions: the 
ancient aristocracy, the dynasty of Hapsburgs, and the Catholic Church. In 
1803, at the dawn of his interest in national ideas, he complained in his 
Journey to France that the world capital of Catholicism was located in Italy and 
not in Germany. Now he was ready to reconcile himself to this insofar as he 
saw the Hapsburgs as the natural leaders of the Catholic world (ibid.; cf. 
Meineke 1970). These ideas obviously depend on Herder’s philosophy, on 
the one hand, and on Rousseau and the ideologists of the French Revolution, 
on the other. In distinction from Herder, Schlegel shifts the emphasis in the 
concept of the “nation” from cultural and religious factors to political ones. 
On the contrary, Schlegel also parted company from the French in that he saw 
the nation not as participants in a social contract, but as the product of organic 
development. Accordingly, he understood the state in natural-historical terms 
as the spontaneous expression of a people’s history. 
At this period Schlegel’s interpretation of the national state was quite 
unusual. In the Europe of the early nineteenth century, this idea was primarily 
associated with liberal thought and served as a fighting slogan for destroying or 
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reforming the dynastic limited monarchial regimes that predominated. 
Understanding the nation as the basis for the state system helped with the 
demand to end class distinctions, the formation of popular representative insti-
tutions, and so on. One of the most noted reformers of the time, the Prussian 
statesman H.-F. Stein, wrote at the end of 1812, “At this moment of great 
changes I do not care at all about any dynasty. My desire is that Germany 
become great and strong, and acquire its freedom, independence, and nation-
ality (Nationalität)” (Stein III, 818). 
This was also the time when Stein, with the help of the Russian court, was 
trying to unify all forces in Germany in order to promote a spirit of nationalism 
and anti-French attitudes among Germans. Uvarov also played a certain role in 
these plans. From his time in Vienna he had preserved profound support for a 
German national revival; Stein even found it necessary to give him lessons in 
Russian patriotism. In September 1812, almost immediately after the Battle of 
Borodino, Stein wrote with some surprise to his wife in Vienna from Peters-
burg, “Uvarov just returned to the city from his village near Moscow. As always, 
he is amicable, obliging, helpful, and very much sympathizes with Germany, 
but he doesn’t like it here and I try to reconcile him with his motherland insofar 
Figure 30 Portrait of Karl Freiherr vom Stein. Sketch by S. S. Uvarov.
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as, for the time being, he has to remain here and live among his countrymen, 
and insofar as he can be of use to his motherland with his knowledge and his 
most highly creditable way of thinking” (ibid., 751). 
These sentiments were not a momentary flirtation for Uvarov. In practi-
cally all of his letters to Stein from 1812–1814, one can trace his profound 
worry over Germany’s future and his hope that “the precious flower of nation-
ality (Nationalität) and freedom must rise up from within itself ” (OPI GIM, f. 
17, op. 1, № 86, prilozh. 1). At the end of 1813, after the Battle of Leipzig, 
Uvarov criticized the policy of the Austrian court and at the same time wrote to 
Stein, “The spectacle of Prussia may serve to console us for everything. This 
people should become the first in Europe. It is a complete and universal renais-
sance. I am convinced that it will produce results that are great in all respects. 
One can’t praise a people enough that awakens in this way” (ibid.). Against this 
background, Uvarov’s pessimism about contemporary Russian reality is espe-
cially striking: 
I will not hide from you that a trip abroad is my greatest wish, which I have 
cherished for a long period of time. Everything makes me prize this idea, not 
only those real torments connected with the work I am now occupied with; 
I find this work itself more and more thankless or, more accurately, more and 
more hopeless. … This is demeaning and almost useless labor. When I think 
about all of the failures in my life, the idea occurs to me that I will never put 
down roots here and will always remain an exotic plant; against my will I 
come to the thought that I should have been born your fellow countryman, or 
perhaps Your son—but this is a dream, I renounce it and want to renounce it. 
(Ibid., 12 verso, 18 verso)7
Quite an unusual psychological picture arises before us: a young Russian 
nobleman and bureaucrat of very high rank, a man of letters who speaks, thinks, 
and writes primarily in French, who, at the same time, considers himself a 
German nationalist. In Vienna Uvarov came into contact with the most popular 
and forward-looking ideology of his day and was completely captivated by it. 
Furthermore, having obtained it from German sources, he considers the only 
suitable place for its embodiment to be Germany for the foreseeable future. As 
7 Two of the surviving eight letters from Uvarov to Stein have been partially published in: 
Peretts III, 692, 697; Uvarov 1871a.
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appropriate for someone of his circle and upbringing, he was likely convinced 
that Russia was not ready for it, and even the “grand spectacle that the Russian 
nation demonstrated to the world and to posterity”—as Schlegel wrote to him 
in January, 1813, (OPI GIM, f. 17, op. 1, № 86, 301 verso)—could not persuade 
him otherwise. The combination of aristocratic and national spirit that Uvarov 
had assimilated from Schlegel made Germany seem far more natural a field for 
his ideas than his own native land.
Yet as an outsider to German nationalistic issues, Uvarov perceived quite 
dissimilar and in some cases even opposing phenomena as compatible. For 
him, ideas of “freedom of the press and trade, enlightenment in its true sense, a 
tolerant spirit of rule, the elimination of obsolete forms” as well as “hatred for 
despotism and a broadminded (liberal’nyi) taste for the Beautiful and True,” 
about which Uvarov wrote Stein (ibid., prilozh. 17 verso), easily got along with 
Schlegel’s imperial conception. He was so blind to the differences between the 
political programs, or, more broadly speaking, between the nationalisms of 
Schlegel and Stein, that he confidently recommended Schlegel to Stein as the 
leading organizer of the anti-Napoleonic front of German intellectuals who 
could “be of great service” organizing education in Prussia (ibid., prilozh. 2). 
Despite Uvarov’s expectation that Stein would like his plan, Stein was by no 
means enthralled by the proposal, and, it seems, did not even consider it neces-
sary to respond. 
Still, Schlegel and Stein’s political projects did have one common feature at 
this stage—neither led to any appreciable results. The campaign of 1809, in 
which Schlegel was the main ideologist, ended in failure. It was not able to 
convince public opinion in the German principalities that the Austrian Empire 
stood for pan-German interests, and no one followed Schlegel and Stadion 
except the rebellious Colonel Schiel. Neither did Stein’s intention to create a 
federation of German states under Prussia’s patronage come to pass after the 
Napoleonic wars. The allied rulers rejected the national principle of state 
building, casting its lot in favor of legitimism. Metternich, who took the reins of 
Austrian politics into his hands, and who had tremendous influence on European 
life, sharply rejected nationalist ideas, seeing them as a threat to the principles on 
which any empire was built. That Stein’s reforms provided the basis for Prussia’s 
rapid development as well as, ultimately, the nucleus for Germany’s unification, 
was something that, naturally, Uvarov could not have foreseen. 
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The further course of European history, the rebellions and other shocks 
of the late 1810s and 20s, and the interventions of the Holy Alliance all testi-
fied that the principles of legitimacy and nationalism were coming into ever 
greater conflict. These historical cataclysms are what Uvarov has in mind 
when he characterizes events since his retirement from the Ministry of 
Popular Enlightenment in 1821 as being “of huge importance” but as having 
“utterly ruinous influence on the development of enlightenment in our 
Fatherland … and even more so in all of the countries of Europe.” The revo-
lutions of 1830 decisively forced those loyal to the old order into a completely 
defensive position. In this situation such a committed supporter of historical 
compromise as Uvarov hardly had any other choice but to turn his gaze to 
Russia. In many respects Russia could seem an even more fitting place than 
Germany to realize a nationalist-imperial utopia. Indeed it had a unified state, 
and the center of the reigning religion was located within the empire, thus 
freeing a proponent of the idea of a national religion from the difficulties that 
Schlegel faced. True, the concept of nationality (“narodnost’”) still required 
definition and development, but it was this very circumstance that could be 
remedied with the help of a well-regulated system of education.
 4 
“Our common duty consists in accomplishing the people’s education in accord 
with the Supreme objective of the Most August Monarch, in the combined 
spirit of Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality,” Uvarov wrote in a circular that 
was distributed to school districts (okrugi) on March 21, 1833, in connection 
with his appointment as minister of popular education (Uvarov, “Tsirkuliarnoe” 
1834, il). Naturally, Orthodoxy headed the list. Thus in his memorandum to the 
emperor, Uvarov had begun his description of the triad with a discussion of its 
religious component:
Without a people’s religion, the people, like an individual person, are 
doomed to destruction; to deprive them of faith is to remove their heart, 
their blood, their insides; this means to put them on the lowest level of the 
physical and moral order, this means to betray them. Even national pride 
rebels against such an idea; a person who is devoted to the Fatherland will 
just as little agree with the loss of one tenet of the reigning church as he 
would to stealing one of the pearls from the crown of Monomakh. 
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This passage apparently seemed so successful to Uvarov that he included it 
almost without change in his report “On Some General Principles” (Uvarov 
1995, 71) a year and a half later and again eleven years later in his review of the 
ministry’s activities under his leadership (Uvarov 1864, 32). But even the stron-
gest expressions that the author used could not hide his obvious confessional 
indifference. Despite the rhetorical emphasis, Uvarov intentionally does not 
mention the divine nature of Orthodoxy; Orthodoxy is significant for him not 
for its truth but for its tradition. His characteristic comparison to the crown of 
Monomakh clearly suggests his—perhaps only half-conscious—desire to legiti-
mize the church through the symbolism of state power and national history. 
An examination of the French original reveals an even more expressive 
picture. Orthodoxy is not mentioned even once. French offered at least three 
usual ways to refer to Russia’s religion and church: “orthodoxie,” “église grecque,” 
and “chrétiennité orientale.” Uvarov, however, consistently uses the formulas 
“religion nationale” and “église dominante.” The phrase “religion nationale” is 
used in listing the elements of the triad itself.  Where “Orthodoxy” figures in 
the triad in the Russian version of the report “On Some General Principles,” the 
corresponding place in the French has “love for the Faith of our ancestors” 
(Uvarov 1995, 71). It seems clear that it is decidedly all the same to Uvarov 
what precise faith and which church is meant, as long as they are rooted in 
national history and the state’s political structure. Uvarov’s own personal religi-
osity also seems to have had certain provisions. M. D. Buturlin cited with 
indignation one of his French witticisms about the clergy that made the rounds 
of St. Petersburg: “That caste is just like a sheet of paper thrown on the ground—
however much it is trampled one is unable to crush it” (Buturlin 1901, 411; 
Buturlin cites it in Russian). We may surmise that Uvarov assigned Orthodoxy 
a functional role as a religious principle, insofar as it was subordinated to the 
state principle of Autocracy. However, Autocracy is treated in the memorandum 
to a great extent in a similar way. 
Back in 1814 in his brochure Alexander and Bonaparte, Uvarov had 
expressed the unfulfilled hope that on the ruins of Napoleon’s empire, kings 
and nations would perform “a mutual sacrifice of autocracy and popular 
anarchy” (Uvarov 1814, 14). In an 1818 speech at the Petersburg Pedagogical 
Institute’s gala meeting—which had no small public resonance—he sympa-
thetically referred to Thomas Erskin, who called political freedom “God’s 
346 By Fables Alone
ultimate and most beautiful gift” (Uvarov 1818, 41; cf. Pugachev 1967, 43–44). 
Of course, these hopes relate to the period of Uvarov’s liberalism. The petulant 
N. I. Grech even wrote that for his speech in the Pedagogical Institute, Uvarov 
“would later have had himself imprisoned in the fortress” (Grech 1903, 365). 
But even in the 1830s, already under the new emperor, Uvarov’s apologia for 
autocracy suggests a characteristic uncertainty:
The strength of autocratic power represents the necessary condition for the 
existence of the Empire in its current form. Let political dreamers (I will not 
speak of sworn enemies of this order) who are off their heads due to false 
notions, who think up schemes about how things should be in the ideal, be 
shocked by appearances, enflamed by theories, animated by words; we can 
answer them that they do not know the country and are mistaken about its 
position, its needs, its desires. … If it accepted the chimaera of limited 
monarchy, equal rights for all estates, national representation in the European 
manner, and a pseudo-constitutional form of rule, the colossus would not 
last two weeks, and what’s more, it would collapse even before these false 
transformations would be completed. (cf. Uvarov 1995; Uvarov 1864, 33)
In this letter Uvarov did not simply address an absolute ruler. He wrote to a 
monarch who deeply believed in his divine anointment. But still Uvarov said 
not a word about the providential nature of Russian autocracy or about its 
absolute merits. Autocracy was merely “the necessary condition for the exis-
tence of the Empire,” and what is more, “in its current form”—at least not 
excluding the suggestion that sometime in the future an autocratic monarch 
would no longer be needed in Russia. Imperial power is legitimized here not by 
divine sanction but by the “conditions,” “needs” and “desires” of the country; 
that is, it represents primarily “Russian power,” just as Orthodoxy is interpreted 
primarily as Russia’s faith. Thus the two first members of the triad appear as 
kinds of attributes of national existence and national history, and thus are 
rooted in the third member—the notorious concept of “Nationality” (narod-
nost’—on the early history of the concept see Azadovskii I, 190–200; Lotman 
and Uspenskii 1996, 506–508, 555–556).8 
8 Translator’s Note: The precise meaning of the Russian the word “narodnost’,” from narod, 
people or nation, was hotly debated by Russian intellectuals during the nineteenth century, 
and this and the adjectival form narodnyi may be translated, depending on the context, as 
referring to “the people,” “the folk,” “the nation,” or as “popular.” There also are many places, 
however, where more than one of these meanings might be applicable. 
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If, according to Uvarov, autocracy was a “conservative principle,” 
nationality presumes neither “movement backward” nor “immobility”; “the state 
organization must and should develop like the human body,” and it is precisely 
this principle of nationality that guarantees the continuity of this development, 
at the same time allowing it to preserve the “main elements” that are inherent to 
the national personality. The responsibility for supporting and spreading this 
principle lies with the government and “in particular” on the system of popular 
education that it creates. Uvarov had already been casting about for such an 
evolutionary metaphor in his speech of 1818: “In this case the theory of 
government resembles the theory of education. That which can perpetuate 
physical or moral infancy is not worthy of praise; that government is most wise 
that can facilitate transitions from one age to another and, while submitting to 
the law of necessity, grows and matures together with the people or with the 
individual” (Uvarov 1818, 52). Now Uvarov tried to fill this scheme with 
concrete content. In the more or less distant future the development of Russian 
nationality would unavoidably have to create the necessary state institutions. 
Therefore the corresponding governing bodies—first and foremost, the 
ministry of popular enlightenment, under the watchful eye of its newly-ap-
pointed leader—had to establish control over the direction of this evolution. 
Uvarov fully understood the complexities connected with introducing such a 
contemporary and two-edged category as nationality as the basis for the 
empire’s state ideology. As an observer of the national revolutions in Europe, he 
recognized that historically the principles of autocracy and nationalism could 
clash; however, he presumed that “whatever these quarrels (altercations) might 
be that had to be overcome, they lived a common life and could enter into alli-
ance and conquer together.” And in his memorandum he undertook to sketch 
out a strategy for this future victory in Russia. 
 5 
In creating his tripartite formula, Uvarov could not help recalling F. Schlegel’s 
well-known patriotic triad—common descent (“race”), customs, and language—
as well as that of Shishkov—faith, education, and language. Both of these 
constructions had been created at about the same time, on the basis of the same 
Rousseauian—Herderian tradition, and in comparable circumstances; both 
Schlegel and Shishkov stood on the threshold of a decisive military clash of 
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their peoples and empires with Napoleonic France and were trying to promote 
a nationalist version of traditional values. The disagreement between the two 
authors on the first plank of their triads was mostly due to specific political 
circumstances. A strong emphasis on faith was just as unacceptable in Germany, 
which was divided into Catholic and Protestant regions, as the demand for 
common descent would have been in the Russian Empire. From time to time 
nationalistically-oriented thinkers might dream of converting national and reli-
gious minorities to Orthodoxy, but they could not expect them to blend into 
one “race” with the Slavic majority. The second elements in both formulas were 
considerably closer to one another. “Customs” and “education” are closely 
related notions, especially if one agrees with Rousseau’s conception of national 
upbringing that consists in cultivating folk traditions. Still, the difference 
between the German and Russian thinkers’ approach is obvious. Shishkov, who 
was in many ways a man of the eighteenth century, believed in the limitless 
power of education and that it could transform individuals into members of the 
national body, or, on the contrary, cast them out. In contrast, the Romantic 
Schlegel trusted in the completely supra-personal and unconscious mechanism 
of tradition. However, the main difference between the two triads was in the 
subject being defined. While Schlegel was listing elements that ensured unity of 
the German nation, Shishkov was talking about the forces that could make 
inhabitants of his country feel themselves part of the state organism. Shishkov’s 
mission was to indicate the natural sources of patriotic feeling. For this reason 
his speech in the “Colloquy,” in which he laid out his understanding of the basic 
pillars of national existence, was entitled “Treatise on Love for the Fatherland.”
Schlegel’s understanding of the nation as the basis for an ideal empire was 
unacceptable for Shishkov not only because of national and confessional prob-
lems.9 The category of nationality in its Romantic recension could not even be 
applied to the properly Great Russian part of the population. The social and 
cultural division that separated the highest and lowest estates in the first half of 
the nineteenth century was insuperable. To find any common customs, say, 
among the Russian nobility and peasantry, was truly impossible. The issue was 
no more encouraging as concerned language; suffice it to say that the very 
9 On the policies that Uvarov proposed implementing that concerned non-Slavic and 
Orthodox ethnic and religious groups, see Uvarov 1864, 35–70; cf. Whittaker 1999, 
215–240.
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document that declared nationality the foundation of Russian statehood was 
written in French. As for ancestry, the great majority of ancient Russian aristo-
crats traced their genealogy back to Germanic, Lithuanian, and Tatar stock. 
There was nothing at all unusual in this; in traditional societies the elite often 
insisted on their foreign extraction in order to justify a way of life that differed 
from that of the rest of society. Thus in France, for example, the ideologist of 
noble privilege A. de Boulainville insisted on the German pedigree of the 
French aristocracy, so that his radical opponent from the third estate, the Abbé 
Sieyès, could propose that all aristocrats take themselves off to the Teutonic 
forests (Greenfeld 1992, 170–172). 
Nevertheless, almost everywhere ideas of national unity were directed at 
breaking down the class divisions that threatened the national organism’s integ-
rity. In the final analysis, the issue had to do with transforming traditional 
Figure 31 Monument to  
Ivan Susanin by V. I. Demut- 
Malinovskii (1838). Drawing  
by V. M. Vasnetsov.
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imperial structures into institutions of the national state. It is precisely in this 
sense that nationality was understood in Decembrist and quasi-Decembrist 
circles in the later 1810s and early 1820s; the same applies to the Slavophiles in 
the 1830s-1850s, right up until the era of the Great Reforms (see Syroechkovskii 
1954; Tsimbaev 1986; Egorov 1991). Uvarov advocated the same slogan in 
order to preserve the existing order of things indefinitely. This kind of change in 
mission demanded a profound rethinking of the very category of nationality, 
and in his memorandum such a reconsideration was realized with exceptional 
inventiveness and even a distinctive elegance. Unable to base his understanding 
of nationality on objective factors, Uvarov decisively shifts his focus onto 
subjective ones. His argumentation belongs completely to the sphere of histor-
ical emotions and national psychology. Russia “still retains religious convictions, 
political convictions, moral convictions in her breast [which constitute] the 
single pledge of her happiness, the remnants of her nationality, the precious and 
final guarantees of its political future.” In the words of the author of the memo-
randum, “several years of special studies” (it is hard to say from the known facts 
of Uvarov’s biography what exactly these were) allowed him to “assert that the 
three great linchpins of religion, autocracy, and nationality constitute the 
cherished legacy of our fatherland.” Thus the basis for nationality turns out to 
be convictions. Simply put, a Russian is someone who believes in his church 
and his sovereign. 
Having defined Orthodoxy and autocracy in terms of nationality, Uvarov 
now defines nationality in terms of Orthodoxy and autocracy. In formal logic 
this kind of maneuver is called a vicious circle, but ideology is built on qualita-
tively different laws, and this risky rhetorical pirouette turns out to be the 
weight-bearing element of the entire new official construction. This line of 
reasoning had serious long-term consequences for Russian state ideology. If 
only those Russians who profess “the national religion” may be members of the 
reigning church, then Old Believers and sectarians among the lower levels of 
society are excluded as well as converted Catholics, deists, and skeptics in the 
higher ones. In exactly the same way, if nationality necessarily presumes accep-
tance of autocracy, any constitutionalist or republican automatically forgoes 
the right to be a Russian. This approach is uncannily similar to the model of the 
“Soviet person” developed by the communist regime, as someone to whom a 
strictly prearranged set of views and convictions is ascribed. A “non-Soviet 
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person” in this ideological system cannot be considered part of “the people” 
and is declared to be a “renegade” (otshchepenets). In the early nineteenth 
century the term used for this phenomenon was “izverg” (monster or outcast).
This parallel forces us to look again at Shishkov’s conception of the people’s 
body. Long before Uvarov, Shishkov had been interested not so much in the 
objective criteria of a nation’s unity as in the ideological instruments capable of 
unifying that people in a general burst of enthusiasm that would transcend class 
and other barriers. To many contemporaries of Uvarov and Shishkov, as to 
subsequent researchers, it has seemed that their ideological constructions had a 
direct link. For example, D. N. Sverbeev (1871, 178), wrote that
Shishkov did not define for himself the three main ideas of his whole life, 
even less put them into words, but he, nevertheless, so to speak uncon-
sciously, was first to embody in himself the three-part Russian creed 
“Orthodoxy—Autocracy—Nationality,” which then became both the 
program for Emperor Nicholas I’ reign and Count Uvarov’s motto, and, 
finally, the banner of the late Slavophiles.
However, beyond the external resemblance, the two ideological systems hide 
much more profound differences. Shishkov and his like-minded colleagues 
were promoting a program for national mobilization. Designed for a period of 
military action, it did not propose anything for peacetime except maintaining 
the regime of mobilization with all of its excesses indefinitely. The issue 
concerned the total isolation of Russia, a “wall” that had to be erected between 
piety and depravity and a struggle against hostile influences and all those who 
would give in to it and cease being part of the people’s body. As noted, it was no 
accident that with the end of the war, both Shishkov and Rostopchin were 
removed from their posts. 
In contrast, Uvarov was active not in the pre-war but in the post-war 
situation, and he needed to craft an ideological strategy for peaceful evolu-
tionary development. At the same time, he by no means strove to unconditionally 
isolate Russia from the West. Uvarov scrutinized and reinterpreted Guizot’s 
parliamentary speech so passionately and subjectively precisely because it 
would help him tackle his main task. The issue was to create an ideological 
system that would preserve the possibility of Russia belonging to European 
civilization, outside of which Uvarov neither conceived of himself nor of his 
work as minister of popular enlightenment. At the same time, such a system 
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would protect the country from that civilization by means of an impermeable 
barrier. In Uvarov’s formulation the dilemma consisted of “how to march in 
step with Europe and not move away from our own place,… what art we must 
master in order to take from enlightenment only what is necessary for a great 
empire and to firmly reject that which contains the seeds of disorder and 
shocks?” For many decades the Russian authorities would ask themselves how 
to appropriate the achievements of Western civilization and not the system of 
social values that had given rise to them. 
Uvarov was also completely lacking in Shishkov’s missionary zeal. He by 
no means desired a fundamental break with the upper classes’ education and 
lifestyle, including the use of the French language that had so infuriated 
Shishkov. He simply desired the establishment of Orthodoxy and autocracy as 
objects of obligatory veneration for all subjects of the Russian Empire. As M. 
M. Shevchenko justly remarked, in his formula “Uvarov essentially paraphrased 
the ancient military motto ‘For Faith, Tsar and Fatherland!’” (Shevchenko 
1997, 105). However, the very nature of the paraphrase reveals the kernel of 
Uvarov’s approach. The concrete, emotionally palpable patriotic symbols for 
which a soldier must go into battle are here replaced with the historical institu-
tions of national existence and abstract principles. The task of the entire system 
of popular education became the clarification and affirmation of these princi-
ples and these institutions, as Uvarov wrote, “not in the form of panegyric 
speeches to the government, which it does not need, but as the conclusions of 
reason, as incontestable fact, as political dogma that guarantees the tranquility 
of the state and which is the birthright of one and all.” Thus the ideological 
guarantee of state politics was translated from a “hot” register into a “cold” one, 
transforming mobilizational slogans into a program of routine bureaucratic and 
educational work. The memorandum also interpreted the sources of danger 
that were menacing the empire as well as the measures proposed to eliminate 
them in an analogous way.
 6 
Uvarov began his letter to the emperor with recollections of his previous career 
in the Ministry of Popular Education. In 1811, thanks to his marriage to the 
daughter of the then minister, Count A. K. Razumovskii, he received the bril-
liant appointment (for a twenty-five-year-old) to the post of administrator of 
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the St. Petersburg educational district. In this position he showed himself to be 
energetic and able (see Whittaker 1999; cf. Shpet 1989), about which Nicholas 
I was naturally well-informed. The emperor also knew about the reasons for 
Uvarov’s departure in 1821 that provided the basis for somewhat paradoxical 
parallels with the circumstances of his new appointment. 
Uvarov was to begin his new responsibilities by making an inspection of 
Moscow University. The review of this institution of higher learning that had 
given serious grounds for suspicion—there had recently been arrests from 
among the students—clearly suggested a forthcoming change of government 
course (see Herzen VIII, 135–148). In recent history this situation had a 
well-examined precedent. In 1819 the task of carrying out an inspection of 
Kazan University had been entrusted to M. L. Magnitskii. The result was not 
only the decimation of the university but the start of repressions throughout 
Russia’s educational system, which did not spare Uvarov’s beloved St. Peters-
burg University. On the initiative of Magnitskii’s henchman, D. P. Runich, its 
leading professors were ousted—K. I. Arsen’ev, A. I. Galich, and E. Raupakh. 
Uvarov unsuccessfully tried to oppose these persecutions and was forced to 
retire (see Sukhomlinov II, 382–386; Whittaker 1999, 88–99), although several 
of the fired professors were quickly accepted into military educational institu-
tions under the administration of Grand Prince Nikolai Pavlovich. The future 
emperor did not conceal his dislike for Magnitskii and Runich, to whom he 
once ironically asked to accept his gratitude for their concern with the cadres of 
the Engineering School (Grech 1930, 381; sf. Shil’der 1903 II, 60–62). As N. I. 
Grech wrote, banishing Magnitskii from Petersburg was “the single matter that 
Nikolai Pavlovich permitted himself [to get involved with] before he ascended 
to the throne” (Grech 1930, 383–384). 
In 1831, a year before Uvarov’s memorandum, Magnitskii tried to escape 
his political disfavor. Together with the well-known mystic of the Alexandrine 
era, Andrei Golitsyn, he submitted two closely connected denunciations to 
Nicholas I that allegedly exposed a global conspiracy of the Illuminati. In their 
opinion, this conspiracy was coordinated from abroad and had sunk deep roots 
in Russia (see Shil’der 1898/1899; for more detail, see Gordin 1999). They 
declared Speranskii—once a patron and friend of Magnitskii, who had at that 
time been leading the effort to compile a law code for the Russian Empire—the 
inspiration for and organizer of the Illuminati’s activity in Russia. The 
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immediate cause for the denunciations was probably the newly-minted 
proposals of the commission of December 6 (see Gordin 1999, 252–255). 
However, Golitsyn and Magnitskii wrote about affairs of twenty years prior. 
Apparently the two disgraced bureaucrats wanted to attract attention to them-
selves by demonstrating that they were conversant with past events. In one 
denunciation it said that Speranskii “was accepted to a high rank of Illuminism” 
during the Erfurt Congress and that “Weishaupt was ordered by Napoleon to 
pay attention to state secretary Speranskii” (Shil’der 1898/1899, № 12, 524, 
534). In 1831, after the Polish uprising that echoed the July Revolution in 
France, the Polish question again became topical. In Magnitskii’s words, “the 
hurried and unripe Polish revolt at the very beginning of a great rebellion that 
apparently was supposed to embrace Europe again is a clear sign” of the activity 
“of the all-destructive union of the Illuminati” (ibid., № 1, 87). However, here 
too the informers’ argument was based on peripeties of a bygone era. 
Magnitskii asserted that among Speranskii’s papers were “especially 
important constitutional projects for Russia and especially one, written in 
Czartoryski’s hand, as well as an introduction to the extensive and grand work 
that Speranskii wrote while returning from Erfurt where he had been with the 
sovereign and from where, it seems, he came back with various foreign impres-
sions” (ibid., № 1, 82). The connections between the Illuminati and the Poles 
were proved by the fact that “their first action” in 1794 was the liberation of 
Tadeusz Kościuszko, who led the uprising against Russia. Moreover, their 
weapon within Russia already in the nineteenth century was the lodge of the 
Polish aristocrat Tadeusz Grabianka. The lodge counted members such as 
Speranskii and F. P. Lubianovskii and influenced the emperor through his 
favorite M. A. Naryshkina, who was Polish by birth (ibid., № 2, 292–293, 298). 
Magnitskii and Golitsyn calculated that the emperor, whose reign had begun 
with the revolt on Senate Square and who five years later faced revolutions in 
France and Belgium, the Polish uprising, and student conspiracies, could hardly 
remain deaf to this sort of warning. They therefore revived the old construc-
tions of Abbé Barruel that had been so effective in 1812 for denouncing 
Speranskii, and again in 1824 when Fotii was able to unseat Aleksandr Golitsyn. 
Curiously, Magnitskii, who had been sent into exile on account of the first 
intrigue was, like Andrei Golitsyn, an active participant in the second one. 
Neither Nicholas I nor Uvarov was immune to ideas about a multi-pronged 
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conspiracy coordinated from abroad. However, the mythology of an eschato-
logical clash between good and evil, so natural in the overwrought atmosphere 
of Alexandrine mysticism, did not arouse anything in either man except irrita-
tion and repulsion. In Uvarov’s memorandum the carriers of the revolutionary 
spirit were not the prevailing servants of “Satan’s synagogue” but “minds 
dimmed by false ideas and prejudices worthy of pity.” Uvarov clearly distin-
guished between “the sworn enemies of the empire,” with whom one could 
only handle with repressive measures, and “political dreamers” who were 
“confused by false notions” and whom the authorities could still return to the 
lap of national life. 
Uvarov’s triad was designed to perform this task, as it represented, in B. A. 
Uspenskii’s persuasive hypothesis, a polemical reversal of the most famous 
tripartite political formula, the French Revolutionary slogan “Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity” (Uspenskii 1999). If in Barruel’s scheme “Liberty” corresponded to 
the conspiracy by “sophists of atheism,” for Uvarov “Orthodoxy” was called on 
to oppose it. The answer to the conspiracy on the part of “sophists of rebellion” 
that preached “Equality” became “Autocracy.” Against the conspiracy of “the 
sophists of anarchy” that challenged the foundations of society and patriotic 
feeling, “Nationality” was put forward as a replacement for “Fraternity,” which 
was equally objectionable for a Russian monarchist due to its cosmopolitan and 
Masonic implications (see Ozouff 1988). 
After a short investigation that established the complete falsity of their 
accusations (see Gordon 1999), both Golitsyn and Magnitskii were sent into 
exile. Uvarov was left to decide how to battle freethinking and the revolutionary 
threat. In the start of 1832 he found himself in the situation that Magnitskii had 
been in thirty years earlier—he was expected to come up with a complex of 
measures that would eliminate the rabble-rousing that had infiltrated higher 
education. However, the role of fanatical obscurantist did not at all appeal to 
him; thus, he needed to be assured once again that the emperor did not expect 
anything of this kind from him and had not chosen him to carry out a pogrom 
in Russia’s oldest university in the fashion of his unfortunate predecessor. “It is 
precisely in the sphere of popular education that we need first of all to revive 
faith in monarchist and national principles, and to restore it without shocks, 
without haste, without violence. Enough ruins surround us—[we are] able to 
destroy, but what have we built”? he wrote to Nicholas I in his memorandum. 
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“Ruins” was not merely a metaphor here; Magnitskii had proposed that they 
not limit the punishment of Kazan University to a purge but give it over for 
“public destruction” (Zagoskin II, 309). 
In the report on his inspection, Uvarov recommended that they fight 
“against the influence of so-called European ideas” not by the use of repression 
but by instilling young people “with a penchant for other concepts, other 
occupations and principles, increasing where we can the number of intellec-
tual levees” that could direct the energy of the young generation’s minds into 
a channel the government needed (Uvarov 1875, 517). In the late 1810s 
Uvarov proposed that the study of the East could save Russia from the 
“European infection.” Now he had in mind constructing “intellectual levees” 
(umstvennye plotiny) capable of changing the natural flow of ideas, “incul-
cating into young people the desire to become better acquainted with the 
fatherland’s history, paying greater attention to our nationality in all of its 
diverse manifestations.” “It is unquestionable,” he continued, “that this kind 
of affinity for works that are continuing, substantial, inoffensive, will serve as 
a kind of support against the influence of so-called European ideas” (ibid.). 
Encouraging study and research in the field of Russian history was basically 
the only positive proposal that Uvarov was able to put forward. The past was 
ordained to replace the empire’s perilous and uncertain future, and Russian 
history, with its deeply rooted institutions of Orthodoxy and autocracy, was 
to become the single repository of nationality and the ultimate alternative to 
Europeanization. 
 7 
In suggesting that loyalty to the church and to the throne were the main features 
of Russian nationality, Uvarov was forced to presume that these feelings unite 
“the incalculable majority” of his countrymen (Uvarov 1995, 71), at the same 
time as 
the senseless passion for innovations without restraint or reasonable plan, 
[and leading] to unexpected destructive consequences, characterizes an 
extremely insignificant circle of people in Russia and serves as the credo for 
a school that is so weak that it not only cannot increase the number of its 
adherents but loses several of them daily. One may assert there is no doctrine 
less popular in Russia, because there is no system that would offend so many 
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ideas, be hostile to so many interests, be so fruitless and surrounded by 
mistrust to any greater extent. 
In such a situation and social dynamic it would seem that the government had 
nothing to worry about. Nonetheless Uvarov prepared for a difficult struggle, 
the prospectives for which he was by no means inclined to be optimistic. 
Despite what he said, literally two paragraphs previously, among the factors that 
threatened the final victory of his mission was “the universal state of people’s 
minds, and, in particular, that of the generation that is graduating today from 
our bad schools and for whose moral neglect we, perhaps, should reproach 
ourselves, a lost generation, if not an antagonistic one, a generation of ignoble 
beliefs, bereft of enlightenment, grown old before it had a chance to enter life, 
withered away by ignorance and fashionable sophisms, whose future will bring 
no benefit to the Fatherland.” 
Defeatist notes resound in Uvarov’s letter. His mission as he himself 
conceived it was, on the one hand, rooted in the nature of national existence, 
and on the other—infinitely lonely and Sisiphean. Uvarov wrote that he would 
defend the “breach” which the emperor had commanded him to fill “until the 
last,” but expressed misgivings that he would be “overcome by the force of 
circumstances.” An influential statesman summoned to formulate and imple-
ment a new system of state consciousness, he felt himself, as before, an “exotic 
flower” unable to put down roots in his native soil, as he had characterized 
himself eighteen years earlier in the letter to Stein. This situation seems quite 
paradoxical. Given the Russians’ love for the native principles of national life 
that Uvarov postulated, where could that generation—whose disposition was 
described in terms that today almost seem like quotations from Lermontov’s 
poem “Thought” (Duma), written six years later—have come from, and why 
did the task of raising future generations in the spirit of Russian nationality 
seem so dangerous and unattainable to the future minister? 
Of course, a significant measure of the responsibility for such a situation 
predates Uvarov. Rather, it lies with the state’s ideological apparatus, whose 
permissiveness and lack of well-considered policy had allowed the evil to pene-
trate so deeply. Yet the main reason for the spread of anti-national tendencies 
lies elsewhere. The very metaphor of “intellectual levees” suggests that Uvarov 
was trying to partition off a current of thought that he himself felt was natural. 
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In his opinion, Russia had for the moment “avoided the humiliation” like that 
which Europe suffered after the July Revolution. But the very phrase “has not 
arrived at that point of disgrace” (n’a pas arrive à ce point de degradation) indi-
cates that he clearly discerned an analogous evolution for Russia. Also very 
pessimistic were Uvarov’s sense of the fragility of the Russian government’s 
mode of being and his above-cited assertion that if reforms began, the empire 
would not be able to last even two weeks (cf. Shevchenko 1997, 105). Appar-
ently, while Uvarov saw the European path of development as ruinous for 
Russia, he simply could not envisage any alternative. 
As one of the most authoritative scholars of nationalism, Benedict 
Anderson, has written, in Russia, “‘official nationalism’—[the] willed merger of 
nation and dynastic empire—… developed after, and in reaction to, the popular 
national movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s. … It was only that 
a certain inventive legerdemain was required to permit the empire to appear 
attractive in national drag” (Anderson 1994, 68–87). Consequently, in histor-
ical practice the experience of Western nation-states inevitably served as the 
measure for any realization of this very “nationalism.” The intellectual drama of 
Russian state nationalism consisted in the following: the key notion of 
“nationality” or “nationalism” (nationalité, Volkstum) had been developed by 
Western European social thinkers to legitimize the new social order that was 
replacing the traditional confessional and dynastic principles of the state 
system; but Uvarov’s triad declared that precisely those institutions that nation-
alism had been summoned to destroy were the cornerstones of Russian 
nationality—the reigning church and imperial absolutism. In fulfilling the 
Russian monarchy’s political mandates, Uvarov attempted to unite the contra-
dictory demands of the time and to preserve the existing order, but his European 
education proved stronger than the traditionalism he had adopted. Nationalism 
thus predominated over both Orthodoxy and autocracy, turning them into 
ethnographically ornamental components of national history. 
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